216 ideas
14519 | It is a great good to show reverence for a wise man [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: To show reverence for a wise man is itself a great good for him who reveres [the wise man]. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 32) | |
A reaction: It is characteristic of Epicurus to move up a level in his thinking, and not merely respect wisdom, but ask after the value of his own respect. Compare Idea 14517. Nice. |
22115 | Wise people should contemplate and discuss the truth, and fight against falsehood [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The role of the wise person is to meditate on the truth, especially the truth regarding the first principle, and to discuss it with others, but also to fight against the falsity that is its contrary. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], I.1.6), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 14 | |
A reaction: So nice to hear someone (from no matter how long ago) saying that wisdom is concerned with truth. If you lose your grip on truth (which many thinkers seem to have done) you must also abandon wisdom. Then fools rule. |
22733 | Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature [Epicurus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Epicurus in his popular exposition allows the existence of God, but in expounding the real nature of things he does not allow it. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.58 | |
A reaction: Plato and Aristotle also distinguished their esoteric from their exoteric writings, but this is an indication that thei popular works may always have presented safer doctrines. |
14518 | In the study of philosophy, pleasure and knowledge arrive simultaneously [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: In philosophy the pleasure accompanies the knowledge. For the enjoyment does not come after the learning but the learning and the enjoyment are simultaneous. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 27) |
14052 | Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Let no one delay the study of philosophy while young nor weary of it when old; for no one is either too young or too old for the health of the soul. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 122) | |
A reaction: I agree with this on both accounts. I think the correct age to begin the study of philosophy is four, and it is vital to continue its study up to the point where you can no longer remember your own name. 'Health of the soul' sounds right too. |
13291 | Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: To win true freedom you must be a slave to philosophy. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 008 | |
A reaction: A lovely idea. It is one thing to free the body, or to free one's social situation, but the challenge to 'free your mind' is either romantic nonsense or totally baffling, apart from the suggestion offered here. Reason is freedom. Very Kantian. |
22758 | Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is an activity which secures the happy life by arguments and discussions. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Ethicists (one book) VI.169 | |
A reaction: Presumably this aims at the happiness of the participant. Universal happiness would need to be much more political. If this is your aim then you can't just follow the winds of the argument, but must channel it towards happiness. No nasty truths? |
22101 | Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The study of philosophy has as its purpose to know not what people have thought, but rather the truth about the way things are. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'De Caelo' [1268], I.22.228), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 05 | |
A reaction: I agree with this deeply unfashionable opinion. Of course, modern investigations must be more sensitive to biases built into language, culture and conceptual schemes. But I am one of those sad old folks who still think truths can be stated. |
14523 | We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: I congratulate you, sir, because you have come to philosophy free of any taint of culture. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [source: Athenaeus, 'Deipnosophists' 13 588b] No one nowadays thinks such an aspiration remotely possible, not least because the culture is embedded in your native language, but I find the idea very appealing. |
22240 | The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Just as there is no benefit to medicine if it does not heal the sicknesses [nosos] of bodies, so too there is none to philosophy unless it expels that affections of the soul. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], fr 221), quoted by James Allen - Soul's Virtue and the Health of the Body p.78 | |
A reaction: This sounds rather Buddhist, if the only route to happiness is to suppress the emotions. Epicurus probably refers to the more extreme desires, which only lead to harm. Galen quotes Chrysippus as endorsing this idea (see footnote 5). |
1484 | We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: We should make no assertion about the whole when our contact is with the parts. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109e |
14027 | If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that we look to the primary conception corresponding to each word and that it stand in no need of demonstration, if, that is, we are going to have something to which we can refer the object of search or puzzlement and opinion. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 38) | |
A reaction: This either points to definition or to consensus, and since definition seems in danger of some sort of Quinean circularity, I favour consensus. Philosophy is, after all, people discussing things, not inscriptions sent to the gods. |
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.10) |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Mind is compelled by necessary truths that can't be regarded as false, but not by contingent ones that might be false. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 12) |
21267 | Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob2) | |
A reaction: Notice that this is 'superfluous' rather than 'wrong'. But ten people can lift a piano which could have been lifted by eight. Note that this is 150 years before Ockham. |
22102 | Arguing with opponents uncovers truths, and restrains falsehoods [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There is no better way of uncovering the truth and keeping falsity in check than by arguing with people who disagree with you. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (On the spiritual perfection of life [1268], 26), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 05 | |
A reaction: Not the sort of attitude you associate with medieval scholastics, who are presumed to be dogmatists. How many modern philosophers actually have the courage to follow this advice? |
2670 | Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.30.97 |
13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Socrates has no definition if definitions by their nature must be in purely general terms, and if no purely general terms can succeed in uniquely singling out this signated matter. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], 23) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.1.2 | |
A reaction: There seem to be two models. That general terms actually individuate the matter of Socrates, or that they cross-reference to (so to speak) define Socrates 'by elimination', as the only individual that fits. But the latter is a poor definition. |
11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: What sorts things into their proper genus and species are the definitions that express what they are. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: This is straight from Aristotle, though Aristotle's view is a little more complex, I think. If the definitions 'express what they are', then definitions seem to specify the essence. |
23176 | Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q94 4) | |
A reaction: Amazing how many modern thinkers fail to grasp this simple distinction. However, the truth is not quite the same for all if diverse persons are expressing a single truth with different concepts and languages. The word 'facts' is helpful here. |
20621 | Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
Full Idea: Lying can involve (1) speaking false words, (2) the intention to speak false words, (3) the intention of bringing about deception, and (4) the ultimate goal of one's deception. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q110) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 10 'Lying' | |
A reaction: It's a start, but much more is needed to clarify lying. Irony is an obvious problem with (1). |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Good itself as taken in by mind is one truth among others, and truth itself as goal of mind's activity is one good among others. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
14040 | Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Everything that is observed or grasped by the intellect in an act of application is true. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 62) | |
A reaction: Not quite clear what he means, but Epicurus is committed to perception as the source of knowledge, with the intellect extending the findings of the senses. He might subscribe to Descartes's 'clear and distinct' perceptions. |
21248 | If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and if truth does not exist, then the proposition 'Truth does not exist' is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
A reaction: A classic example of turning the tables, also applicable to anyone who firmly denies knowledge, or that words are meaningful, or says that meaning needs verification. However, one measily truth is not much consolation. |
22104 | Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The word 'true' expresses the conformity of a being to intellect. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Disputed questions about truth [1267], I.1c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 09 | |
A reaction: I believe in a 'robust' theory of truth, but accept that the concept of 'correspondence' has major problems. So I embrace with delight the word 'conformity'. I offer the world The Conformity Theory of Truth! 'Conform' is suitably vague. |
13451 | The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
Full Idea: The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative Conception and the Limitation of Size Conception. | |
From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2) |
13452 | Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
Full Idea: There are set theories that countenance exceptions to the Principle of Separation in exchange for a universal set. | |
From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2) |
23173 | If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: In syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity, others must follow too. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q19 6) | |
A reaction: This asserts the necessity of logical consequence, which he derives from Aristotle. |
21668 | Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus said that not every proposition is either true or false. ...Epicurus was afraid that if he admits that every proposition is true or false he will also have to admit that all events are caused by fate (if they are so from all eternity). | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.21 | |
A reaction: Epicurus proposed his 'swerve' in the movements of atoms to avoid this fatalism. Epicurus is agreeing with Aristotle, who did not accept excluded middle for a future contingent sea-fight. |
21676 | Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicureans make the impudent assertion that disjunctions consisting of contrary propositions are true, but that the statements contained in the propositions are neither of them true. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 16.36 | |
