56 ideas
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: [On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics. |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
Full Idea: There is no sense in abandoning a successful theory if you have nothing to replace it with. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: This is also a problem for infererence to the best explanation. What to do if your best explanation is not very good? The simple message is do not rush to dump a theory when faced with an anomaly. |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Is Newton's theory simpler than Einstein's, since there is only one relation of simultaneity in absolute time, or is Einstein's simpler because it dispenses with absolute time altogether? | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: A nice question, to which a good scientist might be willing to offer an answer. Since simultaneity is crucial but the existence of time is not, I would vote for Newton as the simpler. |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Structural Realists say that modern science achieves a true or 'truer' account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature. The structure carries over to new theories. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: At first glance I am unconvinced that when an old theory is replaced it neverthess contains some sort of 'mathematical structure' which endures and is worth preserving. No doubt Worrall, French and co have examples. |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Structural Realists must show that it is the mathematical aspects of the theories, not their content, that account for their success ….and that their structure and content can be clearly separated. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Their approach certainly seems to rely on mathematical types of science, so it presumably fits biology, geology and even astronomy less well. |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The main difficulty with instrumentalism is its implausible account ot the meaning of theoretical claims and concepts. Most scientists take them to be straightforward attempts to describe the world. Most say they are useful because they are accurate. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Instrumentalism is seen as a Pragmatist view, and Dewey is cited. |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available. |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The more unification and integration is found among the modern sciences, the less likely it seems it will have all been a dream. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: I believe this strongly. Ancient theories which were complex, wide ranging and false do not impress me. This is part of my coherence view of justification. |
23590 | Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer] |
Full Idea: It is a feature of criminal responsibility that it can be distributed without being divided. We can, that is, blame more than one person for a particular act without splitting up the blame we assign. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 19) | |
A reaction: How far can this extend? To a large violent mob? To an entire nation? In court the responsibility is usually adjusted in the sentencing, rather than in the initial verdict. |
23578 | Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Double effect is defensible, I want to argue, only when the two outcomes are the product of a double intention - that 'good' be achieved, and that the foreseeable evil be reduced as far as possible. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 09) | |
A reaction: A good proposal, I think. We have to accept evil side effects sometimes, but it is immoral to pursue some good 'whatever the cost'. |
23564 | Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer] |
Full Idea: The substructure of the ethical world is a matter of deep and unending controversy, Meanwhile, however, we are living in the superstructure. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], Pref) | |
A reaction: This may be the best approach to ethics. Nearly all applied ethics takes the common sense consensus on values for granted. Personally I think that is because the substructure is the obvious success and failure of human functioning. |
20595 | You can't distribute goods from behind a veil, because their social meaning is unclear [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
Full Idea: Walzer says behind the veil of ignorance there would be no way to know how a particular good should be distributed, because we would not know the social meaning of the good in question. | |
From: report of Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice [1983]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 4 'Communitarian' | |
A reaction: Is Rawls actually proposing to decide details of distribution from behind the veil? There is just the maximin principle. What that means in practice would surely come once the society was under way. |
23125 | Most good social changes are incremental, rather than revolutionary [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: More permanent positive social change is made incrementally rather than by revolutionary transformation. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: This is the standard liberal response to revolution. Revolutionaries obviously consider such a claim to be very naïve, and a failure to grasp how deep the changes need to go. |
23126 | Conservatives often want peace, prosperity and tolerance, but not social fairness [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Many conservatives want their world to be peaceful, properous, and pluralist, just as liberals do, but they don't particularly care that it be fair. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: Every conservative will have a sense of what is fair (such as appropriate punishments, and keeping of contracts), but they are more inclined to think that fairness must be fought for by individuals, not imposed by governments. |
23132 | Conservatives believe obedience and rank are essential to social order [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The idea that the appearance of submission and obedience and rank are essential to order is at the heart of the conservative ideal. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: [He has just quoted Edmund Burke writing of Marie Antoinette] I once heard Richard Hare say that he thought social order would be best modelled on the army. A colleague once told me that obedience is a prime duty of a school teacher. |
23128 | The opposite of liberalism is dogmatism [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The opposite of liberalism is not conservatism but dogmatism. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: Nice. It pinpoints the liberal opposition to both extremes of normal politics. It might make anarchists their allies, though! |
