Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Albert of Saxony and Alex Betteridge

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6 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident [Albert of Saxony]
     Full Idea: Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident.
     From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], I.18), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2
     A reaction: This seems to be the view of those who base their ontology on first-order classical logic. The more austere reading of that makes the accidents into sets of substances, so it's just substances. All the non-substance stuff cries out for recognition.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony]
     Full Idea: Something can be conceived of as successive simpliciter, with respect to both its substance and its state. For example, if Socrates were continually made and made again by the First Cause, as the Seine flow, so nothing of what preexists remains.
     From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.4
     A reaction: This is precisely the problem that modern stage theory faces, of knowing how to connect the stages together.
Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony]
     Full Idea: For existence to hold of completely successive entities it is not required that their parts exist, but that one part succeed another, as a future part succeeds a past part.
     From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3 ad 2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
     A reaction: A nice move, but it doesn't quite solve it. How can non-existent things 'succeed one another'? It is worrying for metaphysics that some things have entirely different concepts of persistence from other things.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Understanding is needed for imagination, just as much as the other way around [Betteridge]
     Full Idea: Although it might be right to say that imagination is required in order to make reasoning and understanding possible, this also works the other way, as imagination cannot occur without some prior understanding.
     From: Alex Betteridge (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a very illuminating remark, particularly for anyone who aspires to draw a simplified flowdiagram of the mind showing logical priority between its various parts. In fact, the parts are interdependent. Maybe imagination is understanding.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Elements are found last in dismantling bodies, and first in generating them [Albert of Saxony]
     Full Idea: On one possible description, an element is what is found last when bodies are taken apart, and what is found first when bodies are generated.
     From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1356], II.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 2.1