170 ideas
9218 | Maybe what distinguishes philosophy from science is its pursuit of necessary truths [Sider] |
Full Idea: According to one tradition, necessary truth demarcates philosophical from empirical inquiry. Science identifies contingent aspects of the world, whereas philosophical inquiry reveals the essential nature of its objects. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Reductive Theories of Modality [2003], 1) | |
A reaction: I don't think there is a clear demarcation, and I would think that lots of generalizations about contingent truths are in philosophical territory, but I quite like this idea - even if it does make scientists laugh at philosophers. |
14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical enquiry can survive if we are willing to live with highly tentative conclusions. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], Intro) | |
A reaction: Nice. Nothing alienates the rather literal scientific sort of mind quicker that bold, dogmatic and even arrogant assertions about metaphysics. But to entirely close down metaphysical speculation for that reason is absurd. |
15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
Full Idea: Ontological 'cheaters' are those ne'er-do-well metaphysicians (such as presentists, phenomenalists, or solipsists) who refuse to countenance a sufficiently robust conception of the fundamental to underwrite the truths they accept. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.4) | |
A reaction: Presentists are placed in rather insalubrious company here, The notion of 'cheaters' is nice, and I associate it with Australian philosophy, and the reason that was admired by David Lewis. |
14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics, at bottom, is about the fundamental structure of reality. Not about what's necessarily true. Not about what properties are essential. Not about conceptual analysis. Not about what there is. Structure. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: The opening words of his book. I take them to be absolutely correct, and to articulate the new orthodoxy about metaphysics which has emerged since about 1995. He expands this as being about patterns, categories and joints. |
14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
Full Idea: The most extreme critics of metaphysics base their critique on sweeping views about language (logical positivism), or knowledge (empiricism), ...but this notoriously threatens the science of unobservables as much as it threatens metaphysics. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 05.1) | |
A reaction: These criticisms also threaten speculative physics (even about what is possibly observable). |
15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
Full Idea: It has always seemed odd that insight into the fundamental workings of the universe should be gained by reflection on how we think and speak. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.8) | |
A reaction: A nice expression of what should by now be obvious to all philosophers - that analysis of language is not going to reveal very much. It is merely clearing the undergrowth so that we can go somewhere. |
14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
Full Idea: Conceptual analysts generally regard intuitive judgements about particular cases as being far more diagnostic than intuitive judgements about general principles. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.4 n7) | |
A reaction: Since I take the aim to be the building up an accurate picture about general truths, it would be daft to just leap to our intuitions about those general truths. Equally you can't cut intuition out of the picture (pace Ladyman). |
15570 | Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt] |
Full Idea: For Husserl, phenomenology must seek the essential aspects of phenomena - necessary, universal structures, such as the essence of art or the essence of representation. He sought a science of these essences. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Logical Investigations [1900]) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 2 'Dilthey' |
7614 | Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: In effect, the device of bracketing subtracts entailments from the ordinary belief locution (the entailments that refer to what is external to the thinker's mind). | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Logical Investigations [1900]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to leave phenomenology as pure introspection, or as a phenomenalist description of sense-data. It is also a refusal to explain anything. That sounds quite appealing, like Keats's 'negative capability'. |
6893 | Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner] |
Full Idea: Phenomenology, in Husserl, is an attempt to describe our experience directly, as it is, separately from its origins and development, independently of the causal explanations that historians, sociologists or psychologists might give. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Logical Investigations [1900]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.421 | |
A reaction: In this simple definition the concept sounds very like the modern popular use of the word 'deconstruction', though that is applied more commonly to cultural artifacts than to actual sense experience. |
22216 | Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: Husserl's phenomenology is the science of the intentional correlation of acts of consciousness with their objects and it studies the ways in which different kinds of objects involve different kinds of correlation with different kinds of acts. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.198 | |
A reaction: I notice he uncritically accepts Husserl's description of it as a 'science'. My naive question is how you would distinguish one kind of 'correlation' from another. |
21217 | Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Phenomenology demands the most perfect freedom from presuppositions and, concerning itself, an absolute reflective insight. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], III.1.063), quoted by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 3.1 | |
A reaction: As an outsider, I would have thought that the whole weight of modern continental philosophy is entirely opposed to the aspiration to think without presuppositions. |
22218 | There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: How can there be a science of a Heraclitean flux of acts of consciousness? Husserl answers that this is possible only if these acts are described in respect of their invariant or essential structure. This is an 'eidetic' scence of 'pure' psychology. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.199 | |
A reaction: This is his phenomenology in 1913, which Bernet describes as 'static'. Husserl later introduced time with his 'genetic' version of phenomenology, looking at the sources of experience (and then at history). Essentialism seems to be intuitive. |
22217 | Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: Husserl's goal is to account for the validity, the 'being-true', of objects on the basis of the way in which they are given or constituted. ...Experiences more suitable for guaranteeing objects are those which both intend and intuitively apprehend them. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.199 | |
A reaction: [compressed] In the light of previous scepticism and idealism, the project sounds a bit optimistic. If there is a gulf between mind and world it can only be bridged by 'reaching out' from both sides. This is a mind-sided attempt. |
22219 | Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: Phenomeonology is 'transcendental' in describing the correlation between phenomena and intentional objects, to show how their meaning and validity are constructed. Husserl gave this process an idealist interpretation (which Heidegger criticised). | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.200 | |
A reaction: [compressed] If the actions which produce our concepts of objects all take place 'behind' phenomenal consciousness, then it is hard to avoid sliding into some sort of idealism. It encourages direct realism about perception. |
22204 | Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Where other philosophers ...start from unclarified, ungrounded preconceptions, we start out from that which antedates all standpoints: from the totality of the intuitively self-given which is prior to any theorising reflexion. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.2.020) | |
A reaction: This is the great aim of Phenomenology, which is obviously inspired by Hegel's similar desire to start from nothing. Hegel starts from a concept ('nothing'), but Husserl starts from raw experience. I suspect both approaches are idle dreams. |
22207 | Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl] |
Full Idea: In relation to every thesis we can use this peculiar epoché (the phenomenon of 'bracketing' or 'disconnecting'), a certain refraining from judgment which is compatible with the unshaken and unshakable because self-evidencing conviction of Truth. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.1.031) | |
A reaction: This is the crucial first step of Phenomenology. It seems to me that it is best described as 'methodological scepticism'. People actually practise it all the time, while they focus on some experience, while trying to forget preconceptions. |
22208 | 'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl] |
Full Idea: I use the 'phenomenological' epoché, which completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.1.032) | |
A reaction: This makes bracketing (or epoché) into a sort of voluntary idealism. Put like that, it is hard to see what benefits it could bring. I am, you will notice, a pretty thorough sceptic about the project of phenomenology. What has it taught us? |
22210 | After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl] |
Full Idea: We fix our eyes steadily upon the sphere of Consciousness and study what it is that we find immanent in it. ...Consciousness in itself has a being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by disconnection. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.2.033) | |
