Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Geoffrey Gorham, Euclid and Ryan Wasserman

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26 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege]
     Full Idea: Euclid gives proofs of many things which anyone would concede to him without question. ...The aim of proof is not merely to place the truth of a proposition beyond doubt, but also to afford us insight into the dependence of truths upon one another.
     From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §02
     A reaction: This connects nicely with Shoemaker's view of analysis (Idea 8559), which I will adopt as my general view. I've always thought of philosophy as the aspiration to wisdom through the cartography of concepts.
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / c. Derivations rules of PC
If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon]
     Full Idea: Euclid begins proofs about all triangles with 'let ABC be a triangle', but ABC is not a proper name. It names an arbitrarily selected triangle, and if that has a property, then we can conclude that all triangles have the property.
     From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by E.J. Lemmon - Beginning Logic 3.2
     A reaction: Lemmon adds the proviso that there must be no hidden assumptions about the triangle we have selected. You must generalise the properties too. Pick a triangle, any triangle, say one with three angles of 60 degrees; now generalise from it.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik]
     Full Idea: Euclid's geometry is a synthetic geometry; Descartes supplied an analytic version of Euclid's geometry, and we now have analytic versions of the early non-Euclidean geometries.
     From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michael D. Resnik - Maths as a Science of Patterns One.4
     A reaction: I take it that the original Euclidean axioms were observations about the nature of space, but Descartes turned them into a set of pure interlocking definitions which could still function if space ceased to exist.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR]
     Full Idea: Assume a largest prime, then multiply the primes together and add one. The new number isn't prime, because we assumed a largest prime; but it can't be divided by a prime, because the remainder is one. So only a larger prime could divide it. Contradiction.
     From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.1
     A reaction: Not only a very elegant mathematical argument, but a model for how much modern logic proceeds, by assuming that the proposition is false, and then deducing a contradiction from it.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid]
     Full Idea: A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one.
     From: Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE], 7 Def 1)
     A reaction: See Frege's 'Grundlagen' §29-44 for a sustained critique of this. Frege is good, but there must be something right about the Euclid idea. If I count stone, paper and scissors as three, each must first qualify to be counted as one. Psychology creeps in.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Euclid's Postulate 2 says the geometer can 'produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line'.
     From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 4.2
     A reaction: The point being that this takes infinity for granted, especially if you start counting how many points there are on the line. The Einstein idea that it might eventually come round and hit you on the back of the head would have charmed Euclid.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid]
     Full Idea: Euclid's axioms were insufficient to derive all the theorems of geometry: at various points in his proofs he appealed to properties that are obvious from the diagrams but do not follow from the stated axioms.
     From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 03 'aim'
     A reaction: I suppose if the axioms of a system are based on self-evidence, this would licence an appeal to self-evidence elsewhere in the system. Only pedants insist on writing down what is obvious to everyone!
Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend]
     Full Idea: Euclid's fifth 'parallel' postulate says if there is an infinite straight line and a point, then there is only one straight line through the point which won't intersect the first line. This axiom is independent of Euclid's first four (agreed) axioms.
     From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 2.2
     A reaction: This postulate was challenged in the nineteenth century, which was a major landmark in the development of modern relativist views of knowledge.
Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid]
     Full Idea: Euclid gives no principle of continuity, which would sanction an inference that if a line goes from the outside of a circle to the inside of circle, then it must intersect the circle at some point.
     From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.1 n2
     A reaction: Cantor and Dedekind began to contemplate discontinuous lines.
Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays]
     Full Idea: Euclid postulates: One can join two points by a straight line; Hilbert states the axiom: Given any two points, there exists a straight line on which both are situated.
     From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Paul Bernays - On Platonism in Mathematics p.259
Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid]
     Full Idea: In descriptive geometry the first 26 propositions of Euclid hold. In projective geometry the 1st, 7th, 16th and 17th require modification (as a straight line is not a closed series). Those after 26 depend on the postulate of parallels, so aren't assumed.
     From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §388
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik]
     Full Idea: The best known example of Euclid's 'common notions' is "If equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal". These can be called axioms, and are what "the man who is to learn anything whatever must have".