A reaction: Is that 'it is definitely one or the other, but we haven't a clue which one'? Seems to fit speculations about Goldbach's Conjecture. It doesn't sound terribly impudent to me. Or is it the crazy 'It's definitely one of them, but it's neither of them'? |
13449 | We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
Full Idea: The possibility of unrestricted quantification does not immediately presuppose the existence of an all-inclusive domain. One could deny an all-inclusive domain but grant that some quantifications are sometimes unrestricted. | |
From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Thus you can quantify over anything you like, but only from what is available. Eat what you like (in this restaurant). |
13450 | Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
Full Idea: There are doubts about whether absolute generality is possible, if there are certain concepts which are indefinitely extensible, lacking definite extensions, and yielding an ever more inclusive hierarchy. Sets and ordinals are paradigm cases. | |
From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.1) |
13453 | Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
Full Idea: If one thought of second-order quantification as quantification over first-level Fregean concepts [note: one under which only objects fall], talk of domains might be regimented as talk of first-level concepts, which are not objects. | |
From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2) | |
A reaction: That is (I take it), don't quantify over objects, but quantify over concepts, but only those under which known objects fall. One might thus achieve naïve comprehension without paradoxes. Sound like fun. |
14028 | Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Nothing comes into being from what is not. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 38) | |
A reaction: King Lear puts it better: Nothing will come of nothing [1.i]. There seems to be an underlying assumption that coming into being out of nothing is much weirder than just existing, but I am not convinced about that. It's all equally weird. |
14029 | If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If that which disappears were destroyed into what is not, all things would have been destroyed, since that into which they were dissolved does not exist. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 39) | |
A reaction: This follows on from Idea 14028. Theologians will immediately spot that this is the underlying principle cited by Aquinas in his Third Way for proving God's existence (Idea 1431). |
11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If being is what makes propositions true, then anything we can express in an affirmative proposition, however unreal, is said to be; so lacks and absences are, since we say that absences are opposed to presences, and blindness exists in an eye. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: See Idea 11194 for the alternative Aristotelian approach to being, according to categories. Do absences and lacks have real essences, or causal properties? The absence of the sentry may cause the loss of the city. |
22103 | Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Being is inherently intellect's most intelligible object, in which it finds the basis of all conceptions. ...All of intellect's other conceptions must be arrived at by adding to being, insofar as they express what is not expressed by 'being' itself. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Disputed questions about truth [1267], I.1c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 09 | |
A reaction: I like the word 'intelligible' here. We might know reality, or be aware of appearances, but what is intelligible lies nicely in between. What would Berkeley make of that? I presume 'intelligible' means 'makes good sense'. |
15812 | Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: What first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly the notion of multitude. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I Q11 ar2 ad4), quoted by Roderick Chisholm - Person and Object 1.5 | |
A reaction: This is one of the best things I have read on 'being'. It is the Aristotelian recognition that we can only study being by studying identity, and that this leads on to wider metaphysics. Other approaches to being are dead ends. |
14030 | The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The totality of things has always been just like it is now and always will be. For there is nothing for it to change into. For there exists nothing in addition to the totality, which could enter into it and produce the change. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 39) | |
A reaction: This smacks of the sort of dubious arguments that the medieval theologians fell in love with. I never thought I'd say this, but I think Epicurus needs a comprehensive course in set theory before he makes remarks like this. |
21268 | Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: All natural things can be reduced to one principle, which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle, which is human reason, or will. Therefore God does not exist. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob2) | |
A reaction: Not, of course, the opinion of Aquinas. So the possibility of naturalism (assuming the human will can be further reduced to nature) was a clear option in the thirteenth century. In reply Aquinas cites his Fifth Way. |
14048 | Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Movements, turnings, risings, settings, and related phenomena occur without any god helping out and ordaining or being about to ordain things, and at the same time have complete blessedness and indestructibility. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 76) | |
A reaction: Epicurus is sometimes accused of atheism for remarks like these, but he is always trying to show piety in his attitudes. We might now call this attitude 'deism' (see alphabetical themes). |
16655 | Different genera are delimited by modes of predication, which rest on modes of being [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Being is delimited into different genera in accord with different modes of predicating, which depend on different modes of being. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (On Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' [1266], V.9.890), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3 | |
A reaction: I like this. When people say that predication is the way we divide things up, and go all linguistic-relativist about things, they forget how closely language not only describes reality, but arises out of, or is even caused by, reality. 'Grue' is silly. |
14044 | The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The shapes, colours, sizes and weights which are predicated of body as accidents, ...and are known by sense-perception, must not be thought of as independent natures (for that is inconceivable). | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 68) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an anti-platonist remark, though he is not denying that the accidental properties may have some universal character. I'm struck by how close the basic metaphysics of Epicurus is to that of Aristotle. |
14045 | Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Accidental qualities are not non-existent, nor are they distinct corporeal entities inhering in the body, nor parts of it. We should think that the whole body throughout derives its permanent nature from these properties, though not as a compound of them. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 69) | |
A reaction: 'Permanent' nature sounds more like essential than accidental properties. This is uncomfortably negative in its attempt to pin down what accidental properties are. The last bit seems to deny the bundle view of objects. Would he like tropes? |
16641 | Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Whiteness is said to exist not because it subsists in itself, but because by it something has existence-as-white. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], IX.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.2 | |
A reaction: It seems unavoidable to refer to the whiteness as 'it'. It might be called the 'adverbial' theory of properties, as ways of doing something. |
11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Incidental properties have an incomplete essence, and need to refer in their definitions to their subject, lying outside their own genus. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93) | |
A reaction: These are 'incidental' properties, but it is a nice question whether properties have essences. Presumably they must have if they are universals, or platonic Forms. The notion of being 'strong' can be defined without specific examples. |
11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If (in the Platonic view) manyness was contained in humanness it could never be one as it is in Socrates, and if oneness was part of its definition then Socrates would be Plato and the nature couldn't be realised more than once. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.100) | |
A reaction: I suppose the reply is that since we are trying to explain one-over-many, then this unusual combination of both manyness and oneness is precisely what distinguishes forms from other ideas. |
13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: In the view of Aquinas, while substantial form is the ultimate ground of identity and difference of angels, it is matter that provides a principle of diversity in the case of corporeal substances. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 5.2.3 | |
A reaction: This is at least as good a proposal as their apatial location. There is more chance of reidentifying matter than of precisely reidentifying a spatial location. Two indistinguishable spheres remain the classic problem case (of Max Black, Idea 10195) |
14524 | Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Epicurus said that body was conceived as an aggregate of shape and size and resistance and weight. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.257] Note that this is how we 'conceive' them. They might be intrinsically different, except that Epicurus is pretty much a phenomenalist. |
14046 | A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Properties are known by their peculiar forms of application and comprehension, in close accompaniment with the aggregate [of atoms], which is given the predicate 'body' by reference to the aggregate conception. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 69) | |
A reaction: There is an interesting hint here of how to think of properties (as both applying and comprehended in some distinctive way), and a suggestion that there is something conventional about bodies, depending on how we conceive them. |
17555 | 'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There are two sorts of one. There is the one which is convertible with being, which adds nothing to being except being undivided; and this deprives of multitude. Then there is the principle of number, which to the notion of being adds measurement. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de Potentia Dei [1269], q3 a16 ad 3-um) | |
A reaction: [From a lecture handout] I'm not sure I understand this. We might say, I suppose, that insofar as water is water, it is all one, but you can't count it. Perhaps being 'unified' and being a 'unity' are different? |
16765 | Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A human being has no substantial form other than the intellective soul alone, and it contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, and all lower forms, and it alone brings about whatever it is that less perfect forms bring about in other things. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia Q76 4c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.1 | |
A reaction: He says brutes and plants also have a single soul. Pasnau says this is Aquinas's most distinctive doctrine, because other thinkers postulate a whole hierarchy of substantial forms. |
