Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A and Danielle Macbeth

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

10 ideas

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19086 Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth]
     Full Idea: Peirce and Sellars takes Peirce's conception of meaning, on which pragmatism is founded, to support an adequate account of objective truth; James, Dewey and Rorty say it forecloses all possibility of such an account.
     From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.169)
     A reaction: Ah. Very helpful. I thought there was a pragmatic theory of truth, then began to think that it was just a denial of truth. I've long suspected that Peirce is wonderful, and James is not very good (on this topic).
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
19093 Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth]
     Full Idea: Ancient mathematical concepts were essentially sensory; they were not mathematical in our sense - that is, wholly constituted by their inferential potential.
     From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.187)
     A reaction: The latter view is Frege's, though I suppose it had been emerging for a couple of centuries before him. I like the Greek approach, and would love to see that reunited with the supposedly quite different modern view. (Keith Hossack is attempting it).
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
19091 Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth]
     Full Idea: As mathematically understood, the world is not an object of experience but instead an object of thought.
     From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.183)
     A reaction: Since I am keen on citing biology to show that science does not have to be mathematical, this nicely shows that there is something wrong with a science which places a large gap between itself and the world.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
19088 For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth]
     Full Idea: In the pragmatist view, the meaning of a concept is exhausted by its consequences.
     From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.173)
     A reaction: I'm unclear why the concept of a volcanic eruption only concerns its dire consequences, and is supposed to contain nothing of its causes. Pragmatists seem to be all future, and no past. Very American.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
22808 Liberalism is minimal government, or individual rights, or equality [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: Liberalism has been defended as a theory of minimal government, or as a theory of basic individual rights, or as an egalitarian philosophy.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
     A reaction: Minimal government tends towards anarchist liberalism, but then what grounds the right to be free of government? Presumably any sensible theory of rights has to be egalitarian. What could ground unequal rights?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
22803 Can individualist theories justify an obligation to fight in a war? [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: How can an individualist theory justify an obligation to fight for the state in the case of war?
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §4)
     A reaction: The most dramatic example of obliging citizens to contribute to the state, the notable other case being taxes. Some imagined ancient 'social contract' doesn't seem sufficient for later generations. Does being naturally sociable create such obligations?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
22804 Autonomy is better achieved within a community [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: Communitarians often argue that personal autonomy is better achieved within the community.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §4)
     A reaction: Hegel is the source of this view. The simplest version of the point is that autonomy can only be asserted if a person has rights, which can be asserted and defended, and only a society can provide that. That is plausible.
22806 Communitarians avoid oppression for the common good, by means of small mediating communities [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: Because of the mediating structures of small communities, communitarians are less fearful [than liberals] of the emergence of an oppressive government as a result of the politics of the common good.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
     A reaction: A politics of the common good has an obvious implicit conservatism because the central consensus is always likely to disapprove of errant individuals, of all sorts. Only individual rights can block an oppressive government.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
22807 If our values are given to us by society then we have no grounds to criticise them [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: If communitarians are right that we are not free to choose, but rather that our values are determined by our community, the individualists say, then there is no reason to criticise the values of one's society.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
     A reaction: This is an obvious challenge, but if one's concept of community is a forum for free debate then it can be overcome. There is no avoiding the fact, though, that a good community always needs a high degree of consensus.