92 ideas
8013 | In the Reformation, morality became unconditional but irrational, individually autonomous, and secular [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Three concepts about morality emerge from the Reformation period: that moral rules are unconditional demands that lack rational justification; that moral agents are sovereign in choices; and that secular powers have their own norms and justifications. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I get the impression that a rather frank admission of the role of self-interest emerged at that time as well. It is only in the late seventeenth century that the possibility of a secular altruism begins to be investigated. But there's Shakespeare... |
8021 | The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: John Lilburne, the Leveller, 'Free-Born John', was the most important of them. They mainly fought for rights of religious conscience, but it quickly escalated into a demand for economic and social rights. It spread to France and the United States. |
8060 | In the 17th-18th centuries morality offered a cure for egoism, through altruism [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: It was in the seventeenth and eighteenth century that morality came generally to be understood as offering a solution to the problems posed by human egoism and that the content of morality came to be largely equated with altruism. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch.16) | |
A reaction: It was the elevation of altruism that caused Nietzsche's rebellion. The sixteenth century certainly looks striking cynical to modern eyes. The development was an attempt to secularise Jesus. Altruism has a paradox: it needs victims. |
8053 | Twentieth century social life is re-enacting eighteenth century philosophy [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Twentieth century social life turns out in key part to be the concrete and dramatic re-enactment of eighteenth-century philosophy. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This suggest a two hundred year lag between the philosophy and its impact on the culture. One might note the Victorian insistence on 'duty' (e.g. in George Eliot), alongside Mill's view that the Kantian account of it didn't work (Idea 3768). |
8047 | Philosophy has been marginalised by its failure in the Enlightenment to replace religion [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The failure, in the Enlightenment, of philosophy to provide what religion could no longer furnish was an important cause of philosophy losing its central cultural role and becoming a marginal, narrowly academic subject. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: A strange way of presenting the situation. Philosophy has never aspired to furnish beliefs for the masses. Plato offered them myths. The refutation of religion was difficult and complex. There is no returning from there to a new folk simplicity. |
8062 | Proof is a barren idea in philosophy, and the best philosophy never involves proof [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Arguments in philosophy rarely take the form of proofs; and the most successful arguments on topics central to philosophy never do. (The ideal of proof is a relatively barren one in philosophy). | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch.18) | |
A reaction: He seems proud of this, but he must settle for something which is less than proof, which has to be vindicated to the mathematicians and scientists. I agree, though. Plato is the model, and the best philosophy builds a broad persuasive picture. |
10987 | Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read] |
Full Idea: Three traditional names for rules are 'Simplification' (P from 'P and Q'), 'Addition' ('P or Q' from P), and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' (Q from 'P or Q' and 'not-P'). | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) |
11004 | Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read] |
Full Idea: In S4 necessity is said to be informal 'provability', and in S5 it is said to be 'true in every possible world'. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: It seems that the S4 version is proof-theoretic, and the S5 version is semantic. |
11018 | There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read] |
Full Idea: In fuzzy logic, besides fuzzy predicates, which define fuzzy sets, there are also fuzzy quantifiers (such as 'most' and 'few') and fuzzy modifiers (such as 'usually'). | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.7) |
11011 | Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read] |
Full Idea: It is normal to classify free logics into three sorts; positive free logics (some propositions with empty terms are true), negative free logics (they are false), and neuter free logics (they lack truth-value), though I find this unhelpful and superficial. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5) |
11020 | Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read] |
Full Idea: Hard-headed realism tends to embrace the full Comprehension Principle, that every well-defined concept determines a set. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: This sort of thing gets you into trouble with Russell's paradox (though that is presumably meant to be excluded somehow by 'well-defined'). There are lots of diluted Comprehension Principles. |
14187 | If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read] |
Full Idea: The topic-neutrality of logic need not mean there is a pure subject matter for logic; rather, that the logician may need to go everywhere, into mathematics and even into metaphysics. | |
From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Logic') |
10986 | Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read] |
Full Idea: We must recognise that first-order classical logic is inadequate to describe all valid consequences, that is, all cases in which it is impossible for the premisses to be true and the conclusion false. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is despite the fact that first-order logic is 'complete', in the sense that its own truths are all provable. |
10972 | The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read] |
Full Idea: The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) |
11024 | Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read] |
