49 ideas
6259 | Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: Why cannot a wise man dare to doubt anything and everything? | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0562) | |
A reaction: This question seems to be the start of the Enlightenment Project, of attempting to prove everything. MacIntyre warns of the dangers of this in ethical theory. The story of modern philosophy is the discovery of its impossibility. E.g. Davidson on truth. |
6263 | No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: Take a beam wide enough to walk along: suspend it between two towers: there is no philosophical wisdom, however firm, which could make us walk along it just as we would if we were on the ground. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0672) | |
A reaction: This proposes great scepticism about the practical application of philosophical wisdom, but if we talk in terms of the wise assessment of risk in any undertaking, our caution on the raised beam makes perfectly good sense. |
23122 | Montaigne was the founding father of liberalism [Montaigne, by Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The first liberal, the founding father if we have one, is the great sixteenth century French essayist Michel de Montaigne. | |
From: report of Michel de Montaigne (On Cruelty [1580]) by Adam Gopnik - A Thousand Small Sanities 1 | |
A reaction: He says this not on the basis of his politicies or achievements, but his general attitudes and values. It may be another hundred years before we can identify another obvious liberal (Locke?). |
5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
Full Idea: I believe it is worth considering imaginary cases (such as Teletransportation), as we can use them to discover, not what the truth is, but what we believe. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.293) | |
A reaction: The trouble is that we might say that IF I were suddenly turned into a pig, then I would come to believe in dualism, but that will not and cannot happen, because dualism is false. It seems essential to accept the natural possibility of the case. |
6258 | Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: The distinctive mark of the Truth we hold ought to be virtue, which is the most exacting mark of Truth, the closest one to heaven and the most worthy thing that Truth produces. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0493) | |
A reaction: A long way from Tarski and minimalist theories of truth! But not so far from pragmatism. Personally I think Montaigne is making an important claim, which virtue theorists should be attempting to incorporate into their theory. Aristotle would sympathise. |
458 | Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: From what in no wise exists, it is impossible for anything to come into being; for Being to perish completely is incapable of fulfilment and unthinkable. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B012), quoted by Anon (Lyc) - On Melissus 975b1-4 |
5112 | Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles claims that things are alternately changing and at rest - that they are changing whenever love is creating a unity out of plurality, or hatred is creating plurality out of unity, and they are at rest in the times in between. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 250b26 | |
A reaction: I suppose one must say that this an example of Ruskin's 'pathetic fallacy' - reading human emotions into the cosmos. Being constructive little creatures, we think goodness leads to construction. I'm afraid Empedocles is just wrong. |
5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
Full Idea: We can distinguish Identifying Reductionism (as in 'persons are bodies'), or Constitutive Reductionism (as in 'persons are distinct, but consist of thoughts etc.'), or Eliminative Reductionism (as in 'there are no persons, only thoughts etc.'). | |
From: report of Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.295) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: Constitutive Reductionism seems the most common one, as in 'chemistry just consists of lots of complicated physics'. He doesn't mention bridge laws, which are presumably only required in more complicated cases of constitutive reduction. |
6262 | We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: We may all lack some sense or other; because of that defect, most of the features of objects may be concealed from us. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0666) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as simple, straightforward common sense, and right. I cannot make sense of the claim that reality really is just the way it appears. We do not have a built-in neutrino detector, for example. |
13209 | There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles says there is no coming-to-be of anything, but only a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314b08 | |
A reaction: Aristotle comments that this prevents Empedocleans from distinguishing between superficial alteration and fundamental change of identity. Presumably, though, that wouldn't bother them. |
457 | Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: There is no creation of substance in any one of mortal existence, nor any end in execrable death, but only mixing and exchange of what has been mixed. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1111f | |
A reaction: also Aristotle 314b08 |
6260 | Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: Pyrrhonians say that truth and falsehood exist; within us we have means of looking for them, but not of making any lasting judgements: we have no touchstone. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0564) | |
A reaction: This states the key difference between sceptics and relativists. The latter are more extreme as they say there is no such thing as truth. The former concede truth, and their scepticism is about the abilities of human beings. I am an anti-relativist. |
