20771
|
Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius]
|
|
Full Idea:
Cleanthes says there are six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology.
|
|
From:
report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.41
|
|
A reaction:
This was a minority view, as most stoics agreed with Zeno and Chrysippus that there are three main topics. Nowadays there is little discussion of the 'parts' of philosophy, but the recent revival of meta-philosophy should encourage it.
|
19076
|
Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
|
|
Full Idea:
Coherence theories of truth differ on their accounts of the coherence relation, and on their accounts of the set (or sets) of propositions with which true propositions occur (the 'specified set').
|
|
From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
Coherence is clearly more than consistency or mutual entailment, and I like to invoke explanation. The set has to be large, or the theory is absurd (as two absurdities can 'cohere'). So very large, or very very large, or maximally large?
|
19077
|
Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is unsatisfactory for the coherence relation to be consistency, because two propositions could be consistent with a 'specified set', and yet be inconsistent with each other. That would imply they are both true, which is impossible.
|
|
From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
I'm not convinced by this. You first accept P because it is consistent with the set; then Q turns up, which is consistent with everything in the set except P. So you have to choose between them, and might eject P. Your set was too small.
|
19078
|
Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
|
|
Full Idea:
One extreme for the specified set is the largest consistent set of propositions currently believed by actual people. A moderate position makes it the limit of people's enquiries. The other extreme is what would be believed by an omniscient being.
|
|
From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
One not considered is the set of propositions believed by each individual person. Thoroughgoing relativists might well embrace that one. Peirce and Putnam liked the moderate one. I'm taken with the last one, since truth is an ideal, not a phenomenon.
|
20653
|
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
|
|
From:
report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
|
|
A reaction:
I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
|
6028
|
Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius]
|
|
Full Idea:
Cleanthes says no incorporeal interacts with a body, but one body interacts with another body; the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body feels shame and fear, and turns red or pale, so the soul is a body.
|
|
From:
report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Nemesius - De Natura Hominis 78,7
|
|
A reaction:
This is precisely the interaction problem with dualism, or, as we might now say, the problem of mental causation. The standard Stoic view is that the soul is a sort of rarefied fire, which disperses at death.
|
19074
|
Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
|
|
Full Idea:
For the coherence theory of truth, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are ... objective features of the world.
|
|
From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro)
|
|
A reaction:
It is obviously rather important for your truth-conditions theory of meaning that you are clear about your theory of truth. A correspondence theory is evidently taken for granted, even in possible worlds versions.
|
19082
|
Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
|
|
Full Idea:
Coherence theorists can argue that the truth conditions of a proposition are those under which speakers tend to assert it, ...and that speakers can only make a practice of asserting a proposition under conditions they can recognise as justifying it.
|
|
From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §2.2)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] This sounds rather verificationist, and hence wrong, since if you then asserted anything for which you didn't know the justification, that would remove its truth, and thus make it meaningless.
|