118 ideas
13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
Full Idea: I would say that all worthwhile philosophy consists of synthetic theorizing, evaluated against experience. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: This is the view that philosophy is just science at a high level of abstraction, and he explicitly rejects 'conceptual analysis' as a fruitful activity. I need to take a stance on this one, but find I am in a state of paralysis. Welcome to philosophy... |
5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The concept of truth was originated by the senses. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.479) | |
A reaction: This is a refreshing challenge to the modern view of truth, which seems entirely entangled with language. Truth seems a useful concept when discussing the workings of an animal mind. As you get closer to an object, you see it more 'truly'. |
458 | Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: From what in no wise exists, it is impossible for anything to come into being; for Being to perish completely is incapable of fulfilment and unthinkable. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B012), quoted by Anon (Lyc) - On Melissus 975b1-4 |
5112 | Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles claims that things are alternately changing and at rest - that they are changing whenever love is creating a unity out of plurality, or hatred is creating plurality out of unity, and they are at rest in the times in between. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 250b26 | |
A reaction: I suppose one must say that this an example of Ruskin's 'pathetic fallacy' - reading human emotions into the cosmos. Being constructive little creatures, we think goodness leads to construction. I'm afraid Empedocles is just wrong. |
3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Some people view an externalist approach to epistemology as the essence of philosophical naturalism. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], Intro) | |
A reaction: I suspect philosophers avoid psychology and mental events, simply because they are elusive. Externalism is a theory about justification, and independent of naturalism as a metaphysic. |
13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Our empirically best-supported theories may commit us to certain abstract mathematical entities, but this does not necessarily mean that this is what justifies our commitment. That we are committed doesn't explain why we should be. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: A nice point. It is only a slightly gormless scientism which would say that we have to accept whatever scientists demand. Who's in charge here - scientists, mathematicians or philosophers? Don't answer that... |
13209 | There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles says there is no coming-to-be of anything, but only a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314b08 | |
A reaction: Aristotle comments that this prevents Empedocleans from distinguishing between superficial alteration and fundamental change of identity. Presumably, though, that wouldn't bother them. |
457 | Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: There is no creation of substance in any one of mortal existence, nor any end in execrable death, but only mixing and exchange of what has been mixed. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1111f | |
A reaction: also Aristotle 314b08 |
12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The truth condition of the belief is the 'normal' circumstances in which, given the learning process, it is biologically supposed to be present. | |
From: David Papineau (Reality and Representation [1987], p.67), quoted by Christopher Peacocke - A Study of Concepts 5.2 | |
A reaction: How do we account for a belief in ghosts in this story? The notion of 'normal' circumstances and what is 'biologically supposed' to happen don't seem very appropriate. This is the 'teleological' view of belief. |
13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
Full Idea: I am a fully paid up-naturalist, but I see no reason to deny that a priori knowledge is possible. My view is that a priori knowledge is unimportant (esp to philosophy). If there is a priori knowledge, it is analytic, true by the structure of our concepts. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to say it is the structure of our concepts, and another to infer that it is unimportant. I take the structure of our concepts to be a shadow cast by the structure of the world. E.g. the structure of numbers reveals the world. |
7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
Full Idea: We may say that a perceptual concept refers to that entity which normally causes classificatory uses of that concept...but this won't work because such deployments are often caused by things which the concept doesn't refer to. A model might cause 'bird'. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.6) | |
A reaction: This rejects the causal theory of perceptual concepts. I like the approach, because classifying things strikes me as absolutely basic to what brains do. To see that x is a bird is to place x in the class of birds. |
5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The structure of your reasoning must be rickety and defective, if the senses on which it rests are themselves deceptive. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.518) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as one of the most basic tenets of empiricism. It denies the existence of 'pure' reason, and instead asserts that it is built out of complex and abstracted sense experience, which makes it ultimately a second-class citizen. |
5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: What can be a surer guide to the distinction of true from false than our own senses? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.700) | |
A reaction: This doesn't say they are the only guide, which leaves room for guides such as what is consistent or self-evident or inferred. There is enough here, though, to show that the Epicureans were empiricists in a fairly modern way. |
13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Naturalists can allow for thought-experiments in philosophy. Intuitions play an important role, but only because they embody substantial information about the world. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: In this sense, intuitions are just memories which are too complex for us to articulate. They are not the intuitions of 'pure reason'. It is hard to connect the intuitive spotting of a proof with memories of the physical world. |
5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If a belief resting directly on the foundation of the senses is not valid, there will be no standard to which we can refer any doubt on obscure questions for rational confirmation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.422) | |
A reaction: A classic statement of empiricist foundationalism. The Epicureans don't appear to have any time for a priori truths at all. I wonder if they settled mathematical disputes by counting objects and drawing diagrams? |
