32 ideas
6319 | Wise people choose inaction and silence [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: The sage keeps to the deed that consists in taking no action and practises the teaching that uses no words. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.II.6) | |
A reaction: Notice that this is an active 'deed', and a positive 'practice'. He is not just recommending indifference and lethargy. Personally I don't find the advice very appealing, but it might be good if you live in 'interesting times'. |
6325 | One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVI.128) | |
A reaction: A famous remark, which my western mind finds simply perplexing. It strikes me as wicked selfishness to keep your wisdom to yourself, and not try to persuade others to follow it. We are all in this together, I say. |
6321 | Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XX.47) | |
A reaction: Personally I think all human beings are deeply perplexed when they actually address their situation, but most people never spend more than a few minutes a year worrying about it. |
4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
Full Idea: If mere consistency is our aim in achieving a coherent set of beliefs, then new evidence and experiments are irrelevant. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (The Internalist Conception of Justification [1980], §VIII) | |
A reaction: An important reminder. What epistemic duty requires us to attend to anomalous observations, instead of sweeping them under the carpet? |
4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
Full Idea: It has been proposed (on the basis of observations) that young children have three innate principles of counting - one-to-one correspondence of number to item, stable order for numbers, and cardinality (which labels the nth item counted). | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.60) | |
A reaction: I like the idea of observed patterns as central (which is the one-to-one principle). But the other two principles are plausible, and show why pure empiricism won't work. |
4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Rats can determine the number of times they have pressed a lever up to at least twenty-four presses,…and can consistently turn down the fifth tunnel on the left in a maze. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.58) | |
A reaction: This seems to encourage an empirical view of maths (pattern recognition?) rather than a Platonic one. Or numbers are innate in rat brains? |
4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Infant behaviour implies inbuilt ontological categories of thing, place, event, path, action, sound, manner, amount and number. ...There is an algebra of relationships between them. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.109) | |
A reaction: Interesting. We would expect the categories in infant brains to have instrumental value, but we don't have to accept them as true. Adults (even Aristotle) are big infants. |
6328 | To know yet to think that one does not know is best [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: To know yet to think that one does not know is best. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXI.173) | |
A reaction: Tricky. Self-deception doesn't sound like a virtue to me. There are epistemic virtues, and caution about one's own knowledge has to be one of them, but a totally false assessment sounds counter-productive. |
6323 | Pursuit of learning increases activity; the Way decreases it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: In the pursuit of learning one knows more every day; in the pursuit of the Way one does less every day. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVII.108) | |
A reaction: Everything in my culture has raised the status of the pursuit of learning, so that I can hardly comprehend what is proposed by the Way. I don't believe that the Way can be achieved without great learning, but one might move beyond learning. |
4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
Full Idea: An elephant may be fully represented by nine primitive shapes ('geons'), but it may require as few as three geons in appropriate relations to be correctly identified. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.7) | |
A reaction: Encouraging the idea of the mind as a maker of maps and models |
4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
Full Idea: A unique yellow experience may be evoked with monochrome light of 580nm, or a mixture of 540nm and 670nm. ..Our interpretation of colour experience is a highly idiosyncratic artefact of our visual system. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.117) | |
A reaction: This confirms what I have always thought - that colour (as qualia) is strictly a feature of minds, not of the world. |
4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Gestalt psychology claims that there are at least four unlearned factors in perceptual grouping - the principles of proximity (close things), of similarity, of good continuation (extending lines in a smooth course), and closure (which completes figures). | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.103) | |
A reaction: This offers a bridge between Hume's associationism and rationalist claims of innate ideas |
8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
Full Idea: A characteristic case in which a belief is justified though the cognizer doesn't know that it's justified is where the original evidence for the belief has long since been forgotten. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
A reaction: This is a central problem for any very literal version of internalism. The fully rationalist view (to which I incline) will be that the cognizer must make a balanced assessment of whether they once had the evidence. Were my teachers any good? |
6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Strong internalism says only current conscious states can justify beliefs, but this has the problem of Stored Beliefs, that most of our beliefs are stored in memory, and one's conscious state includes nothing that justifies them. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §2) | |
A reaction: This point seems obviously correct, but one could still have a 'fairly strong' version, which required that you could always call into consciousness the justificiation for any belief that you happened to remember. |
6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Even weak internalism has the problem of Forgotten Evidence; the agent once had adequate evidence that she subsequently forgot; at the time of epistemic appraisal, she no longer has adequate evidence that is retrievable from memory. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §3) | |
A reaction: This is certainly a basic problem for any account of justification. It will rule out any strict requirement that there be actual mental states available to support a belief. Internalism may be pushed to include non-conscious parts of the mind. |
6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
Full Idea: The problem for internalists of Doxastic Decision Interval says internal justification must avoid mental change to preserve the justification status, but must also allow enough time to compute the formal relations between beliefs. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §4) | |
A reaction: The word 'compute' implies a rather odd model of assessing coherence, which seems instantaneous for most of us where everyday beliefs are concerned. In real mental life this does not strike me as a problem. |
