66 ideas
13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Knowledge 'that' is descriptive, and knowledge 'why' is explanatory, and it is the latter that provides scientific understanding of our world. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: I agree, but of course, knowing 'why' may require a lot of knowing 'that'. People with extensive knowledge 'that' things are so tend to understand why something happens more readily than the rest of us ignoramuses. |
13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Understanding is an extremely vague concept. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.3) | |
A reaction: True, I suppose, but we usually recognise understanding when we encounter it, and everybody has a pretty clear notion of an 'increase' in understanding. I suspect that the concept is perfectly clear, but we lack any scale for measuring it. |
17405 | If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri] |
Full Idea: A theorist may have designed his theory to fit the facts, but is it not equally possible for observers to be influenced by a theory in their report of experimental facts? | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 05 'Power') | |
A reaction: This is in reply to Lipton's claim that prediction is better than accommodation because of the 'fudging' problem. The reply is that you might fudge to achieve a prediction. If it was correct, that wouldn't avoid the charge of fudging. |
13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Various kinds of correlations exist that provide excellent bases for prediction, but because no suitable causal relations exist (or are known), these correlations do not furnish explanation. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.3) | |
A reaction: There may be problem cases for the claim that all explanations are causal, but I certainly think that this idea is essentially right. Prediction can come from induction, but inductions may be true and yet baffling. |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
Full Idea: There is no sense in abandoning a successful theory if you have nothing to replace it with. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: This is also a problem for infererence to the best explanation. What to do if your best explanation is not very good? The simple message is do not rush to dump a theory when faced with an anomaly. |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: [On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics. |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Is Newton's theory simpler than Einstein's, since there is only one relation of simultaneity in absolute time, or is Einstein's simpler because it dispenses with absolute time altogether? | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: A nice question, to which a good scientist might be willing to offer an answer. Since simultaneity is crucial but the existence of time is not, I would vote for Newton as the simpler. |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Structural Realists say that modern science achieves a true or 'truer' account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature. The structure carries over to new theories. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: At first glance I am unconvinced that when an old theory is replaced it neverthess contains some sort of 'mathematical structure' which endures and is worth preserving. No doubt Worrall, French and co have examples. |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Structural Realists must show that it is the mathematical aspects of the theories, not their content, that account for their success ….and that their structure and content can be clearly separated. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Their approach certainly seems to rely on mathematical types of science, so it presumably fits biology, geology and even astronomy less well. |
13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
Full Idea: There is a centuries-old philosophical tradition, sometimes referred to by the name of 'instrumentalism', that has denied the claim that science has explanatory power. For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.3) | |
A reaction: [He quotes Coffa] Presumably it is just a matter of matching the world to the readings on the instruments, aiming at van Fraassen's 'empirical adequacy'. If there are no scientific explanations, does that mean that there are no explanations at all? Daft! |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The main difficulty with instrumentalism is its implausible account ot the meaning of theoretical claims and concepts. Most scientists take them to be straightforward attempts to describe the world. Most say they are useful because they are accurate. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Instrumentalism is seen as a Pragmatist view, and Dewey is cited. |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available. |
17397 | The periodic system is the big counterexample to Kuhn's theory of revolutionary science [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The history of the periodic system appears to be the supreme counterexample to Kuhn's thesis, whereby scientific developments proceed in a sudden, revolutionary fashion. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 03 'Rapid') | |
A reaction: What is lovely about the periodic table is that it seems so wonderfully right, and hence no revolution has ever been needed. The big theories of physics and cosmology are much more precarious. |
13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Inductive logicians have a 'requirement of total evidence': induction is strong if 1) it has true premises, 2) it has correct inductive form, and 3) no additional evidence that would change the degree of support is available at the time. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.4.2) | |
A reaction: The evidence might be very close at hand, but not quite 'available' to the person doing the induction. |
13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