Full Idea: For the realist, study of semantic structures comes before study of proofs. In higher-order logic is has to, for the logics are incomplete. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: This seems to be an important general observation about any incomplete system, such as Peano arithmetic. You may dream the old rationalist dream of starting from the beginning and proving everything, but you can't. Start with truth and meaning. |
10985 | We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read] |
Full Idea: Those who believe mathematics goes beyond logic use that fact to argue that classical logic is right to exclude second-order logic. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) |
14183 | Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read] |
Full Idea: Maybe some arguments are really only valid when a suppressed premise is made explicit, as when we say that 'taller than' is a transitive concept. ...But what is added by making the hidden premise explicit? It cannot alter the soundness of the argument. | |
From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Suppress') |
10970 | A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read] |
Full Idea: A theory of logical consequence, while requiring a conceptual analysis of consequence, also searches for a set of techniques to determine the validity of particular arguments. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) |
14188 | Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read] |
Full Idea: Belief that every valid argument is valid in virtue of form is a myth. ..Validity is a question of the impossibility of true premises and false conclusion for whatever reason, and some arguments are materially valid and the reason is not purely logical. | |
From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Logic') | |
A reaction: An example of a non-logical reason is the transitive nature of 'taller than'. Conceptual connections are the usual example, as in 'it's red so it is coloured'. This seems to be a defence of the priority of semantic consequence in logic. |
14182 | If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read] |
Full Idea: In 'A is taller than B, and B is taller than C, so A is taller than C' this can been seen as a matter of meaning - it is part of the meaning of 'taller' that it is transitive, but not of logic. Logic is now seen as the study of formal consequence. | |
From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Reduct') | |
A reaction: I think I find this approach quite appealing. Obviously you can reason about taller-than relations, by putting the concepts together like jigsaw pieces, but I tend to think of logic as something which is necessarily implementable on a machine. |
10984 | Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read] |
Full Idea: If classical logic insists that logical consequence is just a matter of the form, we fail to include as valid consequences those inferences whose correctness depends on the connections between non-logical terms (such as 'round' and 'square'). | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: He suggests that an inference such as 'round, so not square' should be labelled as 'materially valid'. |
14184 | In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read] |
Full Idea: A puzzle about modus ponens is that the major premise is either false or unnecessary: A, If A then B / so B. If the major premise is true, then B follows from A, so the major premise is redundant. So it is false or not needed, and contributes nothing. | |
From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Repres') | |
A reaction: Not sure which is the 'major premise' here, but it seems to be saying that the 'if A then B' is redundant. If I say 'it's raining so the grass is wet', it seems pointless to slip in the middle the remark that rain implies wet grass. Good point. |
14186 | Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read] |
Full Idea: The logical connectives are useful for bundling information, that B follows from A, or that one of A or B is true. ..They import no information of their own, but serve to record combinations of other facts. | |
From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Repres') | |
A reaction: Anyone who suggests a link between logic and 'facts' gets my vote, so this sounds a promising idea. However, logical truths have a high degree of generality, which seems somehow above the 'facts'. |
10973 | A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read] |
Full Idea: A 'theory' is any logically closed set of propositions, ..and since any proposition has infinitely many consequences, including all the logical truths, so that theories have infinitely many premisses. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Read is introducing this as the essential preliminary to an account of the Compactness Theorem, which relates these infinite premisses to the finite. |
11007 | Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read] |
Full Idea: Quantifiers are second-order predicates. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: [He calls this 'Frege's insight'] They seem to be second-order in Tarski's sense, that they are part of a metalanguage about the sentence, rather than being a part of the sentence. |
10978 | In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read] |
Full Idea: The defining factor of second-order logic is that, while the domain of its individual variables may be arbitrary, the range of the first-order variables is all the properties of the objects in its domain (or, thinking extensionally, of the sets objects). | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The key point is that the domain is 'all' of the properties. How many properties does an object have. You need to decide whether you believe in sparse or abundant properties (I vote for very sparse indeed). |
10971 | A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read] |
Full Idea: Logical truth is a degenerate, or extreme, case of consequence. A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses, or a proposition in the premisses of an argument which is unnecessary or may be suppressed. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) |
10988 | Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read] |
Full Idea: Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate because of the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski property, and the consequent Skolem paradox. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The limitation is in giving an account of infinities. |