16766 | One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: One thing simpliciter is produced out of many actually existing things only if there is something uniting and tying them to each other. If Socrates were animal and rational by different forms, then to be united they would need something to make them one. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de anima [1269], 11c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.2 | |
A reaction: This is the reply to the idea that a single thing is just an interesting of many sortal essences. It presumes, of course, that a thing like a horse has something called 'unity'. |
11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is by having essence that things exist. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.94) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 11199, which gives a fuller picture. This idea seems to suggest essence as the cause of existence, which sounds wrong. Perhaps essence is a necessary condition of existence, but it is necessary that nothing indeterminate can exist? |
11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Specific essence differs from generic essence by being demarcated: individuals are demarcated within species by dimensionally defined material, but species within genus by a defining differentiation taken from the form. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.95) | |
A reaction: It clearly won't be enough to define an individual just to define its material and its shape. The material might also be essential to the genus, as when defining fire. Probably not very helpful. |
11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Form alone cannot be a composite substance's essence. For a thing's essence is expressed by its definition, and unless the definition of a physical substance included both form and material, the definition wouldn't differ from mathematical objects. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of thoroughly sensible remark that you only get from the greatest philosophers. Minor philosophers fall in love with things like forms, and then try to use them to explain everything. |
11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Since being as belonging to a category expresses the 'isness' of things, and belongs to all ten Aristotelian categories, essence must be something all the natures that sort different beings into genera and species have in common. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: I like this because it is the essence which does the sorting, not the sorting which defines the essence (which seems to me to be a deep and widespread confusion). |
11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A simple substance is its own essence. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103) | |
A reaction: Aquinas takes complex substances to have their essences in various ways, but this thought is the basis of all essence. Presumably the Greek word 'ousia' names the key ingredient. |
14047 | Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Impermanent properties do not have the nature of an entire thing, which we call a body when we grasp it in aggregate, nor the nature of permanent accompaniments without which it is not possible to conceive of a body. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 70) | |
A reaction: Epicurus doesn't discuss essences, but this seems to commit to the basic Aristotelian idea, that there there are some properties which actually bestow identity, and then others which are optional for that thing. The 'conception' is always mentioned. |
14039 | Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: What is over our heads ...or what is below any point which we think of ...will never appear to us as being at the same time and in the same respect both up and down. For it is impossible to conceive of this. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 60) | |
A reaction: Note that he says it will 'never appear to us' as both - not that it absolutely cannot be both. Both Aristotle and Epicurus are much more focused on how our humanity shapes our metaphysics than the modern pure metaphysicians are. |
22170 | Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Our imagination and senses grasp only the outer properties of things, not their natures. ...Understanding, however, grasps the very substance and nature of things, so that what is represented in understanding is a likeness of thing's very essence. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.2) | |
A reaction: This is exactly the picture I endorse for modern science. Explanation is the path to understanding, and that must venture beyond immediate experience. |
14050 | We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If we give a correct and complete causal account of the source of our disturbance and fears, we will dissolve them, by accounting for the phenomena to which we are constantly exposed, and which terrify other men most severely. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 82) | |
A reaction: Notice 'other' men! This eudaimonist aim lies at the heart of Epicurus's physical account of the world. He was primarily interested in living better, rather than in physical science. He seeks 'tranquillity' and 'freedom from disturbance'. |
23175 | The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Since the speculative reason is concerned chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q94 4) | |
A reaction: This seems over-confident, and to confuse the facts with our knowledge of the facts. Simple arithmetic may seem certain, but long and intricate proofs are always a little uncertain. |
21337 | A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Knowing beings are differentiated from non-knowing beings by this: non-knowing beings have only their own reality, but knowing beings are capable of possessing also the reality of something else, ...a presence of the thing known produced by this thing. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,q.Q14,art 1) | |
A reaction: [Quoted by Ryan Meade in a talk at Pigotts] A famous and much discussed remark. Aquinas was a direct realist about perception, so this presence seems to be the thing itself, rather than a 'representation'. |
21249 | Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other hand, self-evident in itself, and to us. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
A reaction: A clear distinction, which is hard to deny, though there are lots of borderline cases. Self-evident to genius, and self-evident to future genius. Self-evident to almost everyone. Goldbach's Conjecture may be self-evident but unknowable. |
22169 | Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: For present in us by nature are certain initial truths everyone knows, in which lie potentially known conclusions our reasons can draw out and make actually known. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.2) | |
A reaction: Note that these are truths rather than concepts, but that they have to be 'drawn out' by reason. This is Descartes' view of the matter, where the 'natural light' of reason is needed to articulate what is innate, such as geometry. |
1823 | We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We could not seek for anything if we had not some notion of it. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.21 |
21250 | A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject. E.g. Man is an animal, because animal is included in the essence of man. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
A reaction: Aquinas focuses on the essence of the subject, where Kant embraces the whole concept of the subject. Is it self-evident that we are genetically related to apes? Yes, to a geneticiist. Is that part of human essence? No. So Kant wins. |
1824 | To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We could not give names to things, if we had not a preliminary notion of what the things were. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.21 |
14037 | Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: One must believe that the atoms bring with them none of the qualities of things which appear except shape, weight, and size and the properties which necessarily accompany shape. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 54) | |
A reaction: This appears to be fairly precisely a claim that atoms only have primary qualities, though that terminology only came in in the seventeenth century. I take the view to be more or less correct. |
5949 | Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Epicurus says that colours are not intrinsic to bodies but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative to the eye, which implies that body is no more colourless than coloured. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], Fr 30) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1110 | |
A reaction: This seems to me such a self-evident truth that I am puzzled as to why anyone would claim that colours are real features of bodies. Epicurus points out that entering a dark room we see no colour, but then colour appears after a while. |
22168 | Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: What the mind takes in is not some material element of the agent, but a likeness of the agent actualising some potential the patient already has. This, for example, is the way our seeing takes in the colour of a coloured body. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibeta [1267], 8.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is exactly right. Descartes agreed. It works for colour, but not (obviously) for cheese graters. |
1821 | Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sensation is out of reach of control, because one sensation cannot judge another which resembles itself, as they have equal value, and different sensations have different objects. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 | |
A reaction: Scepticism about the possibility of purely empirical knowledge; an interesting comment on the question of whether perceptions contain any intrinsic knowledge. |
20224 | Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension, for these prepare the way to intellectual knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues by which we know truth; these are in the intellect or reason. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q56 a5 obj3), quoted by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind III 2.2 | |
A reaction: A gem of a quotation for Zagzebski's thesis, that knowledge is defined in terms of the intellectual virtues. The only virtues of perception are in focusing and paying attention to features. Good eyesight is a biological 'virtue', I suppose. |
1820 | The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The criteria of truth are the senses, the preconceptions, and the passions. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 |
1822 | Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Reason cannot judge the senses, because it is based on them. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: All our knowledge comes through our senses, but that doesn't mean that everything we know is sensed. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 18) |
22109 | The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
Full Idea: Having 'scientia' is the fullest possible human cognition, by which one situates the fact expressed by a conclusion in an explanatory theory that accurately maps metaphysical or physical reality. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics' [1269], 1.2.9, 1.5.7) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11 | |
A reaction: That is a perfect statement of my concept of knowledge. Explanatory theories must specify the essential natures of the entities involved. We don't aim for 'knowledge', we aim for the 'fullest possible cognition'. This account extend's Aristotle's. |
4549 | Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values [Nietzsche on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Epicurus denied the possibility of knowledge in order to retain moral (or hedonistic) values as the highest values. | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - The Will to Power (notebooks) §578 | |
