67 ideas
| 4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
| Full Idea: Necessary and sufficient conditions are usually expressed by "if and only if" (abbr. "iff"), where "if" is the sufficient condition, and "only if" is the necessary condition. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: 'I take my umbrella if and only if it is raining' (oh, and if I'm still alive). There may be other necessary conditions than the one specified. Oh, and I take it if my wife slips it into my car… |
| 4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
| Full Idea: The tradition of the Stoics and Frege says that truth-bearers are propositions, Descartes and the classical empiricist say they are ideas or beliefs, and Ockham and Quine say they are sentences or utterances. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: I'm with propositions, which are unambiguous, can be expressed in a variety of ways, embody the 'logical form' of sentences, and could be physically embodied in brains (the language of thought?). |
| 4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
| Full Idea: The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p'. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.2) | |
| A reaction: But then when you ask what p means, you have to give the truth-conditions for its assertion, and you find you have to mention the facts after all. |
| 4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
| Full Idea: The correspondence theory implies displaying an identity or similarity of structure between the contents of thoughts and the way the world is structured, but we seem only to be able to say that the world's structure corresponds to our thoughts. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.2) | |
| A reaction: I don't accept this. The structure of the world gives rise to our thoughts. There is an epistemological problem here (big time!), but that doesn't alter the metaphysical situation of what truth is supposed to be, which is correspondence. |
| 4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
| Full Idea: The coherence theory of truth says that it is a relationship between truth-bearers themselves, that is between propositions or beliefs or sentences. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: We immediately begin to wonder how many truth-bearers are required. Two lies can be coherent. It is hard to make thousands of lies coherent, but not impossible. What fixes the critical number. 'All possible propositions' is not much help. |
| 4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
| Full Idea: Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding to it one or more false beliefs. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.3) | |
| A reaction: A simple but rather devastating point. It is the policeman manufacturing a bogus piece of evidence to clinch the conviction, the scientist faking a single observation to fill in the last corner of a promising theory. |
| 4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
| Full Idea: Deflationism about truth seems to deprive us of any hope of asking genuinely metatheoretical questions, which are the questions that occupy philosophers most of the time. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5) | |
| A reaction: This seems like the best reason for moving from deflationism to at least minimalism. Clearly one can talk meaningfully about the success of assertions and theories. You can say a sentence is true, but not assert it. |
| 4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
| Full Idea: The deflationist view is silent about the fact that our assertions and beliefs are generally made or held for certain reasons. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5) | |
| A reaction: The point here must be that I attribute strength to my beliefs, depending on how much support I have for them - how much support for their real truth. I scream "That's really TRUE!" when I have very good reasons. |
| 4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
| Full Idea: We could compare the status of 'true' with the status of the logical operator 'and' in logic. Once we have explained how it functions to conjoin two propositions, there is not much more to be said about it. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.4) | |
| A reaction: A good statement of the minimalist view. I don't believe it, because I don't believe that truth is confined to language. An uneasy feeling I can't put into words can turn out to be true. Truth is a relational feature of mental states. |
| 22246 | A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: For logic purposes, a train of reasoning has to be construed as synchronic. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: If we are looking for a gulf between logic and the real world this is a factor to be considered, along with Nietzsche's observation about necessary simplification. [ref to Kaplan 'Afterthoughts' 1989, 584-5] |
| 4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
| Full Idea: It is said that deflationism cannot even formulate the principle of bivalence, for 'either p is true or p is false' will amount to the principle of excluded middle, 'either p or not-p'. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.4) | |
| A reaction: Presumably deflationists don't lost any sleep over this - in fact, it looks like a good concise way to state the deflationist thesis. However, excluded middle refers to a proposition (not-p) that was never mentioned by bivalence. Cf Idea 6163. |
| 16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Mental files are the mental counterparts of singular terms. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: A thoroughly satisfactory theory. We can build up a picture of filing merging, duplication, ambiguity, error etc. Eventually neuroscience will map the whole system, and we will have cracked it. |