10974 | Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read] |
Full Idea: Classical logical consequence is compact, which means that any consequence of an infinite set of propositions (such as a theory) is a consequence of some finite subset of them. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) |
10975 | Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read] |
Full Idea: Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses. It can; but classically, it is valid if and only if the conclusion follows from a finite subset of them. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) |
10977 | Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read] |
Full Idea: Compact consequence undergenerates - there are intuitively valid consequences which it marks as invalid, such as the ω-rule, that if A holds of the natural numbers, then 'for every n, A(n)', but the proof of that would be infinite, for each number. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) |
10976 | Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read] |
Full Idea: Compactness is a virtue - it makes the consequence relation more manageable; but it is also a limitation - it limits the expressive power of the logic. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The major limitation is that wholly infinite proofs are not permitted, as in Idea 10977. |
11014 | Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read] |
Full Idea: It cannot be self-reference alone that is at fault. Rather, what seems to cause the problems in the paradoxes is the combination of self-reference with falsity. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.6) |
11025 | Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read] |
Full Idea: Every potential infinity seems to suggest an actual infinity - e.g. generating successors suggests they are really all there already; cutting the line suggests that the point where the cut is made is already in place. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: Finding a new gambit in chess suggests it was there waiting for us, but we obviously invented chess. Daft. |
10979 | Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read] |
Full Idea: Second-order arithmetic is categorical - indeed, there is a single formula of second-order logic whose only model is the standard model ω, consisting of just the natural numbers, with all of arithmetic following. It is nevertheless incomplete. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is the main reason why second-order logic has a big fan club, despite the logic being incomplete (as well as the arithmetic). |
10980 | Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read] |
Full Idea: Second-order arithmetic can rule out the non-standard models (with non-standard numbers). Its induction axiom crucially refers to 'any' property, which gives the needed categoricity for the models. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) |
10997 | Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read] |
Full Idea: The Von Neumann numbers have a structural isomorphism to the natural numbers - each number is the set of all its predecessors, so 2 is the set of 0 and 1. This helps proofs, but is unacceptable. 2 is not a set with two members, or a member of 3. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4) |
18933 | Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: I. Nothing exists. a) Not-Being does not exist. b) Being does not exist as everlasting, as created, as both, as One, or as Many. II. If anything does exist, it is incomprehensible. III. If existence is comprehensible, it is incommunicable. | |
From: report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE], B03) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09 | |
A reaction: [Also Sextus Empiricus, Against Logicians I.65-] For Part I he works through all the possible modes of being he can think of, and explains why none of them are possible. It is worth remembering that Gorgias loved rhetoric, not philosophy! |
11016 | Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read] |
Full Idea: We must ask whether a language without vagueness would be usable at all. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Popper makes a similar remark somewhere, with which I heartily agreed. This is the idea of 'spreading the word' over the world, which seems the right way of understanding it. |
11013 | Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read] |
Full Idea: In supervaluations, the Law of Identity has no value for empty names, and remains so if extended. The Indiscernibility of Identicals also fails if extending it for non-denoting terms, where Fa comes out true and Fb false. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5) |
11012 | A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read] |
Full Idea: A 'supervaluation' says a proposition is true if it is true in all classical extensions of the original partial valuation. Thus 'A or not-A' has no valuation for an empty name, but if 'extended' to make A true or not-true, not-A always has opposite value. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5) |
11019 | Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read] |
Full Idea: The supervaluation approach to vagueness is to construe vague predicates not as ones with fuzzy borderlines and no cut-off, but as having a cut-off somewhere, but in no particular place. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Presumably you narrow down the gap by supervaluation, then split the difference to get a definite value. |
10995 | A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read] |
Full Idea: The haecceitist (a neologism coined by Duns Scotus, pronounced 'hex-ee-it-ist', meaning literally 'thisness') believes that each thing has an individual essence, a set of properties which are essential to it. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a difference of opinion over whether a haecceity is a set of essential properties, or a bare particular. The key point is that it is unique to each entity. |
11001 | Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read] |
Full Idea: The equation of 'necessity' with 'true in every possible world' is known as the S5 conception, corresponding to the strongest of C.I.Lewis's five modal systems. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Are the worlds naturally, or metaphysically, or logically possible? |
