Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eucleides, Albertus Magnus and Tuomas E. Tahko

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8 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16756	Substantial forms must exist, to explain the stability of metals like silver and tin [Albertus Magnus]
	Full Idea: There is no reason why the matter in any natural thing should be stable in its nature, if it is not completed by a substantial form. But we see that silver is stable, and tin and other metals. Therefore they will seem to be perfected by substantial forms.
	From: Albertus Magnus (On Minerals [1260], III.1.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.2
	A reaction: Illuminating. This may be the best reason for proposing substantial forms. Once materialism arrives, the so-called 'laws' of nature have to be imposed on the material to do the job - but what the hell is a law supposed to be?

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible

16978	If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko]
	Full Idea: Maybe conceivability could be understood as a priori coherence, which implies possibility.
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 3.2)
	A reaction: I'm not quite sure why 'a priori' has to be there. Assessing conceivability just is assessing coherence. That couches it as a rational activity, rather than as a purely imaginary one. Trying to conceive a square circle isn't just daydreaming.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities

16718	Primary qualities are the cause of all the other sensible qualities [Albertus Magnus]
	Full Idea: The primary qualities of tangible things are the cause of all the other sensible qualities.
	From: Albertus Magnus (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1261], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
	A reaction: This makes the primary qualities sound suspiciously like the essence.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence

16975	Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko]
	Full Idea: Essences are supposed to do a lot of explanatory work: natural kinds can be identified in terms of their essences, metaphysical modality can be reduced to essence, the causal power of objects can be explained with the help of essence.
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 1)
	A reaction: Natural kinds and modality are OK with me, but I'm dubious about the third one. If an essence explains something's causal powers, I have no idea what an essence might be. Essence are largely characterised in terms of causal powers.

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

1757	The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: The 'Electra': Electra knows that Orestes is her brother, but not that this man is Orestes, so she knows and does not know her brother simultaneously.
	From: report of Eucleides (fragments/reports [c.410 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Eu.4
	A reaction: Hence we distinguish 'know of', 'know that' and 'know how'. Hence Russell makes 'knowledge by acquaintance' fundamental, and descriptions come later.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good

3028	The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides]
	Full Idea: The chief good is unity, which is known by several names, for at one time people call it prudence, at another time God, at another intellect, and so on.
	From: Eucleides (fragments/reports [c.410 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.9.2
	A reaction: So the chief good is what unites and focuses our moral actions. Kant calls that 'the will'.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

16976	Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko]
	Full Idea: The conception of essence taken for granted in much of the 'scientific essentialist' literature is that essence can be explained in terms of modality (rather than the other way round).
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 2.1)
	A reaction: [He cites Ellis and Bird] That is, presumably, that they are inclined to say that the essence of gold is a set of necessary properties. Maybe conceptual necessities dictate the properties of gold, and they in turn dictate metaphysical necessities?

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity

16977	If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko]
	Full Idea: If essence is conceived in terms of modality and the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, it seems that the laws of nature constitute essentialist knowledge, so the discovery of essences is mostly due to scientists.
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 2.1)
	A reaction: This seems muddled to me. The idea that the laws themselves are essences is way off target. No one thinks all knowledge of necessities is essentialist. Mumford, for example, doesn't even believe in laws.