| 14221 | Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski] |
| Full Idea: Serious essentialism is the position that a) everything has an essence, b) essences are not themselves things, and c) essences are the ground for metaphysical necessity and possibility. | |
| From: Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: If a house is being built, it might acquire an identity first, and only get an essence later. Essences can be physical, but if you extract them you destroy thing thing of which they were the essence. Does all of this apply to abstract 'things'. |
| 14222 | Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski] |
| Full Idea: The route into essentialism is, first, a recognition that the essence of a thing is "what it is to be" that (kind of) thing; the essence of a thing is just its identity. | |
| From: Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Essent') | |
| A reaction: The first half sounds right, and very Aristotelian. The second half is dramatically different, controversial, and far less plausible. Slipping in 'kind of' is also highly dubious. This remark shows, I think, some confusion about essences. |
| 14226 | We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski] |
| Full Idea: In ordinary contexts, we distinguish objects not by their essences but by their attributes. | |
| From: Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Ess and Know') | |
| A reaction: Hence we have a gap between what bestows identity intrinsically, and how we bestow identity conventionally. If you could grasp the essence of something, you might predict a new attribute, as yet unobserved. |
| 14225 | Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski] |
| Full Idea: According to critics, the thorniest problem for essentialism is the question of our knowledge of essence. It is usually at this point that terms of abuse such as 'dark', 'mysterious', and 'occult' are wheeled out. | |
| From: Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Ess and Know') | |
| A reaction: I'm inclined to think that the existence of essences can be fairly conclusively inferred, but that attributing a precise identity to them is the biggest challenge. |
| 16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: An identity statement 'A=B' is informative to the extent that the terms 'A' and 'B' are associated with distinct mental files. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: Hence the information in 'Scott is the author of 'Waverley'' is information about what is in your mind, not what is happening in Scotland. This is Recanati's solution to one of Frege's classic puzzles. 'Morning Star' and 'Evening Star' files. Nice. |
| 14223 | De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski] |
| Full Idea: De dicto necessity is a species of de re necessity. Anyone prone to countenance de dicto necessity must recognise mental and/or linguistic entities, thus counting each of them as a res to which necessity attaches. | |
| From: Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Essent') | |
| A reaction: This seems to rest on the Kit Fine thought that analytic necessities seem to derive from the essences of words such as 'bachelor'. I like this idea: all necessity is de re, but some of the 'things' are words. |
| 9220 | Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider] |
| Full Idea: If purple cows are simply absent from Lewis's multiverse, then certain correct propositions turn out to be impossible. Lewis must require a world for every possibility. But then it is circular, as the multiverse needs modal notions to characterize it. | |
| From: report of Scott Shalkowski (Ontological Ground of Alethic Modality [1994], 3.9) by Theodore Sider - Reductive Theories of Modality 3.9 | |
| A reaction: [Inversely, a world containing a round square would make that possible] This sounds very nice, though Sider rejects it (p.197). I've never seen how you could define possibility using the concept of 'possible' worlds. |
| 4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
| Full Idea: A problem for the Humean theory of motivation is that it is disputed that beliefs are only representational states, which cannot, unlike desires, move us to act. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §4.2) | |
| A reaction: This is a crucial issue for Humeans and empiricists. Rationalists claim that people act for reasons, so that reasons are intrinsically motivational (like the Form of the Good), and reasons may even be considered direct causes of actions. |
| 4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
| Full Idea: Belief is said to 'aim at truth', in the sense that beliefs are the kind of mental states that have to be true for the mind to 'fit' the world (where our desires have the opposite 'direction of fit'; the world is supposed to fit our desires). | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5) | |
| A reaction: I don't think it is possible to give a plausible definition of belief without mentioning truth. Hume's account of them as thoughts with a funny feeling attached is ridiculous. Thinking is an activity, not a passive state. |
| 4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
| Full Idea: The 'evidentialists' (such as Locke and Hume) deny, and the 'voluntarists' (such as William James) affirm, that we ought to, or at least may, believe for other reasons than evidential epistemic reasons (e.g. for pragmatic reasons). | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §5.2) | |
| A reaction: No need to be black-or-white here. Blatant evidence compels belief, but we may also come to believe by spotting a coherence, without additional evidence. We can also be in a state of trying to believe something. But see 4764. |