5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Paradoxical experiences (such a dreams and illusions) cannot shake our faith in the senses. Most of the illusion is due to the mental assumptions we ourselves superimpose, so that things not perceived by the senses pass for perceptions. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.462) | |
A reaction: Some misinterpretations of the senses, such as thinking a square tower round, are the result of foolish lack of judgement, but actual delusions within the senses, such as a ringing in the ears, or a pain in a amputated leg, seem like real sense failures. |
462 | One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: One vision is produced by both eyes | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B088), quoted by Strabo - works 8.364.3 |
5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: No fact is so simple that it is not harder to believe than to doubt at the first presentation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1022) | |
A reaction: Hence induction is just 'drumming it in' until you come to believe it. There are good evolutionary reasons why we should be like this, because we would otherwise believe all sorts of silly half-perceptions in the gloaming. |
5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The guiding principle of the whole body is the mind or intellect, which is firmly lodged in the mid-region of the breast. Here is felt fear and alarm, and the caressing pulse of joy. Here, then is the seat of the intellect and mind. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.140) | |
A reaction: Even by this date thinking people were not clear that the mind is in the brain. They paid insufficient attention to head injuries. The emotions are felt to have a location, but intellect and principles are not. |
5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: First, I maintain that the mind, which we often call the intellect, the seat of guidance and control of life, is part of a man, no less than hand or foot or eyes are parts of a whole living creature. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.95) | |
A reaction: Presumably Lucretius asserts this because some people were denying it. Sounds like common sense to me. The only reason I can see for anyone denying what he says is if they are desperate to survive death. |
7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Anybody writing seriously about mind-brain issues nowadays needs to explain whether they think of materialism in terms of identity, token identity, realization, or supervenience. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6) | |
A reaction: Dualists are not invited. Functionalists are attending a different party. I wonder if his four categories collapse into two: the token/supervenience view, and the identity/realization view? |
7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Maybe physical effects of mental causes are always overdetermined by distinct causes (the 'belt and braces' view). Defenders say the two are still counterfactually dependent - but that would raise the question of why, if they are ontologically distinct. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: [He cites D.H. Mellor as defending 'belt and braces'] This strikes me as the sort of theory that arises from desperation: traditional dualism won't work, but we MUST keep mind separate, so that we can have free will, and save morality. All very confused! |
7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The classic manifestation of being able to think about other individuals' mental states is success on the 'false belief test', which requires attribution of mistaken representations to other agents. Children aged three or four can do this. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.7) | |
A reaction: There may be an other minds problem, but there is empirical evidence that we can 'read' the minds of others (from their behaviour) even if other animals can't. That seems to be clear, even if folk psychology is fiction, and we make mistakes. |
7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
Full Idea: There is debate about whether we attribute beliefs and desires to others, and predict their behaviour, by simulating the decisions we would make ourselves ('simulation-theory'), or by deducing them from some general theory ('theory-theory'). | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.7) | |
A reaction: Could be both. If someone is hurt, empathy leads to direct mind-reading (which seems like simulation), but if someone is behaving strangely we may have to bring theories to bear, because this person seems to be different. |
21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: No single element [of the soul] can be separated, nor can their capacities be divided spatially; they are like the multiple powers of a single body | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.262), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 2.7 | |
A reaction: It is interesting that this comes from someone with a strongly physicalist view of the mind (though not, if I recall, focusing on the brain). He is still totally impressed by the unified phenomenology of mental experience. He is an empiricist. |
7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
Full Idea: It is a mistake to suppose that research into phenomenal consciousness can proceed just like other kinds of scientific research. Phenomenal concepts are peculiar, and some of the questions they pose for empirical investigation are peculiar too. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.01) | |
A reaction: This arises from Papineau's Conceptual Dualism, that our concepts are deeply dualist, when the underlying ontology is not. Brain researchers are wise to ignore phenomenology, and creep slowly forward from the physical end, where the concepts are clear. |
7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Our phenomenal concepts are irredeemably vague in certain dimensions, in ways that preclude there being any fact of the matter about whether octopuses feel phenomenal pain, or silicon-based humanoids would have any phenomenal consciousness. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §7) | |
A reaction: It would be hard for Papineau to prove this point, but clearly our imagination finds it very hard to grasp the idea of a thing which is 'somewhat conscious'. The concept of being much more conscious than humans also bewilders us. |
7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Our phenomenal concept of consciousness-as-such is a crude tool, lacking theoretical articulation | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.13) | |
A reaction: This is a point well made. Given that the human brain is the most complex thing (for its size) in the known universe, we shouldn't expect it to divide up into three or four clear-cut activities. Compare the precision of 'geography' as a concept. |
7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
Full Idea: If consciousness is availability for HOT judgements, then cats are not conscious, but if it consists in attention, then they are. I say the concept of consciousness is indefinite between the two, so there is no fact about whether cats are conscious. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.16) | |