462 | One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: One vision is produced by both eyes | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B088), quoted by Strabo - works 8.364.3 |
6261 | The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: The seat of the powers of the soul is in the brain, as is clearly shown by the fact that wounds and accidents affecting the head immediately harm the faculties of the soul. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0614) | |
A reaction: At last someone has finally got the facts clear. It seems surprising that the Greeks never clearly grasped this piece of irrefutable evidence - even those Greeks who speculated that the brain was the key. Here we have a fixed fact of philosophy of mind. |
3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
Full Idea: For Parfit all personal identity really amounts to is a chain of experiences and other psychological features causally related to each other in 'direct' sorts of ways. | |
From: report of Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 10.5 | |
A reaction: When summarised like this, it strikes me that Parfit is just false to our experience, whatever Hume may say. I suspect that Parfit (and those like him) concentrate too much on rather passive perceptual experience, and neglect the will. |
5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
Full Idea: When psychologists discuss identity, they are typically concerned with the kind of person someone is, or wants to be (as in an 'identity crisis'). But when philosophers discuss identity, it is numerical identity they mean. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.293) | |
A reaction: I think it is important to note that the philosophical problem breaks down into two areas: whether I have numerical identity with myself over time, and whether other people have it. It may be that two different sets of criteria will emerge. |
1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
Full Idea: If I say 'It will not be me, but one of my future selves', I do not imply that I will be that future self. He is one of my later selves, and I am one of his earlier selves. There is no underlying person we both are. | |
From: Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971], §5) | |
A reaction: The problem here seems to be explaining why I should care about my later self, if it isn't me. If the answer is only that it will be psychologically very similar to me, then I would care more about my current identical twin than about my future self. |
5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
Full Idea: If the two halves of my brain are transplanted into different bodies just like mine, they cannot both be me, since that would make them the same person. ..But my relation to these two contains everything that matters, so identity is not what matters. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.314) | |
A reaction: I challenge his concept of what 'matters'. He has a rather solipsistic view of the problem, and I take Parfit to be a rather unsociable person, since his friends and partner will be keenly interested in the identities of the new beings. |
5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |
Full Idea: We should revise our view about identity over time: what matters isn't that there will be someone alive who will be me; it is rather that there should be at least one living person who will be psychologically continuous with me as I am now. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.316) | |
A reaction: Parfit and Locke seem to agree on this, and it is no accident that they both like 'science fiction' examples. Apparently Parfit wouldn't bat an eyelid if someone threatened to cut his corpus callosum. I rate it as a catastrophe for my current existence. |
1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
Full Idea: In the case of the man who, like an amoeba, divides….we can suggest that he survives as two different people without implying that he is those people. | |
From: Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971], §1) | |
A reaction: Maybe an amoeba is a homogeneous substance for which splitting is insignificant, but when a person has certain parts that are totally crucial, splitting them is catastrophic, and quite different. I'm not sure that splitting a self would leave persons. |
5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
Full Idea: If I am largely paralysed, and my twin brother is dying of brain disease, then if the operation to graft my head onto his body is offered, I should accept the operation, and it is irrelevant whether this person would be me. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.308) | |
A reaction: Parfit notes that the brain is a particularly significant part of the process. The fact that I might cheerfully accept this offer without philosophical worries doesn't get rid of the question 'who is this person?' Who should they remain married to? |
5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
Full Idea: If there is someone with my head and my brother's body, it is a merely verbal question whether that person will be me, and that is why, even if it won't be me, that doesn't matter. ..What matters is not identity, but the facts of which identity consists. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.310) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that from the subjective psychological point of view identity is of little interest, but from the objective external viewpoint (e.g. the forensic one) such questions are highly significant, and rightly so. |
1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
Full Idea: Egoism, and the fear not of near but of distant death, and the regret that so much of one's life should have gone by - these are not, I think, wholly natural or instinctive. They are strengthened by a false belief in stable identity. | |
