170 ideas
| 15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Just as the tiniest error in navigation may lead to a landfall even on the wrong continent, so the acceptance of apparently innocuous principles can lead to doctrines which, if accepted, would render intellectual life impossible. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A) | |
| A reaction: If one lived life by an axiom system, and one of the axioms was a bit off kilter, then this idea would be a powerful one. Note that it is only 'intellectual' life that is screwed up, but even there a plurality of ideas keep correcting one another. |
| 15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: In our view the task of a philosopher is to devise and critically assess conceptual schemes in the service of some overall vision of the world. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.B) | |
| A reaction: This makes theology just as genuinely a branch of philosophy as their scientific essentialism. Is there any sort of philosophy, then, which is not 'in the service' of some independent worldview? Interesting. Note 'devise', as well as 'assess'. |
| 15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Adequate accounts of those concepts which are neither purely formal nor simply psychological can be achieved by attention to ....the content of our knowledge, content which goes beyond the reports of immediate experience. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A) | |
| A reaction: I like this one. Most proponents of analysis are either bogged down in trying to reduce all of our talk to formal logic, or else they think that they are just analysing how we think. It's neither, because the concepts arise from the world. |
| 15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The Humean view has led philosophers to suppose that their task is to provide an analysis of key concepts and relations wholly in terms drawn from formal logic, since relations of necessity are, in their view, fundamentally logical relations | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A) | |
| A reaction: A very sharp observation about why logic has become central to contemporary philosophy. As far as I can see, logic steadily increases its dominance, to the point where ordinary metaphysical thought is being squeezed out. |
| 15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Positivism is the doctrine that the content of scientific propositions is exhausted by what can be immediately experienced. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.I) | |
| A reaction: The simple thing missing from positivism is inference to the best explanation. Also, if you actually rule out other propositions as 'meaningless', you rule out speculation, which would certainly cripple science. |
| 15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: From a logical point of view all definitions look exactly alike, that is, they contain a logical subject and a set of predicates which are attributed of necessity to that subject. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.IV) |
| 15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Points can be 'dense' by indefinitely prolonged division. To be 'continuous' is more stringent; the points must be cut into two sets, and meet the condition laid down by Boscovich and Dedekind. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: This idea goes with Idea 15274, which lays down the specification of the Dedekind Cut, which is the criterion for the real (and continuous) numbers. Harré and Madden are interested in whether time can support continuity of objects. |
| 15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Divide points into left and right set. They're 'continuous' if that point is either last member of left set, and greatest lower bound of right (so no least member), or least upper bound of left set (so no last member) and first member of right set. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: The best attempt I have yet encountered to explain a Dedekind Cut for the layperson. I gather modern mathematicians no longer rely on this way of defining the real numbers. |
| 15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The assumption that there is an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the psychological is, in our view, an error of enormous consequence. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A) | |
| A reaction: I agree entirely with this, and am opposed to the Fregean view of the matter. The psychology is the bridge between the physical world and the logic. Frege had to be a platonist, so that the formalism could latch onto something. |
| 19482 | Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Our best theories of physics imply we shouldn't be here. The big bang ought to have produced equal amounts of matter and antimatter particles, which would have almost immediately annihilated each other, leaving nothing but light. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.05.23) | |
| A reaction: This is not, of course, a rejection of physics, but a puzzle about the current standard model of physics. |
| 19483 | CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The phenomenon of charge-parity (CP) violation says that under certain circumstances antiparticles decay at different rates from their matter counterpart. ...This might explain matter's dominance in the universe, but the effect is too small. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.05.23) | |
| A reaction: Physicists are currently studying CP violations, hoping to explain why there is any matter in the universe. This will not, I presume, explain why matter and antimatter arrived in the first place. |
| 15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Given the Humean ontology, there is grave difficulty in making any sense at all of the concept of change with continuity as distinct from successive replacements. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6. Intro) | |
| A reaction: Hence the four-dimensionalist approach is basically Hume updated. The weird nature of time lurks behind this difficulty. If you can separate the moments of time, you can separate the bits of a continuous thing, and then ask how they relate. |
| 15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: On our view, 'event' is to be understood in terms of the ontology of enduring things, while on the Humean view enduring things are conceived to be constructions of events. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: It has quite hard to take either objects or events, given that they seem to be amenable to analysis. I am tempted to take essences as primitive. They fix identity, endure change, bear accidental properties (including temporary intrinsics). |
| 15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: By a shift from events to things we claim to make the big problem of induction tractable. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.II) | |
