27 ideas
| 6319 | Wise people choose inaction and silence [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The sage keeps to the deed that consists in taking no action and practises the teaching that uses no words. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.II.6) | |
| A reaction: Notice that this is an active 'deed', and a positive 'practice'. He is not just recommending indifference and lethargy. Personally I don't find the advice very appealing, but it might be good if you live in 'interesting times'. |
| 6325 | One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVI.128) | |
| A reaction: A famous remark, which my western mind finds simply perplexing. It strikes me as wicked selfishness to keep your wisdom to yourself, and not try to persuade others to follow it. We are all in this together, I say. |
| 6321 | Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XX.47) | |
| A reaction: Personally I think all human beings are deeply perplexed when they actually address their situation, but most people never spend more than a few minutes a year worrying about it. |
| 21554 | Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey] |
| Full Idea: Cantor proved that the number of sets in a collection of terms is larger than the number of terms. Hence Cantor's Paradox says the number of sets in the collection of all sets must be larger than the number of sets in the collection of all sets. | |
| From: Douglas Lackey (Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' [1973], p.127) | |
| A reaction: The sets must count as terms in the next iteration, but that is a normal application of the Power Set axiom. |
| 21553 | It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey] |
| Full Idea: The ordinal series is well-ordered and thus has an ordinal number, and a series of ordinals to a given ordinal exceeds that ordinal by 1. So the series of all ordinals has an ordinal number that exceeds its own ordinal number by 1. | |
| From: Douglas Lackey (Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' [1973], p.127) | |
| A reaction: Formulated by Burali-Forti in 1897. |
| 8439 | Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps it is impossible that an event should have had a causal history different from the one that it actually had. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.220) | |
| A reaction: [He cites van Inwagen for this] The idea is analagous to baptismal accounts of reference. Individuate an event by its history. It might depend (as Davidson implies) on how you describe the event. |
| 8440 | Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: It has been argued that an event's time of occurrence is essential to it. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.221) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Lawrence Lombard] This sound initially implausible, particularly if a rival event happened, say, .1 of a second later than the actual event. It might depend on one's view about determinism. Interesting. |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1 | |
| A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right. |
| 6328 | To know yet to think that one does not know is best [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: To know yet to think that one does not know is best. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXI.173) | |
| A reaction: Tricky. Self-deception doesn't sound like a virtue to me. There are epistemic virtues, and caution about one's own knowledge has to be one of them, but a totally false assessment sounds counter-productive. |
| 6323 | Pursuit of learning increases activity; the Way decreases it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: In the pursuit of learning one knows more every day; in the pursuit of the Way one does less every day. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVII.108) | |
| A reaction: Everything in my culture has raised the status of the pursuit of learning, so that I can hardly comprehend what is proposed by the Way. I don't believe that the Way can be achieved without great learning, but one might move beyond learning. |
| 6331 | Truth is not beautiful; beautiful speech is not truthful [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Truthful words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not truthful. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXXI.194) | |
| A reaction: A sharp disagreement with Keats ('Ode to a Grecian Urn'). A deep and important question, especially in relation to Plato's discussion of rhetoric (where he is very ambivalent). Great mathematics is beautiful. Truth can harsh. On the whole, I disagree. |
| 6330 | One with no use for life is wiser than one who values it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: It is just because one has no use for life that one is wiser than the man who values life. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181a) | |
| A reaction: To have no use for life certainly seems to put a person into a position of superiority, especially when the 'Titanic' is sinking. However, if our lives have no value, I don't know what does. A balance must clearly be struck. |
| 6327 | Do good to him who has done you an injury [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Do good to him who has done you an injury. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXIII.148) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 6288 (Jesus). People like this really mess up the social contract theory of morality. If they are going to return good for your evil, there doesn't seem much point in helping them, given how much effort is involved. Most peculiar… |
| 23402 | The highest virtue is achieved without effort [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Those of highest virtue do not strive for virtue, and so they have it. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 38), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.2 | |
| A reaction: Every moralist's dream is the person to whom virtue comes so naturally that no thought is required. This says they don't even notice it; Aristotle says they simply enjoying behaving virtuously. |
