Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Godfrey Vesey and Peter Forrest

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4 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17962 The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
     Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker.
     From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1)
     A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15432 Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: Forrest proposed that structural universals should serve as ersatz possible worlds.
     From: report of Peter Forrest (Ways Worlds Could Be [1986]) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Intro'
     A reaction: I prefer powers to property universals. Perhaps a possible world is a maximal set of co-existing dispositions?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6457 Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey]
     Full Idea: Whereas a sensation is by definition mental, a sense-datum might be mind-independent.
     From: Godfrey Vesey (Collins Dictionary of Philosophy [1990], p.266)
     A reaction: This seems to be what Russell is getting at in 1912, as he clearly separates sense-data from sensations. Discussions of sense-data always assume they are mental, which may make them redundant - but so might making them physical.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?