5 ideas
17809 | Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel] |
Full Idea: Usually Gödel's incompleteness theorems are taken as showing a limitation on the syntactic approach to an understanding of the concept of infinity. | |
From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 05) |
17810 | The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to use non-mathematical concepts, i.e. concepts lacking the precision which permit mathematical manipulation, for a significant approach to foundations. We currently have no concepts of this kind which we can take seriously. | |
From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 06) | |
A reaction: Music to the ears of any philosopher of mathematics, because it means they are not yet out of a job. |
17619 | We renounce all abstract entities [Goodman/Quine] |
Full Idea: We do not believe in abstract entities..... We renounce them altogether. | |
From: Goodman,N/Quine,W (Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism [1947], p.105), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Defending the Axioms | |
A reaction: Goodman always kept the faith here, but Quine decided to embrace sets, as a minimal commitment to abstracta needed for mathematics, which was needed for science. My sympathies are with Goodman. This is the modern form of 'nominalism'. |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
17811 | The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel] |
Full Idea: In analysis, the most natural conception of a point ignores the matter of naming the point, i.e. how the real number is represented or by what constructions the point is reached from given points. | |
From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 13) | |
A reaction: This problem has bothered me. There are formal ways of constructing real numbers, but they don't seem to result in a name for each one. |