Full Idea: I reject the view that scientific explanation involves reduction of the unfamiliar to the familiar. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Pref) | |
A reaction: Aristotle sometimes seems to imply this account of explanation, and I would have to agree with Salmon's view of it. Aristotle is also, though, aware of real explanations, definitions and essences. People are 'familiar' with some peculiar things. |
13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
Full Idea: There are evidence-seeking why-questions, as well as explanation-seeking why-questions. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Surely we would all prefer an explanation to mere evidence? It seems to me that they are all explanation-seeking, but that we are grateful for some evidence when no full explanation is available. Explanation renders evidence otiose. |
17393 | Scientists eventually seek underlying explanations for every pattern [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Whenever scientists are presented with a useful pattern or system of classification, it is only a matter of time before the begin to ask whether there may be some underlying explanation for the pattern. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], Intro 'Evol') | |
A reaction: Music to my ears, against the idea that the sole aim of science is accurately describe the patterns. |
13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The 'inferential' conception of scientific explanation is the thesis that all legitimate scientific explanations are arguments of one sort or another. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that someone has to be persuaded of something, and hence seems a rather too pragmatic view. I presume an explanation might be no more than dumbly pointing at conclusive evidence of a cause. Man with smoking gun. |
13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Proponents of the ontic conception of explanation can say that explanations exist in the world as facts, or that they are reports of such facts (as opposed to the view of explanations as arguments, or as speech acts). | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I am strongly drawn to the ontic approach, but not sure whether we want facts, or reports of them. The facts are the causal nexus, but which parts of the nexus provide the main aspect of explanation? I'll vote for reports, for now. |
14366 | An explanation is a table of statistical information [Salmon, by Strevens] |
Full Idea: On Salmon's statistical relevance view, an explanation is a table of statistical information. | |
From: report of Wesley Salmon (Statistical Explanation [1970]) by Michael Strevens - No Understanding without Explanation 1 | |
A reaction: [He cites W.Salmon 1970] When put like that the view sounds incredibly implausible, but maybe a reading of Salmon would improve the case for it. |
13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
Full Idea: There are three basic conceptions of scientific explanation - modal, epistemic, and ontic - which can be discerned in Aristotle, and that have persisted down the ages. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.1) |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
Full Idea: The more unification and integration is found among the modern sciences, the less likely it seems it will have all been a dream. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: I believe this strongly. Ancient theories which were complex, wide ranging and false do not impress me. This is part of my coherence view of justification. |
13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The problem is to distinguish between laws and accidental generalizations, for laws have explanatory force while accidental generalizations, even if they are true, do not. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [He is discussing Hempel and Oppenheim 1948] This seems obviously right, but I can only make sense of the explanatory power if we have identified the mechanism which requires the generalisation to continue in future cases. |
13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The deductive-nomological view has an explanation/prediction symmetry thesis - that a correct explanation could be a scientific prediction, and that any deductive prediction could serve as a deductive-nomological explanation. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Of course, not all predictions will explain, or vice versa. Weird regularities become predictable but remain baffling. Good explanations may be of unrepeatable events. It is the 'law' in the account that ties the two ends together. |
13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
Full Idea: To provide an adequate explanation of any given fact, we need to provide information that is relevant to the occurrence of that fact - information that makes a difference to its occurrence. It is not enough to subsume it under a general law. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Bromberger for this idea] Salmon is identifying this idea as the beginnings of trouble for the covering-law account of explanation, and it sounds exactly right. |
13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The height of the flagpole explains the length of the shadow because the interaction between the sunlight and the flagpole occurs before the interaction between the sunlight and the ground. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.6) | |
A reaction: [Bromberger produced the flagpole example] This seems to be correct, and would apply to all physical cases, but there may still be cases of explanation which are not causal (in mathematics, for example). |
17093 | Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Causal processes, causal interactions, and causal laws provide the mechanisms by which the world works; to understand why certain things happen, we need to see how they are produced by these mechanisms. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World [1984]), quoted by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 7 | |
