Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Carl Ginet and Paul M. Churchland

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8 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues

8836	Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
	Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible.
	From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141)
	A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons.

8837	Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
	Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential.
	From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148)
	A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

20653	Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
	Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
	From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
	A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism

4988	Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: It may well be that completed neuroscience will not include a reduction of folk psychology, but why should that be a reason to regard it as false? It would only be a reason if irreducibility entailed that they could not possibly both be true.
	From: comment on Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981]) by Robert Kirk - Mind and Body §3.9
	A reaction: If all our behaviour had been explained by a future neuro-science, this might not falsify folk psychology, but it would totally marginalise it. It is still possible that dewdrops are placed on leaves by fairies, but this is no longer a hot theory.

4987	Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: Eliminative materialism says our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena is a radically false theory, so defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced (rather than reduced).
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981], Intro)
	A reaction: It is hard to see what you could replace the idea of a 'belief' with in ordinary conversation. We may reduce beliefs to neuronal phenomena, but we can't drop the vocabulary of the macro-phenomena. The physics of weather doesn't eliminate 'storms'.

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology

7518	If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II)
	A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws.

7519	Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
	A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.

7520	Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
	A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.