22 ideas
| 8011 | Aristotle is a buffoon who has misled the Church [Luther, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle is a buffoon who has misled the Church. | |
| From: report of Martin Luther (talk [1525]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: Before he became famous, Luther was a university lecturer on Aristotle. This remark was a hundred years before philosophers began serious criticism of Aristotle. Presumably Protestants just stopped reading him. |
| 20320 | Truth is what unites, and the profound truths create a community [Jaspers] |
| Full Idea: Truth is what unites. ...[p.145] The most profound truth is that which all men might understand so as to form one community. | |
| From: Karl Jaspers (Philosophy [1932], vol.2) | |
| A reaction: Nice slogan, for robust realists like me. The hallmark of truth is our convergence on it. This is a 20th century existentialist perfectly expounding the enlightenment dream. The best rhetoric is truthful rhetoric. |
| 22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: [On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics. |
| 22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: There is no sense in abandoning a successful theory if you have nothing to replace it with. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: This is also a problem for infererence to the best explanation. What to do if your best explanation is not very good? The simple message is do not rush to dump a theory when faced with an anomaly. |
| 22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Is Newton's theory simpler than Einstein's, since there is only one relation of simultaneity in absolute time, or is Einstein's simpler because it dispenses with absolute time altogether? | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: A nice question, to which a good scientist might be willing to offer an answer. Since simultaneity is crucial but the existence of time is not, I would vote for Newton as the simpler. |
| 22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Structural Realists say that modern science achieves a true or 'truer' account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature. The structure carries over to new theories. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: At first glance I am unconvinced that when an old theory is replaced it neverthess contains some sort of 'mathematical structure' which endures and is worth preserving. No doubt Worrall, French and co have examples. |
| 22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Structural Realists must show that it is the mathematical aspects of the theories, not their content, that account for their success ….and that their structure and content can be clearly separated. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Their approach certainly seems to rely on mathematical types of science, so it presumably fits biology, geology and even astronomy less well. |
| 22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available. |
| 22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The main difficulty with instrumentalism is its implausible account ot the meaning of theoretical claims and concepts. Most scientists take them to be straightforward attempts to describe the world. Most say they are useful because they are accurate. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: Instrumentalism is seen as a Pragmatist view, and Dewey is cited. |
| 22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: The more unification and integration is found among the modern sciences, the less likely it seems it will have all been a dream. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: I believe this strongly. Ancient theories which were complex, wide ranging and false do not impress me. This is part of my coherence view of justification. |
| 20323 | Freedom needs knowledge, the possibility of arbitrariness, and law [Jaspers] |
| Full Idea: Without knowledge there is no freedom ....and without an arbitrary act there is no freedom, ....and there is no freedom without law. | |
| From: Karl Jaspers (Philosophy [1932], vol.2) | |
| A reaction: He emphasises that an arbitrary act is not a free act, but it is a precondition for being free. The submission to law is active freedom. If you believe in education (and you should) you must believe that knowledge is liberating. |
| 20322 | I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom [Jaspers] |
| Full Idea: Either there is no freedom or it is in asking about it. But what makes me ask is an original will to be free, so my freedom is anticipated in the fact of asking. I cannot prove it first, then will it. I will it because I am conscious of its possibility. | |
| From: Karl Jaspers (Philosophy [1932], vol.2) | |
| A reaction: This presents the subjective claims for free will rather more persuasively than usual. I am conscious of a possibility that I might flap my arms and fly, so that doesn't establish anything. But yearning to be free is a sort of freedom. |
| 20324 | My freedom increases as I broaden my vision of possiblities and motives [Jaspers] |
| Full Idea: I become free by incessantly broadening my worldly orientation, by limitlessly visualising premises and possibilities of action, and by allowing all motives to speak to me. ...The more the totality determines my vision the freer I know I am. | |
