28 ideas
9307 | Modern Western culture suddenly appeared in Jena in the 1790s [Svendsen] |
Full Idea: Foucault was right to say that Jena in the 1790s was the arena where the fundamental interests in modern Western culture suddenly had their breakthrough. | |
From: Lars Svendsen (A Philosophy of Boredom [2005], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: [Hölderlin, Novalis, Tieck, Schlegel, based on Kant and Fichte] Romanticism seems to have been born then. Is that the essence of modernism? Foucault and his pals are hoping to destroy the Enlightenment by ignoring it, but that is modern too. |
1606 | You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Everyone who enters into a debate about reality automatically becomes a Platonist. Since such debates are the essence of philosophy, every philosopher is a Platonist. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.199) | |
A reaction: This is correct |
1595 | Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Philosophy, the attempt to articulate the vision of beauty itself, is the attempt to satisfy the highest human desire. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.120) | |
A reaction: A million miles away from modern philosophy, but still an ideal to be taken seriously. |
9297 | You can't understand love in terms of 'if and only if...' [Svendsen] |
Full Idea: I once began reading a philosophical article on love. The following statement soon came up: 'Bob loves Kate if and only if...' At that point I stopped reading. Such a formalized approach was unsuitable, because the actual phenomenon would be lost. | |
From: Lars Svendsen (A Philosophy of Boredom [2005], Pref) | |
A reaction: It is hard to disagree! However, if your best friend comes to you and says, 'I can't decide whether I am really in love with Kate; what do you think?', how are you going to respond. You offer 'if and only if..', but in a warm and sympathetic way! |
1571 | 'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos can mean i) a thought or reasoning, ii) the word which expresses a thought, iii) a rational structure outside human thought. These meanings give 'logos' an extraordinary range. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 12) |
1572 | In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: In the seventeenth century only a certain type of logos was deemed legitimate, namely that identified with technical knowledge (or 'techné'). | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 15) |
1573 | The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: What is supposed to identify the person of logos from the one without is the commitment to giving reasons explaining why one opinion is superior to another. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 17) |
1592 | Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos cannot refute the radical, consistent and self-conscious relativist. Therefore it must admit that, like the relativist, it itself is essentially a matter of desire. It wants to say what is right and wrong, true and false, and for others to agree. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.108) |
1593 | Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.109) |
1603 | Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos is not unconditionally good, but good contingent on there being some other person (out there) who is willing to talk with logos, to approach it even as an opponent. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.175) |
1598 | We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Is the arché (basis) intelligible, or is it chaos? Upon this question hinges all, for answering it determines whether poetry or logos is the form of human speech that best does justice to the world. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.139) |
1584 | Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: The modern scientific world view, with all its hope for clarity and precision, has a flipside, …which is its abandonment of rationality in the world of human significance. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.74) |
1591 | Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Unfortunately for the logos there is no argument that can, without begging the question, establish the goodness of argumentation. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.106) |
1599 | Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: To debate about suspending all our presuppositions requires a common ground which, upon being established, immediately renders the debate superfluous. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.144) |
1605 | Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: There are two extremes: the Aristotelian views reality simply as reality, and the sophist or poet view reality only as an object of desire. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.199) |
9308 | If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen] |
Full Idea: It is doubtful whether the traditional dichotomy between the strictly subjective and the strictly objective can still be maintained; if not, we must also revise the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. | |
From: Lars Svendsen (A Philosophy of Boredom [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Very perceptive. The reason why I am so keen to hang onto the primary/secondary distinction is because I want to preserve objectivity (and realism). I much prefer Locke to Hume, as empiricist spokesmen. |
