Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Empedocles, Danielle Macbeth and Nicholas Rescher

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


29 ideas

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth]
     Full Idea: Peirce and Sellars takes Peirce's conception of meaning, on which pragmatism is founded, to support an adequate account of objective truth; James, Dewey and Rorty say it forecloses all possibility of such an account.
     From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.169)
     A reaction: Ah. Very helpful. I thought there was a pragmatic theory of truth, then began to think that it was just a denial of truth. I've long suspected that Peirce is wonderful, and James is not very good (on this topic).
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth]
     Full Idea: Ancient mathematical concepts were essentially sensory; they were not mathematical in our sense - that is, wholly constituted by their inferential potential.
     From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.187)
     A reaction: The latter view is Frege's, though I suppose it had been emerging for a couple of centuries before him. I like the Greek approach, and would love to see that reunited with the supposedly quite different modern view. (Keith Hossack is attempting it).
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: From what in no wise exists, it is impossible for anything to come into being; for Being to perish completely is incapable of fulfilment and unthinkable.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B012), quoted by Anon (Lyc) - On Melissus 975b1-4
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles claims that things are alternately changing and at rest - that they are changing whenever love is creating a unity out of plurality, or hatred is creating plurality out of unity, and they are at rest in the times in between.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 250b26
     A reaction: I suppose one must say that this an example of Ruskin's 'pathetic fallacy' - reading human emotions into the cosmos. Being constructive little creatures, we think goodness leads to construction. I'm afraid Empedocles is just wrong.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Process philosophy insists that processes are not inferior in being to substances [Rescher]
     Full Idea: Process philosophy diametrically opposes the view that denies processes or downgrades them in the order of being or of understanding by subordinating them to substantial things.
     From: Nicholas Rescher (Process Metaphysics [1996]), quoted by R.D. Ingthorsson - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 7
     A reaction: [No page cited - nr start?] Ingthorsson quotes this in order to challenge it, and says that substances are also processes, because change is essential to them.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles says there is no coming-to-be of anything, but only a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314b08
     A reaction: Aristotle comments that this prevents Empedocleans from distinguishing between superficial alteration and fundamental change of identity. Presumably, though, that wouldn't bother them.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
In the military, persons are parts of parts of large units, but not parts of those large units [Rescher]
     Full Idea: In military usage, persons can be parts of small units, and small units parts of large ones; but persons are never parts of large units.
     From: Nicholas Rescher (Axioms for the Part Relation [1955]), quoted by Achille Varzi - Mereology 2.1
     A reaction: This much-cited objection to the transitivity of the 'part' relation seems very odd. There could hardly be an army or a regiment if there weren't soldiers to make up parts of it.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: There is no creation of substance in any one of mortal existence, nor any end in execrable death, but only mixing and exchange of what has been mixed.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1111f
     A reaction: also Aristotle 314b08
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: One vision is produced by both eyes
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B088), quoted by Strabo - works 8.364.3
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth]
     Full Idea: As mathematically understood, the world is not an object of experience but instead an object of thought.
     From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.183)
     A reaction: Since I am keen on citing biology to show that science does not have to be mathematical, this nicely shows that there is something wrong with a science which places a large gap between itself and the world.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Wisdom and power of thought, know thou, are shared in by all things.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) II.286
     A reaction: Sextus quotes this, saying that it is 'still more paradoxical', and that it explicitly includes plants. This may mean that Empedocles was not including inanimate matter.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus]
     Full Idea: Empedocles assumes that thinking is either identical to or very similar to sense-perception.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], A86) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 9
     A reaction: Not to be sniffed at. We can, of course, control our thinking (though we can't control the controller) and we contemplate abstractions, but that might be seen as a sort of perception. Vision is not as visual as we think.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth]
     Full Idea: In the pragmatist view, the meaning of a concept is exhausted by its consequences.
     From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.173)
     A reaction: I'm unclear why the concept of a volcanic eruption only concerns its dire consequences, and is supposed to contain nothing of its causes. Pragmatists seem to be all future, and no past. Very American.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles was the first to give evil and good as principles.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 985a
