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5182
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Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
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Full Idea:
Such a metaphysical pseudo-proposition as 'the Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress' (F.H.Bradley) is not even in principle verifiable.
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From:
comment on F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.1
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A reaction:
One may jeer at the Verification Principle for either failing to be precise, or for failing to pass its own test, but Ayer still has a point here. When we drift off into sustained abstractions, we must keeping asking if we are still saying anything real.
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13913
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The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
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Full Idea:
There are four 'perfect syllogisms': Barbara (every M is P, every S is M, so every S is P); Celarent (no M is P, every S is M, so no S is P); Darii (every M is P, some S is M, so some S is P); Ferio (no M is P, some S is M, so some S is not P).
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From:
Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8)
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A reaction:
The four names are mnemonics from medieval universities.
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13916
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Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
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Full Idea:
Term logic begins with expressions and two 'term functors'. Any simple letter is a 'term', any term prefixed by a minus ('-') is a 'negative term', and any pair of terms flanking a plus ('+') is a 'compound term'. Parenthese are used for grouping.
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From:
Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8)
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A reaction:
[see Engelbretsen and Sayward for the full formal system]
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13849
|
Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
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Full Idea:
Classical logic rests on the concepts of truth and falsity (and usually makes use of a semantic theory based on models), whereas constructivist logic accounts for inference in terms of defense and refutation.
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From:
Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], Intro)
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A reaction:
My instincts go with the classical view, which is that inferences do not depend on the human capacity to defend them, but sit there awaiting revelation. My view isn't platonist, because I take the inferences to be rooted in the physical world.
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6422
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Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell]
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Full Idea:
The doctrine of internal relations held that every relation between two terms expresses, primarily, intrinsic properties of the two terms and, in ultimate analysis, a property of the whole which the two compose.
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From:
report of F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]) by Bertrand Russell - My Philosophical Development Ch.5
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A reaction:
Russell's first big campaign was to reject this view, and his ontology from then on included relations among the catalogue of universals. The coherence theory of truth also gets thrown out at the same time. Russell seems right.
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7966
|
Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
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Full Idea:
If a relation between qualities is to be something, then clearly we will now require a new connecting relation. The links are united by a link, and this link has two ends, which require a fresh link to connect them to the old.
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From:
F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893], p.28), quoted by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.6
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A reaction:
That is: external relations generates an infinite regress, so relations must be internal. Russell launched his own philosophy with an attack on Bradley's idea. Personally I take how two things 'relate' to one another as one of the deepest of mysteries.
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6404
|
British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling]
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Full Idea:
The idealism of Green and Bradley, both of whom were much influenced by the German Idealists, espoused the thesis that the universe ultimately consists of a single Mind which, so to speak, experiences itself.
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From:
report of F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
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A reaction:
This looks now like the last (extreme) throw by the religious view of the world, which collapsed in the face of the empirical realism of Russell and Moore. It is all Kant's fault, for cutting us off from his 'noumenon'.
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5655
|
Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
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Full Idea:
For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
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From:
report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
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A reaction:
Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).
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6406
|
Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]
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Full Idea:
Reality is one. It must be simple because plurality, taken as real, contradicts itself. Plurality implies relations, and, through its relations it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity.
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From:
F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893], p.519), quoted by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
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A reaction:
This argument depends on a belief in 'internal' relations, which Russell famously attacked. If an internal feature of every separate item was its relation to other things, then I suppose Bradley would be right. But it isn't, and he isn't.
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18202
|
The concept of a field gradually replaced the substances in explaining relations between charges [Einstein/Infeld]
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Full Idea:
In the beginning the field concept was no more than a means of facilitating the understanding of phenomena. ...In the new field language it is the field and not the charges themselves which is essential. The substance was overshadowed by the field.
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From:
Einstein,A/Infeld,L (The Evolution of Physics [1938], p.151), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.4
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A reaction:
This is very important for philosophical metaphysicians, especially those like me who want to explain the universe by the nature of the stuff that composes it. The 'stuff' had better not be simplistic individual 'substances'.
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