Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Edmund L. Gettier, Timothy Smiley and Andrew Gibson

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3 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Aristotle's proofs give understanding, so it can't be otherwise, so consequence is necessary [Smiley, by Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: The ingredient of necessity [in Aristotle's account of consequence] is required by his demand that proof should produce 'understanding' [episteme], coupled with his claim that understanding something involves seeing that it cannot be otherwise.
     From: report of Timothy Smiley (Conceptions of Consequence [1998], p.599) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 3.2
     A reaction: An intriguing reverse of the normal order. Not 'necessity in logic delivers understanding', but 'reaching understanding shows the logic was necessary'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier]
     Full Idea: The claim that someone knows a proposition if it is true, it is believed, and the person is justified in their belief is false, in that the conditions do not state a sufficient condition for the claim.
     From: Edmund L. Gettier (Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? [1963], p.145)
     A reaction: This is the beginning of the famous Gettier Problem, which has motivated most epistemology for the last forty years. Gettier implies that justification is necessary, even if it is not sufficient. He gives two counterexamples.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture is the struggle to agree what is normal [Gibson,A]
     Full Idea: Culture is the struggle to agree what is normal.
     From: Andrew Gibson (talk [2018])
     A reaction: A nice aphorism. Typically the struggle took place in villages, but has now gone global. The normalities of other cultures are beamed into a remote society, and are frequently unwelcome.