25 ideas
8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: Because there cannot be relations without terms, in a meta-physic that makes first-order tropes the terms of all relations, relational tropes must belong to a second, derivative order. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §8) | |
A reaction: The admission that there could be a 'derivative order' may lead to trouble for trope theory. Ostrich Nominalists could say that properties themselves are derivative second-order abstractions from indivisible particulars. Russell makes them first-order. |
8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: Events are widely acknowledged to be particulars, but they are plainly not ordinary concrete particulars. They are best viewed as trope-sequences, in which one condition gives way to another. They are changes in which tropes replace one another. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §3) | |
A reaction: If nothing exists except bundles of tropes, it is worth asking WHY one trope would replace another. Some tropes are active (i.e. they are best described as 'powers'). |
8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: If we have two cloths of the very same shade of redness, we can show there are two cloths by burning one and leaving the other unaffected; we show there are two cases of redness in the same way: dye one blue, leaving the other unaffected. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §1) | |
A reaction: This has to be one of the basic facts of the problem accepted by everyone. If you dye half of one of the pieces, was the original red therefore one instance or two? Has it become two? How many red tropes are there in a red cloth? |
8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: If there are a varied group of red objects, the only element that recurs is the colour. But it must be the colour as a particular (a 'trope') that is involved in the recurrence, for only particulars can be many in the way required for recurrence. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §1) | |
A reaction: This claim seems to depend on the presupposition that rednesses are countable things, but it is tricky trying to count the number of blue tropes in the sky. |
8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: The 'companionship difficulty' cannot arise if the members of the resemblance class are tropes rather than whole concrete particulars. The instances of having a heart, as abstract particulars, are quite different from instances of having a kidney. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §6) | |
A reaction: The companionship difficulty seems worst if you base your account of properties just on being members of a class. Any talk of resemblance eventually has to talk about 'respects' of resemblance. Is a trope a respect? Is a mode an object? |
8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: The 'problem of imperfect community' cannot arise where our resemblance sets are sets of tropes. Tropes, by their very nature and mode of differentiation can only resemble in one respect. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §6) | |
A reaction: You arrive at very different accounts of what resemblance means according to how you express the problem verbally. We can only find a solution through thinking which transcends language. Heresy! |
8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: The metaphysics of abstract particulars gives a central place to space, or space-time, as the frame of the world. ...Tropes are, of their essence, regional, which carries with it the essential presence of shape and size in any trope occurrence. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §7) | |
A reaction: Trope theory has a problem with Aristotle's example (Idea 557) of what happens when white is mixed with white. Do two tropes become one trope if you paint on a second coat of white? How can particulars merge? How can abstractions merge? |
8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: The objection to nominalism is its consequence that if there were no human race (or other living things), nothing would be like anything else. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §6) | |
A reaction: Anti-realists will be unflustered by this difficulty. Personally it strikes me as obvious that some aspects of resemblance are part of reality which we did not contribute. This I take to be a contingent fact, founded on the existence of natural kinds. |
8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: If tropes are basic particulars, then concrete particulars count as dependent realities. They are collections of co-located tropes, depending on these tropes as a fleet does upon its component ships. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §2) | |
A reaction: If I sail my yacht through a fleet, do I become part of it? Presumably trope theory could avoid a bundle view of objects. A bare substratum could be a magnet which attracts tropes. |
8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: Each individual is distinct from each other individual, so the bundle account of objects requires each bundle to be different from every other bundle. So the Identity of Indiscernibles must be a necessary truth, which, unfortunately, it is not. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §5) | |
A reaction: Clearly the Identity of Indiscernibles is not a necessary truth (consider just two identical spheres). Location and time must enter into it. Could we not add a further individuation requirement to the necessary existence of a bundle? (Quinton) |
4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: The Identity of Indiscernibles is not a necessary truth. It fails in possible worlds where there are two identical spheres in a non-absolute space, or worlds without beginning or end where events are exactly cyclically repeated. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §5) | |
A reaction: The principle was always very suspect, and these seem nice counterexamples. As so often, epistemology and ontology had become muddled. |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