10989 | The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read] |
Full Idea: The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional, that is, that their truth-values are determined by the truth-values of their constituents. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.3) |
10992 | The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read] |
Full Idea: The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: [He attributes this idea to Frank Jackson] This makes the point, against Grice, that the implication of conditionals is not conversational but a matter of logical convention. See Idea 21396 for a very different view. |
11017 | Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read] |
Full Idea: Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: See Idea 14283, where this appears to have been 'proved' by Lewis, and is not just a view held by some people. |
14185 | Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read] |
Full Idea: Truth enables us to carry various reports around under certain descriptions ('what Iain said') without all the bothersome detail. Similarly, conditionals enable us to transmit a record of proof without its detail. | |
From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Repres') | |
A reaction: This is his proposed Redundancy Theory of conditionals. It grows out of the problem with Modus Ponens mentioned in Idea 14184. To say that there is always an implied 'proof' seems a large claim. |
10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
Full Idea: The modal Platonist denies that knowledge always depends on a causal relation. The reality of possible worlds is an ontological requirement, to secure the truth-values of modal propositions. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: [Reply to Idea 10982] This seems to be a case of deriving your metaphyics from your semantics, of which David Lewis seems to be guilty, and which strikes me as misguided. |
10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
Full Idea: If modal Platonism was true, how could we ever know the truth of a modal proposition? | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I take this to be very important. Our knowledge of modal truths must depend on our knowledge of the actual world. The best answer seems to involve reference to the 'powers' of the actual world. A reply is in Idea 10983. |
10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
Full Idea: There are two main forms of actualism: reductionism, which seeks to construct possible worlds out of some more mundane material; and moderate realism, in which the actual concrete world is contrasted with abstract, but none the less real, possible worlds. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I am a reductionist, as I do not take abstractions to be 'real' (precisely because they have been 'abstracted' from the things that are real). I think I will call myself a 'scientific modalist' - we build worlds from possibilities, discovered by science. |
10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
Full Idea: A possible world is a complete determination of the truth-values of all propositions over a certain domain. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Even if the domain is very small? Even if the world fitted the logic nicely, but was naturally impossible? |
11000 | If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read] |
Full Idea: If each possible world constitutes a concrete reality, then no object can be present in more than one world - objects may have 'counterparts', but cannot be identical with them. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This explains clearly why in Lewis's modal realist scheme he needs counterparts instead of rigid designation. Sounds like a slippery slope. If you say 'Humphrey might have won the election', who are you talking about? |
8052 | To find empiricism and science in the same culture is surprising, as they are really incompatible [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: There is something extraordinary in the coexistence of empiricism and natural science in the same culture, for they represent radically different and incompatible ways of approaching the world. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: I would say that science is commitment to an ontology, and empiricism is a commitment to epistemology. It is a very nice point, given the usual assumption that science is an empirical activity. See Idea 7621. Strict empiricism distorts science. |
10356 | Relativism can be seen as about the rationality of different cultural traditions [MacIntyre, by Kusch] |
Full Idea: MacIntyre formulates relativism in terms of rationality rather than truth or objectivity. Things are rational relative to some particular tradition, but not rational as such. | |
From: report of Alasdair MacIntyre (Whose Justice? Which Rationality? [1988], p.352) by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.19 | |
A reaction: Personally I had always taken it to be about truth, and I expect any account of rationality to be founded on a notion of truth. There can clearly be cultural traditions of evidence, and possibly even of logic (though I doubt it). |
8057 | Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Just as unpredictability does not entail inexplicability, so predictability does not entail explicability. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: The second half is not quite as obvious as the first. The location of lightning strikes is an example of the first. He gives examples of the second, but they all seem to be very complex cases which might be explained, if only we knew enough. |
8054 | Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Social sciences have discovered no law-like generalisations whatsoever, ...and for the most part they adopt a very tolerant attitude to counter-examples. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is as much to do with a narrow and rigid view of what 'science' is supposed to be, as a failure of the social sciences. Have such sciences explained anything? I suspect that they have explained a lot, often after the facts. |
8006 | When Aristotle speaks of soul he means something like personality [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: When Aristotle speaks of the soul we could very often retain his meaning by speaking of personality. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: MacIntyre contrasts this strongly with Plato's dualist view. Famously Aristotle thinks the soul is the 'form' of the body, but this implies that he also includes the higher-level functions of the body. Soul is character? |
