33 ideas
| 6319 | Wise people choose inaction and silence [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The sage keeps to the deed that consists in taking no action and practises the teaching that uses no words. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.II.6) | |
| A reaction: Notice that this is an active 'deed', and a positive 'practice'. He is not just recommending indifference and lethargy. Personally I don't find the advice very appealing, but it might be good if you live in 'interesting times'. |
| 6325 | One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVI.128) | |
| A reaction: A famous remark, which my western mind finds simply perplexing. It strikes me as wicked selfishness to keep your wisdom to yourself, and not try to persuade others to follow it. We are all in this together, I say. |
| 6321 | Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XX.47) | |
| A reaction: Personally I think all human beings are deeply perplexed when they actually address their situation, but most people never spend more than a few minutes a year worrying about it. |
| 6328 | To know yet to think that one does not know is best [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: To know yet to think that one does not know is best. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXI.173) | |
| A reaction: Tricky. Self-deception doesn't sound like a virtue to me. There are epistemic virtues, and caution about one's own knowledge has to be one of them, but a totally false assessment sounds counter-productive. |
| 6323 | Pursuit of learning increases activity; the Way decreases it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: In the pursuit of learning one knows more every day; in the pursuit of the Way one does less every day. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVII.108) | |
| A reaction: Everything in my culture has raised the status of the pursuit of learning, so that I can hardly comprehend what is proposed by the Way. I don't believe that the Way can be achieved without great learning, but one might move beyond learning. |
| 22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: There is no sense in abandoning a successful theory if you have nothing to replace it with. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: This is also a problem for infererence to the best explanation. What to do if your best explanation is not very good? The simple message is do not rush to dump a theory when faced with an anomaly. |
| 22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: [On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics. |
| 22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Is Newton's theory simpler than Einstein's, since there is only one relation of simultaneity in absolute time, or is Einstein's simpler because it dispenses with absolute time altogether? | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: A nice question, to which a good scientist might be willing to offer an answer. Since simultaneity is crucial but the existence of time is not, I would vote for Newton as the simpler. |
| 22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Structural Realists say that modern science achieves a true or 'truer' account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature. The structure carries over to new theories. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: At first glance I am unconvinced that when an old theory is replaced it neverthess contains some sort of 'mathematical structure' which endures and is worth preserving. No doubt Worrall, French and co have examples. |
| 22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Structural Realists must show that it is the mathematical aspects of the theories, not their content, that account for their success ….and that their structure and content can be clearly separated. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Their approach certainly seems to rely on mathematical types of science, so it presumably fits biology, geology and even astronomy less well. |
| 22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available. |
| 22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The main difficulty with instrumentalism is its implausible account ot the meaning of theoretical claims and concepts. Most scientists take them to be straightforward attempts to describe the world. Most say they are useful because they are accurate. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Instrumentalism is seen as a Pragmatist view, and Dewey is cited. |
| 22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The more unification and integration is found among the modern sciences, the less likely it seems it will have all been a dream. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: I believe this strongly. Ancient theories which were complex, wide ranging and false do not impress me. This is part of my coherence view of justification. |
| 7647 | The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: The imagination alone perceives; it forms an idea of all objects, with the words and figures that characterise them; thus the imagination is the soul, because it plays all its roles. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.15) | |
| A reaction: This is not just a big claim for the importance of imagination, in strong opposition to Descartes's rather dismissive view (Idea 1399), but also appears to be the germ of an interesting theory about the nature of personal identity. |
| 7645 | When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: The soul and body fall asleep together. The soul slowly becomes paralysed, together with all the body's muscles. They can no longer hold up the weight of the head, while the soul can no longer bear the burden of thought. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.6) | |
| A reaction: A very nice observation, to place alongside other evidence such as drunkenness and blushing. Personally I find it hard to see why anyone ever believed dualism. You don't need modern brain scans and brain lesion research to see the problem. |
| 23225 | The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: All the soul's faculties depend so much on the specific organisation of the brain and of the whole body that they are clearly nothing but that organisation. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.26) | |
| A reaction: An interesting idea because it suggests that La Mettrie is a functionalist, rather than simply a reductive physicalist. |
| 7652 | Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: Let us conclude boldly that man is a machine and that there is in the whole universe only one diversely modified substance. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.39) | |
| A reaction: What courage it must have taken to write what now seems a perfectly acceptable and normal view. One day there should be a collective monument to Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, La Mettrie and Hume, who thought so boldly. |
| 7650 | All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: Thought is only a capacity to feel, and the rational soul is only the sensitive soul applied to the contemplation of ideas and to reasoning. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.33) | |
| A reaction: What a very nice idea. La Mettrie wants to bring us closer to animals. Because we can pursue a train of rational thought, it does not follow that we have a faculty called 'rationality'. A dog can follow a clever series of clues that lead to food. |