A reaction: Nice point. My personal view is that the question of whether cats are conscious is hopeless because philosophers insist on making consciousness all-or-nothing (e.g. Idea 5786). If I experienced cat mentality, I might say I was 'semi-conscious'. |
7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The thesis of 'representational theories of consciousness' is that a creature is conscious just in case it is in a certain kind of representational state, some state which represents in a certain way. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002]) | |
A reaction: [He cites Harman, Dretske and Tye] The immediate impediment I see to this view is the extreme difficulty of explaining what the special 'way' is that turns representations into consciousness. Some mental states are not representational, and vice versa. |
7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The 'actualist' HOT theory says that a state is conscious if the subject is 'aware' of it, where this is understood as a matter of the subject forming some actual Higher-Order judgement about it. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.11) | |
A reaction: As stated there seems an obvious regress problem. Is the consciousness in the mental state, or in the higher awareness of it? If the former, how does being observed make it conscious? If the latter, what gives the higher level its consciousness? |
7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Actualist HOT theories face an awkward problem with memory judgements: ...how can an earlier mental state be rendered conscious by some later act of memory? As when I see a red pillar box with no higher-order judgement, and then recall it later. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.11) | |
A reaction: [See 7886 for 'Actualist' HOT theories] This is not altogether absurd. A red pillar box could be somewhere in my field of vision, and then I might suddenly become conscious of it (if it moved!). Police interrogation reminds me of what I only glimpsed. |
7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The 'dispositional' HOT thesis says that a state is conscious just in case it could have been the subject of an introspective Higher-Order judgement, even if it wasn't actually so subject. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.13) | |
A reaction: [He cites Dennett and Carruthers for this view] This is designed to meet other problems, but it sounds odd. Does it really make no difference whether higher-judgement actually occurs? How can conscious events be distinguished once they've gone? |
7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Dispositional Higher-Order judgeability will be present in some cases which the empirical methodology catalogues as not conscious (as when a subject denies having heard a sound, or seen a bird). | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.13) | |
A reaction: (This attacks Idea 7887) This confirms my intuition, that we can be quite unconscious of things which can still be recalled at a later date. Of course, one could always challenge the reliability of the subject's report in such a case. |
5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The fact that the mind itself has no internal necessity to determine its every act and compel it to suffer in helpless passivity - this is due to the slight swerve of the atoms at no determinate time or place. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.294) | |
A reaction: No one likes this proposal much, but it is very intriguing. The Epicureans had seen a problem, one which doesn't bother me much. If, nowadays, you are a reductive physicalist who believes in free will, you have a philosophical nightmare ahead of you. |
5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing can touch or be touched except body. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.303) | |
A reaction: This is the key objection to interactionism, and the main reason why the atomists have a thoroughly material view of the mind. It is an induction from a very large number of instances, but the argument is not, of course, conclusive. |
5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The earth is and always has been an insentient being. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.658) | |
A reaction: The fact that Epicurus needs to deny this shows that some idea close to panpsychism must still have been around in his time. He is discussing gods at the time, so maybe pantheism was the view being attacked, but that is a subset of panpsychism. |
22765 | Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Wisdom and power of thought, know thou, are shared in by all things. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) II.286 | |
A reaction: Sextus quotes this, saying that it is 'still more paradoxical', and that it explicitly includes plants. This may mean that Empedocles was not including inanimate matter. |
5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: There is the possibility that particles have senses like those of an animate being as a whole, …but from the fact that we perceive eggs turning into live fledglings, we may infer that sense can be generated from the insentient. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.914) | |
A reaction: He gives other arguments for his view. The egg example is not a strong argument, but is precisely our puzzle of how consciousness can emerge from the process of evolution, and natural selection makes dualism look unlikely. |
7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
Full Idea: If epiphenomenalism were true, then the relation between mind and brain would be like nothing else in nature. After all, science recognises no other examples of 'causal danglers', ontologically independent states with causes but no effects. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This would be a good enough reason for me to reject the epiphenomenalist view, even if I thought it was a coherent proposal. Insofar as it proposes the existence of something (mind) with no causal powers at all, it strikes me as nonsense. |
7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Even if conscious decisions did not contribute causally to the actions normally attributed to them, they would still presumably be the causes of the sounds I make when I later report my earlier conscious decisions. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This is a good reply to my view (borrowed from Dennett - Idea 7379), that epiphenomalism proposes an absurdity (an entity with no causal powers). But if mind can cause speech, why could it not cause arm movements? |
3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Even dualists must explain how the mind represents things, but then their mind-stuff has so many special powers already (being outside space but in time, being transparent to itself etc.) that one more scarcely seems worth worrying about. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 3.1 n1) | |
A reaction: I share the exasperation. It is hard to see how a dualist could even begin to formulate a theory about HOW the mind does so many different things. Could Descartes get a research grant for it? Would we understand God if he tried to explain it to us? |