| 16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: It is not too difficult to imagine a continuum of cases between straightforward instances of knowledge by acquaintance and straightforward instances of knowledge by description, with more or less tenuous informational links to the referent. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 12.2) |
| 4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
| Full Idea: Pragmatism in general is better construed as a certain conception of belief, rather than as a distinctive conception of truth. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.5) | |
| A reaction: Which is why aspiring relativists drift towards the pragmatic theory - because they want to dispense with truth (and hence knowledge), and put mere belief in its place. |
| 4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
| Full Idea: Direct psychological voluntarism about beliefs seems to be false, but we can have an indirect voluntary control on many of our beliefs, by manipulating the states in us that are involuntary and which lead to certain beliefs. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §5.2) | |
| A reaction: Very nice! This points two ways - to scientific experiments, which can have compelling outcomes (see Fodor), and to brain-washing, and especially auto-brainwashing (only reading articles which support your favourites theories). What magazines do you take? |
| 4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
| Full Idea: For functionalism mental states as roles are second-order properties that have to be realised in various ways in first-order physical properties. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: I take that to be properties-of-properties, as in 'bright red' or 'poignantly beautiful'. I am inclined to think (with Edelman) that mind is a process, not a property. |
| 16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Singularity and indexicality are closely related: for indexicals systematically exploit the contextual relations in which we stand to what we talk about. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: Recanati builds a nice case that we may only have an ontology of singular objects because we conceptualise and refer to things in a particular way. He denies the ontology, but that's the bit that interests me. |
| 18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: I defend the applicability of the indexical model to singular thought, and to mental files qua vehicles of singular thought. Mental files, I will argue, possess the essential features of indexicals. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 05.1) | |
| A reaction: I love mental files, but am now (thanks to Cappelen and Dever) deeply averse to giving great significance to indexicals. A revised account of files will be needed. |
| 22247 | Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: People once took indexicality to be exclusively a property of language, ....but a series of examples seemed to establish that the thought expressed by uttering an indexical sentence is itself indexical (and is thus 'essential'). | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 6.1) | |
| A reaction: Perry's example of not realising it is him leaking the sugar in a supermarket is the best known example. Was this a key moment for realising that philosophy of thought is (pace Dummett) more important than philosophy of language? |
| 22248 | How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Indexical thoughts create an obvious problem with regard to communication. How can we manage to communicate such thoughts to those who are not in the right context? | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 7.1) | |
| A reaction: One answer is that you often cannot communicate them. If I write on a wall 'I am here now', that doesn't tell the next passer-by very much. But 'it's raining here' said in a telephone call works fine - if you know the location of the caller. |
| 16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Paderewski cases are cases in which a subject associates two distinct files with a single name. Inverse Paderewski cases are cases in which there are two names but the subject associates them with a single file. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 10.1) | |
| A reaction: In the inverse there are two people with the same name, and someone thinks they are one person (with their combined virtues and vices). E.g. Einstein the famous physicist, and Einstein the famous musicologist. What a man! |
| 16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: The reference of a file is the object to which the subject stands in the relevant epistemic relation. In the case of encylopedic entries there is an arbitrary number of distinct relations. The file grows new links in an opportunistic manner. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 11.3) | |
| A reaction: I'm not convinced by Recanati's claim that encylopedic files are a distinct type. My files seem to grow these opportunistic links right from their inception. All files seem to have that feature. A file could have four links at its moment of launching. |
| 16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: The mental file framework rests on two principles: that the subject cannot entertain a singular thought about an object without possessing and exercising a mental file about it, and that this requires an acquaintance relation with the object. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 12.3) | |
| A reaction: I'm puzzled by the case where I design and build a completely new object. I seem to assemble a file, and only bestow singularity on it towards the end. Or the singularity can just be a placeholder, referred to as 'something'. […see p.158] |