     From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE], 72a17) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.149
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
     Full Idea: Some insist that constitution is identity, on the grounds that distinct material objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Others argue that constitution is not identity, since the statue and its material differ in important respects.
     From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], Intro)
     A reaction: The 'important respects' seem to concern possibilities rather than actualities, which is suspicious. It is misleading to think we are dealing with two things and their relation here. Objects must have constitutions; constitutions make objects.
Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
     Full Idea: For those for whom 'constitution is not identity' (the 'constitution view'), constitution is said to be an asymmetric relation, and also a dependence relation (unlike identity).
     From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 2)
     A reaction: It seems obvious that constitution is not identity, because there is more to a thing's identity than its mere constitution. But this idea makes it sound as if constitution has nothing to do with identity (chalk and cheese), and that can't be right.
There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
     Full Idea: The three most common objections to the constitution view are the Impenetrability Objection (two things in one place?), the Extensionality Objection (mereology says wholes are just their parts), and the Grounding Objection (their ground is the same).
     From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 2)
     A reaction: [summary] He adds a fourth, that if two things can be in one place, why stop at two? [Among defenders of the Constitution View he lists Baker, Fine, Forbes, Koslicki, Kripke, Lowe, Oderberg, N.Salmon, Shoemaker, Simons and Yablo.]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
     Full Idea: We do not calculate the weight of something by summing the weights of all its parts - weigh bricks and the molecules of a wall and you will get the wrong result, since you have weighed some parts more than once.
     From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 2)
     A reaction: In fact the complete inventory of the parts of a thing is irrelevant to almost anything we would like to know about the thing. The parts must be counted at some 'level' of division into parts. An element can belong to many different sets.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
     Full Idea: If the relative identity theorist denies transitivity (to deal with the Ship of Theseus, for example), this would make us suspect that relativised identity relations are not identity relations, since transitivity seems central to identity.
     From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 6)
     A reaction: The problem here, I think, focuses on the meaning of the word 'same'. One change of plank leaves you with the same ship, but that is not transitive. If 'identical' is too pure to give the meaning of 'the same' it's not much use in discussing the world.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham]
     Full Idea: There is no sense in abandoning a successful theory if you have nothing to replace it with.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 2)
     A reaction: This is also a problem for infererence to the best explanation. What to do if your best explanation is not very good? The simple message is do not rush to dump a theory when faced with an anomaly.
If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3)
     A reaction: [On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Is Newton's theory simpler than Einstein's, since there is only one relation of simultaneity in absolute time, or is Einstein's simpler because it dispenses with absolute time altogether?
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: A nice question, to which a good scientist might be willing to offer an answer. Since simultaneity is crucial but the existence of time is not, I would vote for Newton as the simpler.
Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Structural Realists say that modern science achieves a true or 'truer' account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature. The structure carries over to new theories.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: At first glance I am unconvinced that when an old theory is replaced it neverthess contains some sort of 'mathematical structure' which endures and is worth preserving. No doubt Worrall, French and co have examples.
Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Structural Realists must show that it is the mathematical aspects of the theories, not their content, that account for their success ….and that their structure and content can be clearly separated.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: Their approach certainly seems to rely on mathematical types of science, so it presumably fits biology, geology and even astronomy less well.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham]
     Full Idea: The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available.
For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham]
     Full Idea: The main difficulty with instrumentalism is its implausible account ot the meaning of theoretical claims and concepts. Most scientists take them to be straightforward attempts to describe the world. Most say they are useful because they are accurate.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: Instrumentalism is seen as a Pragmatist view, and Dewey is cited.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham]
     Full Idea: The more unification and integration is found among the modern sciences, the less likely it seems it will have all been a dream.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: I believe this strongly. Ancient theories which were complex, wide ranging and false do not impress me. This is part of my coherence view of justification.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Aristotelian physics assumed that celestial motion is naturally circular and eternal while terrestrial motion is naturally toward the center of the earth and final.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: The overthrow of this by Galileo and then Newton may have been the most dramatic revolution of the new science. It opened up the possibility of universal laws of physics.