A reaction: 'Disconnection' is his 'bracketing'. He makes it sound obvious, but Schopenhauer entirely disagrees with him, and I have no idea how to arbitrate. I struggle to grasp consciousness once nature has been bracketed, but have little luck. Is it Da-sein? |
22215 | Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Phenomenology is a pure descriptive discipline which studies the whole field of pure transcendental consciousness in the light of pure intuition. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.4.059) | |
A reaction: When he uses the word 'pure' three times in a sentence, each applied to a different thing, you begin to wonder precisely what it means. Strictly speaking, I would probably only apply 'pure' to abstracta, and never to experiences or reality.115 |
3348 | If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA on Husserl] |
Full Idea: Sternly envisaged by Husserl as a scientific discipline, phenomenology, on being stripped of the synthetic a priori by the logical positivists, ends up in Sartre as a largely literary undertaking. | |
From: comment on Edmund Husserl (works [1898]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.18 |
15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
Full Idea: Arguably, 'there is absolutely no space between two objects in contact' is false, but definitional of 'contact'. ...We need a word for true definitional sentences. I propose: 'analytic'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.8) |
22201 | The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Definition cannot take the same form in philosophy as it does in mathematics; the imitation of mathematical procedure is invariably in this respect not only unfruitful, but perverse and most harmful in its consequences. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], Intro) | |
A reaction: A hundred years of analytic philosophy has entirely ignored this warning. My heart has always sunk when I read '=def...' in a philosophy article (which is usually American). The illusion of rigour. |
14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
Full Idea: Philosophical concepts of interest are rarely reductively defined; still more rarely does our understanding of such concepts rest on definitions. ...(We generally understand concepts to the extent that we know what role they play in thinking). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.1) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I agree with this. I suspect that Sider has the notion of definition in mind that is influenced by lexicography. Aristotle's concept of definition I take to be lengthy and expansive, and that is very relevant to philosophy. |
14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
Full Idea: What we care about is truth in joint-carving terms, not just truth. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 04.5) | |
A reaction: The thought is that it matters what conceptual scheme is used to express the truth (the 'ideology'). Truths can be true but uninformative or unexplanatory. |
15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
Full Idea: According to the entrenched truthmaker theorist, the fundamental facts consist just of facts citing the existence of entities. It's hard to see how all the complexity we experience could possibly be explained from that sparse basis. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.5) | |
A reaction: This may be the 'entrenched' truthmaker view, but it is not clear why there could not be more complicated fundamental truthmakers, with structure as well as entities. And powers. |
13689 | 'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider] |
Full Idea: Formulas provable from no premises at all are often called 'theorems'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 2.6) |
13705 | Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider] |
Full Idea: The method of truth tables assumes truth functionality. Truth tables are just pictures of truth functions. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 6.3) |
13706 | Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider] |
Full Idea: Deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive (that it ought to be true doesn't make it true). One could argue that it is serial (that there is always a world where something is acceptable). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 6.3.1) |
13710 | In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider] |
Full Idea: In D we add to K a new axiom saying that 'what's necessary is possible' (□φ→◊φ), ..and it can then be proved that tautologies are possible and contradictions are not necessary. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 6.4.2) |
13711 | System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider] |
Full Idea: With system B we begin to be able to say something about iterated modalities. ..S4 then takes a different stand on the iterated modalities, and neither is an extension of the other. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 6.4.4) |
13708 | S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider] |
Full Idea: S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas. That's because it has the fewest models; it's easy to be S5-valid since there are so few potentially falsifying models. K is the weakest system, for opposite reasons. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 6.3.2) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, the orthodox view is that S5 is the correct logic for metaphysics, but it sounds a bit lax. Compare Idea 13707. |
13712 | Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider] |
Full Idea: Epistemic accessibility should be required to be reflexive (allowing Kφ→φ). S4 allows the 'KK principle', or 'positive introspection' (Kφ→KKφ), and S5 allows 'negative introspection' (¬Kφ→K¬Kφ). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 7.2) |
13714 | We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider] |
Full Idea: We can think of the worlds of modal logic as being times, rather than 'possible' worlds. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 7.3.3) |
13720 | Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider] |
Full Idea: The Converse Barcan Formula reads □∀αφ→∀α□φ (or an equivalent using ◊). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 9.5.2) | |
A reaction: I would read that as 'if all the αs happen to be φ, then αs have to be φ'. Put like that, I would have thought that it was obviously false. Sider points out that some new object could turn up which isn't φ. |
13718 | The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider] |
Full Idea: The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx is often regarded as a defect of Simple Quantified Modal Logic, though this most clearly seen in its equivalent form ◊∃xFx→∃x◊Fx. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 9.5.2) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 13719 for an explanation why it might be a defect] I translate the first one as 'if xs must be F, then they are always F', and the second one as 'for x to be possibly F, there must exist an x which is possibly F'. Modality needs existence. |
13723 | System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider] |
Full Idea: The proof of the Barcan Formula require System B. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 9.7) |
15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
Full Idea: If we accept the Barcan and converse Barcan schemas, this leads to surprising ontological consequences. Wittgenstein might have fathered something, so, by the Barcan schema, there is something that Wittgenstein might have fathered. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.9) | |
A reaction: [He cites Tim Williamson for this line of thought] I was liking the Barcan picture, by now I am backing away fast. They cannot be serious! |
13715 | You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider] |
Full Idea: Not everyone who employs intuitionistic logic is an intuitionist about mathematics. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 7.4.1) | |
A reaction: This seems worthy of note, since it may be tempting to reject the logic because of the implausibility of the philosophy of mathematics. I must take intuitionist logic more seriously. |
15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
Full Idea: An object is 'gunky' if each of its parts has further proper parts; thus gunk involves infinite descent in the part-whole relation. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.11.2) |
14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
Full Idea: Should our fundamental theory of part and whole take 'part' or 'overlap' as primitive? | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.3) |
14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
Full Idea: Certain debates over the 'correct' logic are genuine, and not linguistic or conceptual. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01.3) | |
A reaction: It is rather hard to give arguments in favour of this view, but I am pleased to have the authority of Sider with me. |
15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
Full Idea: I cannot legislate-true 'It is raining' and I cannot legislate true 'It is not raining', so if I cannot legislate either true then I cannot legislate-true the disjunction 'it is raining or it is not raining'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very simple and very persuasive argument against the idea that logic is a mere convention. I take disjunction to be an abstract summary of how the world works. Sider seems sympathetic. |
15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
Full Idea: Despite its brilliant success in mathematics and fundamental science, classical logic applies uneasily to natural language. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 10.6) | |
A reaction: He gives examples of the conditional, and debates over the meaning of 'and', 'or' and 'not', and also names and quantifiers. Many modern philosophical problems result from this conflict. |
