37 ideas
| 4643 | The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §3.28) | |
| A reaction: This sounds a reasonable note of caution, but doesn't carry much weight unless some type of non-causal reason can be envisaged. God's free will? Our free will? The laws of causation? |
| 4633 | You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: Anyone who denies the principle of non-contradiction simultaneously affirms it; it cannot be rationally criticised, because it is presupposed by all rationality. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §1.12) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche certainly wasn't afraid to ask why we should reject something because it is a contradiction. The 'logic of personal advantage' might allow logical contradictions. |
| 4635 | Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic can be said to aim at wholeness or unity, while 'analytic' thinking divides that with which it deals into parts. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §2.03) | |
| A reaction: I don't accept this division (linked here to Hegel). I am a fan of analysis, as practised by Aristotle, but it is like dismantling an engine to identify and clean the parts, before reassembling it more efficiently. |
| 4631 | In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §1.09) | |
| A reaction: Yes, but the trouble is that all our notions of 'rational' (giving reasons, being consistent) break down when we look at unsupported axioms. In what sense is something rational if it is self-evident? |
| 4632 | 'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: A 'natural' system of deduction does not posit any axioms, but looks instead for its formulae to the practices of ordinary rationality. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §1.09) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there is some middle ground, where we attempt to infer the axioms of normal practice, and then build a strict system on them. We must be allowed to criticise 'normal' rationality, I hope. |
| 4638 | The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: Forcing everything into the straightjacket of bivalence seriously distorts the world. The problem is most acute in the case of vague concepts, such as thinness. It is not straightforwardly true or false that a person is thin. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §3.03) | |
| A reaction: Can't argue with that. Can we divide all our concepts into either bivalent or vague? Presumably both propositions and concepts could be bivalent. |
| 18933 | Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: I. Nothing exists. a) Not-Being does not exist. b) Being does not exist as everlasting, as created, as both, as One, or as Many. II. If anything does exist, it is incomprehensible. III. If existence is comprehensible, it is incommunicable. | |
| From: report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE], B03) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09 | |
| A reaction: [Also Sextus Empiricus, Against Logicians I.65-] For Part I he works through all the possible modes of being he can think of, and explains why none of them are possible. It is worth remembering that Gorgias loved rhetoric, not philosophy! |
| 4640 | If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The Masked Man fallacy is when Leibniz's Law is taken as 'X and Y are identical if what is true of X is true of Y' (rather than being about properties). Then 'I know X' but 'I don't know Y' (e.g. my friend wearing a mask) would make X and Y non-identical. | |
| From: report of J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §3.17) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: As the book goes on to explain, Descartes is guilty of this when arguing that I necessarily know my mind but not my body, so they are different. Seems to me that Kripke falls into the same trap. |
| 4647 | 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: If you found that I had the same car as you, I don't suppose you would care, but if you found I had the same fiancée as you, you might not be so happy. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §4.17) | |
| A reaction: A very nice illustration of the ambiguity of "same", and hence of identity. 'I had the same thought as you'. 'I have the same DNA as you'. |
| 4639 | Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: Leibniz's Law ('if identical, must have same properties') defines identity according to the properties possessed by the object itself, but the Identity of Indiscernibles defines identity in terms of how things are conceived or grasped by the mind. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §3.16) | |
| A reaction: This is the heart of the problem of identity. We realists must fight for Leibniz's Law, and escort the Identity of Indiscernibles to the door. |
| 4646 | Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: Of the proposition that "all experienced events have causes", Descartes says this is analytic a priori, Hume says it is synthetic a posteriori, and Kant says it is synthetic a priori. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §4.01) | |
| A reaction: I am not sympathetic to Hume on this (though most people think he is right). I prefer the Kantian view, but he makes a very large claim. Something has to be intuitive. |
| 4645 | 'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: What makes something a priori is not the means by which it came to be known, but the means by which it can be shown to be true or false. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §4.01) | |
| A reaction: Helpful. Kripke in particular has labelled the notion as an epistemological one, but that does imply a method of acquiring it. Clearly I can learn an a priori truth by reading it the newspaper. |
| 4582 | Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: Sentence are held to be basic because they are self-evident or 'cataleptic' (Stoics), or rooted in sense data (positivists), or grasped by intuition (Platonists), or revealed by God, or grasped by faculties certified by God (Descartes). | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §1.01) | |
| A reaction: These are a bit blurred. Isn't intuition self-evident? Isn't divine guarantee a type of revelation? How about reason, experience or authority? |
| 4644 | A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: The problem with falsification is that it fails to work with logically particular claims such as 'some swans are purple'. Examining a million swans and finding no purple ones does not falsify the claim, as there might still be a purple swan out there. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §3.29) | |
