17292
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Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P]
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Full Idea:
We should not use 'in virtue of' where it might express a reflexive relation, such as identity. Since grounding is a relation of determination, and closely linked to the concept of explanation, it is irreflexive and asymmetric.
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From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2)
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A reaction:
E.g. he says someone isn't a bachelor in virtue of being an unmarried man, since a bachelor just is an unmarried man. I can't disagree. 'Determination' looks like the magic word, even if we don't know how it cashes out.
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17302
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Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P]
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Full Idea:
The logical principles about grounding include irreflexivity, asymmetry, transitivity, non-monotonicity, and so forth.
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From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.8)
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A reaction:
[It can't ground itself, there is no mutual grounding, grounds of grounds ground, and grounding judgements are not fixed]
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17294
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Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P]
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Full Idea:
On my view, grounding is a singular relation between facts. ...Facts, on this view, are obtaining states of affairs.
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From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2)
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A reaction:
He rest this claim on his 'worldly' view of facts, Idea 17293. I seem to be agreeing with him. Note that it is not between types of fact, even if there are such general truths, such as in chemistry.
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17300
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If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P]
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Full Idea:
Taking facts to be the relata of grounding has the interesting consequence that it does not relate ordinary particulars, objects, considered apart from their properties.
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From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.4)
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A reaction:
It will depend on what you mean by properties, and it seems to me that something like 'powers' must be invoked, to get the active character that seems to be involved in grounding.
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17301
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Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P]
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Full Idea:
I deny that when p grounds q, q thereby reduces to p, and I deny that if q reduces to p, then p grounds q. ...On my view, reduction is nothing other than identity, so p is the same fact as q.
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From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.5)
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A reaction:
Very good. I can't disagree with any of it, and it is crystal clear. Philosophical heaven.
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17299
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There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P]
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Full Idea:
There are a number of explanations where it seems clear that causation is not involved at all: normative grounded in non-normative, disposition grounded in categorical, aesthetic grounded in non-aesthetic, semantic in social and psychological.
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From:
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3)
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A reaction:
Apart from dispositions, perhaps, these all seem to be experienced phenomena grounded in the physical world. 'Determination' is the preferred term for non-causal grounding.
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2854
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Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Prescriptivism holds that if you think one 'ought' to do a certain kind of act, and yet you are not committed to doing that act in the relevant circumstances, then you either spoke insincerely, or are using the word 'ought' in a weak sense.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640)
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A reaction:
So that's an 'ought', but not a 'genuine ought', then? (No True Scotsman move). Someone ought to rescue that drowning child, but I can't be bothered.
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20883
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Modern utilitarians value knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and achievement, as well as pleasure [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Most utilitarians now think that pleasure, even if construed widely, is not the only thing desirable in itself. ...Goods also include important knowledge, friendship, autonomy, achievement and so on.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 2)
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A reaction:
That pleasure is desired is empirically verifiable, which certainly motivated Bentham. A string of other desirables each needs to be justified - but how? What would be the value of a 'friendship' if neither party got pleasure from it?
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20885
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Euthanasia is active or passive, and voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Six types of euthanasia: 1) Active voluntary (knowing my wishes), 2) Active non-voluntary (not knowing my wishes), 3) Active involuntary (against my wishes), 4) Passive voluntary, 5) Passive non-voluntary, 6) Passive involuntary.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 5)
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A reaction:
'Active' is intervening, and 'passive' is not intervening. A helpful framework.
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20882
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Euthanasia may not involve killing, so it is 'killing or not saving, out of concern for that person' [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Passive euthanasia is arguably not killing, and the death involved is often painful, so let us take the term 'euthanasia' to mean 'either killing or passing up opportunities to save someone, out of concern for that person'.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 1)
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A reaction:
This sounds good, and easily settled, until you think concern for that person could have two different outcomes, depending on whether the criteria are those of the decider or of the patient. Think of religious decider and atheist patient, or vice versa.
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