13678 | The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider] |
Full Idea: On the question of the nature of genuine logical consequence, ...the most popular answer is the semantic, or model-theoretic one. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Reading the literature, one might be tempted to think that this is the only account that anyone takes seriously. Substitutional semantics seems an interesting alternative. |
13679 | Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider] |
Full Idea: Another answer to the question about the nature of logical consequence is a proof-theoretic one, according to which it is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 1.5) | |
A reaction: I don't like this, and prefer the model-theoretic or substitutional accounts. Whether you can prove that something is a logical consequence seems to me entirely separate from whether you can see that it is so. Gödel seems to agree. |
13682 | Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider] |
Full Idea: The 'modal' account of logical consequence is that it is not possible for the premises to be true and the consequent false (under some suitable notion of possibility). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Sider gives a nice summary of five views of logical consequence, to which Shapiro adds substitutional semantics. |
13680 | Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider] |
Full Idea: There is a 'primitivist' account, according to which logical consequence is a primitive notion. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 1.5) | |
A reaction: While sympathetic to substitutional views (Idea 13674), the suggestion here pushes me towards thinking that truth must be at the root of it. The trouble, though, is that a falsehood can be a good logical consequence of other falsehoods. |
15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
Full Idea: The simplest modal account is that logical consequence is just necessary consequence; another modal account says that logical consequences are modal consequences that involve only logical words essentially. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Quine's 'Carnap and Logical Truth' for the second idea] Sider is asserting that Humeans like him dislike modality, and hence need a nonmodal account of logical consequence. |
13722 | A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider] |
Full Idea: A 'theorem' is defined as the last line of a proof in which each line is either an axiom or follows from earlier lines by a rule. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 9.7) | |
A reaction: In other words, theorems are the axioms and their implications. |
21222 | Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: Husserl maintained that because most logicians have not studied the connection between logic and the world, logic did not achieve its status of purity. Even more, their logic implicitly presupposed a world. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1 | |
A reaction: The point here is that the bracketing of phenomenology, to reach an understanding with no presuppositions, is impossible if you don't realise what your are presupposing. I think the logic/world relationship is badly neglected, thanks to Frege. |
21223 | Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: The phenomenological logic grounds logical notions in subjective acts of experience. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929], p.183) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1 | |
A reaction: I'll approach this with great caution, but this is a line of thought that appeals to me. The core assumptions of logic do not arise ex nihilo. |
15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
Full Idea: Some say that logical constants are those expressions that are defined by their proof-theoretic roles, others that they are the expressions whose semantic values are permutation-invariant, and still others that they are the topic-neutral expressions. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 10.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites MacFarlane 2005 as giving a survey of this] |
13696 | When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider] |
Full Idea: When a variable is not combined with a quantifier (and so is 'free'), the result is, intuitively, semantically incomplete, and incapable of truth or falsity. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 4.2) |
13700 | A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider] |
Full Idea: Calling a function a 'total' function 'over D' means that the function must have a well-defined output (which is a member of D) whenever it is given as inputs any n members of D. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 5.2) |
13703 | λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider] |
Full Idea: We might prefer λx(Fx∧Gx)(a) as the symbolization of 'John is cold and hungry', since it treats 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 5.5) |
13688 | Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider] |
Full Idea: Since they are the foundations on which a proof rests, the axioms in a good axiomatic system ought to represent indisputable logical truths. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 2.6) |
13687 | No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider] |
Full Idea: Axiomatic systems do not allow reasoning with assumptions, and therefore do not allow conditional proof or reductio ad absurdum. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 2.6) | |
A reaction: Since these are two of the most basic techniques of proof which I have learned (in Lemmon), I shall avoid axiomatic proof systems at all costs, despites their foundational and Ockhamist appeal. |
13690 | Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider] |
Full Idea: The style of proof called 'induction on formula construction' (or 'on the number of connectives', or 'on the length of the formula') rest on the fact that all formulas are built up from atomic formulas according to strict rules. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 2.7) | |
A reaction: Hence the proof deconstructs the formula, and takes it back to a set of atomic formulas have already been established. |
13691 | Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider] |
Full Idea: A proof by induction starts with a 'base case', usually that an atomic formula has some property. It then assumes an 'inductive hypothesis', that the property is true up to a certain case. The 'inductive step' then says it will be true for the next case. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 2.7) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Tonk' is stipulated by Prior to stand for a meaning that obeys the elimination and introduction rules; but there simply is no such meaning; 'tonk' cannot be interpreted so as to obey the rules. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: 'Tonk' thus seems to present a problem for so-called 'natural' deduction, if the natural deduction consists of nothing more than obey elimination and introduction rules. |
13685 | Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider] |
Full Idea: The method of natural deduction is popular in introductory textbooks since it allows reasoning with assumptions. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 2.5) | |
A reaction: Reasoning with assumptions is generally easier, rather than being narrowly confined to a few tricky axioms, You gradually show that an inference holds whatever the assumption was, and so end up with the same result. |
13686 | We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider] |
Full Idea: We can construct proofs not out of well-formed formulae ('wffs'), but out of sequents, which are some premises followed by their logical consequence. We explicitly keep track of the assumptions upon which the conclusion depends. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 2.5.1) | |
A reaction: He says the method of sequents was invented by Gerhard Gentzen (the great nazi logician) in 1935. The typical starting sequents are the introduction and elimination rules. E.J. Lemmon's book, used in this database, is an example. |
13697 | Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider] |
Full Idea: A valuation function in predicate logic will assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Sider observes that this is a 'double' relativisation (due to Tarski), since propositional logic truth was already relative to an interpretation. Now we are relative to variable assignments as well. |
13684 | The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider] |
Full Idea: The semantical notion of a logical truth is that of a valid formula, which is true in all interpretations. In propositional logic they are 'tautologies'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This implies that there is a proof-theoretic account of logical truth as well. Intuitively a logical truth is a sequent which holds no matter which subject matter it refers to, so the semantic view sounds OK. |
13704 | It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider] |
Full Idea: It isn't clear which formulas of modal propositional logic are logical truths, ...especially for sentences that contain iterations of modal operators. Is □P→□□P a logical truth? It's hard to say. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 6.3) | |
A reaction: The result, of course, is that there are numerous 'systems' for modal logic, so that you can choose the one that gives you the logical truths you want. His example is valid in S4 and S5, but not in the others. |
13724 | In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider] |
Full Idea: In model theory one normally defines some notion of truth in a model, and then uses it to define validity as truth in all models, and semantic consequence as the preservation of truth in models. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 10.1) |
13698 | In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider] |