| A reaction: Isn't it beautiful how unease about a theory (Popper's) slowly crystallises into an incredibly simple and devastating point? Maybe 'some swans are purple' isn't science unless there is a good reason to propose it? |
| 4584 | The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: At its simplest, the problem of induction can be boiled down to the problem of justifying our belief in the uniformity of nature. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §1.03) | |
| A reaction: An easy solution to the problem of induction: we treat the uniformity of nature as axiomatic, and then induction is all reasoning which is based on that axiom. The axiom is a working hypothesis, which may begin to appear false. Anomalies are hard. |
| 4583 | How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: The problem of induction is the problem of how an argument can be good reasoning as induction but poor reasoning as deduction. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §1.03) | |
| A reaction: Nicely put, and a good defence of Hume against the charge that he has just muddled induction and deduction. All reasoning, we insist, should be consistent, or it isn't reasoning. |
| 4634 | Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: There are some 'principles of selection' in abduction: 1) prefer simple explanations, 2) prefer coherent explanations (consistent with what is already held true), 3) prefer theories that make testable predictions, and 4) be comprehensive in scope. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §2.01) | |
| A reaction: Note that these are desirable, but not necessary (pace Ockham and Ayer). I cannot think of anything to add to the list, so I will adopt it. Abduction is the key to rationality. |
| 4637 | To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: The only way to be sure we have the best explanation is to investigate the alternatives and see if they are any better. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §3.01) | |
| A reaction: Unavoidable! Since I love 'best explanation', I now seem to be committed to investigation every mad theory that comes up, just in case it is better. I hope I am allowed to reject after a very quick sniff. |
| 4629 | Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality. | |
| From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §1.06) | |
| A reaction: This is right, and is a cornerstone of Kant's approach to ethics. Rational beings must follow principles - in order to be consistent in their behaviour. 'Consistent' now requires a definition…. |
| 5864 | Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias] |
| Full Idea: Destroy the seriousness of others with laughter, and their laughter with seriousness. | |
| From: Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - The Art of Rhetoric 1419b | |
| A reaction: This sounds like brilliant tactical advice, which should be on the wall of every barrister's chambers. This is a case of rhetoric having something to teach us which is nothing at all to do with truth. It is more like learning karate. |
| 9866 | Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato] |
| Full Idea: Gorgias insists that the art of persuasion is superior to all others because it enslaves all the rest, with their own consent, not by force, and is therefore by far the best of all the arts. | |
| From: report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]) by Plato - Philebus 58a | |
| A reaction: A nice point, and it is not unreasonable to rank the arts in order of their power. To enchant, without achieving agreement, and to speak truth without persuading, are both very fine, but there is something about success that cannot be gainsaid. |
| 7337 | In Mosaic legal theory, crimes are sins and sins are crimes [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: In Mosaic legal theory, all breaches of the law offend God. All crimes are sins, just as all sins are crimes. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: This would seem to define Josephus called a 'theocracy'. Not just rule by a priesthood, but also an attempt to make civil law coincide with the teachings of sacred texts. But doing 80 m.p.h. on a motorway at 2 a.m. hardly seems like a sin. |
| 7339 | Because human life is what is sacred, Mosaic law has no death penalty for property violations [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Where other codes provided the death penalty for offences against property, in Mosaic law no property offence is capital; human life is too sacred, where the rights of property alone are violated. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: We still preserve this idea in our law, and also in our culture, where we are keen to insist that catastrophes like earthquakes or major fires are measured almost entirely by the loss of life, not the loss of property. I approve. |
| 7353 | The Pharisees undermined slavery, by giving slaves responsibility and status in law courts [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: It is no accident that slavery among Jews disappeared with the rise of the Pharisees, as they insisted that all were equal before God in a court. Masters were no longer responsible for actions of slaves, so a slave had status, and slavery could not work. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: As in seventeenth century England, the rise of social freedom comes from religious sources, not social sources. A slave has status in the transcendent world of souls, despite being a nobody in the physical world. |
| 7340 | Mosaic law was the first to embody the rule of law, and equality before the law [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Mosaic law meant that God ruled through his laws, and since all were equally subject to the law, the system was the first to embody the double merits of the rule of law and equality before the law. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: If this is correct, it seems to be a hugely important step, combined with Idea 1659, that revenge should be the action of a the state, not of the individual. They are the few simple and essential keys to civilization. |
| 7338 | Man's life is sacred, because it is made in God's image [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: In Mosaic theology, man is made in God's image, and so his life is not just valuable, it is sacred. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: The obvious question is what exactly is meant by "in God's image". Physically, spiritually, intellectually, morally? I am guessing that the original idea was intellectual, because we are the only rational animal. The others seem unlikely, or arrogant. |