| 7651 | With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: If wonderful machines like Huygens's planetary clock can be made, it would take even more cogs and springs to make a speaking machine, which can no longer be considered impossible, particularly at the hands of a new Prometheus. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.34) | |
| A reaction: Compare Descartes in Idea 3614. The idea of artificial intelligence does not arise with the advent of computers; it follows naturally from the materialist view of the mind, along with a bit of ambition to build complex machines. |
| 6331 | Truth is not beautiful; beautiful speech is not truthful [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Truthful words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not truthful. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXXI.194) | |
| A reaction: A sharp disagreement with Keats ('Ode to a Grecian Urn'). A deep and important question, especially in relation to Plato's discussion of rhetoric (where he is very ambivalent). Great mathematics is beautiful. Truth can harsh. On the whole, I disagree. |
| 6330 | One with no use for life is wiser than one who values it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: It is just because one has no use for life that one is wiser than the man who values life. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181a) | |
| A reaction: To have no use for life certainly seems to put a person into a position of superiority, especially when the 'Titanic' is sinking. However, if our lives have no value, I don't know what does. A balance must clearly be struck. |
| 6327 | Do good to him who has done you an injury [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Do good to him who has done you an injury. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXIII.148) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 6288 (Jesus). People like this really mess up the social contract theory of morality. If they are going to return good for your evil, there doesn't seem much point in helping them, given how much effort is involved. Most peculiar… |
| 23402 | The highest virtue is achieved without effort [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Those of highest virtue do not strive for virtue, and so they have it. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 38), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.2 | |
| A reaction: Every moralist's dream is the person to whom virtue comes so naturally that no thought is required. This says they don't even notice it; Aristotle says they simply enjoying behaving virtuously. |
| 6324 | To gain in goodness, treat as good those who are good, and those who are not [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Those who are good I treat as good; those who are not good I also treat as good; in doing so I gain in goodness. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLIX.111) | |
| A reaction: Socrates (idea 346) and Jesus (Idea 6288) had similar ideas. Who, though, is going to administer justice, and where is the idea that people 'deserve' good or ill treatment? Schoolteachers should treat all children as if they were good. |
| 6322 | There is no crime greater than having too many desires [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: There is no crime greater than having too many desires. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVI.104) | |
| A reaction: It seems harsh to call this a 'crime', given that no one is likely to choose to have 'too many' desires. The crime is in deciding to stimulate desire to excess, or deciding to show no sensible restraint. |
| 6320 | The best rulers are invisible, the next admired, the next feared, and the worst are exploited [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subjects; next comes the ruler they love and praise; next comes one they fear; next comes one with whom they take liberties. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XVII.39) | |
| A reaction: This fits our understanding of football referees to perfection. It might apply to anyone doing a vital adminstrative job, such as compiling a school timetable. It is hard, though, to accept anonymity as a mark of success. |
| 6329 | People are hard to govern because authorities love to do things [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: It is because those in authority are too fond of action that the people are difficult to govern. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181) | |
| A reaction: I love this. It should be on the wall of every human institution in our civilization. How the heart sinks at the prospect of a 'new initiative'. Not that I am against action; it is just important to recognise that inaction is sometimes the best option. |
| 6326 | The better known the law, the more criminals there are [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The better known the laws and edicts, the more thieves and robbers there are. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVII.132) | |
| A reaction: Nice. I link this with my favourite moral maxim from Democritus (Idea 519). The idea is that continual emphasis on what you should not do fills the mind with evil possibilities. Moral perfection must start by taking goodness for granted. |
| 23401 | A military victory is not a thing of beauty [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: A military victory is not a thing of beauty. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.1 | |
| A reaction: Should be written on the wall of every military academy and barracks. |
| 22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Aristotelian physics assumed that celestial motion is naturally circular and eternal while terrestrial motion is naturally toward the center of the earth and final. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: The overthrow of this by Galileo and then Newton may have been the most dramatic revolution of the new science. It opened up the possibility of universal laws of physics. |
| 7648 | The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: The sun was not made in order to heat the earth and all its inhabitants - whom it sometimes burns - any more than the rain was created in order to grow seeds - which it often spoils. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747]) | |
| A reaction: This denial of Aristotelian (and divine) teleology is as much part of the movement against religion, as are concerns about natural evil, and about the weakness of arguments for God's existence. These facts were obvious long before La Mettrie. |
| 7646 | There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: From animals to man there is no abrupt transition. What was man before he invented words and learnt languages? An animal of a particular species, with much less natural instinct than the others. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.13) | |
| A reaction: This shows how strongly the evolutionary idea was in the air, a century before Darwin proposed a mechanism for it. This thought is the beginning of a very new view of man, and also of a very new view of animals. |
| 7649 | There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: The soul is merely a vain term of which we have no idea and which a good mind should use only to refer to that part of us which thinks. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747]) | |
| A reaction: I have always found the concept of the soul particularly baffling. It seems that it is only believed in to make immortality possible, with no other purpose to the belief, let alone evidence. I suspect that Descartes agreed with La Mettrie on this. |