From: Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971], §6) | |
A reaction: This raises some very nice questions, about the extent to which various aspects of self-concern are instinctive and natural, or culturally induced, and even totally misguided and false. I can worry about the distant death of my guinea pig, or my grandson. |
5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
Full Idea: It is quite uninteresting whether, with half its components replaced, I have the same audio system, and also whether I exist if half of my body were simultaneously replaced. | |
From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.302) | |
A reaction: It is impossible to deny this, if the part replaced is not the brain. My doubt about Parfit's thesis is that while I may not care whether some modified thing is still me, my lawyers and the police might be very concerned. |
22765 | Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Wisdom and power of thought, know thou, are shared in by all things. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) II.286 | |
A reaction: Sextus quotes this, saying that it is 'still more paradoxical', and that it explicitly includes plants. This may mean that Empedocles was not including inanimate matter. |
1524 | For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: Empedocles assumes that thinking is either identical to or very similar to sense-perception. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], A86) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 9 | |
A reaction: Not to be sniffed at. We can, of course, control our thinking (though we can't control the controller) and we contemplate abstractions, but that might be seen as a sort of perception. Vision is not as visual as we think. |
7496 | Rules and duties are based on the will, as that is all we control [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: Since actions and performances are not wholly in our power and since nothing is really in our power but our will - it is on the will that all the rules and duties of Man are based and established. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (I.7 Our deeds are judged by intention [1580], p.0028) | |
A reaction: This is almost Kant's claim that the only truly good thing is a good will (e.g. Idea 3711). Aristotle disagrees, because a virtuous person should also have good desires. We may will to have good desires, but virtue requires actually having them. |
7495 | Apart from the fear, dying is an easy duty [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: If our fears did not lend it weight, dying would be one of our lighter duties. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (III.12 On physiognomy [1580], p.1191) | |
A reaction: An Epicurean thought. 'Duties' is nice - presumably death qualifies as a duty, because Nature requires it of us (we each of us 'owe nature a death'). The remark appears to me to be true. |
552 | Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles was the first to give evil and good as principles. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 985a | |
A reaction: Once you start to think that good and evil will only matter if they have causal powers, it is an easy step to the idea of a benevolent god, and a satanic anti-god. Otherwise the 'principles' could be ignored. |
22269 | We must fight fiercely to hang on to the few pleasures which survive into old age [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: I am training and sharpening my appetite for those pleasures that are left. ...We must cling tooth and claw to the use of the pleasures of this life which the advancing years, one after another, rip from our grasp. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (I.39 On Solitude [1580], p.276) | |
A reaction: That may be one of the most inspiring ideas I have read about pleasure. |
20482 | Virtue inspires Stoics, but I want a good temperament [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: What Stoics did from virtue I teach myself to do from temperament. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an Aristotelian criticism of Stoicism. They venerate virtue above everything, but Aristotle says you must integrate virtue into your very being, so that right actions flow from you, with very little need for premeditation. |
20480 | There is not much point in only becoming good near the end of your life [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: It is almost better never to become a good man at all than to do so tardily, understanding how to live when you have no life left. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1142) | |
A reaction: A very nice perspective, which I don't recall Aristotle mentioning. It does, though, reinforce Aristotle's belief that early training is essential. |
9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |
Full Idea: It becomes more plausible, when thinking morally, to focus less upon the person, the subject of experiences, and instead to focus more upon the experiences themselves. | |
From: Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons [1984], §116) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints how Parfit moves from a view of persons in terms of continuity of consciousness to a utilitarian morality. It brings out nicely what is wrong with utilitarianism - the reductio of a great ball of nice experiences, with no one having them. |
20481 | Nothing we say can be worse than unsaying it in the face of authority [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: Nothing which a gentleman says can seem worse than the shame of his unsaying it under duress from authority. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153) | |
A reaction: The point is that you have to fight every day for free speech, because no matter what the law says, there are always people in power who want to shut you up. |