Full Idea: You can establish facts of the form Γ|-φ while avoiding the agonies of axiomatic proofs by reasoning directly about models to conclusions about semantic consequence, and then citing completeness. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 4.5) | |
A reaction: You cite completeness by saying that anything which you have shown to be a semantic consequence must therefore be provable (in some way). |
13699 | Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider] |
Full Idea: Compactness is intuitively surprising, ..because one might have thought there could be some contradiction latent within some infinite set, preventing it from being satisfiable, only discovered when you consider the whole set. But this can't happen. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 4.5) |
9837 | 0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Husserl contends that 0 is not a number, on the grounds that 'nought' is a negative answer to the question 'how many?'. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Philosophy of Arithmetic [1894], p.144) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.8 | |
A reaction: I seem to be in a tiny minority in thinking that Husserl may have a good point. One apple is different from one orange, but no apples are the same as no oranges. That makes 0 a very peculiar number. See Idea 9838. |
9576 | Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Multiplicity in general is no more than something and something and something, etc.; ..or more briefly, one and one and one, etc. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Philosophy of Arithmetic [1894], p.85), quoted by Gottlob Frege - Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic' | |
A reaction: Frege goes on to attack this idea fairly convincingly. It seems obvious that it is hard to say that you have seventeen items, if the only numberical concept in your possession is 'one'. How would you distinguish 17 from 16? What makes the ones 'multiple'? |
17444 | Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck] |
Full Idea: Husserl famously argued that one should not explain number in terms of equinumerosity (or one-one correspondence), but should explain equinumerosity in terms of sameness of number, which should be characterised in terms of counting. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Philosophy of Arithmetic [1894]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3 | |
A reaction: [Heck admits he hasn't read the Husserl] I'm very sympathetic to Husserl, though nearly all modern thinking favours Frege. Counting connects numbers to their roots in the world. Mathematicians seem oblivious of such things. |
21224 | Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: Pure mathematics is the science of the relations between any object whatever (relation of whole to part, relation of equality, property, unity etc.). In this sense, pure mathematics is seen by Husserl as formal ontology. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.2 | |
A reaction: I would expect most modern analytic philosophers to agree with this. Modern mathematics (e.g. category theory) seems to have moved beyond this stage, but I still like this idea. |
13701 | A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider] |
Full Idea: A single second-order sentence has second-order semantic consequences which are all and only the truths of arithmetic, but this is cold comfort because of incompleteness; no axiomatic system draws out the consequences of this axiom. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 5.4.3) |
22209 | Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl] |
Full Idea: We could refer to our goal as the winning of a new region of Being, the distinctive character of which has not yet been defined. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.2.033) | |
A reaction: The obvious fruit of this idea, I would think, is Heidegger's concept of Da-sein, which claims to be a distinctively human region of Being. I'm not sure I can cope with the claim that Being itself (a very broad-brush term) has hidden regions. |
22211 | As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl] |
Full Idea: We are left with the transcendence of the thing over against the perception of it, ...and thus a basic and essential difference arises between Being as Experience and Being as Thing. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.2.042) | |
A reaction: I'm thinking that this is not just the germ of Heidegger's concept of Da-sein, but it actually IS his concept, without the label. Husserl had said that he hoped to reveal a new region of Being. |
14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
Full Idea: Four-dimensionalism does not respect a deep difference between thing-talk and process-talk, because it tends to place events and things in the same ontological category. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 6.1) | |
A reaction: He then quotes Broad, Idea 14759. This idea is the best reason yet for being sympathetic to the four-dimensionalist view, because I think processes really must have a central place in any decent ontology. |
15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
Full Idea: Supervenience is just a kind of modal connection. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.10) | |
A reaction: It says what would happen, as well as what does. This is big for Sider because he rejects modality as a feature of actuality. I think the world is crammed full of modal facts, so supervenience should be a handy tool for me. |
15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
Full Idea: The locus of fundamentality for a Finean is the whole proposition, whereas for me it is the proposition-part. Fundamentality is holistic for the Finean, atomistic for me. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.3) | |
A reaction: This is because Kit Fine has pushed fundamentality into a relation (grounding), rather than into the particular entities involved (if I understand Sider's reading of him aright). My first intuition is to side with Sider. I'm on Sider's side... |
15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
Full Idea: The existence of tables and chairs is just as fundamental as the existence of electrons (in contrast, perhaps, with smirks and shadows, which do not exist fundamentally). However, tables and chairs have nonfundamental natures. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.7) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a good clarification, and to me the 'nature' of something points towards its essence. However, I suppose he refers here to the place of something in a dependence hierarchy. But then, why does it have that place? What power? |
21226 | Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: Husserl's notion of monad expresses a complete inegration of every intentional presence into its sense, and every sense into the intentional acts, ....and finally every intentional act is integrated into the ego. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Cartesian Meditations [1931]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.6.2 | |
A reaction: No, I don't understand that either, but it makes good sense to employ the concept of a 'monad' into the concept of the ego, if you think it embodies perfect unity. That was a main motivation for Leibniz to employ the word. |
15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
Full Idea: Stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism, whereas things do not. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.6.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Markosian 2004] |
22202 | The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl] |
Full Idea: The World is the totality of objects that can be known through experience. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.1.001) | |
A reaction: I think this is the 'Nature' which has to be 'bracketed', when pursuing Phenomenology. It sounds like anti-realist empiricism, which has no place for unobservables. |
22213 | Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl] |
Full Idea: An absolute reality is just as valid as a round square. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.3.055) | |
A reaction: Husserl distances himself from 'Berkeleyian' idealism, but his discussion keeps flirting with, perhaps in some sort of have-your-cake-and-eat-it Hegelian way. Perhaps it is close to Dummett's Anti-Realism. |
15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker theorist's 'concrete' states of affairs must be distinguished from necessarily existing 'abstract' states of affairs. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Plantinga's 'Nature of Necessity' for the second one; I presume the first one is Armstrong] |
13692 | A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider] |
Full Idea: For a 'precisification' we take a trivalent interpretation and preserve the T and F values, and then assign all the third values in some way to either T or F. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 3.4.5) | |
A reaction: [my informal summary of Sider's formal definition] |
13695 | Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider] |
Full Idea: Supervaluation preserves classical logic (even though supervaluations are three-valued), except when we add the Δ operator (meaning 'definitely' or 'determinately'). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 3.4.5) |
13693 | A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider] |
Full Idea: In a 'supervaluation' we take a trivalent interpretation, and assign to each wff T (or F) if it is T (or F) in every precisification, leaving the third truth-value in any other cases. The wffs are then 'supertrue' or 'superfalse' in the interpretation. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 3.4.5) | |
A reaction: [my non-symbolic summary] Sider says the Ts and Fs in the precisifications are assigned 'in any way you like', so supervaluation is a purely formal idea, not a technique for eliminating vagueness. |
13694 | We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider] |
