10198
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If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
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Full Idea:
If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible.
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From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
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A reaction:
The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event?
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10199
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Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
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Full Idea:
Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object.
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From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts.
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20653
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Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
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Full Idea:
There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
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From:
report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
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A reaction:
I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
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14608
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A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW]
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Full Idea:
To be an A-theorist is to believe in some sort of objective distinction between what is present and past and future. ..To be a B-theorist is to deny the objectivity of our talk about past, present and future.
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From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 2)
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A reaction:
The A/B distinction originates with McTaggart. All my intuitions side with the A-theory, certainly to the extent that the present seems to be objectively privileged in some way (despite special relativity).
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