12 ideas
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: The common feature of every designating term is that designation may change from state to state - thus it can be formalized by a function from states to objects. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3) | |
| A reaction: Specifying the objects sounds OK, but specifying states sounds rather tough. |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: To first order modal logic (with quantification over objects) we can add a second kind of quantification, over intensions. An intensional object, or individual concept, will be modelled by a function from states to objects. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.3) |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: Awareness logic enriched Hintikka's epistemic models with an awareness function, mapping each state to the set of formulas we are aware of at that state. This reflects some bound on the resources we can bring to bear. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Fagin and Halpern 1988 for this] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: In justification logics, the logics of knowledge are extended by making reasons explicit. A logic of proof terms was created, with a semantics. In this, mathematical truths are known for explicit reasons, and these provide a measure of complexity. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) |
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics is typically extensional throughout (we write 3+2=2+3 despite the two terms having different meanings). ..Classical first-order logic is extensional by design since it primarily evolved to model the reasoning of mathematics. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §1) |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: λ-abstraction can be used to abstract and disambiguate a predicate. De re is [λx◊P(x)](f) - f has the possible-P property - and de dicto is ◊[λxP(x)](f) - possibly f has the P-property. Also applies to □. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: Compare the Barcan formula. Originated with Church in the 1930s, and Carnap 1947, but revived by Stalnaker and Thomason 1968. Because it refers to the predicate, it has a role in intensional versions of logic, especially modal logic. |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds quite naturally. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: A definite description can pick out the same object in another possible world, or a very similar one, or an object which has almost nothing in common with the others. |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
| From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
| A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
| 22693 | The works we value most are in sympathy with our own moral views [John,E] |
| Full Idea: The works we tend to value most highly are ones that are in sympathy with the moral views we actually accept. | |
| From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I would have to endorse this. She admits that we may rate other works very highly, but they won't appear on our list of favourites. This fact may well distort philosophical discussions of morality and art. |
| 22694 | We should understand what is morally important in a story, without having to endorse it [John,E] |
| Full Idea: Our responses to literature should show that we grasp whatever counts as morally important within the narrative, but not necessarily that we judge and feel in the way deemed appropriate by the work. | |
| From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], 'Accommodating') | |
| A reaction: She gives as an example a story by Hemingway which places a high value on the courageous hunting of big game. A second example is the total amorality of a Highsmith novel. This idea seems exactly right to me. |
| 22695 | We value morality in art because that is what we care about - but it is a contingent fact [John,E] |
| Full Idea: Moral value is valuable in art because people care about moral value. This runs deep, but it is a contingent matter, and the value of morality in art hinges on art's need to provide something precious to us. | |
| From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], 'Contingency') | |
| A reaction: I think this is exactly right. Thrillers are written with very little moral concern, for a readership which cares about brave and exciting deeds. Even there, violence has its ethics. |
| 22692 | A work can be morally and artistically excellent, despite rejecting moral truth [John,E] |
| Full Idea: A work that rejects moral truth can be artistically excellent, in part because of its moral content. | |
| From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], Intr) | |
| A reaction: She cites the film 'Trainspotting', about desperate drug addicts, because it gives an amoral insight into their world. |