Full Idea: We can introduce 'sharpenings', to make vague terms precise without disturbing their semantics. Then truth (or falsity) becomes true(false)-in-all-sharpenings. You are only 'rich' if you are rich-on-all-sharpenings of the word. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 3.4.5) | |
A reaction: Not very helpful. Lots of people might be considered rich in many contexts, but very few people would be considered rich in all contexts. You are still left with some vague middle ground. |
14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
Full Idea: We can add to the Quinean advice to believe the ontology of your best theory that you should also regard the ideology of your best theory as carving at the joints. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.3) | |
A reaction: I've never liked the original Quinean formulation, but this is much better. I just take my ontological commitments to reside in me, not in whatever theory I am currently employing. I may be dubious about my own theory. |
13683 | A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider] |
Full Idea: A relation is just a feature of multiple objects taken together. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 1.8) | |
A reaction: Appealingly simple, especially for a logician, who can then just list the relevant objects as members of a set, and the job is done. But if everyone to the left of me is also taller than me, this won't quite do. |
14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
Full Idea: Chisholm and Kim proposed a modal notion of an 'intrinsic' property - that a property is intrinsic if and only if it is possibly instantiated by an object that is alone in the world. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Chisholm 1976:127 and Kim 1982:59-60] Sider then gives a counterexample from David Lewis (Idea 14979). |
14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
Full Idea: A proper ontology should invoke only categorical, or occurrent, properties and relations. Categorical properties involve what objects are actually like, whereas hypothetical properties 'point beyond' their instances. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This spectacularly leaves out powers and dispositions, which are actual properties which 'point beyond' their instances! This is the nub of the powers debate, and the most interesting topic in modern metaphysics. |
14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
Full Idea: For Armstrong a predicate is sparse when there exists a corresponding universal; for Lewis, a predicate is sparse when there exists a corresponding natural property or relation. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06) | |
A reaction: I like 'sparse' properties, but have no sympathy with Armstrong, and am cautious about Lewis. I like Shoemaker's account, which makes properties even sparser. 'Abundant' so-called properties are my pet hate. They are 'predicates'! |
14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
Full Idea: Followers of the view that every entity is associated with some sortal term that answers the question 'what kind of thing is this?', and determines its persistence conditions, must answer the question what kinds of entity there are. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.3) | |
A reaction: [He explicitly refers to David Wiggins here] In other words Wiggins has got it the wrong way round, which is my own view of his theory. Sortal terms don't grow on the trees in the Garden of Eden, available for applications. |
14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
Full Idea: This powerful puzzle (known to the Stoics, introduced by Geach, popularised by Wiggins) has a cat Tibbles and a proper part Tib, which is all of Tibbles except the tail. If Tibbles loses her tail, the two were distinct, but they now coincide. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Compare a few people leave a football ground, and what was a large part of the crowd becomes the whole of the crowd. Which suggests that there is no problem if cats are like crowds. But we don't like that view of cats. |
14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
Full Idea: Presumably it is claimed that the artist 'created' the statue because the object created is essentially a statue, and thus cannot be identified with the unformed lump of clay with which the artist began. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001]) | |
A reaction: This is based on Burke's views. This is sortal essentialism, rather than my own view of essence as an inner explanatory mechanism or form. If an old abstract sculpture was no longer recognised as a statue, would it necessarily still be a statue? |
14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
Full Idea: There are numerous cases in which there is pressure to admit coincident entities. The best way of coming to grips with this, I think, invokes the stage view. ...In the worm theory, coincident objects are no more mysterious than overlapping roads. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.1) | |
A reaction: At this point I get nervous if in order to 'get to grips' with a phenomenon which is hard to articulate but obvious to common sense, we have to invoke a rather startling metaphysics that completely upends the common sense we started with. |
16597 | Quantity is the capacity to be divided [Digby] |
Full Idea: Quantity …is divisibility, or a capacity to be divided into parts. | |
From: Kenelm Digby (Two treatises [1644], I.2.8), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.1 | |
A reaction: 'Quantity' is scholastic philosophy is a concept we no longer possess. Without quantity, a thing might potentially exist at a spaceless point. Quantity is what spreads things out. See Pasnau Ch. 4. |
14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Composition as identity' says that when a thing, x, is composed of some other objects, the ys, then this is a kind of identity between the x and the ys. The industrial-strength version says object x just is the ys. Lewis says it is just an analogy. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.3) | |
A reaction: I am averse to such a doctrine, as is Leibniz, with his insistence that an aggregate is not a unity. There has to be some sort of principle that bestows oneness on a many. I take this to be structural, and is an elucidation of hylomorphism. |
21218 | The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl] |
Full Idea: It belongs to the sense of anything contingent to have an essence and therefore an Eidos which can be apprehended purely. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.1.002), quoted by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 3.2.2 | |
A reaction: This is the quirky idea that we can know necessary categorial essences a priori, even if the category is currently empty. Crops us in Lowe. Husserl says grasping the corresponding individuals must be possible. Third Man question. |
19263 | Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya] |
Full Idea: Husserl's 'eidetic variation' implies that we can judge the essential properties of an object by varying the properties of the object in imagination, and seeing which vary and which do not. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Anand Vaidya - Understanding and Essence 'Knowledge' | |
A reaction: The problem with this is that there are trivial or highly general necessary properties which are obviously not essential to the thing. Vaidya says [822] you can't perform the experiment without prior knowledge of the essence. |
14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
Full Idea: Mereological essentialism says that an object's parts are necessary for its existence. ....It is literally never correct to say that an thing survives a change in its parts. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.7) | |
A reaction: Chisholm is well known for proposing this view. Sider adds a possible toughening clause, that the parts are also sufficient for the object's existence. This is a philosophers' notion of identity, not the normal English language concept. |
15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
Full Idea: We should not regard nonmodal essence as being metaphysically basic: fundamental theories need essence no more than they need modality. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1) | |
A reaction: He is discussing Kit Fine, and notes that Fine offers a nonmodal view of essence, but still doesn't make it fundamental. I am a fan of essences, but making them fundamental in metaphysics seems unlikely. |
14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
Full Idea: Three-dimensionalists say that things have no 'temporal parts', that they 'endure', and that they are wholly present at every moment of their careers. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: An obvious problem case for being wholly present would be the building and fitting of a large ship, where it might seem to be present before it was wholly present. |
14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
Full Idea: Some might even regard inconsistency with time travel as an advantage of three-dimensionalism, as a vindication of a prior belief that time travel is impossible! I see no merit in these claims. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 7.2) | |
A reaction: I do! Sider cheerfully says that there are good reasons to believe that time travel is possible, and then use this possibility to support his four-dimensional view, but I personally doubt his assumption. The evidence for time travel is flimsy and obscure. |
14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
Full Idea: Four-dimensionalists say that things have 'temporal parts', that they 'perdure', and that they are spread out over time. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3) |
14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
Full Idea: For four-dimensionalists intrinsic change is difference between successive temporal parts. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This attempts a reply to the commonest criticism of four-dimensionalism - that you can't explain change if you don't have one enduring thing which undergoes the change. I get stuck of the question 'how big (temporally) is a part?'. |