23142 | People are fallible, so liberalism tries to distribute power [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Liberalism makes the idea of fallibility into a political practice by trying not to have too much power concentrated in one place or part of the system. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: There is a potential inefficiency and failure to focus on key goals implicit in this aim. It may be a good idea for a peacetime democracy, but a terrible idea for a wartime army. To stop corruption, don't let anyone do anything? |
23143 | Liberals have tried very hard to build a conscience into their institutions [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: What liberalism can say on its own behalf is that no system of power in human history has tried harder to insert a corrective conscience into its institutions. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: What we are learning in recent years is that wonderful liberal institutions can be quietly eroded by the forces of darkness, once those forces have sufficient control of the media to hide what they are doing. The 'rule of law' is wobbling. |
23141 | Left-wingers are inconsistent in their essentialist descriptions of social groups [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: A criticism of the left is that it is essentialist at some moments, and wildly anti-essentialist at others. We can call this opportunistic essentialism. Gender is fluid - except for transgender kids. Race is a construction - except for white races. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Interesting. Gopnik's solution seems to be to abandon all social essentialism as wicked. In this context he is probably right, but I am firmly committed to the idea that many entities in the world have essential natures. 'Bourgeois'. |
23124 | Liberal community is not blood ties or tradition, but shared choices, and sympathy for the losers [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The liberal idea of community is not one, as it is for many conservatives, of blood ties or traditional authority. It rest on the idea of shared choices …including even a sense of sympathy for those caught on the losing side of the argument. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: The key point is that most liberals (other than extreme libertarians) have a strong sense of community, contrary to the standard criticisms offered by communitarians. |
23127 | Liberal community includes flight from the family, into energetic reforming groups [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Where conservatives believe in the renewal of traditional community, liberals believe as well in the flight from family and tradition into new kinds of communal order. …It is an idea of assembling confidence and energies for reform. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: He cites Greenwich Village as an example. This suggests that his vision is a little narrow. His communities are for radicals who flee to join like minds in big cities. Politics must care about community for those left behind. Pubs, sport and pets. |
23138 | Modern left-wingers criticise liberalism's control of culture [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Most left-wing critiques of liberalism now turn more often on its cultural power and its cultural illusions. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: As opposed to older Marxists critiques of the exploitation of workers. This is certainly fertile ground for interesting studies of our culture. It is very hard to grasp the influence had by the endless stories we expose ourselves to. |
23129 | Right-wingers attack liberal faith in reason, left-wingers attack its faith in reform [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The right-wing critique of liberalism is largely an attack on its overreliance on reason; the left-wing one, mostly an attack on its false faith in reform. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: I doubt whether sensible liberals do rely too much on reason, though they do rely of scientific evidence (after peer review!). No one can doubt that lots of reforms have occurred, so it must be frustration with the very slow process. |
23133 | Cosmopolitan liberals lack national loyalty, and welcome excessive immigration [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Critics say liberal cosmopolitanism is indifference to national loyalty, making them easily contemplate going elsewhere and, worse still, welcoming in the world through unsifted immigration. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: There is certainly some truth in this. Not all liberals are so cosmopolitan, though. It is interesting to observe whether people who retire stay in their old community or move to somewhere quite new. |
23139 | Liberalism's attempt to be neutral and colour-blind erases cultural identities [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The 'colour-blind' universe of 'neutral' liberalism is actually an attempt to erase cultural identity and history. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: This is the modern critique of liberalism [centred on the Intersectionality of Bell Hooks or Kimberlé Crenshaw], which analyses alienated minorities, and their emphasis on their difference in response. It can lead to 'identity politics'. |
23135 | Classic Marxists see liberalism as the ideology of the bourgeoisie [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The classic Marxist account shows liberalism as merely the ideology of the bourgeoisie. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: The word 'merely' does an awful lot of work in philosohy! I suspect that 'bourgeoisie' is self-defining here - as the believers in liberalism - given that lots of Marxists emerge from the middle classes. |
23140 | Environmental disasters result not from capitalism, but from a general drive for growth [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: It is the drive for growth, not capitalism in particular, that makes environmental disasters happen. Those caused by the command economics of Eastern Europe were far greater than even the worst known in Western Europe. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: So the next question is whether you can have capitalism without a drive for growth. I would have thought not, given the role recycled profit plays in driving capitalism. Command economies are more easily swept away. |
23130 | Popular imperialism gives the poor the belief that their acts have world historical meaning [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: Popular imperialism is the cosmopolitanism of the poor, the lever by which the small and impotent come to believe that their acts have world historical meaning. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: It is not only the poor who like imperialism. The focus of this popular attitude is the armed forces, and especially the army, where personal bravery is most obvious. The army gets strong support, no matter how dubious are its activities. |