8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
Full Idea: If one shares my view that justified belief is, at least roughly, well-formed belief, surely animals and young children can have justified beliefs. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], III) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a key hallmark of the externalist view of knowledge. Personally I think we should tell the animals that they have got true beliefs, but that they aren't bright enough to aspire to 'knowledge'. Be grateful for what you've got. |
6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
Full Idea: The problem of Concurrent Retrieval is a problem for internalism, notably coherentism, because an agent could ascertain coherence of her entire corpus only by concurrently retrieving all of her stored beliefs. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §3) | |
A reaction: Sounds neat, but not very convincing. Goldman is relying on scepticism about short-term memory, but all belief and knowledge will collapse if we go down that road. We couldn't do simple arithmetic if Goldman's point were right. |
8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
Full Idea: The justificational status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the processes that cause it, where (provisionally) reliability consists in the tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
A reaction: Goldman's original first statement of reliabilism, now the favourite version of externalism. The obvious immediate problem is when a normally very reliable process goes wrong. Wise people still get it wrong, or right for the wrong reasons. |
6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Reliability involves truth, and truth (on the usual assumption) is external. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §6) | |
A reaction: As an argument for externalism this seems bogus. I am not sure that truth is either 'internal' or 'external'. How could the truth of 3+2=5 be external? Facts are mostly external, but I take truth to be a relation between internal and external. |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Introspection should be regarded as a form of retrospection. Thus, a justified belief that I am 'now' in pain gets its justificational status from a relevant, though brief, causal history. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
A reaction: He cites Hobbes and Ryle as having held this view. See Idea 6668. I am unclear why the history must be 'causal'. I may not know the cause of the pain. I may not believe an event which causes a proposition, or I may form a false belief from it. |
6331 | Truth is not beautiful; beautiful speech is not truthful [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: Truthful words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not truthful. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXXI.194) | |
A reaction: A sharp disagreement with Keats ('Ode to a Grecian Urn'). A deep and important question, especially in relation to Plato's discussion of rhetoric (where he is very ambivalent). Great mathematics is beautiful. Truth can harsh. On the whole, I disagree. |
6330 | One with no use for life is wiser than one who values it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: It is just because one has no use for life that one is wiser than the man who values life. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181a) | |
A reaction: To have no use for life certainly seems to put a person into a position of superiority, especially when the 'Titanic' is sinking. However, if our lives have no value, I don't know what does. A balance must clearly be struck. |
6327 | Do good to him who has done you an injury [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: Do good to him who has done you an injury. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXIII.148) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 6288 (Jesus). People like this really mess up the social contract theory of morality. If they are going to return good for your evil, there doesn't seem much point in helping them, given how much effort is involved. Most peculiar… |
23402 | The highest virtue is achieved without effort [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: Those of highest virtue do not strive for virtue, and so they have it. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 38), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.2 | |
A reaction: Every moralist's dream is the person to whom virtue comes so naturally that no thought is required. This says they don't even notice it; Aristotle says they simply enjoying behaving virtuously. |
6324 | To gain in goodness, treat as good those who are good, and those who are not [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: Those who are good I treat as good; those who are not good I also treat as good; in doing so I gain in goodness. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLIX.111) | |
A reaction: Socrates (idea 346) and Jesus (Idea 6288) had similar ideas. Who, though, is going to administer justice, and where is the idea that people 'deserve' good or ill treatment? Schoolteachers should treat all children as if they were good. |
6322 | There is no crime greater than having too many desires [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: There is no crime greater than having too many desires. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVI.104) | |
A reaction: It seems harsh to call this a 'crime', given that no one is likely to choose to have 'too many' desires. The crime is in deciding to stimulate desire to excess, or deciding to show no sensible restraint. |
6320 | The best rulers are invisible, the next admired, the next feared, and the worst are exploited [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subjects; next comes the ruler they love and praise; next comes one they fear; next comes one with whom they take liberties. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XVII.39) | |
A reaction: This fits our understanding of football referees to perfection. It might apply to anyone doing a vital adminstrative job, such as compiling a school timetable. It is hard, though, to accept anonymity as a mark of success. |
6329 | People are hard to govern because authorities love to do things [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: It is because those in authority are too fond of action that the people are difficult to govern. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181) | |
A reaction: I love this. It should be on the wall of every human institution in our civilization. How the heart sinks at the prospect of a 'new initiative'. Not that I am against action; it is just important to recognise that inaction is sometimes the best option. |
6326 | The better known the law, the more criminals there are [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: The better known the laws and edicts, the more thieves and robbers there are. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVII.132) | |
A reaction: Nice. I link this with my favourite moral maxim from Democritus (Idea 519). The idea is that continual emphasis on what you should not do fills the mind with evil possibilities. Moral perfection must start by taking goodness for granted. |
23401 | A military victory is not a thing of beauty [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
Full Idea: A military victory is not a thing of beauty. | |
From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.1 | |
A reaction: Should be written on the wall of every military academy and barracks. |