A reaction: The history of philosophy suggests that this dichotomy is unnecessary. Dogmatist place a high value on multitudes of things. |
2668 | Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus says that if one sense has told a lie once in a man's life, no sense must ever be believed. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.25.79 |
6010 | Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak] |
Full Idea: Epicurus says illusions are not false perceptions, because the senses accurately report the pattern of atoms; for instance, the edges are worn off the pattern produced by a square tower, so its perception as a round tower is true. | |
From: report of Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 47-53) by Deborah K.W. Modrak - Classical theories of Mind | |
A reaction: As so often, Epicurus got it right, because Democritus got it right, thus demonstrating that good philosophy must be preceded by good physics. However, good physics must be preceded and followed by good philosophy. |
1482 | If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: If one person says the wine is dry and the other that it is sweet, and neither errs in his sensation, how is the wine any more dry than sweet? | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b |
1483 | Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: In the very same bath some treat the water as too hot, others as too cold. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b |
1487 | When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: On entering a dark room we see no colour, but do so after waiting a short time. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1110d |
11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is definition of essence that makes things understandable. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: The aim of philosophy is understanding, which is achieved by successful explanation. I totally agree with this Aristotelian view, so neatly summarised by Aquinas. |
21386 | We should accept as explanations all the plausible ways in which something could come about [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The phases of the Moon could happen in all the ways [at least four] which the phenomena in our experience suggest for the explanation of this kind of thing - as long as one is not so enamoured of unique explanations as to groundlessly reject the others. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Pythocles [c.292 BCE], 94) | |
A reaction: Very interesting, for IBE. While you want to embrace the 'best', it is irrational to reject all of the other candidates, simply because you want a single explanation, if there are no good grounds for the rejection. |
14526 | The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Democritus and Epicurus say the soul has two parts, one which is rational and is situated in the chest area, and the other which is non-rational and is spread throughout the entire compound of the body | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [source Aetius 4.4.6] |
14041 | The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The soul is a body made up of fine parts distributed throught the entire aggregate, most closely resembling breath with a certain admixture of heat, in one way resembling breath and in another resembling heat | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 63) | |
A reaction: Remember that 'psuché' refers as much to the life within a creature as it does to the consciousness. The stoics seem to have held a similar view. |
6035 | Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception [Epicurus, by Aetius] |
Full Idea: Epicurus says the soul is a blend of fiery stuff (for bodily warmth), airy stuff (rest), breath (motion), and a nameless stuff (sense-perception). | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Aetius - fragments/reports 4.3.11 | |
A reaction: Obviously Epicurus thought the four stuffs were different combinations of atoms, rather than being elements. Is there no stuff which gives reason? Reason must reduce to motion, presumably. |
22107 | Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
Full Idea: Sensory species received in external senses are transmitted to 'internal senses', organs located in the brain. The most important of these for cognition are 'phantasia' and 'imagination' (part of phantasia), which produce and preserve 'phantasms'. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11 | |
A reaction: This seems to make Aquinas a representative realist. I add this to my portfolio of philosophical faculties - those required by philosophy, rather than by psychology or neuroscience. |
9098 | Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Mental activity combines two activities which in the senses are distinct: exterior perception in which we are simply affected by what we sense, and interior imagination in which we create images of things that are not, and never have been present. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2) | |
A reaction: Geach cites this thought to show that he is anti-abstractionist, since mind creates images, and these can arise from things which have not been experienced. Any defence of abstractionism must allow an active power to imagination. |
9092 | Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Abstacting A from B can mean denying A's connection with B, or simply thinking A without thinking B. Abstracting what in reality is connected generates falsehood if done the first way, but not if done the second. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: Despite Geach's denials, this seems to make Aquinas a classic abstractionist. He goes on to distinguish two sorts of abstraction, but he certainly thinks of abstraction from sense experience as a revelation about the nature of reality. |
9093 | We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If we think what defines a stone, man or horse, without thinking of any individual peculiarities it may have, this is precisely what we do when we abstract the general nature of what we understand from any particular way in which we imagine it. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: This may not be simple abstraction from sense experience, since there would obviously be a threatened circularity in the process. Do you need to know the essential definition first, in order to discard the individual peculiarities? |
9097 | The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Our mind both abstracts the species from images when it attends to the general nature of things, and understand the species in the images when it has recourse to the images in order to understand the things whose species it has abstracted. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: Geach claims that the second half of this idea means that Aquinas is not an abstractionist, but he seems to be explictly abstractionist about the way in which we create higher level concepts from lower ones. |
9095 | Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There are even things we can abstract from thought matter in general, things like being and oneness and potentiality and realization. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: The Aristotelian 'potentiality' means possibility, which means that modality is understood by abstraction. Aquinas seems to have four levels: particular perceived, general perceived, particular thought, and general thought. This is the highest level. |
9099 | Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The generality attaching to a nature - its relatedness to many particular instances - results from abstraction, so in this sense a generalized nature presupposes its instances, and does not, as Plato thought, precede them. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a quite explicit endorsement of abstractionism by Aquinas, despite all Geach's assertions to the contrary. |
10508 | Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms insofar as through the power of the agent intellect we can take into our consideration the natures of the species without the individual conditions. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad4) | |
A reaction: There might be a threatened circularity here, in trying to decide which features to ignore and which to retain. If we saw a hundred horses with a white nose blaze, we still wouldn't be sure that this was essential to a horse. Innate notions of species?? |
6018 | Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley] |
Full Idea: By posing the problem of determinism, Epicurus became arguably the first philosopher to recognise the philosophical centrality of what we call the Free Will Question. His strongly libertarian approach is strongly contrasted with Stoic determinism. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary | |
A reaction: Epicurus introduced the rather dubious 'swerve' of the atoms to make room for free will. It seems to me more consistent to stick with the determinism of Democritus. Zeno became a determinist in reaction to Epicurus. |
22111 | Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
Full Idea: Aquinas conceives of freedom as free decision or judgement, which cannot be attributed to the will alone. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 12 | |
A reaction: This idea might improve the free will debate considerably, because it is not clear what sort of thing a 'will' is, and it is not clear how an entity can be 'free' in isolation, by its intrinsic nature. Isn't all freedom contextual? |
20922 | Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms [Epicurus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
Full Idea: There is a free motion in the atoms, which Democritus did not discover, but which Epicurus brought to light, and which consists in a swerve, as he demonstrated on the basis of what is seen to be the case? | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes (Oen) - Wall inscription 54.II-III | |
A reaction: I presume the last bit means that we see that we have freedom of choice, and infer the swerve in the atoms as the only possible explanation. The worry for libertarians is, of course, who is in charge of the swerve. |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Something apprehended to be good and appropriate in any and every circumstance that could be thought of would compel us to will it. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Nothing can be willed except good, but many and various things are good, and you can't conclude from this that wills are compelled to choose this or that one. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 05) |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 24) |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Reasoning powers can entertain opposite objects. Now will is a reasoning power, so will can entertain opposites and is not compelled to embrace one of them. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.x2) |
14516 | There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Necessity is a bad thing, but there is no necessity to live with necessity. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], 9) |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The will is not compelled to move, for it doesn't have to want the pleasant things set before it. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 21) |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Because will moves itself by deliberation - a kind of investigation which doesn't prove some one way correct but examines the alternatives - will doesn't compel itself to will. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: We are forced to admit that, in any will that is not always willing, the very first movement to will must come from outside, stimulating the will to start willing. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
A reaction: cf Nietzsche |