20479 | People at home care far more than soldiers risking death about the outcome of wars [Montaigne] |
Full Idea: How many soldiers put themselves at risk every day in wars which they care little about, rushing into danger in battles the loss of which will not make them lose a night's sleep. Meanwhile a man at home is more passionate about the war than the soldier. | |
From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1139) | |
A reaction: It depends whether you are a mercenary (which the majority probably were in 1680), and what are the implications of defeat. |
589 | 'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Nature is but a word of human framing. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1015a |
21823 | The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: In Empedocles we have a dividing principle, 'Strife', set against 'Friendship' - which is the One and is to him bodiless, while the elements represent matter. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.09 | |
A reaction: The first time I've seen the principle of Love in Empedocles identified with the One of Parmenides. Plotinus is a trustworthy reporter, I think, because he was well read, and had access to lost texts. |
2680 | Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, but that all the elements, including those which create motion, are six in number. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a16 |
6002 | Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood] |
Full Idea: Empedocles used numerical ratios to explain different kinds of matter; for example, bone is two parts water, four parts fire, two parts earth; and blood is an equal blend of all four elements. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Brad Inwood - Empedocles | |
A reaction: Why isn't the ration 1:2:1? This presumably shows the influence of Pythagoras (who had also been based in Italy, like Empedocles), as well as that of the earlier naturalistic philosophers. It was a very good theory, though wrong. |
13207 | Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements, and are thus 'simple' rather than flesh, bone and bodies which, like these, are 'homoeomeries'. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a26 | |
A reaction: The translation is not quite clear. I take it that flesh and bone may look simple, because they are homoeomerous, but they are not really - but what is his evidence for that? Compare Idea 13208. |
459 | All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: These elements never cease their continuous exchange, sometimes uniting under the influence of Love, so that all become One, at other times again moving apart through the hostile force of Hate. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1- |
13218 | The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Empedocles says it is evident that all the other bodies down to the 'elements' have their coming-to-be and their passing-away: but it is not clear how the 'elements' themselves, severally in their aggregated masses, come-to-be and pass-away. | |
From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325b20 | |
A reaction: Presumably the elements are like axioms - and are just given. How do electrons and quarks come-to-be? |
13225 | Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
Full Idea: It is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things moving', unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind. | |
From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 333b23 | |
A reaction: I take this to be of interest for showing Aristotle's quest for explanations, and his unwillingness to be fobbed off with anything superficial. I take a task of philosophy to be to push explanations further than others wish to go. |
460 | If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Besides these elements, nothing else comes into being, nor does anything cease. For if they had been perishing continuously, they would Be no more; and what could increase the Whole? And whence could it have come? | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1- |
5090 | Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Is it just an accident that teeth and other parts of the body seem to have some purpose, and creatures survive because they happen to be put together in a useful way? Everything else has been destroyed, as Empedocles says of his 'cow with human head'. | |
From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], 61) by Aristotle - Physics 198b29 | |
A reaction: Good grief! Has no one ever noticed that Empedocles proposed the theory of evolution? It isn't quite natural selection, because we aren't told what does the 'destroying', but it is a little flash of genius that was quietly forgotten. |
461 | God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: God is equal in all directions to himself and altogether eternal, a rounded Sphere enjoying a circular solitude. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B028), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.15.2 |
466 | God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: God is mind, holy and ineffable, and only mind, which darts through the whole cosmos with its swift thought. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B134), quoted by Ammonius - On 'De Interpretatione' 4.5.249.6 |
1719 | In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
Full Idea: It is a consequence of Empedocles' view that God is the most unintelligent thing, for he alone is ignorant of one of the elements, namely strife, whereas mortal creatures are familiar with them all. | |
From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 410b08 |
1522 | It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles] |
Full Idea: Wretched is he who cares not for clear thinking about the gods. | |
From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B132), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.140.5.1 |