21 ideas
7460 | The great moments are the death of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Romanticism [Berlin, by Watson] |
Full Idea: Berlin says there were three great turning points: after the death of Aristotle (when Greek schools focused on the inner life of individuals, instead of as social beings), Machiavelli's division of political and individual virtues, and Romanticism. | |
From: report of Isaiah Berlin (The Sense of Reality [1996], p.168-9) by Peter Watson - Ideas Intro | |
A reaction: I have the impression that Machiavelli introduced a new hard-boiled ethics, which dominated the sixteenth century, but in the seventeenth and eighteenth century they fought back, and Machiavellianism turned out to be just a phase. |
7662 | Romanticism is the greatest change in the consciousness of the West [Berlin] |
Full Idea: Romanticism seems to me the greatest single shift in the consciousness of the West that has occurred. | |
From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Far be it from me to challenge Berlin on such things, but I think that the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century (though acting more slowly and less dramatically than romanticism) may well be more significant in the long run. Ideas filter down. |
11193 | Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence [Avicenna] |
Full Idea: Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence. | |
From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 1/6), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.91 | |
A reaction: I think I might put it that wisdom is only really possible for people who aim to grasp being and essence in some way. I see no prospect of understanding 'being', and even essences may be forever just beyond our grasp. |
11209 | The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna] |
Full Idea: The simple's whatness is its very self. | |
From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 5.5), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.103 | |
A reaction: Aquinas endorses this Aristotelian view in Idea 11208. |
11204 | The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna] |
Full Idea: The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness. | |
From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 11/12.14), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) | |
A reaction: This remark is not invalidated by developments in modern particle physics. |
15036 | An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio] |
Full Idea: Avicenna's 'indifference of essence' says the essence of certain things can become universal or singular, according to whether it is entertained by the mind (as a universal) or concretely exemplified as a singular thing. One essence can exist in two ways. | |
From: report of Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'Sources' | |
A reaction: This would appear to be a form of nominalism, since in the concrete external world we only have particulars, and it is our mode of thinking (by abstraction?) that generates the universal aspect. I think this is probably right. |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
Full Idea: There is no sense in abandoning a successful theory if you have nothing to replace it with. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: This is also a problem for infererence to the best explanation. What to do if your best explanation is not very good? The simple message is do not rush to dump a theory when faced with an anomaly. |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: [On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics. |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Is Newton's theory simpler than Einstein's, since there is only one relation of simultaneity in absolute time, or is Einstein's simpler because it dispenses with absolute time altogether? | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: A nice question, to which a good scientist might be willing to offer an answer. Since simultaneity is crucial but the existence of time is not, I would vote for Newton as the simpler. |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Structural Realists say that modern science achieves a true or 'truer' account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature. The structure carries over to new theories. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: At first glance I am unconvinced that when an old theory is replaced it neverthess contains some sort of 'mathematical structure' which endures and is worth preserving. No doubt Worrall, French and co have examples. |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Structural Realists must show that it is the mathematical aspects of the theories, not their content, that account for their success ….and that their structure and content can be clearly separated. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Their approach certainly seems to rely on mathematical types of science, so it presumably fits biology, geology and even astronomy less well. |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The main difficulty with instrumentalism is its implausible account ot the meaning of theoretical claims and concepts. Most scientists take them to be straightforward attempts to describe the world. Most say they are useful because they are accurate. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Instrumentalism is seen as a Pragmatist view, and Dewey is cited. |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available. |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The more unification and integration is found among the modern sciences, the less likely it seems it will have all been a dream. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: I believe this strongly. Ancient theories which were complex, wide ranging and false do not impress me. This is part of my coherence view of justification. |
7665 | Most Enlightenment thinkers believed that virtue consists ultimately in knowledge [Berlin] |
Full Idea: What is common to most of the main thinker of the Enlightenment is the view that virtue consists ultimately in knowledge. | |
From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I have always found this view (which seems to originate with Socrates) rather sympathetic. What is so frustrating about cheerful optimists who smoke cigarettes is not the weakness of will or strong desires, but their apparent failure of understanding. |
7676 | If we are essentially free wills, authenticity and sincerity are the highest virtues [Berlin] |
Full Idea: Since (for romantics) we are wills, and we must be free, in the Kantian sense, controllable motives count more than consequences, and the greatest virtue of all is what existentialists call 'authenticity' and what romantics called 'sincerity'. | |
From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: The case of the sincere or authentic Nazi shows the problems with this. However, I agree that sincerity is a key virtue, perhaps the crucial preliminary to all the other virtues. It is hard to imagine a flow of other virtues from an insincere person. |
7664 | The Greeks have no notion of obligation or duty [Berlin] |
Full Idea: There is an absence among the Greeks of a notion of obligation, and hence of duty, which is difficult to grasp for people who read the Greeks through spectacles partly affected by the jews. | |
From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This doesn't quite fit early section of 'Republic', in which morality is a mutual agreement not to do harm. Presumably the Greek word 'deon' refers to what needs to be done, rather than to anyone's obligation to do it(?). Contracts need duty? Cf. 4133 |
7677 | Central to existentialism is the romantic idea that there is nothing to lean on [Berlin] |
Full Idea: The central sermon of existentialism is essentially a romantic one, namely, that there is in the world nothing to lean on. | |
From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: He tracks this back to Kant's view that our knowledge of the world arises out of our own minds. So what is there to lean on? Rational consistency? Natural human excellence? God? Pleasure? Anonymous duty? I like the second one. |
20544 | Berlin distinguishes 'negative' and 'positive' liberty, and rejects the latter [Berlin, by Swift] |
Full Idea: Isaiah Berlin draws a famous distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' concepts of liberty, and argues that the latter should be seen as a wrong turning (because totalitarian regimes have invoked it). | |
From: report of Isaiah Berlin (Two Concepts of Liberty [1958]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 2 'Intro' | |
A reaction: Swift argues against him, saying that positive liberty is not a single concept (it's three), and has aspects that should be defended. I think I'm with Swift on that. Is religious freedom a freedom 'from' something, or a freedom 'to do' something? |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Aristotelian physics assumed that celestial motion is naturally circular and eternal while terrestrial motion is naturally toward the center of the earth and final. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: The overthrow of this by Galileo and then Newton may have been the most dramatic revolution of the new science. It opened up the possibility of universal laws of physics. |
7663 | Judaism and Christianity views are based on paternal, family and tribal relations [Berlin] |
Full Idea: The notion from which both Judaism and Christianity to a large degree sprang is the notion of family life, the relations of father and son, perhaps the relations of members of a tribe to one another. | |
From: Isaiah Berlin (The Roots of Romanticism [1965], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: He compares this with Plato's mathematical view of reality. Key stories would be Abraham and Isaac, and Jesus being the 'son' of God, which both touch the killing of the child. Berlin means that the universe is explained this way. |