A reaction: I don't think I've ever found a better quotation on explanation. That strikes me as correct, and (basically) there is nothing more to be said. I'm not sure about the 'laws'. This is later Wesley Salmon. |
17492 | Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon] |
Full Idea: While Salmon's mechanisms are processes involving interactions, the interactions are not necessarily regular, and they do not involve the operation of systems. | |
From: comment on Wesley Salmon (Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World [1984]) by Stuart Glennan - Mechanisms 'hierarchical' | |
A reaction: This is why modern mechanistic philosophy only began in 2000, despite Wesley Salmon's championing of the roughly mechanistic approach. |
13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
Full Idea: My basic feeling about explanation in the quantum realm is that it will involve mechanisms, but mechanisms that are quite different from those that seem to work in the macrocosm. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Pref) | |
A reaction: Since I take most explanation to be by mechanisms (or some abstraction analogous to mechanisms), then I think this is probably right (rather than being by new 'laws'). |
13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
Full Idea: In functional explanation, there is a disagreement over whether an item has a function the first time it occurs. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.8) | |
A reaction: This question arises particularly in evolutionary contexts, and would obviously not generally arise in the case of human artefacts. |
13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
Full Idea: I favour an ontic conception of explanation, that explanations reveal the mechanisms, causal or other, that produce the facts we are trying to explain. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.1) | |
A reaction: [He also cites Coffa and Peter Railton] A structure may explain, and only be supported by causal powers, but it doesn't seem to be the causal powers that do the explaining. Is a peg fitting a hole explained causally? |
16557 | Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: For Salmon mechanisms are composed of processes and interactions. The interactions are identified in terms of transmitted marks and statistical relations, or (more recently) exchanges of conserved quantities. | |
From: report of Wesley Salmon (Causality and Explanation [1998], 3.1) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 3.1 | |
A reaction: They say that Salmon has too little to say about the activities that constitute a mechanism. A 'mark' doesn't sound too promising, but I quite like the exchange of conserved quantities, which gets into the guts of what is going on. |
13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.6) | |
A reaction: I take this to be one of the reasons why explanation must ultimately reside at the level of individual objects and events, rather than residing with generalisations and laws. |
13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Statistical relevance, not high probability, is the key desideratum in statistical explanation. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.5) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is because the explanation will not ultimately be probabilistic at all, but mechanical and causal. Hence the link is what counts, which is the relevance. He notes that relevance needs two values instead of one high value. |
13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Perhaps we should think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Coffa 1974 for this] I find this suggestion very appealing, as it connects up with dispositions and powers, which I take to be the building blocks of all explanation. It is, of course, easier to render frequencies numerically. |
17403 | The periodic table suggests accommodation to facts rates above prediction [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Rather than proving the value of prediction, the development and acceptance of the periodic table may give us a powerful illustration of the importance of accommodation, that is, the ability of a new scientific theory to explain already known facts. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 05 'Intro') | |
A reaction: The original table made famous predictions, but also just as many wrong ones (Scerri:143), and Scerri thinks this aspect has been overrated. |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
Full Idea: Aristotelian physics assumed that celestial motion is naturally circular and eternal while terrestrial motion is naturally toward the center of the earth and final. | |
From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: The overthrow of this by Galileo and then Newton may have been the most dramatic revolution of the new science. It opened up the possibility of universal laws of physics. |
17394 | Natural kinds are what are differentiated by nature, and not just by us [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Natural kinds are realistic scientific entities that are differentiated by nature itself rather than by our human attempts at classification. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], Intro 'Evol') |
17421 | If elements are natural kinds, might the groups of the periodic table also be natural kinds? [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Elements defined by their atomic numbers are frequently assumed to represent 'natural kinds' in chemistry. ...The question arises as to whether groups of elements appearing in the periodic table might also represent natural kinds. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 10 'Elements') | |
A reaction: Scerri says the distinction is not as sharp as that between the elements. As a realist, he believes there is 'one ideal periodic classification', which would then make the periods into kinds. |
8412 | A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon] |
Full Idea: When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4) | |