| 16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: On my view, actual acquaintance is not necessary to open a mental file; expected acquaintance will suffice; yet opening a mental file itself is not sufficient to entertain a singular thought-content. It only enables a thought-vehicle. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 13.1) | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear why I can't create a file with no expectation at all of acquaintance, as in a fictional case. Depends what 'acquaintance' means. Recanati longs for precise distinctions where they may not be available. |
| 16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Files function metarepresentationally if they serve to represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. ..An 'indexed' file has an index referring to the other subject whose files the indexed file stands for or simulates. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 14.1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there is an implicit index on all files, which says in a conversation whether my interlocutor does or does not hold the same file-type as me. Recanati wants many 'types' of files, but I suspect there is just one file type. |
| 16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: The mental file account preserves the original, Millian inspiration of direct reference theories in giving pride of place to acquaintance relations and downplaying satisfaction factors. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 17.3) | |
| A reaction: I find this a very satisfying picture, in which reference links to the simple label of a file (which could be a number), and not to its contents. There are tricky cases of non-existents, fictional entities and purely possible entities to consider. |
| 16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: What files refer to is not determined by properties which the subject takes the referent to have (information, or misinformation, in the file), but through the relations on which the files are based. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: Maybe. 'Lot 22'. I can build up a hypothetical file by saying 'Imagine an animal which is F, G, H…', and build a reference that relates to nothing. Maybe Recanati overestimates the role of his 'epistemically rewarding' relations in file creation. |
| 16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: The role of a mental file is precisely to treat all the information as if it concerned one and the same object, from which it derives. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: Recanati's book focuses entirely on singular objects, but we presumably have files for properties, generalisation, groups etc. Can they only be thought about if they are reified? Maybe. |
| 16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: A 'demonstrative' file only exists during the demonstrative relation to something; …a 'recognitional' file is based on 'familiarity' (a disposition to recognise); …an 'encylopedic' file contains all the information on something, however it is gained. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 6.1-3) | |
| A reaction: [picked as samples of his taxonomy, pp.70-73] I'm OK with this as long as he doesn't think the categories are sharply separated. I'm inclined to think of files as a single type, drifting in and out of different of modes. |
| 16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: There is a hierarchy of files. Proto-files are the most basic; conceptual files are generated from them. First-order ones are more basic, as the higher-order encylopedic entries presuppose them. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 6.3) | |
| A reaction: This hierarchy might fit into a decent account of categories, if a plausible one could be found. A good prospect for exploring categories would be to start with mental file-types, and work outwards through their relations. |
| 16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: I take a file to have a dual structure, with a 'nucleus' of the file consisting of information derived through the relevant epistemically rewarding relation, while the 'periphery' consists of information derived through linking with other files. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 8.3) | |
| A reaction: This sounds strikingly like essentialism to me, though what constitutes the essence is different from the usual explanatory basics. The link, though, is in the causal connection. If we naturally 'essentialise', that will control file-formation. |
| 22242 | Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Mental files are entries in the mental encyclopedia, that is, concepts. Some, following Grice, say they are information collections, but I think of them as containers. Collections are determined by their elements, but containers have independent identity. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], Pref) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] [Grice reference is 'Vacuous Names' (1969)] I agree with Recanati. The point is that you can invoke a file by a label, even when you don't know what the content is. |
| 22243 | The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Frege's Constraint says if a subject believes an object is both F and not-F (as in 'Frege cases'), then the subject thinks of that object under distinct modes of presentation. Having distinct mental files of the object is sufficient to generate this. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], Pref) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] When you look at how many semantic puzzles (notably from Frege and Kripke) are solved by the existence of labelled mental files, the case for them is overwhelming. |
| 16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: As Evans emphasises, what matters when we want to individuate semantic content is what would count as a proper understanding of an utterance; but 'understanding' defines the task of the hearer. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 16.2) | |