| A reaction: [You'll have to read their chapter to get the whole picture] The idea of basing a metaphysics on 'events' gives me the creeps, given the difficulty of individuating an event. Events are not primitive; even animals can analyse their components. |
| 15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Fundamental particulars are incapable of change. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.IV) | |
| A reaction: I quote this in order to challenge it. If the proton can decay (which seems to be the case) maybe everything can. The fundamentals of a lawn mower eventually rust away; it may be thus with universe. What evidence could deny this? |
| 15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: There is no metaphysical justification whatever for treating the solid, bounded, material object as the determiner of all thing concepts. Fluids are no less material things than are hard solid blocks. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV) | |
| A reaction: We don't tend to talk of a fluid as 'a' thing, and without distinct objects there would be virtually no structure, or interest, in nature, so what gives identity to the blocks must interest the metaphysician. |
| 15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The magnetic and the gravitation field can occupy all the same places without merging. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV) | |
| A reaction: We can divide stuff into two classes, then, according to whether they usually merge if coextensive in space. Oil and water can be mixed, but eventually separate again. |
| 15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The region around a magnetic body, the space between earth and moon, and the vicinity of an electric cable remain obstinately and, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III) | |
| A reaction: Ouch, if you are a strict 'materialist'! I call myself a 'naturalist', in a hand-wavy sort of way. On materialism and determinism I remain vague. |
| 15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: A state of affairs consists of structures of particulars that endure (of which physical objects would be one type), the properties and powers of those particulars, and the relations obtaining among them. A common 'event' is a change in state of affairs. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: I find 'event' to be so vague, and so dependent on pragmatic interests, that it has hard to find a place for it in an ontological system. Ditto with state of affairs. They overlap. States of affairs can survive change (like a political majority). |
| 15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The connectivity of ensembles of predicates is characteristic of natural science, while the independence of empirical predicates is the requirement of the Humean position. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.I) | |
| A reaction: This is yet another excellent reason for getting rid of the hyperempirical Humean view of these things. The best explanation of the world is that its ingredients are clearly not 'independent' of each other. |
| 15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The concept of energy was introduced into physics precisely to make possible the application of the 'store of potency' paradigm in cases like the contact of billiard balls, since the moving ball is clearly an agent of change. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: I find this to be a hugely revealing little observation. For years the nature of energy has bothered me, and I have been struck by the active character of nature. I am beginning to understand the world! |
| 15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Some powerful particulars require to be stimulated before their powers are manifested. Others will manifest their powers whenever the impediments to action, the constraints, are removed. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.V) | |
| A reaction: Sounds nice and clear, but if gunpowder explodes at a certain temperature, how can you distinguish temperatures as the 'stimulus' ones and the 'release' ones? We just remove the constraint of low temperature. |
| 15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Contrasted with variable powers are those powers which cannot be diminished or augmented without loss of identity for the particular to which they are ascribed. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.I) | |
| A reaction: They give the example of a Deputy Sheriff's powers, as one that cannot vary. I suppose the powers of an electron are in the fixed category. Fair enough. Can a fundamental power be variable (or only 'complex' powers)? |
| 15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: For scientists 'copper' refers to something having the properties of malleability, fusibility, ductility, electric conductivity, density 8.92, atomic weight 63.54, and atomic number 19. All but the last of these are dispositional. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.C) | |
| A reaction: This is important because it is tempting to pick the atomic number as the essence of copper, but it is the only one on the list which is structural rather than dispositional. The deep question is why that substance has those dispositions. |
| 15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The power of particulars are always made understandable by the natures of those particulars, but finally such explanations come to rest with a power of a particular that has no explanation in the nature of that thing or bit of material. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.VII) | |
| A reaction: I'm glad they faced up to this matter. The question is whether the fundamental powers which are the terminus of explanation are the same sort of thing as the powers which were said to be the target for explanations. Just complex powers? |
| 15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: As the most promising candidate for entities which intrinsically qualify as ultimate because their nature is in principle identical with their powers we will offer a physical field. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.VII) | |
| A reaction: An electron comes fairly close to being nothing but a bundle of powers, but fields seem to have a slightly more basic role in physics, so this strikes me as a good suggestion. It meets Ladyman's mocking of the 'microbangings' view. |
| 15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: An attribution of a power opens up a certain direction of empirical investigation. It is not an attribution of an occult quality, because it is not a quality-attribution at all. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 5.II) | |
| A reaction: They seem to have a rather behaviouristic view of powers, which I am inclined to think misses how fundamental powers are. I see fundamental powers as the terminus of empirical investigation (which focuses on how powers combine). |