10998 | The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read] |
Full Idea: Ways things might be are real, but only when abstracted from the actual way things are. They are brought out and distinguished by the mind, by abstraction, but are not dependent on mind for their existence. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: To me this just flatly contradicts itself. The idea that the mind can 'bring something out' by its operations, with the result being then accepted as part of reality is nonsense on stilts. What is real is the powers that make the possibilities. |
21050 | I can only make decisions if I see myself as part of a story [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: I can only answer the question 'What am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question 'Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?'. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], p.201), quoted by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 09 | |
A reaction: MacIntyre is a great champion of the narrative view of the Self. Does this mean that if you had total amnesia, but retained other faculties, you could make no decisions? Can you start a new story whenever you like? |
8056 | AI can't predict innovation, or consequences, or external relations, or external events [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: AI machines have four types of unpredictability: they can't predict radical innovation or future maths proofs; they couldn't predict the outcome of their own decisions; their relations with other computers would be a game-theory tangle; and power failure. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This isn't an assertion that they lack 'free will', just a very accurate observation of how the super new machines would face exactly the same problems that we ourselves face. |
11005 | Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read] |
Full Idea: A problem with compositionality is negative existential propositions. If some of the terms of the proposition are empty, and don't refer, then compositionality implies that the whole will lack meaning too. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: I don't agree. I don't see why compositionality implies holism about sentence-meaning. If I say 'that circular square is a psychopath', you understand the predication, despite being puzzled by the singular term. |
10966 | A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read] |
Full Idea: A proposition makes an object out of what is said or expressed by the utterance of a certain sort of sentence, namely, one in the indicative mood which makes sense and doesn't fail in its references. It can then be an object of thought and belief. | |
From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Nice, but two objections: I take it to be crucial to propositions that they eliminate ambiguities, and I take it that animals are capable of forming propositions. Read seems to regard them as fictions, but I take them to be brain events. |
9866 | Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato] |
Full Idea: Gorgias insists that the art of persuasion is superior to all others because it enslaves all the rest, with their own consent, not by force, and is therefore by far the best of all the arts. | |
From: report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]) by Plato - Philebus 58a | |
A reaction: A nice point, and it is not unreasonable to rank the arts in order of their power. To enchant, without achieving agreement, and to speak truth without persuading, are both very fine, but there is something about success that cannot be gainsaid. |
5864 | Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias] |
Full Idea: Destroy the seriousness of others with laughter, and their laughter with seriousness. | |
From: Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - The Art of Rhetoric 1419b | |
A reaction: This sounds like brilliant tactical advice, which should be on the wall of every barrister's chambers. This is a case of rhetoric having something to teach us which is nothing at all to do with truth. It is more like learning karate. |
8059 | The good life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: This contains a self-evident paradox - that success would be failure. The proposal suits philosophers more than it would suit the folk. Less seeking and more getting on with it seems good, if the activity is a 'flourishing' one. |
8034 | We still have the appearance and language of morality, but we no longer understand it [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: We possess simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have - very largely, if not entirely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: MacIntyre's famous (or notorious) assault on modern ethics. We obviously can't prove him wrong by spouting moral talk. Are we actually more wicked than our ancestors? There is, I think, a relativism problem in the 20th centurty, but that is different. |
8036 | Unlike expressions of personal preference, evaluative expressions do not depend on context [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: There are good reasons for distinguishing between expressions of personal preference and evaluative expressions, as the first depend on who utters them to whom, while the second are not dependent for reason-giving force on the context of utterance. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: The sceptics will simply say that in the second type of expression the speaker tries to adopt a tone of impersonal authority, but it is merely an unjustified attempt to elevate personal preferences. "Blue just IS the best colour". |
8049 | Moral judgements now are anachronisms from a theistic age [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Moral judgements are linguistic survivals from the practices of classical theism which have lost the context provided by these practices. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: He is sort of right. Richard Taylor is less dramatic and more plausible on this (Ideas 5065, 5066, 5077). Big claims about 'duty' have become rather hollow, but the rights and wrongs of (e.g.) mistreating children don't seem to need theism. |