3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The functionalist approach to the mind needs to invoke assumptions about what desires are for and beliefs are about, in order to infer what agents will do. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Isn't the idea that you discover what desires are for and what beliefs are about by examining their function, and what the agent does? Which end should we start? |
7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Role concepts can be of two kinds: they can name whichever property realises the role, or they can name the higher property which constitutes the role. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.2 n1) | |
A reaction: This points strikes me as being crucial to discussions of mental functions. Perhaps labels of Realising Properties and Constituting Properties would help. Analytical philosophy rules. |
7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
Full Idea: If causes are basic particulars, then the causal argument won't carry you to the identity of conscious and physical properties, since this only requires them to be instantiated in the same particular, not that the properties are themselves identical. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.3) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 7857; Papineau is rejecting the Davidson view] This explains how Davidson reaches a token-token identity view. Can two events occur in the same particular at the same moment? Depends what you mean by a 'particular'. |
3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Supervenience is a necessary condition for physicalism, but it is not sufficient. Epiphenomenalism rules out mental variation without physical variation, but says mental properties are quite distinct from physical properties. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 1.2) | |
A reaction: I take full epiphenomenalism about mind to be incoherent, and not worth even mentioning (see Idea 7379). Papineau seems to be thinking of so-called property dualism (which may also be incoherent!). |
3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The argument for supervenience rests on the principle that any mental difference must be capable of showing itself in differential physical consequences. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 1.8) | |
A reaction: With our current knowledge of the brain, to assume anything less than this sort of correlation would be crazy. |
7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
Full Idea: I would argue that any benefits offered by the notion of supervenience are more easily gained simply by identifying mental properties directly with higher-order properties or disjunctions of physical properties. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.8) | |
A reaction: Those who talk of supervenience seem to me to have retreated into a mystery that is not far from substance dualism. We want the explanation of a supervenience. If you accompany me everywhere, I think you are stalking me, or are tied to my ankle. |
3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Physicalism does not deny that there are conscious experiences, nor that 'it is like something to have them'. The claim is only that this is nothing different from what it is to be a physical system of the relevant kind. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 4.2) | |
A reaction: The implication is that no physicalist is an extreme eliminativist about consciousness, which seems to be correct. We all concede that weather exists, but have a reductive view of it. The key question is whether mind is reducible to physics. |
7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Without the completeness of physics, there is no compelling reason to identify the mind with the brain. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], App 7) | |
A reaction: Papineau says the completeness of physics was accepted from the 1950s. Why were Epicurus and Hobbes physicalists? Do we have a circularity here? How do you establish the completeness of physics, without asserting mind to be physical? |
5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Mind and spirit are both composed of matter, as we see them propelling limbs, rousing the body from sleep, changing the expression of the face, and guiding the whole man - activities which clearly involves touch, which involves matter. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.164) | |
A reaction: This is the inverse of Descartes' interaction problem, and strikes me as a straightforward common sense truth. However, if you believe in spiritual gods, this gives you a model for the interaction (however mysterious) of matter and spirit. |
5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Why are lions ferocious, foxes crafty, and deer timid? It can only be because the mind always shares in the specific growth of the body according to its seed and breed. If it were immortal and reincarnated, living things would have jumbled characters. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.743) | |
A reaction: A nice argument which I have not encountered in modern times. Of course, even Descartes admits that the mind is intermingled with the body, but it seems that the essential character of a mind is dictated by the body. |
5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: One can laugh without being composed of laughing particles, ..so why cannot the things that we see gifted with sensation be compounded of seeds that are wholly senseless? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.988) | |
A reaction: Lovely argument! You might feel driven to panpsychism in your desperation to explain the 'weirdness' of consciousness, but it would be mad to attribute laughter to basic matter, so comedy has to 'emerge' at some point. |
7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Mind-brain reductions are less explanatory than characteristic reductions in other areas of science, ...because phenomenal concepts have no special associations with causal roles. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 5.3) | |
A reaction: This may always have some truth in it, but I would expect reductive accounts in the far future to get much closer to giving explanations of phenomenal experience. We can't work down from the phenomenal end, but we can work up from the physical/causal end. |
20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Weak reduction of mind requires only that mental causes be identified with physical causes. A strong reduction requires also that the laws by which such causes operate follow by composition from non-special laws. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], App 3 n8) | |
A reaction: I'm cautious about laws, but I still vote for strong reduction. No new principles are needed to make a mind from a brain. |
7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Many effects that we attribute to conscious causes have full physical causes. But it would be absurd to suppose that these effects are caused twice over. So the conscious causes must be identical to some part of those physical causes. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [Papineau labelled this the Causal Argument] Of course two causes can combine to produce an effect, and there can be redundant physical overcausation, but in general I think this is a good argument. |
7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