     A reaction: Once you start to think that good and evil will only matter if they have causal powers, it is an easy step to the idea of a benevolent god, and a satanic anti-god. Otherwise the 'principles' could be ignored.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Nature is but a word of human framing.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1015a
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus]
     Full Idea: In Empedocles we have a dividing principle, 'Strife', set against 'Friendship' - which is the One and is to him bodiless, while the elements represent matter.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.09
     A reaction: The first time I've seen the principle of Love in Empedocles identified with the One of Parmenides. Plotinus is a trustworthy reporter, I think, because he was well read, and had access to lost texts.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, but that all the elements, including those which create motion, are six in number.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a16
Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood]
     Full Idea: Empedocles used numerical ratios to explain different kinds of matter; for example, bone is two parts water, four parts fire, two parts earth; and blood is an equal blend of all four elements.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Brad Inwood - Empedocles
     A reaction: Why isn't the ration 1:2:1? This presumably shows the influence of Pythagoras (who had also been based in Italy, like Empedocles), as well as that of the earlier naturalistic philosophers. It was a very good theory, though wrong.
Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements, and are thus 'simple' rather than flesh, bone and bodies which, like these, are 'homoeomeries'.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a26
     A reaction: The translation is not quite clear. I take it that flesh and bone may look simple, because they are homoeomerous, but they are not really - but what is his evidence for that? Compare Idea 13208.
All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: These elements never cease their continuous exchange, sometimes uniting under the influence of Love, so that all become One, at other times again moving apart through the hostile force of Hate.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1-
The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Empedocles says it is evident that all the other bodies down to the 'elements' have their coming-to-be and their passing-away: but it is not clear how the 'elements' themselves, severally in their aggregated masses, come-to-be and pass-away.
     From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325b20
     A reaction: Presumably the elements are like axioms - and are just given. How do electrons and quarks come-to-be?
Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles]
     Full Idea: It is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things moving', unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind.
     From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 333b23
     A reaction: I take this to be of interest for showing Aristotle's quest for explanations, and his unwillingness to be fobbed off with anything superficial. I take a task of philosophy to be to push explanations further than others wish to go.
If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Besides these elements, nothing else comes into being, nor does anything cease. For if they had been perishing continuously, they would Be no more; and what could increase the Whole? And whence could it have come?
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1-
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
We only see points in motion, and thereby infer movement [Rescher]
     Full Idea: We perceive motion only as isolated points, and then infer it without actually seeing it.
     From: Nicholas Rescher (Scepticism [1980], §112)
     A reaction: Note how writing suddenly becomes readable as you slow down on entering a railway station. Is that points suddenly becoming unified? This is an empiricist endorsement of Russell's 'at-at' account of motion.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Is it just an accident that teeth and other parts of the body seem to have some purpose, and creatures survive because they happen to be put together in a useful way? Everything else has been destroyed, as Empedocles says of his 'cow with human head'.
     From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], 61) by Aristotle - Physics 198b29
     A reaction: Good grief! Has no one ever noticed that Empedocles proposed the theory of evolution? It isn't quite natural selection, because we aren't told what does the 'destroying', but it is a little flash of genius that was quietly forgotten.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: God is equal in all directions to himself and altogether eternal, a rounded Sphere enjoying a circular solitude.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B028), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.15.2
God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: God is mind, holy and ineffable, and only mind, which darts through the whole cosmos with its swift thought.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B134), quoted by Ammonius - On 'De Interpretatione' 4.5.249.6
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles]
     Full Idea: It is a consequence of Empedocles' view that God is the most unintelligent thing, for he alone is ignorant of one of the elements, namely strife, whereas mortal creatures are familiar with them all.
     From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 410b08
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: Wretched is he who cares not for clear thinking about the gods.
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B132), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.140.5.1