Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Frances A. Yates, Michael Stanford and Nicholas Jolley

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought

9288	The magic of Asclepius enters Renaissance thought mixed into Ficino's neo-platonism [Yates]
	Full Idea: The magic of Asclepius, reinterpreted through Plotinus, enters with Ficino's De Vita into the neo-platonic philosophy of the Renaissance, and, moreover, into Ficino's Christian Platonism.
	From: Frances A. Yates (Giordano Bruno and Hermetic Tradition [1964], Ch.4)
	A reaction: Asclepius is the source of 'Hermetic' philosophy. This move seems to be what gives the Renaissance period its rather quirky and distinctive character. Montaigne was not a typical figure. Most of them wanted to become gods and control the stars!

9291	The dating, in 1614, of the Hermetic writings as post-Christian is the end of the Renaissance [Yates]
	Full Idea: The dating by Isaac Casaubon in 1614 of the Hermetic writings as not the work of a very ancient Egyptian priest but written in post-Christian times, is a watershed separating the Renaissance world from the modern world.
	From: Frances A. Yates (Giordano Bruno and Hermetic Tradition [1964], Ch.21)
	A reaction: I tend to place the end of the Renaissance with the arrival of the telescope in 1610, so the two dates coincide. Simply, magic was replaced by science. Religion ran alongside, gasping for breath. Mathematics was freed from numerology.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

7566	The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
	Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle.
	From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation

12314	Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford]
	Full Idea: Rather than an 'interest-relative' notion of explanation (Putnam), it can be informational content which makes an explanation, which is an 'audience-invariant' contraint, which is not pragmatic, but mainly epistemological and also partly metaphysical.
	From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172)
	A reaction: [compressed summary of Ruben 1990] Examples given are that Rome burning explains Nero fiddling, even if no one ever says so, and learning that George III had porphyria explains his madness.

12313	Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford]
	Full Idea: There are a number of reasons why we explain: out of sheer curiosity, to increase our control of a situation, to help understanding by simplifying or making familiar, to confer meaning or significance, and to give scientific authority to some statement.
	From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172)

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

12315	We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford]
	Full Idea: The powerful engine of my car can be explained by an examination of each of its parts, but it is not caused by them. They do not cause the engine; they constitute it.
	From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.174)
	A reaction: [example from Ruben 1990:221] This could be challenged, since there is clearly a causal connection between the constitution and the whole. We distinguish engine parts which contribute to the power from those which do not.