| 15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: How are we to conceive of a field of potentials when the very point of the notion is that it serves to describe what would happen at various places, and is not a description of what did or is happening? | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III) | |
| A reaction: I suppose the answer is induction. If there were no events, the field would be beyond us. We infer the field from observed events, and infer possible events from the patterns of behaviour in the field, and its nature. |
| 15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: In being properly critical about the merits of the concept of substance, ...the Humean finds he has lost the vitally important concept of a thing as well. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: This is the whole reason that Aristotle and others started talking about substances in the first place. The big mistake is to think that Aristotle believes in a thing called 'substance'. The notion is a placeholder for whatever holds a thing together. |
| 15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The importance of the field concept (as ultimate) is that it allows us to escape from the apparently pervasive concepts of substance and its properties. A field has no substance other than its powers (or its potentials). | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.VII) | |
| A reaction: You can't run away from substance by only thinking about what is ultimate. Are they going to ignore separate objects? What gives them identity? Do they have any properties? What has the properties? More work needed here. |
| 15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The assumption that shape and solidity are the fundamental mechanical qualities requires an implausible hypothesis of a substance or material filling the space of bodies. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.II.B) | |
| A reaction: This is 'substance' in the sense of matter, rather than in the sense of an Aristotelian essence. They defend fields (rather than particles) as the fundamentals of the physical world. |
| 15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Chemical analysis either arrives at a qualityless substance, the notorious substratum, or is obliged to declare certain qualities primary and inexplicable. Substituting individuals-with-powers for substance-with-qualities removes these difficulties. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.II) | |
| A reaction: Any account gives you something as basic, and that something is always going to seem inherently and deeply mysterious. I prefer powers to substrata, but what has the powers? They like 'fields'. |
| 15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: From the point of view of philosophical logic, the nature of a kind, or a material substance or an individual is its essence, that is, those of its qualities which are inseparable from its being that kind, that material or that individual. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.I) | |
| A reaction: This might be where the logical and the naturalistic notions of essence come apart. Could something retain its 'natural' essence while losing its identity, or lose its essence while retaining its identity? |
| 15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: If we know the nature of a particular that explains its properties, powers and capacities and relates them into intelligible clusters, then we can indeed infer from some of the powers and properties to others via its essential nature. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.III) | |
| A reaction: This is an optimistic assertion of precisely the possibility which Locke denied in Idea 12547. This optimism is the main reason for the revival of scientific essentialism in recent years. It just seems to be true of modern science. |
| 15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The essential nature of matter and radiation is energy, so it is maintained, but the point of maintaining this is precisely to allow one to make use of a notion of the nature of things. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.III) | |
| A reaction: They are defending essentialism, but this seems to be a counterexample, of our need to postulate essences where there are none. It makes our explanations work better, but at the cost of commitment to a 'quasi-substance' (Idea 15265). |
| 15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Talk about particulars remaining the same and yet lacking their usual capacities and powers is at once to assert and deny that a certain object or sample of material has a given nature. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.C) | |
| A reaction: They imply that this is a contradiction, and hence impossible. So what do we say about something in which the powers fade? Do they both retain and lose their identity? Or can we separate essence from identity?? Aha! |
| 15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Some individuals to gain or lose certain capacities or powers, but do not thereby lose their identity. They still have the same nature. A drug, or photographic paper, may lose effectiveness over time. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.C) | |
| A reaction: Damn! I thought I was the first to spot this problem! I, however, take it to be much more metaphysically significant than Harré and Madden do. The question is whether those properties were essential, since they can be lost. Essential but not necessary! |
| 15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Change might mean that a particular lost some or perhaps all of its previous characteristics and retained at worst only a dubious numerical identity derived from temporal continuity of the occupation of a place or continuous sequence of places. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.II) | |
| A reaction: If all that is left is its location, that seems like passing-away rather than change. A dead leaf retains mere numerical identity while losing its essence. A burnt-up leaf might have a location, but it hardly qualifies as a 'leaf'. |
| 15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Since discontinuities in a dense set of temporal points lead to doubts about the existential integrity of a thing, the thing-ontology demands that a dense time be continuous. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a rather unequivocal assertion about a rather uncertain topic. If quanta can move in 'leaps', which appear to abolish the notion of what happens 'between' two states, who can say what objects might manage to do? |
| 15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: If events are instantaneous time-slices of a physical thing, the persistence of the pattern is an inexplicable fact in that there is no requirement for the successive time-slices to bear any resemblance to the event previously occurring at that place. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: The Humean four-dimensional view doesn't seem to require an explanation of this (or of much else), and takes it as a brute fact that slices resemble. Something has to be a brute fact, I suppose. |