14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
Full Idea: Four-dimensionalism may be formulated as the claim that, necessarily, each spatiotemporal object has a temporal part at every moment at which it exists. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3.2) | |
A reaction: If there were tiny quantum gaps between temporal parts, that would presumably ruin the story. On this view an object has to be a 'worm', to be the thing which has the parts. |
14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
Full Idea: My four-dimensionalism implies the existence of temporal parts, but not that those parts are more fundamental, nor that the object is 'constructed' from its parts, nor that identity over time is reducible to parts. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3.2) | |
A reaction: That's a rather negative account of temporal parts, which makes you ask what their positive role could be. Do they contribute anything to our understanding of a temporally extended object? |
14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
Full Idea: Unless otherwise noted, I will think of temporal parts as being instantaneous. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This comes up against all the Augustinian worries about the intrinsic nature of time. How many temporal parts does a typical object possess? Is a third temporal part always to be found between any two of them? How do they 'connect'? |
14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
Full Idea: How can an instantaneous stage believe anything? Beliefs take time. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.8) | |
A reaction: Sider's four-dimensionalist answer is that the belief is embodied in the earlier counterparts, making belief a 'highly relational property'. I am not impressed by this answer to the very nice problem which he has raised. It's a problem for 3D, too. |
14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
Full Idea: The sensible four-dimensionalist will claim that current temporal parts are caused to exist by previous temporal parts. The laws that govern this process are none other than the familiar laws of motion. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 6.3) | |
A reaction: I keep struggling with the instantaneous natural of temporal parts, and now I find that they have to do the job of being causal relata. When do they do their job? They've gone home before they've finished clocking in. Continuance requires motion? |
14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
Full Idea: The Ship of Theseus seems to be a case of 'asymmetric' fission (where one resultant entity has a stronger claim). Many see the continuously rebuilt ship as the stronger candidate, but each candidate, without the other, would be the original ship. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.1) |
13702 | The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider] |
Full Idea: The identity of indiscernibles (∀x∀y(∀X(Xx↔Xy)→x=y) is necessarily true, provided that we construe 'property' very broadly, so that 'being a member of such-and-such set' counts as a property. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 5.4.3) | |
A reaction: Sider's example is that if the two objects are the same they must both have the property of being a member of the same singleton set, which they couldn't have if they were different. |
14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
Full Idea: If someone is in pain at t1 and not at t2, we might restrict Leibniz's Law so as not to apply to 'timebound' properties, ..but this is deeply unsatisfying, ...and forfeits one's claim to be discussing identity. The demands of identity are high. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.5) | |
A reaction: [on Myro 1986] Sider's response is unsatisfying. It means a thing loses its identity (with itself?) if it has even a tiny fluctuating in its properties. Quantum changes then destroy all notions of identity. English-speakers don't use 'identity' like that. |
13721 | 'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Strong necessity' requires the truth of 'necessarily φ' is all possible worlds. 'Weak necessity' merely requires that 'necessarily φ' be true in all worlds in which objects referred to within φ exist. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 9.6.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a highly desirably distinction, given the problem of Idea 13719. It is weakly necessary that humans can't fly unaided, assuming we are referring the current feeble wingless species. That hardly seems to be strongly necessary. |
13707 | Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider] |
Full Idea: Some argue that metaphysical accessibility is intransitive. The individuals involved mustn't be too different from the actual world. A world in which I am a frog isn't metaphysically possible. Perhaps the logic is modal system B or T. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 6.3.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds rather plausible and attractive to me. We don't want to say that I am necessarily the way I actually am, though, so we need criteria. Essence! |
13709 | Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider] |
Full Idea: On any sense of necessity, surely logical truths must be necessary. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 6.4) |
13716 | 'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider] |
Full Idea: To show the semantic difference between counterfactuals and indicative conditionals, 'If Booth hadn't shot Lincoln someone else would have' is false, but 'If Booth didn't shoot Lincoln then someone else did' is true. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 8) | |
A reaction: He notes that indicative conditionals also differ in semantics from material and strict conditionals. The first example allows a world where Lincoln was not shot, but the second assumes our own world, where he was. Contextual domains? |
15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
Full Idea: The spirit of Humeanism is that necessity is not a realm to be discovered. We draw the lines around what is necessary. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.3) | |
A reaction: I disagree, but it is hard to argue the point. My intuitions are that the obvious necessities of logic and mathematics reflect the way nature has to be. The deepest necessities are patterns (about which God has no choice). |
15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
Full Idea: English modals are context-dependent through and through; there is no stable 'outer modality'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.7) | |
A reaction: Sider has been doing so well up to here. To me this is swallowing the bait of linguistic approaches to philosophy which he has fought so hard to avoid. |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
Full Idea: If □φ says that φ is true by convention, then □φ would apparently turn out to be contingent, since statements about what conventions we adopt are not themselves true by convention. The main axioms of S4 and S5 would be false. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1) |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
Full Idea: Conventionalism is apparently inapplicable to Kripke's and Putnam's examples of the necessary a posteriori (and, relatedly, to de re modality). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1) | |
A reaction: [Sidelle 1989 discusses this] |
15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
Full Idea: Why are logical (or mathematical, or analytic...) truths necessary? The Humean's answer is that this is just how our concept of necessity works. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.11) | |
A reaction: This is why I (unlike Sider) am not a Humean. If we agreed that 'necessary' meant 'whatever is decreed by the Pope', that would so obviously not be necessary that we would have to start searching nature for true necessities. |
15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
Full Idea: At bottom, the world is an amodal place. Necessity and possibility do not carve at the joints; ultimate reality is not 'full of threats and promises' (Goodman). The book of the world says how things are, not how they must or might be. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12) | |
A reaction: Nice to see this expressed so clearly. I find it much easier to disagree with as a result. At first blush I would say that if you haven't noticed that the world is full of threats and promises, you should wake up and smell the coffee. Actuality is active. |
13717 | Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider] |
Full Idea: There is no problem of transworld identification with de dicto modal sentence, for their evaluation does not require taking an individual from one possible world and reidentifying it in another. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 9.2) | |
A reaction: If 'de dicto' is about the sentence and 'de re' is about the object (Idea 5732), how do you evaluate the sentence without at least some notion of the object to which it refers. Nec the Prime Minister chairs the cabinet. Could a poached egg do the job? |
14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
Full Idea: A counterpart relation is a similarity relation. Since there are different dimensions of similarity, there are different counterpart relations. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 6.4) |
13719 | Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider] |
Full Idea: A problem with the Barcan Formula is it might be possible for there to exist a ghost, even though there in fact exists nothing that could be a ghost. There could have existed some 'extra' thing which could be a ghost. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 9.5.2) | |
A reaction: Thus when we make modal claims, do they only refer to what actually exists, or is specified in our initial domain? Can a claim enlarge the domain? Are domains 'variable'? Simple claims about what might have existed seem to be a problem. |