| A reaction: [cites Evans 1982: 92, 143n, 171] I like to place (following Aristotle) understanding at the centre of all of philosophy, so this seems to me an appealing idea. It makes misunderstandings interesting. |
| 16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: I want mental files (properly speaking) to serve as individual concepts, i.e. thought constituents. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 5.3) | |
| A reaction: This is why the concept of mental files is so neat - it gives you a theory of reference and a theory of concepts. I love the files approach because it precisely fits my own introspective experiences. Hope I'm not odd in that way. |
| 16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: A widely held view, originating with Russell, says there are two types of reference (both in language and thought): descriptive reference, and direct reference. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: I would rather say is there is just one sort of reference, and as many ways of achieving it as you care to come up with. With that view, most of the problems vanish, as far as I can see. People refer. Sentences are nothing but trouble. |
| 16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: In super-direct reference, the sort of thing Russell was after, there is no mode of presentation: the referent itself serves as its own vehicle, as it were. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 18.2) | |
| A reaction: To me this is a step too far, because reference is not some physical object like a chair; it is a mental or linguistic phenomenon. Chair's don't refer themselves; it is people who refer. |
| 16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: There are two notions of direct reference, the strong Millian notion (where the expression is like a 'tag' with no satisfaction mechanism), and the weaker Kaplanian notion (where reference is compatible with carrying a descriptive meaning). | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 17.3) | |
| A reaction: I immediately favour the Millian view, which gives a minimal basis for reference, as just a 'peg' (Marcus) to hang things on. I don't take a Millian reference to be the object itself. The concept of a 'tag' or 'label' is key. Mental files have tags. |
| 16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: To say that sense determines reference is to say that the same sense cannot determine distinct referents - any distinction at the level of reference entails a corresponding distinction at the level of sense. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 10.2) | |
| A reaction: Does 'the sentry at the gate' change its sense when the guard is changed? Yes. 'The sentry at the gate will stop you'. 'The sentry at the gate is my cousin'. De re/de dicto reference. So changes of de re reference seem to change the sense? |
| 16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: My view inherits from Frege 'modes of presentation'. Reference is not enough, and sense is needed. …We must make room for non-descriptive modes of presentation, and these are mental files. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 18.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Recanati aims to avoid the standard Kripkean criticisms of descriptivism, while being able to handle Frege's puzzles. I take Recanati's mental files theory to be the most promising approach. |
| 16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: What plays the role of sense is not information in a file, but the file itself. If there are two distinct files, one for 'Cicero' and one for 'Tully', then there are two distinct (non-descriptive) senses, even if the information in both files is the same. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: This may be the best idea in Recanati's book. A sense might be a 'way of coming at the information', rather than some set of descriptions. |
| 16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Three problems with Frege's idea of descriptions in the head are: reference through perception, reference through communicative chains, and reference through indexicals. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: In the end reference has to occur in the head, even if it is social or causal or whatever, so these are not problems that worry me. |
| 16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Descriptivism is the view that our mental relation to individual objects goes through properties of those objects. …This is so because our knowledge of objects is mediated by our knowledge of their properties. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: The implication is that if you view an object as just a bundle of properties, then you are obliged to hold a descriptive theory of reference. Hence a 'singularist' theory of reference seems to need a primitive notion of an object's identity. |
| 16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: A definite description may contribute either the singular predicate it encodes (attributive use) or the mental file to what that predicate belongs (referential use). | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 17.1) | |
| A reaction: This nicely explains Donnellan's distinction in terms of mental files. 'Green' may refer in a shop, but isn't much use in a wood. What to make of 'He's a bit of a Bismark'? |
| 16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: A rigid use of a definite description need not be referential: it may be attributive. Thus I may say: 'The actual F, whoever he is, is G'. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: Recanati offers this as a criticism of the attempted 2-D solution to descriptivist accounts of singularity. The singularity is not strong enough, he says. |