Full Idea: We should be ontological monists, but we should be conceptual dualists. We need to recognise a special phenomenal way of thinking about conscious properties, if we are to dispel the confusions that persuade us that conscious properties cannot be material. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.01) | |
A reaction: This idea came to me as a revelation, and strikes me as spot on. We have developed conceptual dualism simply because humans cannot directly see that their thinking is actually physical brain activity. Thought seems ungrounded, and utterly different. |
3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
Full Idea: If functionalism implies that there is nothing physically in common among the realisations of a given mental state, then there is no possibility of any uniform explanation of why they all give rise to a common physical result. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This is the well known interaction problem for dualism. The standard reply is to accept interaction as a given (with no apparent explanation). A miracle, if you like. |
7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
Full Idea: While there is indeed a before-after difference in Mary, this is just a matter of coming to think in new ways, and acquiring a new concept. There is no new experiential property. She could think about the property perfectly well, using material concepts. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I think it is better to talk of Mary encountering a new mode of experiencing something, just as experience becomes blurred when glasses are removed. No one acquires new 'knowledge' of blurred objects when they remove their glasses. |
7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Thinking about something doesn't require activating some version of it. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §5) | |
A reaction: E.g. I can discuss 'red' without visualising it. This observation strikes me as simple and basic to what thinking is. Papineau thinks that confusion about this simple point leads to major errors in the philosophy of mind. |
1524 | For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: Empedocles assumes that thinking is either identical to or very similar to sense-perception. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], A86) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 9 | |
A reaction: Not to be sniffed at. We can, of course, control our thinking (though we can't control the controller) and we contemplate abstractions, but that might be seen as a sort of perception. Vision is not as visual as we think. |
7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Conscious states clearly affect our bodily movements. But surely anything that so produces a material effect must itself be a material state. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6) | |
A reaction: This is Papineau's simplest possible statement of what he calls the Causal Argument, which he considers to be a knock-down argument for materialism. I agree, but it is really only an intuition. You never know... |
16369 | There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati] |
Full Idea: For Papineau there is just one file, which is initialised on the first encounter with the object, stored in memory, reactivated on further encounters, and consolidated with familiarity. Accumulation of information shows it is the same file. | |
From: report of David Papineau (Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts [2006]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 7.2 | |
A reaction: Recanati attempts to refute this view, defending a more complex taxonomy of files. I'm sympathetic to Papineau, as distinct shift in file type doesn't sound very plausible. Simplicity suggests Papineau as a better starting-point. |
7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Broadness of content is sometimes defended purely on intuitive grounds, but it is also a corollary of most reductive accounts of representation, including standard teleosemantic and causal accounts. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002]) | |
A reaction: (For Causal and Teleosemantic views, see Idea 7871, Idea 7872) Presumably a causal/purposeful relationship would only make sense if both halves of the relationship were specified. I suspect this is obscured by over-simplifications. Cf Idea 6634! |
7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
Full Idea: How can 'broad contents', which hinge on matters outside your head, exert a causal influence on your bodily movements? Surely your bodily movements are causally influenced solely by matters inside your skin, not by how matters are outside you. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This supports my suspicion that there are some extremely simplistic interpretations of the Twin Earth case floating around. If Putnam means by 'elm' whatever experts mean, it is still his idea of what counts as an expert view. |
7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The verificationist sin is to infer an indefiniteness of answers immediately from the undecidability of questions. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.02) | |
A reaction: This remark is aimed at Dummett's anti-realism. It strikes me that what is being described really is a sort of arrogance, in believing that reality can somehow be inferred from studying the epistemic apparatus of a few miserable little mammals. |
13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Verificationism about concepts implies that thinkers will not share concepts with adherents of theories they reject. Those who reject the phlogiston theory will not possess the same concept as adherents, so cannot say 'there is no phlogiston'. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge [2010], §6) | |
A reaction: The point seems to be more general - that it is hard to see how you can have a concept of anything which doesn't actually exist, if the concept is meant to rest on some sort of empirical verification. |
7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The teleosemantic view of perceptual concepts is that the referential value of the concept can be equated with those items which it is the biological function of the concept to track. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.6) | |
A reaction: This seems to work quite nicely for 'bird', which is concept which is used to track birds. It might even work for complex entities, or abstract entities, or even negative entities. Imagination must play a role in that last one. |
7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Basing content on possible worlds that result in truth leaves no room for thoughts about genuine impossibilities, since there are not possible worlds whose actuality would make an 'impossible thought' true. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 3.7) | |
A reaction: Negative existentials like 'no rabbits in this room' and 'no snakes in this room' seem to have the same truth conditions as well. I suppose the sentences must be translated into a logical form which suits the theory, with negation stuck on the end. |
7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The content of our thoughts can be equated with those possible worlds whose actuality would make the thought true. On this model, a true thought is one whose content includes the actual world, while a false thought is one whose content does not. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 3.7) | |