8045 | The failure of Enlightenment attempts to justify morality will explain our own culture [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: A central thesis of this book is that the breakdown of the project (of 1630 to 1850) of an independent rational justification of morality provided the historical background against which the predicaments of our own culture can become intelligible. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Possibly the most important question of our times is whether the Enlightenment failed. MacIntyre's claim is followed by an appeal for a return to Aristotelian/Thomist virtues. Continentals seem to have responded by sliding into relativism. |
8051 | Mention of 'intuition' in morality means something has gone wrong with the argument [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The introduction of the word 'intuition' by a moral philosopher is always a signal that something has gone badly wrong with an argument. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: For the alternative view, see Kripke (Idea 4948). If Kripke is right about logic, I don't see why the same view should have some force in morality. At the bottom of all morality is an intuition that life is worth the struggle. How do you prove that? |
8048 | When 'man' is thought of individually, apart from all roles, it ceases to be a functional concept [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: It is only when man is thought of as an individual prior to and apart from all roles that 'man' ceases to be a functional concept. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This is the one key idea at the heart of the revival of virtue ethics in modern times. It pinpoints what may be the single biggest disaster in intellectual history - the isolation of the individual. Yet it led to freedom, rights, and lots of good things. |
8035 | In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: In reply to the question of what kinds of approval are expressed by the feelings or attitudes of moral judgments, every version of emotivism either remains silent, or becomes viciously circular by identifying it as moral approval. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: There seems to be an underlying assumption that moral judgements are sharply separated from other judgements, of which I am not convinced. I approve of creating a beautiful mural for an old folks home free of charge, but it must be beautiful. |
8037 | The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Expression of feeling is not a function of the meaning of sentences, but of their use, as when a teacher shouts at a pupil "7 x 7 = 49!", where the expression of feeling or attitude has nothing whatsoever to do with its meaning. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This point is what underlies the Frege-Geach problem for emotivism, and is a very telling point. Apart from in metaethics, no one has ever put forward a theory of meaning that says it is just emotion. ...Unless it concerns speakers' intentions? |
8040 | Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Analytical moral philosophers resist emotivism because moral reasoning does occur, but there can be logical linkages between various moral judgements of a kind that emotivism could not allow for ('therefore' and 'if...then' express no moral feelings). | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This is the 'Frege-Geach Problem', nicely expressed, and is the key reason why emotivism seems unacceptable - it is a theory about language, but it just doesn't explain moral discourse sufficiently. |
8042 | Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: To a large degree people now think, talk and act as if emotivism was true, no matter what their avowed theoretical standpoint may be. Emotivism has become embodied in our culture. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: I suspect that it is moderately educated people who have swallowed emotivism, in the same way that they have swallowed relativism; it provides an excuse for neglectly the pursuit of beauty, goodness and truth, in favour of pleasure. |
8002 | Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The sophist tradition failed to distinguish the difference between the concept of a man who stands outside and is able to question the conventions of some one given social order, and the concept of a man who stands outside social life as such. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: A very nice distinction. Compare foreigners in Athens with Diogenes of Sinope, who renounced all cities. This is the germ of MacIntyre's view that morality is essentially dependent on some sort of social order. He is a reviver of virtue theory. |
8012 | The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: One reason why it is highly misleading to talk of a logical gulf between value and fact....is that we cannot characterize the social life of a tribe in their factual terms and escape their evaluations. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: Personally I like the objection that facts about functions cannot avoid the value of good functions, but this is very good. It is much better than simply trying to find a specific counterexample, such as facts about promises. Values just are facts. |
8005 | 'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The name 'eudaimonia' is badly but inevitably translated by 'happiness', badly because it includes both the notion of behaving well and the notion of faring well. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that it does not include the notion of feeling good. Aristotle, however, concludes that pleasure is part of eudaimonia. I take our 'happiness' to be an internal notion, while the Greek word is an external notion. |
8058 | Maybe we can only understand rules if we first understand the virtues [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Maybe we need to attend to the virtues first in the first place in order to understand the function and authority of rules. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: I think MacIntyre's project is exactly right. Morality is about how humans should live their lives. A bunch of robots could implement a set of moral rules, or make contracts, or maximise one another's benefits. The idea of a human community comes first. |
7097 | Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [MacIntyre, by Statman] |