A reaction: There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes. |
8413 | Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon] |
Full Idea: In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8) | |
A reaction: This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle. |
8411 | Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon] |
Full Idea: I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another. |
4784 | Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Salmon argues that processes rather than events should be the basic entities in a theory of physical causation. | |
From: report of Wesley Salmon (Causal Connections [1984]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.2 | |
A reaction: It increasingly strikes me that the concept of a 'process' ought to be ontologically basic. Edelman says the mind is a process. An 'event' is too loose, and a 'fact' too vague, and heaven knows what Hume meant by an 'object'. |
8409 | Probabilistic causal concepts are widely used in everyday life and in science [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Probabilistic causal concepts are used in innumerable contexts of everyday life and science. ...In causes of cancer, road accidents, or food poisoning, for example. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Probabilistic Causality [1980], p.137) | |
A reaction: [Second half compresses his examples] This strikes me as rather a weak point. No one ever thought that a particular road accident was actually caused by the high probability of it at a particular location. Causes are in the mechanisms. |
17396 | The colour of gold is best explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Many seemingly mundane properties of elements such as the characteristic color of gold ....can best be explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 01 'Under') | |
A reaction: John Locke - I wish you were reading this! That we could work out the hidden facts of gold, and thereby explain and predict the surface properties we experience, is exactly what Locke thought to be forever impossible. |
17411 | If all elements are multiples of one (of hydrogen), that suggests once again that matter is unified [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The work of Moseley and others rehabilitated Prout's hypothesis that all elements were composites of hydrogen, being exact multiples of 1. ..This revitalized some philososophical notions of the unity of all matter, criticised by Mendeleev and others. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Philos') |
17420 | The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy, a quantity given by the difference between their masses and the masses of their constituent particles. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 10 'Stabil') |
17407 | The electron is the main source of chemical properties [Scerri] |
Full Idea: It is the electron that is mainly responsible for the chemical properties of the elements. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Intro') |
17409 | Does radioactivity show that only physics can explain chemistry? [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Some authors believe that the interpretation of the properties of the elements passed from chemistry to physics as a result of the discovery of radioactivity. ...I believe this view to be overly reductionist. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Radio') | |
A reaction: It is all a matter of the explanations, and how far down they have to go. If most non-radiocative chemistry doesn't need to mention the physics, then chemistry is largely autonomous. |
17415 | A big chemistry idea is that covalent bonds are shared electrons, not transfer of electrons [Scerri] |
Full Idea: One of the most influential ideas in modern chemistry is of a covalent bond as a shared pair of electrons (not as transfer of electrons and the formation of ionic bonds). | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 08 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Gilbert Newton Lewis was responsible for this. |
17392 | How can poisonous elements survive in the nutritious compound they compose? [Scerri] |
Full Idea: A central mystery of chemistry is how the elements survive in the compounds they form. For example, how can poisonous grey metal sodium combine with green poisonous gas chlorine, to make salt, which is non-poisonous and essential for life? | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], Intro 'Elem') | |
A reaction: A very nice question which had never occurred to me. If our digestive system pulled the sodium apart from the chlorine, we would die. |
17391 | Periodicity and bonding are the two big ideas in chemistry [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The two big ideas in chemistry are chemical periodicity and chemical bonding, and they are deeply interconnected. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], Intro 'Per') |
17404 | Chemistry does not work from general principles, but by careful induction from large amounts of data [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Unlike in physics, chemical reasoning does not generally proceed unambiguously from general principles. It is a more inductive science in which large amounts of observational data must be carefully weighed. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 05 'Mendel') | |
A reaction: This is why essentialist thinking was important for Mendeleev, because it kept his focus on the core facts beneath the messy and incomplete data. |
17398 | 19th C views said elements survived abstractly in compounds, but also as 'material ingredients' [Scerri] |
Full Idea: In the 19th century abstract elements were believed to be permanent and responsible for observed properties in compounds, but (departing from Aristotle) they were also 'material ingredients', thus linking the metaphysical and material realm. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 04 'Nature') | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I can make sense of this gulf between the metaphysical and the material realm, so this was an account heading for disaster. |