Full Idea: There is no sense in abandoning a successful theory if you have nothing to replace it with. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: This is also a problem for infererence to the best explanation. What to do if your best explanation is not very good? The simple message is do not rush to dump a theory when faced with an anomaly. |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: [On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics. |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Is Newton's theory simpler than Einstein's, since there is only one relation of simultaneity in absolute time, or is Einstein's simpler because it dispenses with absolute time altogether? | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: A nice question, to which a good scientist might be willing to offer an answer. Since simultaneity is crucial but the existence of time is not, I would vote for Newton as the simpler. |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Structural Realists say that modern science achieves a true or 'truer' account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature. The structure carries over to new theories. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: At first glance I am unconvinced that when an old theory is replaced it neverthess contains some sort of 'mathematical structure' which endures and is worth preserving. No doubt Worrall, French and co have examples. |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Structural Realists must show that it is the mathematical aspects of the theories, not their content, that account for their success ….and that their structure and content can be clearly separated. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Their approach certainly seems to rely on mathematical types of science, so it presumably fits biology, geology and even astronomy less well. |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The main difficulty with instrumentalism is its implausible account ot the meaning of theoretical claims and concepts. Most scientists take them to be straightforward attempts to describe the world. Most say they are useful because they are accurate. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Instrumentalism is seen as a Pragmatist view, and Dewey is cited. |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available. |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The more unification and integration is found among the modern sciences, the less likely it seems it will have all been a dream. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: I believe this strongly. Ancient theories which were complex, wide ranging and false do not impress me. This is part of my coherence view of justification. |
8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: An item is abstract if it is got before the mind by an act of abstraction, that is, by concentrating attention on some, but not all, of what is presented. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §1) | |
A reaction: I think this point is incredibly important. Pure Fregean semantics tries to leave out the psychological component, and yet all the problems in semantics concern various sorts of abstraction. Imagination is the focus of the whole operation. |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Aristotelian physics assumed that celestial motion is naturally circular and eternal while terrestrial motion is naturally toward the center of the earth and final. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: The overthrow of this by Galileo and then Newton may have been the most dramatic revolution of the new science. It opened up the possibility of universal laws of physics. |
8326 | Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley] |
Full Idea: Basic causal relations can, as a consequence of our scientific knowledge, be identified with certain physicalistic [sic] relations between objects that can be characterized in terms of transference of either energy or momentum between objects. | |
From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by E Sosa / M Tooley - Introduction to 'Causation' §1 | |
A reaction: Presumably a transfer of momentum is a transfer of energy. If only anyone had the foggiest idea what energy actually is, we'd be doing well. What is energy made of? 'No identity without substance', I say. I like Fair's idea. |
10379 | Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Fair, who originated the energy flow view of causation, moved to a view that understands connection in terms of counterfactuals about energy flow. | |
From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.1.2 | |
A reaction: David Fair was a pupil of David Lewis, the king of the counterfactual view. To me that sounds like a disappointing move, but it is hard to think that a mere flow of energy through space would amount to causation. Cause must work back from an effect. |
8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: The conditions in causal statements are usually particular cases of properties. A collapse results from the weakness of this cable (not any other). This is specific to a time and place; it is an abstract particular. It is, in short, a trope. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §3) | |
A reaction: The fan of universals could counter this by saying that the collapse results from this unique combination of universals. Resemblance nominalist can equally build an account on the coincidence of certain types of concrete particulars. |
8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: Not all singular causal statements are of Davidson's event-event type. Many involve conditions, so there are condition-event (weakness/collapse), event-condition (explosion/movement), and condition-condition (hot/warming) causal connections. | |
From: Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §3) | |
A reaction: Fans of Davidson need to reduce conditions to events. The problem of individuation keeps raising its head. Davidson makes it depend on description. Kim looks good, because events, and presumably conditions, reduce to something small and precise. |