13501
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De Morgan found inferences involving relations, which eluded Aristotle's syllogistic [De Morgan, by Hart,WD]
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Full Idea:
There was a prejudice against relations (in favour of properties) but De Morgan and others that impeccable inferences turn on relations and elude Aristotle's syllogistic. Thus: All horses are animals. Hence, all heads of horses are heads of animals.
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From:
report of Augustus De Morgan (On the Syllogism IV [1859]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 4
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A reaction:
This is actually an early example of modern analytic philosophy in action. You start with the inferences, and then work back to the ontology and the definition of concepts. But in pinning down such concepts, do we miss their full meaning?
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21846
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Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze]
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Full Idea:
Bergson was a rallying point for all the opposition, …not so much because of the theme of duration, as of the theory and practice of becoming of all kinds, of coexistent multiplicities.
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From:
report of Henri Bergson (Matter and Memory [1896]) by Gilles Deleuze - A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? I
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A reaction:
The three heroes of Deleuze are Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson. All philosophers are either of Being, or of Becoming, I suggest.
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20653
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Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
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Full Idea:
There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
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From:
report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
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A reaction:
I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
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22100
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Experienced time means no two mental moments are ever alike [Bergson]
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Full Idea:
If duration [experienced time] is what we say, deep-seated psychic states are radically heterogeneous to each other, and it is impossible that any two of them should be quite alike, since they are two different moments in a life-story.
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From:
Henri Bergson (Time and Free Will [1889], p.220), quoted by Pete A.Y. Gunter - Bergson p.174
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A reaction:
This implies that we are intrinsically unpredictable, and there certainly can't be a regularity account of mental causation. The sense of time is said to make the self radically different from the rest of reality. Bergson later rejected dualism.
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