Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Einstein,A/Infeld,L, Peter A. Angeles and Edward N. Zalta

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6 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta

10414	Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer]
	Full Idea: In Zalta's view abstract objects are correlated with collections of properties. ..They encode, as well as exemplify, properties; indeed, an abstract object (such as a Euclidean triangle) is constituted by the properties it encodes.
	From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties 6.3
	A reaction: If we are going to explain abstract objects with properties, then properties had better not be abstract objects. Zalta has a promising idea if we start from a nominalist and naturalistic view of properties (built from physical powers). 'Encode'?

10558	Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta]
	Full Idea: Where for ordinary objects one can discover the properties they exemplify, abstract objects are actually constituted or determined by the properties by which we conceive them. I use the technical term 'x encodes F' for this idea.
	From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], 2 n2)
	A reaction: One might say that whereas concrete objects can be dubbed (in the Kripke manner), abstract objects can only be referred to by descriptions. See 10557 for more technicalities about Zalta's idea.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta

10415	Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer]
	Full Idea: On Zalta's view, properties with the same encoding extensions are identical, but may be distinct with the same exemplification extension. So the properties of being a round square and a round triangle are distinct, but with the same exemplification.
	From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties
	A reaction: (For Zalta's view, see Idea 10414) I'm not sure about 'encoding' (cf. Hodes's use of the word), but the idea that an abstract object is just a bunch of possible properties (assuming properties have prior availability) seems promising.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

6456	Sense-data are neutral uninterpreted experiences, separated from objects and judgements [Angeles]
	Full Idea: Sense-data are that which is given to us directly and immediately such as colour, shape, smell, without identification of them as specific material objects; they are usually thought to be devoid of judgment, interpretation, bias, preconception.
	From: Peter A. Angeles (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1981], p.254)
	A reaction: This definition makes them clearly mental (rather than being qualities of objects), and they sound like Hume's 'impressions'. They are not features of the external world, but the first steps we make towards experience.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection

10557	Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta]
	Full Idea: My object theory is formulated in a 'syntactically second-order' modal predicate calculus modified only so as to admit a second kind of atomic formula ('xF'), which asserts that object x 'encodes' property F.
	From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], p.2)
	A reaction: This is summarising Zalta's 1983 theory of abstract objects. See Idea 10558 for Zalta's idea in plain English.

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields

18202	The concept of a field gradually replaced the substances in explaining relations between charges [Einstein/Infeld]
	Full Idea: In the beginning the field concept was no more than a means of facilitating the understanding of phenomena. ...In the new field language it is the field and not the charges themselves which is essential. The substance was overshadowed by the field.
	From: Einstein,A/Infeld,L (The Evolution of Physics [1938], p.151), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.4
	A reaction: This is very important for philosophical metaphysicians, especially those like me who want to explain the universe by the nature of the stuff that composes it. The 'stuff' had better not be simplistic individual 'substances'.