17418 | It is now thought that all the elements have literally evolved from hydrogen [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The elements are now believed to have literally evolved from hydrogen by various mechanisms. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 10 'Evol) |
17417 | To explain the table, quantum mechanics still needs to explain order of shell filling [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The order of shell filling has not yet been deduced from first principles, and this issue cannot be avoided if one is to really ask whether quantum mechanics explains the periodic system in a fundamental manner. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 09 'From') |
17395 | Elements were ordered by equivalent weight; later by atomic weight; finally by atomic number [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Historically, the ordering of elements across periods was determined by equivalent weight, then later by atomic weight, and eventually by atomic number. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 01 'React') | |
A reaction: So they used to be ordered by quantities (measured by real numbers), but eventually were ordered by unit items (counted by natural numbers). There need to be distinct protons (unified) to be counted. |
17410 | Moseley showed the elements progress in units, and thereby clearly identified the gaps [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Moseley's work showed that the successive elements in the periodic table have an atomic number greater by one unit. The gaps could then be identified definitively, as 43, 61, 72, 75, 85, 87, and 91. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Henry') | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
17412 | Elements are placed in the table by the number of positive charges - the atomic number [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The serial number of an element in the periodic table, its atomic number, corresponds to the number of positive charges in the atom. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 07 'Models') | |
A reaction: Note that this is a feature of the nucleus, despite that fact that the electrons decide the chemical properties. A nice model for Locke's views on essentialism. |
17406 | Moseley, using X-rays, showed that atomic number ordered better than atomic weight [Scerri] |
Full Idea: By using X-rays, Henry Moseley later discovered that a better ordering principle for the periodic system is atomic numbers rather than atomic weight, by subjecting many different elements to bombardment. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Moseley was killed in the First World War at the age of 26. It is interesting that they more or less worked out the whole table, before they discovered the best principle on which to found it. |
17408 | Some suggested basing the new periodic table on isotopes, not elements [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Some chemists even suggested that the periodic table would have to be abandoned in favor of a classification system that included a separate place for every single isotope. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Intro') | |
A reaction: The extreme case is tin, which has 21 isotopes, so is tin a fundamental, or is each of the isotopes a fundamental? Does there have to be a right answer to that? All tin isotopes basically react in the same way, so we stick with the elements table. |
17414 | Pauli explained the electron shells, but not the lengths of the periods in the table [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Pauli explained the maximum number of electrons successive shells can accommodate, ...but it does not explain the lengths of the periods, which is the really crucial property of the periodic table. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 07 'Pauli') | |
A reaction: Paulis' Exclusion Principle says no two electrons in an atom can have the same set of four quantum numbers. He added 'spin' as a fourth number. It means 'electrons cannot be distinguished' (243). Scerri says the big problem is still not fully explained. |
17416 | Orthodoxy says the periodic table is explained by quantum mechanics [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The prevailing reductionist climate implies that quantum mechanics inevitably provides a more fundamental explanation for the periodic system. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 08 'Concl') | |
A reaction: Scerri has argued that chemists did much better than physicists in working out how the outer electron shells of atoms worked, by induction from data, rather than inference from basic principles. |
17422 | The best classification needs the deepest and most general principles of the atoms [Scerri] |
Full Idea: An optimal classification can be obtained by identifying the deepest and most general principles that govern the atoms of the elements. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 10 'Continuum') | |
A reaction: He adds (p.286) that the best system will add the 'greatest degree of regularity' to these best principles. |
17413 | Elements in the table are grouped by having the same number of outer-shell electrons [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The modern notion is that atoms fall into the same group of the periodic table if they possess the same numbers of outer-shell electrons. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 07 'Quantum') | |
A reaction: Scerri goes on to raise questions about this, on p.242. By this principle helium should be an alkaline earth element, but it isn't. |
17419 | Since 99.96% of the universe is hydrogen and helium, the periodic table hardly matters [Scerri] |
Full Idea: All the elements other than hydrogen and helium make up just 0.04% of the universe. Seen from this perspective, the periodic table appears to rather insignificant. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 10 'Astro') |