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7510
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Connectionists say the mind is a general purpose learning device [Pinker]
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Full Idea:
Connectionists do not, of course, believe that the mind is a blank slate, but they do believe in the closest mechanistic equivalent, a general purpose learning device.
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From:
Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
This shows the closeness of connectionism to Hume's associationism (Idea 2189), which was just a minimal step away from Locke's mind as 'white paper' (Idea 7507). Pinker is defending 'human nature', but connectionism has a point.
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7513
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Is memory stored in protein sequences, neurons, synapses, or synapse-strengths? [Pinker]
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Full Idea:
Are memories stored in protein sequences, in new neurons or synapses, or in changes in the strength of existing synapses?
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From:
Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
This seems to be a neat summary of current neuroscientific thinking about memory. If you are thinking that memory couldn't possibly be so physical, don't forget the mind-boggling number of events involved in each tiny memory. See Idea 6668.
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7509
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Roundworms live successfully with 302 neurons, so human freedom comes from our trillions [Pinker]
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Full Idea:
The roundworm only has 959 cells, and 302 neurons in a fixed wiring diagram; it eats, mates, approaches and avoids certain smells, and that's about it. This makes it obvious that human 'free' behaviour comes from our complex biological makeup.
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From:
Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
I find this a persuasive example. Three hundred trillion neurons cannot possibly produce behaviour which is more than broadly predictable, and then it is the environment and culture that make it predictable, not the biology.
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7512
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There are five types of reasoning that seem beyond connectionist systems [Pinker, by PG]
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Full Idea:
Connectionist networks have difficulty with the kind/individual distinction (ducks/this duck), with compositionality (relations), with quantification (reference of 'all'), with recursion (embedded thoughts), and the categorical reasoning (exceptions).
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From:
report of Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate [2002], Ch.5) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
[Read Pinker p.80!] These are essentially all the more sophisticated aspects of logical reasoning that Pinker can think of. Personally I would be reluctant to say a priori that connectionism couldn't cope with these things, just because they seem tough.
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5078
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Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Kant and Mill were in total agreement in trying to give content to the distinction between moral right and wrong, without recourse to any divine lawgiver.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.14)
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A reaction:
A nice analysis, in tune with MacIntyre and others, who see such attempts as failures. It is hard, however, to deny the claims of rational principles, or of suffering, in our moral framework. I agree with Taylor's move back to virtue, but it ain't simple.
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5067
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Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
If morality is based on wrong (meaning 'forbidden'), right ('permitted'), and obligatory ('required'), we are led to ask 'Who is it that thus permits, forbids or requires that certain things be done or not done?'
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
Clear reinforcement for Nietzsche's attack on conventional morals, which Taylor sees as a relic of medieval religious attitudes. Taylor says Kant offered a non-religious version of the same authority. I agree. Back to the Greek pursuit of excellence!
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7505
|
Many think that accepting human nature is to accept innumerable evils [Pinker]
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Full Idea:
To acknowledge human nature, many think, is to endorse racism, sexism, war, greed, genocide, nihilism, reactionary politics, and neglect of children and the disadvantaged.
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From:
Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate [2002], Pref)
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A reaction:
The point is that modern liberal thinking says everything is nurture (which can be changed), not nature (which can't). Virtue theory, of which I am a fan, requires a concept of human nature, as the thing which can attain excellence in its function.
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5079
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Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Pleasures can be located in a particular part of the body, and can be momentary, and come and go, but this is not the case with happiness.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.16)
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A reaction:
Probably no one ever thought that pleasure and happiness were actually identical - merely that pleasure is the only cause and source of happiness. These are good objections to that hypothesis. Pleasure simply isn't 'the good'.
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5068
|
'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
The word 'eudaimonia' means literally 'having a good demon', which is apt, because it suggests some kind of supreme good fortune, of the sort which might be thought of as a bestowal.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
Beware of etymology. This implies that eudaimonia is almost entirely beyond a person's control, but Aristotle doesn't think that. A combination of education and effort can build on some natural gifts to create a fully successful life.
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5077
|
The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12)
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A reaction:
This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings).
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5066
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If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though.
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