23131 | Patriots love their place, but nationalists have a paranoid ethnic hostility [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: The patriot loves his place and its cheeses; …the nationalist has not particular affection for the place, but employs his obsessive sense of encirclement and grievance on behalf of acts of ethnic vengeance. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: 'Vengeance' seems a bit strong. John Le Carré said nationalists are distinguished by the need to have enemies. Russia is particularly obsessed with 'encirclement'. |
23136 | Liberal free speech is actually paid speech [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: What liberals call free speech or a free press is invariably paid speech. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: He give this as the left-wing view of liberalism. The much-hated social media are a substantial breech in this tendency. Sales of newspapers are declining everywhere, so the battle is for television channels. |
23134 | A 'free' society implies a free market, which always produces predatory capitalism and inequalities [Gopnik] |
Full Idea: 'Free societies', as a matter of practical fact, always mean free-market societies - and free markets will never sponsor more than predatory capitalism. Inequalities always emerge. | |
From: Adam Gopnik (A Thousand Small Sanities [2019], 3) | |
A reaction: This is part of his account of left-wing objections to liberalism. The crux of the liberal view is a conviction that the worst of capitalism can be restrained. This began to look doubtful once huge multinational companies emerged. What to do? |
20592 | Complex equality restricts equalities from spilling over, like money influencing politics and law [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
Full Idea: Complex equality tries to keep advantages in one area (such as money) from translating into advantages in politics or before the law. | |
From: report of Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice [1983]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 3 'Complex' | |
A reaction: Put like that, Walzer's complex equality becomes very interesting, and pinpoints a major problem of our age, where discrepancies of wealth have become staggeringly large at the top end. |
20549 | Equality is complex, with different spheres of equality where different principles apply [Walzer, by Swift] |
Full Idea: Michael Walzer argues for 'complex equality', saying different goods belong to different distributive 'spheres', each with its own distributive principles. | |
From: report of Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice [1983]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 3 'Egalitarian' | |
A reaction: Sounds interesting. Equality seems to make different demands when it concerns basic food for survival, or fine wines. You can spend your money freely, but hording in a crisis is frowned on. |
23568 | If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer] |
Full Idea: If states possess rights more or less as individuals do, then it is possible to imagine a society among them more or less like the individuals. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 04) | |
A reaction: The state's rights must derive from the people. Plots of land don't have rights. In some states the people are in conflict. It can't just be the government which represents the rights of the state. |
23570 | The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer] |
Full Idea: The defence of rights is a reason for fighting. I want now to stress again, and finally, that it is the only reason. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 04) | |
A reaction: Walzer states at the beginning, without discussion, that his moral assumptions are based on the notion of rights. This is tricky because rights are assigned by some people to other people, and claims of rights can be challenged. |
23567 | Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Every violation of an independent state is called aggression, which fails to differentiate between a seizure or imposition, and an actual conquest. …But what they have in common is that all aggressive acts justify forceful resistance. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 04) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Walzer concedes that this makes 'aggression' rather imprecise, and small acts can be used as an excuse for desired violent resistance. Each entrant in August 1914 seems to have had a slightly different motive. |
23587 | Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Nuclear weapons are not designed for war at all. …They explode the idea of a just war. They are the first technological innovations that are simply not encompassable within the familiar moral world. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 17) | |
A reaction: A nuclear war can hardly lead to normal victory, if it destroys the thing you are trying to conquer. It is like bringing a machine gun to a boxing match. |
23571 | States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer] |
Full Idea: States can use force in the face of threats of war, if there is a serious risk to territory or independence. They are then forced to fight, and are the victims of aggression. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 05) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He uses this to justify Israeli pre-emptive strikes against Palestinians. I don't think his confident assertion of this principle is justified. It is open to massive abuse. There are, though, clearly situations where he is right. |
23572 | Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Just wars may not be self-defence, if they are to help an independence struggle, or it is to save another country being invaded, or to prevent enslavement or massacre. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 06) | |
A reaction: [summary] Modern wars support some examples of these, but also suggest that without a long-term plan, or an understanding of the country they are entering, such intercessions may worsen the situation. |
23581 | The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
Full Idea: The purpose of reprisals is not to win the war or prevent defeat, but simply to enforce the rules [of war]. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 13) | |
A reaction: That may be wishful thinking, since reprisals are often vastly more ruthless than the original offence, and there is often injustice in the nature of the reprisals, since they cannot be precise. |
23582 | Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Reprisal is the first resort of force. It is an alternative to war, and that description is an important argument in its favour. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 13) | |
A reaction: Enduring wrongs with dignity might be another alternative. Successful reprisals may be acceptable, but how do you assess their prospects? |
23588 | With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer] |
Full Idea: With nuclear weapons, supreme emergency has become a permanent condition. …[283] But supreme emergency is never a stable position. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 17) | |
A reaction: The obvious instability of balanced mutual threat is a nuclear state which finds itself losing a war. |