| 15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: A Humean cannot step in the same river twice, not because the river is always a different river, but because he can strictly have no such concept as 'river'. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.II) | |
| A reaction: This arises from a discussion of induction. What is a Humean to make of an object which keeps changing? They only have connected impressions, and no underlying essence to hold the impressions together. |
| 15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Whatever reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.IV) | |
| A reaction: This is a deeply stirring idea, because it suddenly opens up a research project of narrowing the possibilities, with a stunning Holy Grail at the end of it. Sherlock Holmes said this first, of course. |
| 15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: In addition to absolute necessity ('p is strictly implied by Źp'), i.e. p strictly implied by any proposition whatever, C.I. Lewis also distinguished relative necessity ('p implied by what is given or known'). | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.V) | |
| A reaction: Once you accept this distinction you find that the 'relative' one comes in all sorts of degrees. You "have to" put more salt in this soup. (Deontic' necessity, someone on Twitter tells me!) |
| 15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: When the logical form of a statement is offered as the grounds for the judgement that it cannot be true we have logical necessity. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V.B) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a truth about logical necessity, but certainly not a full account of it, because contingent statements also have logical form. I can't think of any other criterion than the finding of a contradiction buried in the logical form. |
| 15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Natural necessity is neither a mere reflection of logical necessity nor a roundabout way of referring to empirical contingency. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.B) | |
| A reaction: They offer a strong defence of natural necessity, which is basic to their scientific essentialism. The key point is that they, unlike some others, are not defending metaphysical necessity about nature, but finding a different type of necessity. Good. |
| 15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The relation between what a thing is and what it is capable of doing and undergoing is naturally necessary. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.C) | |
| A reaction: Note that this was written in 1975, and in no way rests of Kripkean notions of rigid designation and necessary identities. Needs thought, but I take it to be an appealing proposal. |
| 15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: There is a necessity corresponding to the nature of the actual. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.III.C) | |
| A reaction: A nice slogan for the assertion of a genuine and distinct natural necessity. Hence every possible world will have its own distinctive natural necessity. If the actual contains the possible, then there are possible new natural necessities in the actual! |
| 15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: When the natures of the operative powerful particulars, the constraining or stimulating effect of conditions and so on are offered as the grounds for the judgement that a certain effect cannot but happen (or fail), we have natural necessity. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V.B) | |
| A reaction: This is the view I subscribe to, the really right bit of scientific essentialism. Can this view be proved? Hm. I take the opposite view to be the misguided Humean idea that if you can imagine it not happening, then it might not happen. Firey furnace. |
| 15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: At the basis of all doubts about the rationality of science lies the idea that there is no rational resting place between logical necessity and absolute contingency. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.III) | |
| A reaction: I'm struck by the fact that when someone says "I have to go now", they express a necessity. Are there thousands of types of necessity, or one conditional necessity resting on thousands of different foundations? |
| 15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The relationship between co-existing properties or successive events or states is naturally necessary when understood by scientists to be related by generative mechanisms, whose structure and components constitute the essential natures of the world. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.III) | |
| A reaction: Does that mean that the relationship between an actual state and a possible state is metaphysically necessary, rather than naturally necessary? I think we need dispositions to be part of actuality, and hence replace 'co-existing' with 'possible'. |
| 15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: When the conditions for a rational being having knowledge of the nature of a world are offered as the grounds for the judgement that such a world must have certain characteristics, we have transcendental necessity. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V.B) | |
| A reaction: It seems like a rather hard call to decide whether such characteristics pertain to the world, or to the mind of the rational being. Kant is obviously behind this one. You must read his first Critique at least four times to evaluate it. |
| 15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Whatever is logically necessary must be reflected in a corresponding transcendental necessity. But there are a great range of transcendental necessities which are not reflected in any logical necessity. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V.C) | |
| A reaction: That is, the world would be unknowable if any of the logical necessities failed to apply to it. I hope that doesn't mean that we are supposed to intuitively know all the logical necessities. Nowadays we are famous for being bad at that. |
| 15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: We understand subjunctive conditionals as statements about possibilities, excluding those actualised. So that form is just right for part of the analysis of a power statement, since to say a thing has a power is to say what behaviour is possible for it. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 5.VII) | |
| A reaction: They seem unaware of the famous work of Stalnaker and Lewis on this type of analysis, but as a fan of powers I find this interesting, and it offers a nice extra piece for my big jigsaw. |
| 15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: When a natural necessity is used as the basis for the inclusion or exclusion of the appropriate predicate in the meaning of a concept of a kind of particular, then it is conceptually necessary that that kind of particular has that property or power. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V.B) | |