1577 | Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Relativism is disease, is pollution, for it negates the efficacy of logos. It destroys the possibility of a complete rational debate of fundamental questions. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.41) |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
9309 | Emotions have intentional objects, while a mood is objectless [Svendsen] |
Full Idea: An emotion normally has an intentional object, while a mood is objectless. | |
From: Lars Svendsen (A Philosophy of Boredom [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: It doesn't follow that the object of the emotion is clearly understood, or even that it is conscious. One may experience rising anger while struggling to see what its object is. Artistic symbolism seems to involve objects that create moods. |
1578 | If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: If relativism offers an accurate description of human values, then rhetoric replaces logos as the most fundamental human activity. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.47) | |
A reaction: Or putting it another way, logos (reason) becomes meaningless. I suppose, though, that a relativist can conduct conditional reasoning (but must belief in some rules of reason). |
1596 | Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos originates not in a cognitive capacity for the apprehension of objects, but in the desire to give birth to beautiful speeches. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.124) | |
A reaction: It is hard for us to grasp this, but it might be quite life-enhancing if we could return to that old way of thought. |
9304 | Death appears to be more frightening the less one has lived [Svendsen] |
Full Idea: Death appears to be more frightening the less one has lived. | |
From: Lars Svendsen (A Philosophy of Boredom [2005], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: [He credits Adorno with this] A good thought, which should be immediately emailed to Epicurus for comment. Which is worse - to die when you have barely started your great work (Ramsey), or dying in full flow (Schubert)? |
9298 | We can be unaware that we are bored [Svendsen] |
Full Idea: It is perfectly possible to be bored without being aware of the fact. | |
From: Lars Svendsen (A Philosophy of Boredom [2005], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: True. Also, I sometimes mistake indecision for boredom. It becomes very hard to say for certain whether you are bored. I am certain that I am bored if I am forced to do something which has no interest for me. The big one is free-but-bored. |
9301 | Boredom is so radical that suicide could not overcome it; only never having existed would do it [Svendsen] |
Full Idea: Boredom is so radical that it cannot even be overcome by suicide, only by something completely impossible - not to have existed at all. | |
From: Lars Svendsen (A Philosophy of Boredom [2005], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: [he cites Fernando Pessoa for this] The actor George Sanders left a suicide note saying that he was just bored. A cloud of boredom is left hanging in the air where he was. |
9302 | We are bored because everything comes to us fully encoded, and we want personal meaning [Svendsen] |
Full Idea: Boredom results from a lack of personal meaning, which is due to the fact that all objects and actions come to us fully encoded, while we (as descendants of Romanticism) insist on a personal meaning. | |
From: Lars Svendsen (A Philosophy of Boredom [2005], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This idea justifies me categorising Boredom under Existentialism. This is an excellent idea, and perfectly captures the experience of most teenagers, for whom it is impossible to impose a personal meaning on such a vast cultural reality. |
9310 | The profoundest boredom is boredom with boredom [Svendsen] |
Full Idea: In the profound form of boredom, I am bored by boredom itself. | |
From: Lars Svendsen (A Philosophy of Boredom [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Boredom is boring, which is why I try to avoid it. Third-level boredom is a rather enchanting idea. It sounds remarkably similar to the Buddha experiencing enlightenment. |
9311 | We have achieved a sort of utopia, and it is boring, so that is the end of utopias [Svendsen] |
Full Idea: There can hardly be any new utopias. To the extent that we can imagine a utopia, it must already have been realised. A utopia cannot, by definition, include boredom, but the 'utopia' we are living in is boring. | |
From: Lars Svendsen (A Philosophy of Boredom [2005], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 8989. Lots of people (including me) think that we have achieved a kind of liberal, democratic, individualistic 'utopia', but the community needs of people are not being met, so we still have a way to go. |
9303 | The concept of 'alienation' seems no longer applicable [Svendsen] |
Full Idea: I do not believe that the concept of 'alienation' is all that applicable any more. | |
From: Lars Svendsen (A Philosophy of Boredom [2005], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Interesting but puzzling. If alienation is the key existential phenomenon of a capitalist society, why should it fade away if we remain capitalist? He is proposing that it has metamorphosed into boredom, which may be a different sort of alienation. |