14521 | If everything is by necessity, then even denials of necessity are by necessity [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: He who claims that everything occurs by necessity has no complaint against him who claims that everything does not occur by necessity. For he makes the very claim in question by necessity. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 40) |
14062 | Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: It would be better to follow the stories told about the gods than to be a slave to the fate of the natural philosophers. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 134) | |
A reaction: At this point in history there is a blurring between autonomous decisions and what we now call free will, and also between fate and determinism, which we try to keep distinct. |
1837 | We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The best men have no belief in necessity (set up by some as mistress of all), but refer some things to fortune, some to ourselves, because necessity is irresponsible, and fortune is unstable, while our own will is free. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 133), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27 |
22105 | The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to say that that which is the principle of intellective activity, what we call the soul of a human being, is an incorporeal, subsistent principle. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia.Q75 2c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 10 | |
A reaction: Note 'subsistent' rather than 'existent' (capable of independence?). This identifies the immortal soul with the conscious mind. 'Principle' is an odd word, presumably with roots in Aristotle. It seems to be an Aristotelian 'form' [morphe]. |
20700 | Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If God's divine influence stopped, every operation would stop. Every operation, therefore, of everything is traced back to him as cause. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], III.67), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 3 'Freedom' | |
A reaction: If the systematic interraction of mind and body counts as an 'operation', then this seems to imply Occasionalism. |
14042 | The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Those who say that the soul is incorporeal are speaking to no point; for if it were of that character, it could neither act nor be acted upon at all. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 67) | |
A reaction: This just is the causal argument, which is espoused by Papineau and other modern physicalists. Personally I am inclined to agree with Papineau, that it is so simple and conclusive that it is hardly worth discussing further. Dualism needs a miracle. |
1909 | How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If Epicurus makes the end consist in pleasure and asserts that the soul, like all else, is composed of atoms, it is impossible to explain how in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure, or judgement of the good. | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism III.187 | |
A reaction: This is a nice statement of the mind-body problem. Ontologically, physics still seems to present reality as a 'heap of particles', which gives no basis for the emergence of anything as strange as consciousness. But then magnetism is pretty strange. |
22108 | First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The intellect first apprehends the quiddity of a thing. ...Then it acquires the properties, accidents and dispositions associated with the thing's essence. It must proceed from one compounding or dividing of aspects to another, which is reasoning. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia.Q85 5c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11 | |
A reaction: [compressed] Tracking the process of acquiring knowledge of a thing (rather than necessary and sufficient conditions for full knowledge) is closer to Quine's naturalised epistemology than to the standard analytic approach to the concept of knowledge. |
10503 | We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: To cognize that which is in individual matter, not as it is in such matter, is to abstract the form from the individual matter that the phantasms represents. Thus we come to a degree of cognition of immaterial things. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Reply) | |
A reaction: This offers abstraction as a kind of inference to best explanation which takes us beyond immediate empirical experience to what is behind it. Aquinas thinks the concepts and explanation are spiritual, but they may be generalities and essences. |
10509 | Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Of the thing understood all that is within the actually understanding intellect is the abstracted intelligible species. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Art2) | |
A reaction: Abstraction is never supposed to be a luxury bolt-on, but is always seen (in this tradition, and presumably in the modern one), as essential to the intellect, and its way of coming to understand the world. Aristotelian definition is behind this idea. |
10506 | Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Intellect can abstract mathematical species from sensible matter, both individual and common. Yet it cannot abstract such species from common intelligible matter, but only from individual intelligible matter. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad2) | |
A reaction: The idea is that common intelligible matter lacks underlying substance, which is where quantity is to be found. |
9094 | Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Objects of mathematics abstract from perceived matter both in particular and in general, though from thought matter (substance as underlying quality) only in particular and not in general. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: This appears to be a thoroughly abstractionist view of the way in which humans create mathematics. Aquinas explicitly denies the Platonic view that the numbers already have abstract existence, awaiting our discovery. |
10505 | We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The apple is not part of the nature of the colour, and so nothing prevents one from understanding the colour while understanding nothing of the apple. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Ad 1) | |
A reaction: This helps to clarify why the procedure of 'ignoring' features is possible. It suggests that some features might be too entangled with the substance (too essential?) to be thus ignored. I can't think of an example, though. Why not?! |
10504 | Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Abstracting takes place in two ways: by composition and division, understanding something to be not in another or to be separated from it; and by a simple and unconditioned consideration, understanding one thing while not considering the other at all. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Ad 1) | |
A reaction: The second way is by 'ignoring', which he says cannot contain error. The first seems to be considering some mode of a thing to be actually separate from the thing, which could clearly be erroneous. Ignoring makes to commitment to a unity. |
10507 | Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Quantities such as numbers and dimensions, and also shapes (which are the limits of quantities) can be considered without their sensible qualities, which is for them to be abstracted from sensible matter. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad2) | |
A reaction: His account relies on underlying substance, which is where quantity is to be found (presumably because a substance is the epitome of a unit). |
9096 | The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The agent mind must itself turn to images, and produce by its own power in the receptive mind a representation as to species of whatever the images represent as individual. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1) | |
A reaction: Unlike much of this section, this sentence supports Geach's claim that Aquinas agrees with him - that the mind creates its concepts, rather than 'abstracting' them from experience. |
11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Attribution is something mind brings to completion by constructing propositional connections and disconnections, basing itself on real-world unity possessed by the things being attributed to one another. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.102) | |
A reaction: This compromise story seems to me to be exactly right. I take it that we respond to the real joints of nature, but using thought and language which is riddled with convention. |
13448 | The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
Full Idea: We generally take an assertion's domain of discourse to be implicitly restricted by context. [Note: the standard approach is that this restriction is a semantic phenomenon, but Kent Bach (2000) argues that it is a pragmatic phenomenon] | |
From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I think Kent Bach is very very right about this. Follow any conversation, and ask what the domain is at any moment. The reference of a word like 'they' can drift across things, with no semantics to guide us, but only clues from context and common sense. |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The will is compelled by its ultimate goal (to achieve happiness), but not by the means to achieve it. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.07) |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The will can avoid actually willing something by avoiding thinking of it, since mental activity is subject to will. In this respect we aren't compelled to will even total happiness, which is the only perfect good. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 07) |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Will's object is what is good, and so it cannot will anything but what is good. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.06) |
23180 | The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The will is the rational appetite. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 4) | |
A reaction: Defining the will in terms of reason sounds more like an Enlightenment optimist than a medieval theologian. I suspect that for him it is tautological the reason is involved, if only the reason can make decisions. Hobbes prefers to ruling appetite. |
1836 | Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The greatest good in avoiding confusion of the soul is prudence [phronesis], on which account prudence is something more valuable than even philosophy. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27 |
14061 | Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: What occurs by our own agency is autonomous, and it is to this that praise and blame are attached. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 133) | |
A reaction: I don't think this should be understand as an assertion of free will in the modern sense. The 'swerve' of the atoms just means that decisions can arise out of us - not that they are somehow outside of nature. |
7814 | It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Epicurus was responsible for the innovatory recognition that the question of the will's freedom is central to ethics. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Compare Ideas 7672 and 6018. Obviously ethical action needs freedom, but the idea of a 'free will' is quite different. It is a fiction, created to give some sort of arrogant ultimate responsibility to our actions, like God. |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If we are not free to will in any way, but are compelled, everything that makes up ethics vanishes: pondering action, exhorting, commanding, punishing, praising, condemning. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
A reaction: If doesn't require some magical 'free will' to avoid compulsions. All that is needed is freedom to enact your own willing, rather than someone else's. |
22112 | For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A human being's good is existing in accordance with reason, while what is bad for a human being is whatever is contrary to reason. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q18.5c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13 | |
