Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Geoffrey Gorham, Gerhard Gentzen and T Adorno / M Horkheimer

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
Adorno and Horkheimer subjected the Enlightenment to 'critical theory' analysis [Adorno/Horkheimer, by Finlayson]
     Full Idea: Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of Enlightenment sets the agenda for the subsequent development of critical theory.
     From: report of T Adorno / M Horkheimer (Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.1:07
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934 [Gentzen, by Read]
     Full Idea: Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934.
     From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna]
     Full Idea: Gentzen argued that the inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning.
     From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 5.3
     A reaction: Possibly inspired by Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as use? This idea was the target of Prior's famous connective 'tonk', which has the role of implying anything you like, proving sentences which are not logical consequences.
The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen]
     Full Idea: The introduction rules represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned, and the elimination rules are no more, in the final analysis, than the consequences of these definitions.
     From: Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]), quoted by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8
     A reaction: If an introduction-rule (or a truth table) were taken as fixed and beyond dispute, then it would have the status of a definition, since there would be nothing else to appeal to. So is there anything else to appeal to here?
Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen]
     Full Idea: To every logical symbol there belongs precisely one inference figure which 'introduces' the symbol ..and one which 'eliminates' it. The introductions represent the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned, and eliminations are consequences of these.
     From: Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938], II.5.13), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - "Yes" and "No" III
     A reaction: [1935 paper] This passage is famous, in laying down the basics of natural deduction systems of logic (ones using only rules, and avoiding axioms). Rumfitt questions whether Gentzen's account gives the sense of the connectives.
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Natural deduction shows the heart of reasoning (and sequent calculus is just a tool) [Gentzen, by Hacking]
     Full Idea: Gentzen thought that his natural deduction gets at the heart of logical reasoning, and used the sequent calculus only as a convenient tool for proving his chief results.
     From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (Investigations into Logical Deduction [1935]) by Ian Hacking - What is Logic? §05
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions beyond arithmetic [Gentzen, by Musgrave]
     Full Idea: Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions which transcend arithmetic.
     From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §5
     A reaction: This does not contradict Gödel's famous result, but reinforces it. The interesting question is what assumptions Gentzen felt he had to make.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3)
     A reaction: [On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics.
Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham]
     Full Idea: There is no sense in abandoning a successful theory if you have nothing to replace it with.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 2)
     A reaction: This is also a problem for infererence to the best explanation. What to do if your best explanation is not very good? The simple message is do not rush to dump a theory when faced with an anomaly.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Is Newton's theory simpler than Einstein's, since there is only one relation of simultaneity in absolute time, or is Einstein's simpler because it dispenses with absolute time altogether?
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: A nice question, to which a good scientist might be willing to offer an answer. Since simultaneity is crucial but the existence of time is not, I would vote for Newton as the simpler.
Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Structural Realists say that modern science achieves a true or 'truer' account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature. The structure carries over to new theories.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: At first glance I am unconvinced that when an old theory is replaced it neverthess contains some sort of 'mathematical structure' which endures and is worth preserving. No doubt Worrall, French and co have examples.
Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Structural Realists must show that it is the mathematical aspects of the theories, not their content, that account for their success ….and that their structure and content can be clearly separated.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: Their approach certainly seems to rely on mathematical types of science, so it presumably fits biology, geology and even astronomy less well.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham]
     Full Idea: The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available.
For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham]
     Full Idea: The main difficulty with instrumentalism is its implausible account ot the meaning of theoretical claims and concepts. Most scientists take them to be straightforward attempts to describe the world. Most say they are useful because they are accurate.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: Instrumentalism is seen as a Pragmatist view, and Dewey is cited.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham]
     Full Idea: The more unification and integration is found among the modern sciences, the less likely it seems it will have all been a dream.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: I believe this strongly. Ancient theories which were complex, wide ranging and false do not impress me. This is part of my coherence view of justification.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
De Sade said it was impossible to rationally argue against murder [Adorno/Horkheimer]
     Full Idea: De Sade trumpeted far and wide the impossibility of deriving from reason any fundamental argument against murder.
     From: T Adorno / M Horkheimer (Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944], p.118)
     A reaction: [They focus on 'Juliette'] This is a big problem for utilitarians, because murdering an unhappy person may maximise happiness. Presumably a maniac could will universal carnage, and thus thwart Kant.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Aristotelian physics assumed that celestial motion is naturally circular and eternal while terrestrial motion is naturally toward the center of the earth and final.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: The overthrow of this by Galileo and then Newton may have been the most dramatic revolution of the new science. It opened up the possibility of universal laws of physics.