A reaction: This is the possible worlds semantics version of truth conditions theories of meaning. Papineau offers a nice difficulty for the theory (Idea 7869). Dummett says the whole approach is circular, because content precedes truth. |
3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
Full Idea: I take the moral of the Private Language argument to be that there must be room for error in people's judgements about their experiences, not that those judgements must necessarily be expressed in a language used by a community. | |
From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 4.4 n10) | |
A reaction: These two readings don't seem to be in conflict, and the argument must have something to say about the communal nature of thought expressed in language. Language imposes introspection on us? |
6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: What is food to one may be literally poison to others. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.638) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the origin of the well-known saying. This is not relativism of perception, but a relativism of how individuals actually respond to the world. It sums up the position with, say, the operas of Wagner. |
5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing in our bodies was born in order that we might be able to use it, but the thing born creates the use. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.834) | |
A reaction: This remark (strongly opposed to Aristotle's view of human function and nature) raises the obvious question of why the body is so very useful for staying alive. Most of its uses are not random. Lucretius would abandon this view if he read Darwin. |
5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: One who no longer is cannot suffer, or differ in any way from one who has never been born. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.867) | |
A reaction: There is a special kind of pain in being poor if you were once rich, which is not suffered by those who experience only poverty. Lucretius is right, but we are concerned with how we feel now, not with how we won't feel once dead. |
552 | Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles was the first to give evil and good as principles. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 985a | |
A reaction: Once you start to think that good and evil will only matter if they have causal powers, it is an easy step to the idea of a benevolent god, and a satanic anti-god. Otherwise the 'principles' could be ignored. |
5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nature only clamours for two things, a body free from pain, a mind released from worry and fear for the enjoyment of pleasurable sensation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.21) | |
A reaction: I can't help agreeing with those (like Aristotle) who consider this a very demeaning view of human life. See Idea 99. Bentham agrees with Lucretius (Idea 3777). I think they are largely right, but not entirely. Other motives are possible than sensations. |
589 | 'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Nature is but a word of human framing. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1015a |
5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nature is free and uncontrolled by proud masters and runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1094) | |
A reaction: A nice remark. This apparent personification of nature implies the application of laws to an essentially passive reality. See Idea 5442 and Nature|Laws of Nature|Essentialism for a different view. |
5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: There can be no centre in infinity. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.1069) | |
A reaction: This is highly significant, because if we can establish that the universe is infinite (as Epicurus believes), it follows that the human race cannot be at the centre of it, as the Ptolemaic/medieval view proposed. |
5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The universe is not bounded in any direction. If it were, it would necessarily have a limit somewhere, but a thing cannot have a limit unless there is something outside to limit it. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.959) | |
A reaction: This is a subtler argument than the mere enquiry about why you would have to stop at the end of the universe. It still seems a nice argument, though Einstein's curvature of space seems to have thwarted it. |
21823 | The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: In Empedocles we have a dividing principle, 'Strife', set against 'Friendship' - which is the One and is to him bodiless, while the elements represent matter. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.09 | |
A reaction: The first time I've seen the principle of Love in Empedocles identified with the One of Parmenides. Plotinus is a trustworthy reporter, I think, because he was well read, and had access to lost texts. |
2680 | Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, but that all the elements, including those which create motion, are six in number. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a16 |
6002 | Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood] |
Full Idea: Empedocles used numerical ratios to explain different kinds of matter; for example, bone is two parts water, four parts fire, two parts earth; and blood is an equal blend of all four elements. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Brad Inwood - Empedocles | |
A reaction: Why isn't the ration 1:2:1? This presumably shows the influence of Pythagoras (who had also been based in Italy, like Empedocles), as well as that of the earlier naturalistic philosophers. It was a very good theory, though wrong. |
13207 | Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements, and are thus 'simple' rather than flesh, bone and bodies which, like these, are 'homoeomeries'. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a26 | |
A reaction: The translation is not quite clear. I take it that flesh and bone may look simple, because they are homoeomerous, but they are not really - but what is his evidence for that? Compare Idea 13208. |
459 | All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: These elements never cease their continuous exchange, sometimes uniting under the influence of Love, so that all become One, at other times again moving apart through the hostile force of Hate. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1- |
13218 | The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Empedocles says it is evident that all the other bodies down to the 'elements' have their coming-to-be and their passing-away: but it is not clear how the 'elements' themselves, severally in their aggregated masses, come-to-be and pass-away. | |
From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325b20 | |
A reaction: Presumably the elements are like axioms - and are just given. How do electrons and quarks come-to-be? |
13225 | Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
Full Idea: It is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things moving', unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind. | |