21220 | The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Anything physical which is given in person can be non-existing, no mental process which is given in person can be non-existing. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.2.046), quoted by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 3.3.5 | |
A reaction: This endorsement of Descartes shows how strong the influence of the Cogito remained in later continental philosophy. Phenomenology is a footnote to Descartes. |
21216 | Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: The novelty of Husserl is to describe that we have intellectual intuitions, intuitions of categories as we have intuitions of sense objects. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Logical Investigations [1900], II.VI.24) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 2.4.4 | |
A reaction: This is 'intuitions' in Kant's sense, of something like direct apprehensions. This idea is an axiom of phenomenology, because all mental life must be bracketed, and not just the sense experience part. |
22205 | Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl] |
Full Idea: So-called feelings of self-evidence, of intellectual necessity, and however they may otherwise be called, are just theoretically invented feelings. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.2.021) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a dismissal of the a priori necessary on the grounds that it is 'theory-laden' - which is why it has to be bracketed in order to do phenomenology. |
21221 | Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Immediate 'seeing', not merely sensuous, experiential seeing, but seeing in the universal sense as an originally presenting consciousness of any kind whatsoever, is the ultimate legitimising source of all rational assertions. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.2.019), quoted by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 3.3.5 | |
A reaction: Husserl is (I gather from this) a classic rationalist. Just like Descartes' judgement of the molten wax. |
22220 | The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: In Husserl's phenomenology, the intentional object of a memory is the object of a past experience, which is intuitively given to me in the present, not, however, as being present but as being past. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.203 | |
A reaction: I certainly don't have to assess my mental events, and judge which are past, which are now, and which are future imaginings. I suppose Fodor would say they are memories because we find them in the memory-box. How else could it work? |
22206 | Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Natural science has grown to greatness by pushing ruthlessly aside the rank growth of ancient skepticism and renouncing the attempt to conquer it. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.2.026) | |
A reaction: This may be because scepticism is boring, or it may be because science 'brackets' scepticism, leaving philosophers to worry about it. |
14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Theories' based on bizarre, non-joint-carving classifications are unexplanatory even when true. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.1) | |
A reaction: This nicely pinpoints why I take explanation to be central to whole metaphysical enterprise. |
14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
Full Idea: If the entire theory of this book were replaced by its Ramsey sentence, omitting all mention of fundamentality, something would seem to be lost. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.2 n2) | |
A reaction: It is a moot point whether Ramsey sentences actually eliminate anything from the ontology, but trying to wriggle out of ontological commitment looks a rather sad route to follow. |
14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Is nonblack', 'is a nonraven', and 'grue' fail to carve at the joints. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.3) | |
A reaction: A lot more than this needs to said, but this remark encapsulates why I find most of these paradoxes of induction uninteresting. They are all the creations of logicians, rather than of scientists. |
14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
Full Idea: The applicability of 'grue' to each of a pair of particulars does not guarantee the similarity of those particulars. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.2) | |
A reaction: Grue is not a colour but a behaviour. If two things are 'mercurial' or 'erratic', will that ensure a similarity at any given moment? |
14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
Full Idea: In the Bayesian approach, bizarre prior probability distributions will result in bizarre responses to evidence. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.3) | |
A reaction: This is exactly what you find when people with weird beliefs encounter ridiculous evidence for things. It doesn't invalidate the formula, but just says rubbish in rubbish out. |
15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
Full Idea: Explanations must cite generalisations. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.13) | |
A reaction: I'm uneasy about this. Presumably some events have a unique explanation - a unique mechanism, perhaps. Language is inescapably general in its nature - which I take to be Aristotle's reason for agreeing the Sider. [Sider adds mechanisms on p.159] |
15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
Full Idea: Ultimate explanations always terminate in the citation of entities; but since a mere list of entities is so unstructured, these 'explanations' cannot be systematized with detailed general laws, patterns, or mechanisms. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.5) | |
A reaction: We just need to distinguish between ultimate ontology and ultimate explanations. I think explanations peter out at the point where we descend below the mechanisms. Patterns or laws don't explain on their own. Causal mechanisms are the thing. |
22221 | We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: Another person's consciousness is given to me through the expressive stratum of her body, which gives me access to her experience while making me realise that it is inaccessible to me. Empathy is a presentation of what is absent. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.203 | |
A reaction: This is the phenomenological approach to the problem of other minds, by examining the raw experience of encountering another person. It is true that we seem to both know and not know another person's mind when we encounter them. |
21228 | Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: For Husserl monads have windows because they communicate with each other. The windows of the monads are the acts of empathy. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Cartesian Meditations [1931]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.7.5 | |
A reaction: Leibniz said his monads (which include minds) have 'no windows'. The mere existence of empathy (or mirror neurons, as we would say) is hardly sufficient to defeat solipsism. |
22212 | Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Consciousness, considered in its 'purity', must be reckoned as a self-contained system of Being, a system of actual Being, into which nothing can penetrate, and from which nothing can escape. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.3.049) | |
A reaction: Recorded without comment, to show that among phenomenologists there is a way of thinking about consciousness which is a long way from analytic discussions of the topic. |
15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
Full Idea: One day the physicists will complete the catalogue of ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the like of spin, charm and charge will perhaps appear on the list. But aboutness sure won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 4 Intro) | |
A reaction: Fodor's project is to give a reductive, and perhaps eliminative, account of intentionality of mind, while leaving open what one might do with the phenomenological aspects. Personally I don't think they will appear on the list either. |
9575 | Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege] |
Full Idea: Husserl identifies a 'unitary mental act' where several contents are connected or related to one another, and also a difference-relation where two contents are related to one another by a negative judgement. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Philosophy of Arithmetic [1894], p.73-74) by Gottlob Frege - Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic' p.322 | |
A reaction: Frege is setting this up ready for a fairly vicious attack. Where Hume has a faculty for spotting resemblances, it is not implausible that we should also be hard-wired to spot differences. 'You look different; have you changed your hair style?' |
21225 | The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: Husserl distinguishes two sorts of egos or subjects of experience, the psychological ego and the pure ego. The psychological ego is a reality of the world, and the pure ego is a result of transcendental reduction. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Cartesian Meditations [1931]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.6.1 | |
A reaction: The sounds like embracing both the Cartesian and the Kantian egos. This is obviously the source of Sartre's interesting early book on the self. 'Transcendental reduction' is his bracketing or epoché. |
22214 | We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl] |
Full Idea: We never stumble across the pure Ego as an experience within the flux of manifold experiences which survives as transcendental residuum; nor do we meet it as a constitutive bit of experience appearing with the experience of which it is an integral part. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.4.057) | |
A reaction: It seems that he agrees with David Hume. Sartre's 'Transcendence of the Ego' follows up this idea. However, Husserl goes on to assert the 'necessity' of the permanent Ego, which sounds like Kant's view. |