23580 | States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Whenever there is some substantial chance of success, reprisals are the legitimate resort of a victim state; for no state can be required passively to endure attacks upon its citizens. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 13) | |
A reaction: My concern is whether the reprisals have any direct connection to the attacks. They killed some of ours, so we will kill some of theirs is immoral. E.g. bombing Tripoli as reprisal for crashing the Lockerbie plane. |
23593 | Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Justice of war [ad bellum] and justice in war [in bello] are logically independent. It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly, and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 02) | |
A reaction: The perfect decorum of an unjust firing squad might even make the crime worse. There is something chilling about an evil army conducting itself perfectly within the ethics of warfare. Better than the other thing, though. McMahan disagrees. |
23577 | Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Napoleon said 'Soldiers are made to be killed. …I do not care a fig for the lives of a million men'. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 08) | |
A reaction: [Two separate remarks attributed to Napoleon] He apparently often said things like this this later in his career. It strikes me as despicable, and anyone who still tries to present Napoleon as admirable should be ashamed. |
23573 | For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Just wars are limited wars; there are moral reasons for the statesmen and soldiers who fight them to be prudent and realistic. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 07) | |
A reaction: This is rather profound, I think. Watch closely the behaviour of the good guys when they are winning the war. In general, to know someone's moral principles, the best indicator is how they behave when they have power. |
23614 | Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Soldiers fighting for an aggressor state are not themselves criminals: hence their war rights are the same as those of their opponents. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 08) | |
A reaction: Walzer's main support for this is that opposing armies never regard one another as intrinsically criminal. It seems inevitable, though, that even the invaders themselves see that they are a bit more criminal than the defenders. |
23574 | The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer] |
Full Idea: The duties of individual soldiers …are precisely the same in wars of aggression and wars of defence. …The moral status of soldiers on both sides is very much the same; they are led to fight by their loyalty and their lawful obedience. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 08) | |
A reaction: He excludes war crimes. This is the thesis which Jeff McMahan objects to. It would be very odd to think that mafiosi and the legitimate police were morally equal, because the former are loyal. We should all try hard to avoid supporting unjust causes. |
23575 | We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer] |
Full Idea: It would be difficult to condemn soldiers for anything they did in the course of a battle or a war that they honestly believed, and had good reason to believe, was necessary, or important, or simply useful in determining the outcome. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 08) | |
A reaction: We can't blame unjust aggressors if their own lives are at stake, but what about in a surprise attack on the first day of the war (such as Pearl Harbour)? Or if they massacre the enemy with safe and overwhelming superiority? |
23584 | Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Objections to combatant equality appeal to a sliding scale of 'the more justice, the more right'. …It allows the justice of one's cause to make a difference in the way one fights. …The extreme says soldiers fightly justly can do anything that is useful. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 14) | |
A reaction: This slippery slope fear seems to be Walzer's main argument in favour of the moral equality of combatants. See Jeff McMahan for the opposing view. |
23589 | Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Soldiers may stand to civilians like the crew of a liner to its passengers, for whom they must risk their lives. …But would they be so bound if the sailors had been kidnapped? | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 19) | |
A reaction: The point, I assume, is that a conscripted army does not have the same obligations as volunteers. I can't imagine that principle being accepted in an army which is a mixture of the two. |
23586 | What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer] |
Full Idea: The crucial distinction in the theory and practice of war is not between prohibited and acceptable weapons but between prohibited and acceptable targets. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 17) | |
A reaction: Walzer presents this idea as arising out of discussions about nuclear deterrence. Gas attacks were accepted in WW1 trenches, but modern gas attacks on civilians are a crime. Are nuclear attacks on strictly military targets OK? E.g a fleet. |
23591 | If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer] |
Full Idea: When one cannot count on the moral code of the oppressor, nonviolence is either a disguised form of surrender or a minimalist way of upholding communal values after a military defeat. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], Afterword) | |
A reaction: The point is that ruthless conquerors may just kill the nonviolent, so it would achieve nothing. Nonviolence is only a plausible strategy in a fairly civilised world. Hard to disagree. |
23579 | Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer] |
Full Idea: Soldiers must feel safe among civilians if civilians are ever to be safe from soldiers. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 11) | |
A reaction: This is the great dilemma of any resistance movement. It is very easy for the soldiers to abuse their power, even if they do feel safe. Then what? |
23592 | We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
Full Idea: We must begin by insisting upon the rules of war and by holding soldiers rigidly to the norms they set. The restraint of war is the beginning of peace. | |
From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], Afterword) | |
A reaction: Last sentence of his book. Some cultures have a much greater tradition of ruthless cruelty than others, it seems. Most war ethics seems to concern how the good guys should respond to the bad guys (since the latter hardly care). |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Aristotelian physics assumed that celestial motion is naturally circular and eternal while terrestrial motion is naturally toward the center of the earth and final. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: The overthrow of this by Galileo and then Newton may have been the most dramatic revolution of the new science. It opened up the possibility of universal laws of physics. |