From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 333b23 | |
A reaction: I take this to be of interest for showing Aristotle's quest for explanations, and his unwillingness to be fobbed off with anything superficial. I take a task of philosophy to be to push explanations further than others wish to go. |
460 | If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Besides these elements, nothing else comes into being, nor does anything cease. For if they had been perishing continuously, they would Be no more; and what could increase the Whole? And whence could it have come? | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1- |
5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The ultimate realities of heaven and the gods are the atoms, from which nature creates all things and increases and feeds them, and into which, when they perish, nature again resolves them. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.46) | |
A reaction: Sounds right to me. Nothing in modern particle theory and string theory has refuted this claim. But what makes the atoms move, and what makes them combine in an orderly way? Is the orderliness of atoms made of atoms? Essences? |
5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If there are no atoms, the smallest bodies will have infinite parts, since they can be endlessly halved. ..But then there will be no difference between the smallest thing and the whole universe, as they will equally have infinite parts. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.620) | |
A reaction: Another argument which remains effective even now. There must surely (intuitively) be more divisions possible in a large object than in a small one? Unless of course there were many different sizes of infinity…. See Cantor. |
5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: When atoms are travelling straight down through empty space by their own weight, at quite indeterminate times and places they swerve ever so little from their course. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.217) | |
A reaction: Never a popular theory because it seems to breach the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Ideas 306 + 3646). This seems to be the beginning of a strong need for the concept of free will, and an underlying explanation. Most thinkers put mind outside nature. |
7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Any serious theory of the mind-brain must explain whether it thinks of causation in terms of events, facts, or states of affairs. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6) | |
A reaction: I instantly prefer events, simply because they can be specified a little more precisely than the other two. Since cause has a direction in time, it would be nice to specify the times of its components, and events have times. |
7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
Full Idea: One view of causes is that they are facts, or instantiations of properties (maybe by particulars, making them 'Kim-events'); the alternative view is that causes themselves are basic particulars ('Davidson-events'). | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Like Papineau, I incline to the Kim view. It is too easy for philosophers to treat key ideas as unanalysable axioms of thought. An event typically has components and features. It is a contingent matter whether there are any events. |
17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing has power to break the binding laws of eternity. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], 5.56) | |
A reaction: This seems to be virtually the only remark from the ancient world suggesting that there are 'laws' of nature, so I'm guessing it is a transient metaphor, not a theory about nature. 'Even the gods must bow to necessity'. |
20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
Full Idea: There is no knock down argument for the completeness of physics. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], App 7) | |
A reaction: This is commendably honest, given that he pins his view of the mind on it. He makes the case sound overwhelming, though. The thing which would breach the completeness is like the Loch Ness monster - you can't prove it isn't there, if it hides. |
20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
Full Idea: We can accept determinism without accepting physical determinism, and so without accepting the completeness of physics. ...We can have a deterministic model in which sui generis mental forces play an essential role. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], App 3) | |
A reaction: Papineau cites (on p.241) the 18th century biologist Robert Whytt as an example of this view. |
20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
Full Idea: In the 1950s a great deal became known about biochemical and neurophysiological processes, especially at the level of the cell, and none of it gave any evidence for the existence of special forces not found elsewhere in nature. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], A 6) | |
A reaction: Papineau says that this plus the conservation of energy makes the closure of physics faily conclusive. I would think the similar failure of modern research into the brain to find evidence of weird forces strengthens the case. |
5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: We see movement everywhere, but if there were no empty space, things would be denied the power of movement - or rather, they could not possibly have come into existence, embedded as they would have been in motionless matter. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.342) | |
A reaction: This still seems a good argument, if reality is made of particles. People can move in a crowd until it becomes too dense. |
5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Atoms move themselves. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.133) | |
A reaction: Something has to move itself, I suppose, but then that could be psuché, giving us free will (see Idea 1424). Why does Epicurus need the 'swerve' if atoms are self-movers? See Idea 5708. |
20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The conservation of energy is apparently violated by 'wave collapses' in quantum systems. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], A 7 n15) | |
A reaction: One could imagine it being a little harder to verify the conservation of energy at the quantum levels, where particles and anti-particles pop in and out of existence. I've been wondering why there is some suspicion of collapses. |
5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Anything can be more speedily disintegrated than put together again. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.558) | |
A reaction: Clearly the concept of entropy was around long before anyone tried to give a systematic or mathematical account of it. |
5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It must not be claimed that anyone can sense time by itself apart from the movement of things or their restful immobility. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.465) | |
A reaction: This seems a remarkably Einsteinian remark, though he is only talking of the epistemology of the matter, not the ontology. We are not far from the concept of space-time here. |