A reaction: For anyone who thought Kant invented the idea that morality derives from reason. This idea of Aquinas is a fairly precise echo of the stoic view (which influenced Kant). Is there a circularity? Is it irrational because bad, or bad because irrational? |
22494 | We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end but also knowing it under the aspect of the end and the relation of the means to that end. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-I.Q132), quoted by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness 4 | |
A reaction: We don't talk much now about 'perfect' knowledge of something, but I suppose this is the necessary and sufficient conditions. If you complete the checklist, your knowledge should be perfect (if the list is right). |
14054 | Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 125) | |
A reaction: This is a fairly accurate observation. To fear not being in this life is a bit like fearing not being in Vancouver next Tuesday. It also involves the paradox of the present moment. E.g. Idea 1904. |
14053 | It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: He is a fool who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful when it is still to come. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 125) | |
A reaction: Not very plausible, I'm afraid. It provides a good argument in favour of smoking, if the lung cancer is far in the future. Paralysing fear is daft, but some remote fears should be heeded. |
14055 | The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The same kind of practice produces a good life and a good death. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 126) | |
A reaction: This is the kind of old fashioned observation which we would do well to hang on to. The ideal of dying well has vanished from our culture. |
3562 | Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: I spit on the fine and those who emptily admire it, when it doesn't make any pleasure. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.16 | |
A reaction: in Athenaeus |
1833 | Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is the beginning and end of living happily, and we recognise this as the first good. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 128) | |
A reaction: We might enquire what we would live for if our capacities for pleasure were surgically removed. Would we still experience intellectual curiosity, or an aspiration to some cold and remote goodness? |
14057 | All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Every pleasure is a good thing, since it has a nature congenial to us, but not every one is to be chosen, just as every pain is a bad thing, but not every one is such as to be always avoided. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 129) | |
A reaction: This kind of sensible remark would be wholly endorsed by Bentham and Mill. This fits in with the excellent distinction between what is right and what is good. |
14058 | Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: When we say that pleasure is the goal we do not mean the pleasures of the profligate or the pleasures of consumption, but rather the lack of pain in the body and disturbance in the soul. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 131) | |
A reaction: I don't really understand the aspiration to a 'calm mind'. No one likes stress, but total calmness sounds close to non-existence. The mean! There is no achievement without pain. |
1840 | Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is the chief good, because all animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended by pain by their natural instinct, without the employment of reason. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29 | |
A reaction: The highest pleasure of predators is likely to be the killing of weaker animals. What all animals do isn't much of a criterion for the natural chief good. They also breathe. |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Good applies to all goals, just as truth applies to all forms mind takes in. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
A reaction: In danger of being tautological, if good is understood as no more than the goal of actions. It seems perfectly possibly to pursue a wicked end, and perhaps feel guilty about it. |
14063 | Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: It is better for a good decision not to turn out right in action than for a bad decision to turn out right because of chance. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 135) | |
A reaction: This sounds right, and on the whole the law agrees. Notice that what we need is a 'good decision', and not just to 'mean well'. The well-meaning fool is wicked. I am opposed to consequentialism, and agree with this idea. |
14522 | What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: One should bring this question to bear on all one's desires: what will happen to me if what is sought by desire is achieved, and what will happen if it is not? | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 71) | |
A reaction: Yet another example of Epicurus moving up a level in his thinking about ethical issues, as in Idea 14517 and Idea 14519. The mark of a true philosopher. This seems to be a key idea for wisdom - to think further ahead than merely what you desire. |
14059 | The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: It is not drinking bouts or enjoying boys and women or consuming fish which produces the pleasant life, but sober calculation which searches out reasons for every choice, and drives out opinions which produce turmoil of the soul. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132) | |
A reaction: This more or less sums up what I would call the philosophical life. Spontaneity is good, and some pleasures are killed by excessive thought, but on the whole actions are always better if good reasons are found, and error brings chaos. |
1835 | True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: When we say that pleasure is the chief good, we do not mean debauchery, but freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion…. which requires sober contemplation. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 131), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27 | |
A reaction: I'm not clear how lack of pain and confusion counts as pleasure. Also the concepts of debauchery held by the puritan and the sybarite are wildly different. |
1839 | Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The pains of the soul are worst, for the flesh is only sensible of present affliction, but the soul feels the past, present and future. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29 | |
A reaction: I don't think feeling extended across time is very relevant. What matters is that pains of the soul usually endure far longer than physical suffering. |
1842 | Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If every pleasure lasted long, and affected the whole body, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.08 | |
A reaction: This seems to miss out on intensity, which is of great importance to most pleasure seekers. Also it is a pleasure to be alive, which is lifelong, but we barely notice it. |
3557 | The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas] |
Full Idea: Epicurus identifies our final end with what he calls tranquillity or 'ataraxia', which is static pleasure. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.7 | |
A reaction: I don't recall any Greek ever spotting that boredom is a problem. But then they didn't have privacy, so other people always hold their attention. Maybe this is a dream of privacy. |
14056 | We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: We are in need of pleasure only when we are in pain because of the absence of pleasure, and when we are not in pain, then we no longer need pleasure. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 128) | |
A reaction: This Buddhist aspiration to eliminate desire has no appeal for me. It just sounds like a recipe for boredom, and an aversion to risk-taking. Start by asking what is best in life; it inevitably involves pleasure of some sort. Anyway, desire isn't painful. |
3563 | Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: It is not possible to live pleasantly without living intelligently and finely and justly, nor to live intelligently and finely and justly without living pleasantly. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 5), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.16 | |
A reaction: A person with all these virtues might still suffer from depression. And I don't see why having limited intelligence should stop someone from living pleasantly. Just be warm-hearted. |
1845 | Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.35 |
3560 | Justice is merely a contract about not harming or being harmed [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: There is no such things as justice in itself; in people's relations with one another in any place and at any time it is a contract about not harming or being harmed. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 33), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 13.2 |
23181 | All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The good of any virtue …is referable to the common good, to which justice directs, so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice insofar as it directs man to the common good. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 5) | |
A reaction: Michael Sandel has recently lamented to fading of the concept of 'the common good' from our moral and political life. In which case this thought of Aquinas takes on great importance. I certainly like it. It seems to apply to courage, for example. |
14060 | Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Prudence is the principle of the rational life and is the greatest good. That is why prudence is more valuable than philosophy, for prudence is the source of all the other virtues. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132) | |
A reaction: ['prudence' will be Greek 'phronesis']The interest of this is that it is almost copied straight out of Aristotle's Ethics. Epicurus was an opponent of the Peripatetics, but greatly influenced by them. |
1841 | We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We choose the virtues for the sake of pleasure, and not on their own account. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.30 |
8009 | Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas (unlike St Augustine's Platonism) is not concerned with escaping from the snares of the world and of desire, but with transforming desire for moral ends. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9 | |
A reaction: This is very close to Aristotle himself, for whom education of the feelings (into good habits, and then true virtues) was central. Education of feelings should be central to all education (though young psychopaths may show resistance). |
14517 | We value our own character, whatever it is, and we should respect the characters of others [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: We value our characters as our own personal possessions, whether they are good and envied by men or not. We must regard our neighbours' characters thus too, if they are respectable. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 15) | |
A reaction: I like this because it introduces a metaethical dimension to the whole problem of virtue. We should value our own character - so should we try to improve it? Should we improve so much as to become unrecognisable? |
23182 | Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good, and this virtue is legal justice. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 6) | |
A reaction: This concept of legal justice is underpinned, for Aquinas, by the concept of natural law, which has divine backing. Positive law could hardly fulfil such a major role, given that it could be corrupt. |