| From: Karl Jaspers (Philosophy [1932], vol.2) | |
| A reaction: This matches my naturalistic view of responsibility for actions, which are those performed by the 'full' and knowing self. I note that freedom comes in degrees for him, so he presumably don't believe in absolute freedom. It is wholly subjective. |
| 20318 | My helplessness in philosophising reveals my being, and begins its upsurge [Jaspers] |
| Full Idea: Philosophising, not knowing, brings me to myself. The helplessness to which philosophising reduces me when I doubt its origin is an expressions of the helplessness of my self-being, and the reality of philosophising is the incipient upsurge of that being. | |
| From: Karl Jaspers (Philosophy [1932], vol.2) | |
| A reaction: I like the sound of 'philosophy as a way of life', and loosely aspire to it, but I'm still not sure what it means, other than a good way to pass the time. The idea that it leads to higher modes of being sounds a bit arrogant. But it is a good thing! |
| 20321 | The struggle for Existenz is between people who are equals, and are utterly honest [Jaspers] |
| Full Idea: The struggle for Existenz has to do with ...with utter candour, with the elimination of all kinds of power and superiority, with the other's self-being as well as with my own. | |
| From: Karl Jaspers (Philosophy [1932], vol.2) | |
| A reaction: This is reminiscent of Aristotle's conclusion that democracy is the society which is most conducive to true friendship. I like Jaspers's idea that existential enquiry is a team game. |
| 20325 | Once we grasp freedom 'from' things, then freedom 'for' things becomes urgent [Jaspers] |
| Full Idea: Once the question of 'freedom from what?' has been answered by shattering all objectivities, the question of 'freedom for what?' becomes all the more urgent. | |
| From: Karl Jaspers (Philosophy [1932], vol.2) | |
| A reaction: A quintessential existentialist idea, and its most appealing aspect. Message to all teenagers: don't get bogged down in what you are prevented from doing, but focus on what you can do. The first problem will melt away. (Unless you are in handcuffs....). |
| 20317 | Mundane existence is general, falling under universals, but Existens is unique to individuals [Jaspers] |
| Full Idea: Mundane being, the being we know, is general because it is generally valid for everyone. ...Existenz is never general, and thus not a case that might be subsumed as particular under a universal. | |
| From: Karl Jaspers (Philosophy [1932], vol.2) | |
| A reaction: I'm trying to visualise a mode of existence which would fulfil only me, answering to my unique nature, but it looks like a vain delusion. I may be a one-off combination, but I see all of my ingredients in various other people. |
| 20315 | 'Existenz' is the potential being, which I could have, and ought to have [Jaspers] |
| Full Idea: There is the being which in the phenomenality of existence is not but can be, ought to be, and therefore decides in time whether it is in eternity. This being is myself as 'Existenz'. | |
| From: Karl Jaspers (Philosophy [1932], vol.2) | |
| A reaction: This is quintessentially existentialist, in its claim that my mode of being could be quite other than it is. Personally I aim to fulfil the being I've got. Play the cards you have been dealt. |
| 20319 | We want the correct grasp on being that is neither solipsism nor absorption in the crowd [Jaspers] |
| Full Idea: We want our philosophising to illuminate the free, original, communicative grasp on being that will let us meet the constant threat of solipsism or universalism in existence. | |
| From: Karl Jaspers (Philosophy [1932], vol.2) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like the political wing of existentialism: the aim to get the right relationship between citizens - not too withdrawn, and not swallowed in the crowd. Liberal democracy, I should think. |
| 20316 | Every decision I make moves towards or away from fulfilled Existenz [Jaspers] |
| Full Idea: My Existenz, as a possibility, takes a step toward being or away from being, toward nothingness, in every choice or decision I make. | |
| From: Karl Jaspers (Philosophy [1932], vol.2) | |
| A reaction: The existential idea of action involves what you are, as well as what you do. There seems to be a paradox. My being is plastic, and can change enormously, so I should take responsibility for the change. But who is in charge of the changes? |
| 22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
| Full Idea: Aristotelian physics assumed that celestial motion is naturally circular and eternal while terrestrial motion is naturally toward the center of the earth and final. | |
| From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: The overthrow of this by Galileo and then Newton may have been the most dramatic revolution of the new science. It opened up the possibility of universal laws of physics. |
| 6609 | With respect to religion, reason is a blind whore [Luther] |
| Full Idea: With respect to the mysteries of the Christian religion, reason is a blind whore. | |
| From: Martin Luther (talk [1525]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
| A reaction: Reason is presumably a blind whore with respect to all impenetrable mysteries. Since the reason of Aquinas endorsed the mysteries of Christianity, the remark seems a bit strong, but it is appropriate if you think that only faith (in Christianity) matters. |