21214 | We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: Husserl said that the clarification of any concept is made by determining its psychological origin. He is concerned with the psychological origins of the operation of calculating cardinal numbers. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Philosophy of Arithmetic [1894]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 2.2 | |
A reaction: This may not be the same as the 'psychologism' that Frege so despised, because Husserl is offering a clarification, rather than the intrinsic nature of number concepts. It is not a theory of the origin of numbers. |
9819 | Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl] |
Full Idea: Husserl substitutes his account of the process of concept-formation for a delineation of the concept. It is above all in making this substitution that psychologism is objectionable (and Frege opposed it so vehemently). | |
From: comment on Edmund Husserl (Philosophy of Arithmetic [1894]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: While this is a powerful point which is a modern orthodoxy, it hardly excludes a study of concept-formation from being of great interest for other reasons. It may not appeal to logicians, but it is crucial part of the metaphysics of nature. |
9851 | Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl] |
Full Idea: Husserl saw that abstracted units, though featureless, must in some way retain their distinctness, some shadowy remnant of their objects. So he wanted to correlate like-numbered sets, not just register their identity, but then abstractionism fails. | |
From: comment on Edmund Husserl (Philosophy of Arithmetic [1894]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.12 | |
A reaction: Abstractionism is held to be between the devil and the deep blue sea, of depending on units which are identifiable, when they are defined as devoid of all individuality. We seem forced to say that the only distinction between them is countability. |
14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
Full Idea: It is absurd to say that 'before we introduced our conventions, not all green things were green'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: Well… Different cultures label the colours of the rainbow differently, and many of them omit orange. I suspect the blue/green borderline has shifted. |
14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
Full Idea: To suggest that analytic truths make statements about linguistic conventions is a nonstarter; statements about linguistic conventions are contingent, whereas the statements made by typical analytic sentences are necessary. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: That 'anything yellow is extended' is not just a convention should be fairly obvious, and it is obviously necessary. But we can say that bachelors are necessarily unmarried men - given the current convention. |
15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
Full Idea: Nothing can fully play the role traditionally associated with analyticity, for much of that traditional role presupposed the doctrine of truth by convention. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.8) | |
A reaction: Sider rejects Quine's attack on analyticity, but accepts his critique of truth by convention. |
22203 | Only facts follow from facts [Husserl] |
Full Idea: From facts follow always nothing but facts. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.1.008) | |
A reaction: I presume objective possibilities follow from facts, so this doesn't sound strictly correct. I sounds like a nice slogan for those desiring to keep facts separate from values. [on p.53 he comments on fact/value] |
16731 | Colours arise from the rarity, density and mixture of matter [Digby] |
Full Idea: The origin of all colours in bodies is plainly deduced out of the various degrees of rarity and density, variously mixed and compounded. | |
From: Kenelm Digby (Two treatises [1644], I.29.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.5 | |
A reaction: We are still struggling with this question, though I think the picture is gradually become clear, once you get the hang of the brain. Easy! See Idea 17396. |
14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
Full Idea: That spacetime is 4D Lorentzian manifold, that the universe began with a singularity, and in a state of low entropy, are all central to physics, but it is a stretch to call them 'laws'. ...It has been argued that there are no laws of biology. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.1) |
14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
Full Idea: Adding the notion of law to physical theory doesn't seem to enhance its explanatory power. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.4) | |
A reaction: I agree with his scepticism about laws, although Sider offers it as part of his scepticism about modal facts being included in explanations of actuality. Personally I like dispositions, but not laws. See the ideas of Stephen Mumford. |
14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
Full Idea: There is an alternative to the Russellian 'at-at' theory of motion, according to which dynamical quantities are intrinsic to times. Whether and how an object is moving at a time is a fact about what that object is like then. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I think I find this quite appealing, because there is too much of a tendency to think of objects as passive and inert, with laws, forces, motions etc. imposed from the outside. But nature is active and dynamic. However, motion can't be wholly intrinsic. |
14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
Full Idea: In metaphysics, space is intrinsically structured; the genuine betweenness and congruence relations are privileged in a way that Euclidean-betweenness and Euclidean-congruence are not. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.4) | |
A reaction: I note that Einstein requires space to be 'curved', which implies that it is a substance with properties. |
14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
Full Idea: Unlike time, space has three dimensions and lacks a distinguishing direction; unlike space, time seems to be specially connected with causation. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 4.5) | |
A reaction: These strike me as nice reasons to doubt (what I already prima facie doubt) that there is a single manifold that is 'space-time', for all that twentieth century physics tells us it is so. A century is a mere click of a clock where truth is concerned. |
15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
Full Idea: The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.1) |
15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
Full Idea: The spotlight theorist accepts the block universe, but also something in addition: a joint-carving monadic property of presentness, which is possessed by just one moment of time, and which 'moves', to be possessed by later and later times. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.9) | |
A reaction: This seems better than the merely detached eternalist view, which seems to ignore the key phenomenon. I just can't comprehend any theory which makes the future as real as the past. |
14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
Full Idea: Intermediate between the polar opposites of presentism and eternalism is the view (defended by Broad 1923 and Tooley 1997) that the past is real but the future is not. Reality consists of a growing four-dimensional manifold, the 'growing block universe'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 2.1) | |
A reaction: The obvious and plausible basis for this is that statements about the past seem to have truthmakers, but statements about the future lack them. Does a truth always require ontological commitment? Death is cessation of existence. |
14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
Full Idea: The Presentist acknowledges that no atemporal description of the case can be given; a vantage point must be chosen for any description. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.5) | |
A reaction: This is because Presentists are committed to tense, which have to be either explicit or implicit in any sentence. But what of famously 'timeless' truths such as '2 and 2 are 4'? |
14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
Full Idea: The presentist must deny the truth of everyday claims that concern multiple times taken together. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This rests on the extent to which every truth has an ontological commitment. You can deny the literal existence of multiple times without denying such truths. |
14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
Full Idea: The temporal reductionist claims that tensed locutions are indexical - 'present' being the time of utterance etc. This generalises to say that nothing corresponding to tense need be admitted as a fundamental feature of the world. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [He particular cites Mellor for this view] Highly implausible. I very much doubt whether it is possible to explain the indexicality of a word like 'now' without referring to tenses. Does time only exist when sentences and thoughts occur? |
14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |
Full Idea: The B-theoretic description of the world is completely adequate except that it leaves out information about which time is present. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 4.6) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty basic deficiency. How could there a time which lacked a present moment? The present is when things happen. How would it qualify as time at all if it lacked past, present and future? |
14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |
Full Idea: The B-series has two components: eternalism - the thesis that all future entities are real - and the thesis of reducibility of tense. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 4.2) |