22399 | Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The passions may incite us to something against reason, and so we need a curb, which we name 'temperance'. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia 2ae Q61 a.3), quoted by Philippa Foot - Virtues and Vices II | |
A reaction: I am increasingly unclear what 'reason' means in contexts like these. It seems to mean no more than the awareness of greater goods than the indulgence of passion. Without that awareness, high intelligence couldn't produce temperance. |
23177 | Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are 'adjusted' when they are made equal. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 1) | |
A reaction: Even if you say justice is giving people what they deserve, rather than mere equality, they must still be equal in receiving like for like. Legal justice implies equality before the law (except for monarchs?). |
14513 | Justice is a pledge of mutual protection [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, neither to harm one another nor to be harmed. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 31) | |
A reaction: Notice that justice is not just reciprocal usefulness, but a 'pledge' to that effect. This implies a metaethical value of trust and honesty in keeping the pledge. Is it better to live by the pledge, or to be always spontaneously useful? |
1829 | A wise man would be happy even under torture [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Even if the wise man were put to the torture, he would still be happy. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.26 |
1843 | Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.28 |
14515 | A law is not just if it is not useful in mutual associations [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If someone passes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in mutual associations, this no longer possesses the nature of justice. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 37) |
23179 | People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There are many differences of degrees among men, for instance, some are soldiers, some are priests, some are princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be alloted to them. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 4) | |
A reaction: An objection (3), but Aquinas endorses it in his reply. In 58.10 he says striking a prince is worse that striking a commoner. The shift to the idea that everyone is supposed to be equal before the law has been slow, and we are not quite there yet. |
23174 | Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: It is evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q91 2) | |
A reaction: It is not enough merely that God decrees eternal laws. It is also necessary for us to use reason in order to participate. I'm not sure what reasoning process is involved. |
22113 | Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: All things to be done or to be avoided pertain to the precepts of natural law, which practical reasoning apprehends naturally as being human goods. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q94.2c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13 | |
A reaction: No mention of God, but you feel the divine presence in the background. He also cites 'eternal law'. No coincidence that the atheist Hobbes rejected natural law. Personally I would offer an atheistic defence of natural law, based on human nature. |
22114 | Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A tyrannical law, since it is not in accord with reason, is not unconditionally a law, but is rather a perversion of law. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q92.1, ad 4), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13 | |
A reaction: Only a belief in natural law can give a basis for such a claim. Positivists will say a tyrannical law is unconditionally a law like any other, but a bad one. |
7291 | For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Aquinas argued that on three conditions war can be justified: first, that there is a just cause; second, that it is begun on proper authority; and third, that it is waged with right intention, for 'the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil'. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II) by A.C. Grayling - Among the Dead Cities Ch.6 | |
A reaction: But see also Idea 7292. Nowadays we are rightly suspicious of all three conditions. Evil people seem to think their cause is just; authority has often been seized by violence, or is being abused; and people seem confused about what is good or evil. |
5508 | Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: In Aquinas's view the fertilized egg is not, either at the moment of conception or for quite a while afterwards, endowed with an immortal soul. In fact, technically speaking, it is not even human. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.20 | |
A reaction: It is pointed at that therefore Aquinas does not give good support for modern Catholic views on abortion. There is certainly no reason why a human zygote should be ensouled from the start, as God may do this whenever He wishes. |
14520 | It is small-minded to find many good reasons for suicide [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: He is utterly small-minded for whom there are many plausible reasons for committing suicide. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 38) | |
A reaction: It is a pity that the insult of 'small-minded' has slipped out of philosophy. The Greeks use it all the time, and know exactly what it means. We all recognise small-mindedness, and it is a great (and subtle) vice. |
1831 | Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Even though he lose his eyes, a wise man should still partake of life. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.26 |
12044 | Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas] |
Full Idea: Epicurus alone among the ancient schools denies that in nature we find any teleological explanations. Nothing in nature is for anything, neither the world as a whole nor anything in it. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction | |
A reaction: This may explain the controversial position that epicureanism held in the seventeenth century, as well as its incipient atheism. |
14032 | Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The totality is unlimited. For what is limited has an extreme; but an extreme is seen in contrast to something else, so that since it has no extreme it has no limit. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 41) | |
A reaction: I presume that the 'limit' is the edge, and the 'extreme' is what is beyond the edge. Why could not the extreme be nothingness, which then contrast dramatically with what exists? |
14033 | Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The number of bodies and the magnitude of the void are unlimited. If void were unlimited, and bodies limited, bodies move in scattered fashion with no support of checking collisions; in limited void, unlimited bodies would not have a place to be in. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 42) | |
A reaction: Seems good. The point is that without collisions, bodies would not stop relative to one another, and combine to form the objects we perceive. Of course if the started off (anathema!) stuck together, they may not have dispersed yet. |
14034 | There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: For each type of shape there is an unlimited number of similar atoms, but with respect to the differences they are not simply unlimited but ungraspable. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 42) | |
A reaction: Epicurus's view of the nature of atoms rests on his empiricism, so while he can reason from experience to how they must be, he admits (impressively) his ignorance of the full facts. He has arguments for the unlimited number. |
14035 | Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: There are not even any qualities in atoms, except shape and size and weight; their colour changes according to the arrangement of the atoms. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 44 schol) | |
A reaction: [This is quoted by a 'scholiast' - an early writer quoting from Epicurus's '12 Basic Principles'] He appears to have got this one wrong, as it is evidently the type of atom, as well as the arrangement, which contributes to the colour. |
14038 | There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: One must eliminate unlimited division into smaller pieces (to avoid making everything weak and being forced in our comprehensive grasps of compound things to exhaust the things which exist by reducing them to non-existence). | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 56) | |
A reaction: A basic argument for atoms, but it seems to rest on Zenonian paradoxes about infinite subdivision. An infinite subdivision of a unit doesn't seem to turn it into zero. |
20907 | Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight [Epicurus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Democritus said that the properties of the atoms are in number two, magnitude and shape, but Epicurus added to these a third one, weight. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.3.18 | |
A reaction: The addition of Epicurus seems very sensible, and an odd omission by Democritus. He seems to think that atoms have a uniform density, so that volume indicates weight. |
21669 | Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused [Cicero on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The swerve of Epicurus takes place without a cause; it does not take place in consequence of being struck by another atom, since how can that take place if they are indivisible bodies travelling perpendicularly in straight lines by the force of gravity? | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.22 | |
A reaction: The swerve is the most ad hoc proposal in the history of theoretical physics. This is interesting for spelling out that the travel in vertical parallels. What's that all about, then? |
21680 | What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? [Cicero on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: What fresh cause exists in nature to make the atom swerve (or do the atoms cast lots among them which is to swerve and which not?), or to serve as the reason for making a very small swerve and not a large one, or one swerve, and not two or three swerves? | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 20.46 | |
A reaction: This is an appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which seems to be the main ground for rejecting the swerve. The only reason to accept the swerve is reluctance to accept determinism or fatalism. |
16687 | Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Bodies are those substances in which one finds three dimensions. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia Q18.2c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 16.2 | |
A reaction: Pasnau points out that this extensional view of physical bodies was a commonplace long before Descartes. Presumably there are also non-dimensional substances (such as angels?). |
11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: When things are so related that one causes the other to exist, the cause can exist without what it causes but not vice versa. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103) | |
A reaction: This is open to question, if causes are supposed to be sufficient for effects. Presumably Aquinas would support the view that if the cause had not been, the effect would not have happened. But the current idea indicates the priority relation. |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Even a sufficient cause doesn't always compel its effect, since it can sometimes be interfered with so that its effect doesn't happen | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 15) |
14049 | We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Blessedness lies in knowing the natures which are observed in meteorological phenomena. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 78) | |