Full Idea: MacIntyre argues that the concept of virtue is secondary to that of a role-figure, where the latter is always defined by some particular tradition and culture. | |
From: report of Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981]) by Daniel Statman - Introduction to Virtue Ethics §3 | |
A reaction: MacIntyre is much more of a relativist than Aristotle. There must be some attempt to deal with the problem of a rotten culture which throws up a corrupt role-model. We need a concept of a good culture and of individual flourishing. |
8043 | Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This may be presenting character in an excessively moral way. Being lively, for example, is a very distinctive trait of character, but hardly moral. This tells us why philosophers are interested in character, but not why other people are. |
8061 | If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: If there is nothing to judgements of virtue and vice except the expression of feelings of approval and disapproval, there can be no criteria external to those feelings by appeal to which we may pass judgement upon them. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch.16) | |
A reaction: The idea that there can be right and wrong feelings may be the key idea in virtue theory. See Idea 5217. A good person would be ashamed to have a bad feeling. Some emotional responses are intrinsically wicked, apart from actions. |
8001 | 'Dikaiosune' is justice, but also fairness and personal integrity [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The Greek 'dikaiosune' is inadequately translated as 'justice', but also as any other word; it combines the notion of fairness in externals with that of personal integrity in a way that no English word does. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: 'Dikaiosune' is said to be the main topic of Plato's 'Republic'. Plato seems to have meant it to cover whatever makes a good character. Justice in behaviour presumably flows from internal justice of character (which is, roughly, inner harmony). |
8023 | My duties depend on my identity, which depends on my social relations [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: I cannot answer the question 'What ought I to do?' until I have answered the question 'Who am I?', and any answer to this question will specify my place in a nexus of social relationships. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern critique of deontological ethics coming from revived virtue theory. As it stands, MacIntyre's idea sounds contractual, but I think he intends it in a more organic way. I am a fan. |
8038 | Since Moore thinks the right action produces the most good, he is a utilitarian [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Moore takes it that to call an action right is simply to say that of the available alternative actions it is the one which does or did as a matter of fact produce the most good. Moore is thus a utilitarian. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Far be it from me to disagree with MacIntyre on this, but I would have thought that this made him a consequentialist, rather than a utilitarian. Moore doesn't remotely think that pure pleasure or happiness is the good. He's closer to Rashdall (Idea 6673). |
8022 | I am naturally free if I am not tied to anyone by a contract [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The essence of the claim to natural rights is that no one has a right against me unless he can cite some contract, my consent to it, and his performance of his obligations under it. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This has become the foundation of western democracy, and the rebellious teenager's charter. Children have not consented to a contract with their parents. Close and loving relationships cease to be contractual. |
8050 | There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: His point is that the notion of 'rights' only arises out of a community. However, while you might criticise an individual for absurdly asserting all sorts of dubious rights, no one could criticise them if they asserted the right to defend their own life. |
23080 | Liberals debate how conservative or radical to be, but don't question their basics [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Contemporary debates within modern political systems are almost exclusively between conservative liberals, liberal liberals, and radical liberals. There is little place for the criticism of the system itself. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (Whose Justice? Which Rationality? [1988]), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 01 | |
A reaction: [No page number given] Kekes seems to be more authoritarian, and MacIntyre is a communitarian (which can be rather authoritarian). I'm dubious about both. |
8031 | Fans of natural rights or laws can't agree on what the actual rights or laws are [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: It is notorious that adherents of theories about natural rights or natural laws offer lists of rights or laws which differ in substance from each other. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: There seems to have been a consensus early on that self-defence was a natural right, but divergence presumably occurs when you get bolder and more complex. There is a lot of divergence over which is Shakespeare's best play. |
8055 | If God is omniscient, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions, so decisions are impossible [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Omniscience excludes the making of decisions. If God knows everything that will occur, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: [He cites Aquinas on this] I find it very difficult to see how anyone could read the Bible (see Idea 8008) while keeping this point continually in mind, without seeing the whole book as a piece of blatant anthropomorphism. |
8008 | The Bible is a story about God in which humans are incidental characters [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The Bible is a story about God in which human beings appear as incidental characters. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Very illuminating. He creates man, is betrayed by man, drowns him and starts again, sends a redeemer who gets murdered, and finally enlightens a small band who continue the uphill struggle to promote God's way. What next? |