5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It is in the highest degree unlikely that this earth and sky is the only one to have been created. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1057) | |
A reaction: I can only admire the science fiction imagination of this, which roughly agrees with the assessment of modern cosmologists. We think imagination was cramped in the ancient world, and now wanders free - but that is not so. |
5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: In studying the workings of nature, our starting-point will be this principle: nothing can ever be created by divine power out of nothing. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.152) | |
A reaction: This claim seems to cry out for a bit of empiricist caution. What observation has convinced Lucretius that creation out of nothing is impossible? The early Christians switched to the view that divine creation is 'ex nihilo' - out of nothing. |
5090 | Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Is it just an accident that teeth and other parts of the body seem to have some purpose, and creatures survive because they happen to be put together in a useful way? Everything else has been destroyed, as Empedocles says of his 'cow with human head'. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], 61) by Aristotle - Physics 198b29 | |
A reaction: Good grief! Has no one ever noticed that Empedocles proposed the theory of evolution? It isn't quite natural selection, because we aren't told what does the 'destroying', but it is a little flash of genius that was quietly forgotten. |
466 | God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: God is mind, holy and ineffable, and only mind, which darts through the whole cosmos with its swift thought. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B134), quoted by Ammonius - On 'De Interpretatione' 4.5.249.6 |
461 | God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: God is equal in all directions to himself and altogether eternal, a rounded Sphere enjoying a circular solitude. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B028), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.15.2 |
1719 | In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
Full Idea: It is a consequence of Empedocles' view that God is the most unintelligent thing, for he alone is ignorant of one of the elements, namely strife, whereas mortal creatures are familiar with them all. | |
From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 410b08 |
5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If the matter in things had not been everlasting, everything by now would have gone back to nothing, and the things we see would be the product of rebirth out of nothing. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.544) | |
A reaction: See Idea 1431, which is Aquinas's Third Way of proving God. Aquinas thinks there must be a necessary being outside of the system, but Lucretius thinks there must be some necessary existence within the system (as Hume had suggested). |
5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The universe was certainly not created for us by divine power: it is so full of imperfections. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.180) | |
A reaction: This is certainly a problem if God is 'supremely perfect', as Descartes proposed, because then the universe would also have to be supremely perfect. See Idea 2114 for a possible answer from Leibniz. Hume agrees with Epicurus about design. |
5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The nature of deity is to enjoy immortal existence in utter tranquillity, aloof and detached from our affairs. It is free from all pain and peril, strong in its own resources, exempt from any need of us, indifferent to our merits and immune from anger. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.652) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the seed of late seventeenth century deism - the idea of a Creator who is now absent, and ignores our prayers. At that time 'Epicurean' became a synonym for atheist, but Epicureans never quite reached that point. |
5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Why does Jupiter never hurl his thunderbolt upon the earth and let loose his thunder out of a sky that is wholly blue? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], VI.400) | |
A reaction: Nice question! It really doesn't take very much to see through superstition, and the fact that most people believed such things shows how staggeringly uncritical they were in their thinking, until philosophers appeared and taught them how to reason. |
1522 | It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Wretched is he who cares not for clear thinking about the gods. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B132), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.140.5.1 |
5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If spirit is immortal and can remain sentient when divorced from our body, we must credit it with possession of five senses; but eyes or nostrils or hand or tongue or ears cannot be attached to a disembodied spirit. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.624) | |
A reaction: This is a powerful argument against immortality. If you are going to see, you must interact with photons; to hear you must respond to compression waves; to smell you must react to certain molecules. Immortality without those would be a bit dull. |
5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It is crazy to couple a mortal object with an eternal and suppose that they can work in harmony and mutually interact. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.799) | |
A reaction: An interesting thought, though not a terrible persuasive argument. A god would indeed be a bit restless if it were chained to a human being, but it would presumably knuckle down to the task if firmly instructed to do it by Zeus. |
5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Spirit is mortal. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.542) | |
A reaction: This is asserted at an historical moment when immortality is beginning to grip everyone's imagination. |
5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Since the substance of the mind is extraordinarily mobile, it must consist of particles exceptionally small and smooth and round, ..so that, when the spirit has escaped from the body, the outside of the limbs appears intact and there is no loss of weight. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.201) | |
A reaction: Lucretius is wonderfully attentive to interesting evidence. He goes on to compare it to the evaporation of perfume. The fine-grained connections of the brain are not far off what he is proposing. |
5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If the spirit is by nature immortal and is slipped into the body at birth, why do we retain no memory of an earlier existence, no impress of antecedent events? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.670) | |
A reaction: Plato took the view that we do recall previous existence, as seen in our innate ideas. This problem forced the Christian church into the uncomfortable claim that God creates the soul at conception, but that it then goes on to immortality. |