| 22245 | A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Mental files determine the reference of linguistic expressions: an expression refers to what the mental file associated with it refers to (at the time of tokening). | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 5) | |
| A reaction: Invites the question of how mental files manage to refer, prior to the arrival of a linguistic expression. A mental file is usually fully of descriptions, but it might be no more than a label. |
| 16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: As Peirce insisted, singularity as such cannot be described, it can only be given through actual world relations. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: [Peirce - Exact Logic, Papers 3, 1967, §419] This is the key idea for Recanati's case for basing our grasp of singular things on their relation to a mental file. |
| 16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: A mental file plays the role which Fregean theory assigns to modes of presentation. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 17.1) | |
| A reaction: I'm a fan of mental files, and this is a nice pointer to how the useful Fregean insights can be written in a way better grounded in brain operations. Rewriting Frege in neuroscience terms is a nice project for someone. |
| 14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |
| Full Idea: That 'all and only equilateral triangles are equiangular' required proof, and not for mere curiosity, is grounds for thinking that being an equilateral triangle is not the same property as being an equiangular triangle. | |
| From: Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Serious') | |
| A reaction: If you start with equiangularity, does equilateralness then require proof? This famous example is of two concepts which seem to be coextensional, but seem to have a different intension. Does a dependence relation drive a wedge between them? |
| 16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: If you and I think 'I am tired', there is a sense in which we think the same thing, and another sense in which we think different things. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 18.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a very nice simple account of the semantic distinctiveness of indexicals, which obviously requires a 'two-tiered framework'. He cites Kaplan and Perry as background. |
| 16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: The class of indexicals have the same property as mental files, that their reference is determined relationally rather than satisfactionally. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: Recanati is building an account of reference through mental files. This idea may be the clearest point I have yet encountered about indexicals, showing why they are of particular interest to philosophers. |
| 16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Indexicals do not refer; only tokens of an indexical refer | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: Thus 'Thurs 23rd March 2013' refers, but 'now' doesn't, unless someone produces an utterance of it. This is why indexicals are sometimes called 'token-reflexives'. |
| 16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: In the two-dimensional framework, what characterises the singular case is the fact that truth-evaluation (of possessing of the reference-fixing property) takes place at a later stage than reference determination. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: This sounds psychologically plausible, which is a big (and unfashionable) plus for me. 1) what are we talking about? 2) what are we saying about it, 3) is it true? |
| 16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Descriptivism has trouble catching the singularity of objects, construing them as only directly about properties. …To get the truth-conditions right, it is claimed, the descriptivist only as to go two-dimensional. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that the descriptivist only has a problem here because context is being ignored. 'That man on the beach' can quickly be made uniquely singular after a brief chat. |
| 16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: The Russellian notion of a proposition is arguably a better candidate for the status of semantic content than the Fregean notion of a thought. For the proposition remains constant from one person to the next. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 16.2) | |
| A reaction: A good point, though I rebel against Russellian propositions because they are too much out in the world, and propositions strike me as features of minds. We need to keep propositions separate from facts. |
| 22250 | There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: There is the speaker's thought and the thought formed by the hearer. That is all there is. We don't need an additional entity, the thought expressed by the utterance. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 7.2) | |
| A reaction: This fits my view of propositions nicely. They are the two 'thoughts'. The notion of some further abstract 'proposition' with its own mode of independent existence strikes me as ontologically absurd. |
| 22249 | The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: The Naive Conception of Communication rests on the idea that communication is the replication of thoughts: the thought the hearer entertains when he understands what the speaker is saying is the very thought which the speaker expressed. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 7.1) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to believe that any modern thinker would believe such a view, given holistic views of language etc. |