A reaction: This pursuit of 'natures' seems to be at the heart of scientific essentialism. Epicurus demonstrates his proposal, by offering speculations about the natures of all sorts of phenomena (esp. in 'Letter to Pythocles'). |
14043 | The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The void can neither act nor be acted upon but merely provides the possibility of motion through itself for bodies. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 67) | |
A reaction: Epicurus follows this with the anti-dualist Idea 14042, but he is at least offering the notion of something which exists without powers of causal interaction. Does space undermine the causal criterion for existence? |
14031 | Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If there did not exist that which we call void and space and intangible nature, bodies would not have any place to be in or move through, as they obviously do move. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 40) | |
A reaction: The observation that 'they obviously do move' must be aimed at followers of Parmenides. The idea of the void seems to contain a Newtonian commitment to absolute space. |
14525 | Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Stoics posited that time is an incorporeal which is conceived of all by itself, while Epicurus thinks that it is an accident of certain things, ...and he called in a property of properties. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.219-227] |
15202 | Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The centre of a circle is directly opposite any designated point on the circumference. In this way, whatever is in any part of time coexists with what is eternal as being present to it even though past or future with respect to another part of time. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], I.66), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 2 c | |
A reaction: A nice example of a really cool analogy which almost gets you to accept something which is actually completely incomprehensible. |
14051 | A cosmos is a collection of stars and an earth, with some sort of boundary, movement and shape [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: A cosmos is a circumscribed portion of the heavens containing stars and an earth; it is separated from the unlimited, with a boundary which is rare or dense; it is revolving or stationary; it is round or triangular, or some shape. All these are possible. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Pythocles [c.292 BCE], 88) | |
A reaction: Notice that there seem to exist the 'heavens' which extend beyond the cosmos. See Idea 14036, saying that there are many other cosmoi in the heavens. |
14036 | There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: There is an unlimited number of cosmoi, and some are similar to this one and some are dissimilar. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 45) |
2637 | For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: For Epicureans the gods are made of atoms, so in that case they are not eternal. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.68 |
23178 | Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The divine law commands certain things because they are good and forbids others because they are evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others evil because they are forbidden. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 2) | |
A reaction: This is a fifty-fifty response to the Euthyphro dilemma, but it seems to leave the theological puzzle of the source of the goodness which is prescribed because it is in fact good. |
2633 | Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus alone saw that gods must exist because nature herself has imprinted an idea of them in the minds of all mankind. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.43 |
21251 | We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition 'God exists' is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3) | |
A reaction: Depends on his definition of self-evidence (Idea 21250), which needs knowledge of the essence of the subject. Anselm required 'understanding' of the concept. One might understand the existence criteria without knowing the whole essence. Anselm wins. |
5614 | If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas] |
Full Idea: To those who assume the existence of a necessary being, and would only know which among all things had to be regarded as such a thing, one could not answer: This thing here is the necessary being | |
From: comment on Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason A612/B640 | |
A reaction: See Aquinas in Idea 1431. Kant makes a nice point. You might turn out to be the necessary being? How could you tell? You only know that there must be one lurking somewhere. I could be a slug. Aquinas makes a huge leap to God. |
21269 | Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: A thing can only be reduced from potentiality to actuality by something actual. A thing can never be in actuality and potentiality in the same respect. So what is moved must be moved by another. But this cannot go on to infinity, with no first mover. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This relies on the Aristotelian ideas of potentiality and actuality. We might talk about things moving, but lacking the 'power' to move. This is almost identical to Plato in 'The Laws' (which I guess Aquinas knew nothing of). |
21270 | Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If there is no first cause among efficient causes, there is no ultimate or intermediate cause. That in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity is plainly false. So it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, which everyone calls God. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
A reaction: [compressed] It doesn't seem to follow at all that the First Cause is God. There could be a single thing like the Phoenix, with unique self-causing properties. Or a quantum fluctuation. |
21271 | Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: That which can not-be at some time is not. So if everything can not-be, then once there was nothing in existence. If so, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist. So there must be some being having of itself its own necessity. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Why can't things take it in turns to not-be, so that something is always on duty? Maybe it is a feature of things that they bring other things into existence (e.g. virtual particles)? |
21272 | Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: More and less are predicated of different things according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum. The maximum of a genus is the cause of all in that genus. So there must be something causing the perfections of all beings. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The argument makes a startling jump from each quality (like heat or nobility) having a maximum, to their being a single entity (a 'being' at that) which is the sole source of all human perfections. |
21273 | Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, which is usually in the same way, to obtain the best result. Hence they achieve their end designedly. Hence some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is Greek teleology with a vengeance. Plants probably illustrate best what he has in mind. There is obvious teleology in human affairs, and there is a sort of teleology in living things, but we take the end to be reinforced by success. |
1828 | God does not intervene in heavenly movements, but is beyond all action and perfectly happy [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Let us beware of making the Deity interpose in heavenly movements, for that being we ought to suppose exempt from all occupation and perfectly happy. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Pythocles [c.292 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.25 |
2639 | Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Some believe that Epicurus gave lip-service only to the gods, so as not to offend the Athenians, but in fact did not believe in them. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.84 |
20211 | Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: Aquinas describes the ultimate end of human life as the Beatific Vision, a state that is simultaneously the enjoyment of perfect happiness and a perfect revelation of truth. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II 4.2 | |
A reaction: I like that a lot, even though my idea of the revelation of truth is very distant from that of Aquinas. Ignorant happiness is not much of an aspiration. |
22106 | Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
Full Idea: Unlike some of his contemporaries, Aquinas does not think that there is a 'spiritual matter' that angels or disembodied souls have as one of their components, but rather that they are separated forms that configure no matter at all. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 10 | |
A reaction: 'Separated forms' sounds like the modern concept of abstract entities, meaning that souls and angels exist in the way that platonists believe numbers exist. How else might Aquinas have understood them? |
16711 | Heretics should be eradicated like wolves [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Heretics are wolves …and therefore ought to be eradicated. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Sentences [1264], IV.13.2.3sc), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
14527 | If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If god acted in accordance with the prayers of men, all men would rather quickly be destroyed, since they constantly pray for many sufferings to befall each other. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [source Maximus the Abbott 'Gnom.' 14] |
23306 | Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aquinas infers from Aristotle that intellectual understanding is the only operation of the soul that is performed without a physical organ, so that only human souls, and not animal ones, can be immortal. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I, q75, a3, resp) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Reason' | |
A reaction: This shows why so many thinkers are desperate to hang on to dualism, of some sort. Interesting that he only claims partial dualism. |
1863 | If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Even if soul achieves well-being in another life, that doesn't mean I do or any other human being does. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Super Epistolam Pauli Apostoli [1272]) |
4412 | Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: In order that the bliss of the saints may be more delightful for them, and they may render more copious thanks to God for it, it is given to them to see perfectly the punishment of the damned. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], III Supp Q94,1), quoted by Friedrich Nietzsche - On the Genealogy of Morals I.§15 | |
A reaction: This has probably been repudiated by the Church of England. Justice should be seen to be done. Presumably you mustn't gloat, or you join them. |
21266 | God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the name God means that He is infinite goodness. If therefore God existed there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1) | |
A reaction: This is not, of course, the opinion of Aquinas. I love the way he states the opposition's arguments so lucidly. The modern problem usually talks of God's omnipotence, rather than infinity. His formulation allows that there might be undiscoverable evil. |
21274 | It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: As Augustine says, God would not allow any evil to exist in his works, unless he were to bring good even out of evil. It is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He allows evil to exist and out of it produces good. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1rep) | |
A reaction: Are God's powers so limited that He could not have achieved an equal amount of good without having to indulge in some evil first? |