13 ideas
| 5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'. |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference. |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful. |
| 18933 | Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: I. Nothing exists. a) Not-Being does not exist. b) Being does not exist as everlasting, as created, as both, as One, or as Many. II. If anything does exist, it is incomprehensible. III. If existence is comprehensible, it is incommunicable. | |
| From: report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE], B03) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09 | |
| A reaction: [Also Sextus Empiricus, Against Logicians I.65-] For Part I he works through all the possible modes of being he can think of, and explains why none of them are possible. It is worth remembering that Gorgias loved rhetoric, not philosophy! |
| 6375 | The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger] |
| Full Idea: The taste of chocolate is presumably a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.1.4) | |
| A reaction: An interesting distinction when it comes to what they are like, and whether two very different brains can realise them. Sweetness might be the same for most creatures, but the tast of chocolate subtly different. |
| 6381 | The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger] |
| Full Idea: We should return to the old idea that the mind and the self are one and combine it with the new idea that the mind-self is a biological phenomenon. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §8.3) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't make allowance for the fact that some parts of my mind seem like irritating visitors, and other parts seem like the home-owner. Personally I take the self to be the brain's central controller, or the centre (forum) of brain integration. |
| 6378 | Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger] |
| Full Idea: Teleological functions help explain why a trait has come to exist; causal-role functions tell what a trait does or is apt to do. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4) | |
| A reaction: The teleological view has the merit of nesting nicely with the theory of evolution, and with Aristotelian virtue ethics (which I like). Causal-role functionalism focuses better on what is actually happening inside the head. |
| 6380 | Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger] |
| Full Idea: Identity theories locate consciousness at a certain order of abstraction, typically among neurophysiological states, events, processes, or properties. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.7.6) | |
| A reaction: I increasingly think that processes are the answer. My new analogy for the mind is a waterfall: its physical ontology is simple, it only exists because there is a sustained process, and it is far too complex to predict individual droplet outcomes. |
| 5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon". | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II) | |
| A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items. |
| 9866 | Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato] |
| Full Idea: Gorgias insists that the art of persuasion is superior to all others because it enslaves all the rest, with their own consent, not by force, and is therefore by far the best of all the arts. | |
| From: report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]) by Plato - Philebus 58a | |
| A reaction: A nice point, and it is not unreasonable to rank the arts in order of their power. To enchant, without achieving agreement, and to speak truth without persuading, are both very fine, but there is something about success that cannot be gainsaid. |
| 5864 | Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias] |
| Full Idea: Destroy the seriousness of others with laughter, and their laughter with seriousness. | |
| From: Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - The Art of Rhetoric 1419b | |
| A reaction: This sounds like brilliant tactical advice, which should be on the wall of every barrister's chambers. This is a case of rhetoric having something to teach us which is nothing at all to do with truth. It is more like learning karate. |
| 6379 | A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger] |
| Full Idea: A preserved heart in a jar of formaldehyde has the teleological function of circulating blood. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4) | |
| A reaction: A nice illustration. |
| 6377 | Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger] |
| Full Idea: Teleological notions of function specify not just what a thing happens to do, but what it is supposed to do. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.5.3) | |
| A reaction: This is the basis of a distinct theory of the mind. It seems to be akin to the 'dispositions' of behaviourism, so that the mind becomes once more a theoretical and abstract entity, rather than a thing of occurrent events and processes. |