| 6324 | To gain in goodness, treat as good those who are good, and those who are not [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Those who are good I treat as good; those who are not good I also treat as good; in doing so I gain in goodness. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLIX.111) | |
| A reaction: Socrates (idea 346) and Jesus (Idea 6288) had similar ideas. Who, though, is going to administer justice, and where is the idea that people 'deserve' good or ill treatment? Schoolteachers should treat all children as if they were good. |
| 6322 | There is no crime greater than having too many desires [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: There is no crime greater than having too many desires. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVI.104) | |
| A reaction: It seems harsh to call this a 'crime', given that no one is likely to choose to have 'too many' desires. The crime is in deciding to stimulate desire to excess, or deciding to show no sensible restraint. |
| 6320 | The best rulers are invisible, the next admired, the next feared, and the worst are exploited [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subjects; next comes the ruler they love and praise; next comes one they fear; next comes one with whom they take liberties. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XVII.39) | |
| A reaction: This fits our understanding of football referees to perfection. It might apply to anyone doing a vital adminstrative job, such as compiling a school timetable. It is hard, though, to accept anonymity as a mark of success. |
| 6329 | People are hard to govern because authorities love to do things [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: It is because those in authority are too fond of action that the people are difficult to govern. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181) | |
| A reaction: I love this. It should be on the wall of every human institution in our civilization. How the heart sinks at the prospect of a 'new initiative'. Not that I am against action; it is just important to recognise that inaction is sometimes the best option. |
| 6326 | The better known the law, the more criminals there are [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The better known the laws and edicts, the more thieves and robbers there are. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVII.132) | |
| A reaction: Nice. I link this with my favourite moral maxim from Democritus (Idea 519). The idea is that continual emphasis on what you should not do fills the mind with evil possibilities. Moral perfection must start by taking goodness for granted. |
| 23401 | A military victory is not a thing of beauty [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: A military victory is not a thing of beauty. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.1 | |
| A reaction: Should be written on the wall of every military academy and barracks. |
| 8436 | Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: We must choose between subsumption and counterfactual analyses of causal statements. The former means that cause and effect have some properties that enables them to be subsumed under a conditional. The latter is just 'if no-c then no-e'. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.217) | |
| A reaction: I have an immediate preference for the former account, which seems to potentially connect it with physics and features of the world which make one thing lead to another. The counterfactual account seems very thin, and is more like mere semantics. |
| 8441 | Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Although you cannot cause a fire by delaying something's burning, you can cause a fire by hastening something's burning. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.223) | |
| A reaction: A very nice observation which brings out all sorts of problems about identifying causes. Bennett is criticising the counterfactual account. It is part of the problem of pre-emption, where causes are queueing up to produce a given effect. |
| 8435 | Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Theories of causation are split between event and fact/state of affairs theories. The first have the form 'the explosion caused the fire' (perfect nominals) and the second have the form 'the fire started because a bomb dropped' (sentential clauses). | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987]) | |
| A reaction: Surely events must have priority? The form which uses facts is drifting off into explanation, and is much more likely to involve subjective human elements and interpretations. Events are closer to the physics, and the mechanics of what happens. |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1 | |
| A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out). |
| 8437 | The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: The refinement of a simple counterfactual analysis is to say that cause and effect depend on a series of events. This must be asserted because counterfactual conditionals are well known not to be transitive. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987]) | |
| A reaction: This fills out the theory, but offers another target for critics. If the glue that binds the series is not in the counterfactuals, is it just in the mind of the speaker? How do you decide what's in the series? Cf. deciding offside in football (soccer!). |
| 8438 | A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Any counterfactual about a particular event implies or presupposes something about the event's essence. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.219) | |
| A reaction: This is where the counterfactual theory suddenly becomes more interesting, instead of just being a rather bare account of the logical structure of causation. (Bennett offers some discussion of possible essential implications). |
| 8592 | Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: Because of the multidimensionality of space and unidimensionality of time, empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not. | |
| From: report of Jonathan Bennett (Kant's Analytic [1966], p.175) by Sydney Shoemaker - Time Without Change p.49 n4 | |
| A reaction: An interesting observation, which could have been used by Samuel Clarke in his attempts to prove absolute space to Leibniz. The point does not prove absolute space, of course, but it seems to make a difference. |