| 7348 | The Jews sharply distinguish human and divine, but the Greeks pull them closer together [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The Jews drew an absolute distinction between the human and the divine; the Greeks constantly elevated the human - they were Promethean - and lowered the divine. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: An intriguing observation. The Greek idea runs right through European culture, surfacing (for example) in 'Faust', or 'Frankenstein', or the films of James Cameron. I'm with the Greeks; I want to see how far humanity can be elevated. |
| 7355 | The Torah pre-existed creation, and was its blueprint [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The Torah was not just a book about God. It pre-existed creation, in the same way as God did. In fact, it was the blueprint of creation. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt III) | |
| A reaction: You can only become a 'people of the book' (which Moslems resented in Judaism, and then emulated) if you give this stupendously high status to your book. Hence Christian fundamentalism makes sense, with its emphasis on the divinity of the Bible. |
| 7336 | A key moment is the idea of a single moral God, who imposes his morality on humanity [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The discovery of monotheism, and not just of monotheism but of a sole, omnipotent God actuated by ethical principles and seeking methodically to impose them on human beings, is one of the greatest turning-points in history, perhaps the greatest of all. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: 'Discovery' begs some questions, but when put like this you realise what a remarkable event it was. It is a good candidate for the most influential idea ever, even if large chunks of humanity, especially in the orient, never took to monotheism. |
| 7341 | Sampson illustrates the idea that religious heroes often begin as outlaws and semi-criminals [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Sampson is the outstanding example of the point which the Book of Judges makes again and again, that the Lord and society are often served by semi-criminal types, outlaws and misfits, who become folk-heroes and then religious heroes. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: This illustrates nicely Nietzsche's claim, that the jews were responsible for his 'inversion of values', in which aristocratic virtues are downgraded, and the virtues of a good slave are elevated (though Sampson may not show that point so well!). |
| 7342 | Isaiah moved Israelite religion away from the local, onto a more universal plane [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The works of Isaiah (740-700 BCE) mark the point at which the Israelite religion began to spiritualize itself, to move from a specific location in space and time on to the universalist plane. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
| A reaction: This is necessary if any religion is going to make converts outside the local culture. The crucial step would be to disembody God, so that He cannot be represented by a statue. The difficulty is for him to be universal, but retain a 'chosen people'. |
| 7344 | Judaism involves circumcision, Sabbath, Passover, Pentecost, Tabernacles, New Year, and Atonement [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The practices of Judaism developed during their Exile: circumcision, the Sabbath, the Passover (founding of the nation), Pentecost (giving of the laws), the Tabernacles, the New Year, and the Day of Atonement. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: These were the elements of ritual created to replace the existence of a physically located state. An astonishing achievement, not even remotely achieved by any other state that was driven off its lands. A culture is an idea, not a country. |
| 7345 | In exile the Jews became a nomocracy [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: In exile the Jews, deprived of a state, became a nomocracy - voluntarily submitting to rule by a Law which could only be enforced by consent. Nothing like this had occurred before in history. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: It is the most remarkable case in history of a people united and strengthened by adversity, and it became an important experiment in the building of human cultures. But what is the point of preserving a culture, with no land? Why not just integrate? |
| 7347 | Zoroastrians believed in one eternal beneficent being, Creator through the holy spirit [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Cyrus the Great was a Zoroastrian, believing in one, eternal, beneficent being, 'Creator of all things through the holy spirit'. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: Is this the actual origin of monotheism, or did they absorb this idea from the Jews? The interesting bit is the fact that the supreme being (called Marduk) is 'beneficent', which one doesn't associate with these remote and supposed pagans. |
| 7349 | Immortality based on judgement of merit was developed by the Egyptians (not the Jews) [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: The idea of judgement at death and immortality on the basis of merit were developed in Egypt before 1000 BCE. It is not Jewish because it was not in the Torah, and the Sadducees, who stuck to their texts, seemed to have denied the afterlife completely. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: This is the idea considered crucial to religion by Immanuel Kant (Idea 1455), who should be declared an honorary Egyptian. To me the idea that only the good go to heaven sounds like sadly wishful thinking - a fictional consolation for an unhappy life. |
| 7354 | The main doctrine of the Pharisees was belief in resurrection and the afterlife [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Belief in resurrection and the afterlife was the main distinguishing mark of Pharisaism, and thus fundamental of rabbinic Judaism. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
| A reaction: Belief in an afterlife seems to go back to the Egyptians, but this development in Judaism was obviously very influential, even among early Christians, who initially seem to have only believed in resurrection of the body. |
| 7356 | Pious Jews saw heaven as a vast library [Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Pious Jews saw heaven as a vast library, with the Archangel Metatron as the librarian: the books in the shelves there pressed themselves together to make room for a newcomer. | |
| From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt III) | |
| A reaction: I'm tempted to convert to Judaism. |