| A reaction: This is one of the bolder views of Harré and Madden, since many philosophers would say that conceptual necessity rests entirely on convention rather than on nature. We could cut them out by just saying that most of our conventions rest on nature. |
| 15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Described as a man it is quite contingent that he has a child, but described as a father it is conceptually necessary that he has a child. But that conceptual necessity is a reflection of the natural necessity of the father's role in reproduction. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.I) | |
| A reaction: This is a (good) response to Quine's claim that necessity depends entirely on the mode of description (and his mathematician cyclist example). |
| 15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The question about conceptual necessity is whether it is only stipulative and conventional in character or whether it mirrors something about the nature of physical systems. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.A) | |
| A reaction: This is the key question, which fans of conventionalism (such as Sidelle) don't seem to face up to. I take it to be important that our concepts are not created by a committee of fools, but by people constantly relating to the world. |
| 15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: When discoveries about the nature of a thing or substance explain or justify our holding that certain properties are its nominal essence, then the diachronic process of meaning development creates a genuine conceptual necessity. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.VI) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a pretty good account of one of the bases for conceptual necessity. They seem to think that conceptual necessity rests on a mixture of real and nominal essence (but then some of the nominal features are also real). |
| 15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The concepts of necessity and contingency are detached from those of the apriori and the a posteriori. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.IV) | |
| A reaction: This seems to arise quite independently of Kripke, from the attack by the authors on the Humean view of modality. They also mention the possibility of the apriori contingent. |
| 15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Even in cases (such as Goldbach's Conjecture) which, if true, are logically necessary, we may be able to conceive the opposite. We can conceive of there being a number which is not the sum of two primes. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
| A reaction: [attributed to Kneale] Ah, but can we conceive this (as Descartes would say) 'clearly and distinctly'? I can conceive circular squares, as long as I don't concentrate too hard. |
| 15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: It would be silly to suggest that what is a matter of experience must be justified by reason, and it makes no sense to say that what we are insisting upon as a matter of direct experience must itself be established by experience. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
| A reaction: The first half is now known as the 'Moorean' view (Idea 6349). It does make sense, when faced with a weird experience, to assess and establish it by means of a combination of reason and other experiences. It's called 'coherence'! |
| 15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: It seems clear that we are never presented with a quality except of some object. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
| A reaction: I'm not convinced that that 'seems clear'. The idea of sense-data is that while it seems to be of an object, reason suggests that the experience of the quality must precede the object assembled thereby. How do you arbitrate? |
| 15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: To the objection that one is never aware of inferences in sensation, the unconvincing reply comes that such inferences are automatic, telescoped, non-discursive and unconscious. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
| A reaction: I think the 'unconvincing' reply is a bit more convincing in the light of modern research on the brain, which presents everything it does in a far less conscious light than the traditional view. Even reason seems barely conscious. |
| 15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The Humean event, the impression, basic to his epistemology, is, as we have seen, instantaneous in nature, punctiform and elemenentary, and from this characterisation follows its atomicity, its lack of internal connections with anything else. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: This simple point about Humean associationism is the key to grasping the whole hideous worldview that has gripped twentieth century philosophy. How many impressions make up an apple? And why do they sum to make something? |
| 19737 | A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: If we can train a system for prediction, it can essentially infer the structure of the world it's looking at by doing this prediction. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.12.12) | |
| A reaction: [AI expert] This seems to be powerful support for the centrality of mathematical laws of nature in achieving understanding of the world. We may downplay the 'mere' ability to predict, but this idea says that the rewards of prediction are very great. |
| 15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Clavius' Paradox shows that a theorem-like structure organised by entailments cannot be identified as a scientific explanation by reference to syntactical criteria, since it shares its syntactic criteria with many other theorem-like structures. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.3) | |
| A reaction: I think I was pretty convinced that a scientific theory had to meet more than mere syntactic criteria, before I encountered this idea. Lewis's account of laws may have to face this objection. |
| 15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Whatever simplicity criterion is chosen for theories, it can at best sort out strata of explanations of equal simplicity, each stratum containing infinitely many items. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.I) | |
| A reaction: [They cite Katz 1962 for this] This sounds to me like a purely technical result, where pragmatics would narrow the plausible theories right down. The 'Paradox of Clavius' is behind the idea (with an infinity of possible middle terms). |
| 15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The marvellous success in science of the powers/natures formula as a guide to research naturally leads to an attempt at a universal application of such a powerful schema. The electric and magnetic and gravitational fields are known by their powers. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III) | |
| A reaction: This is a wonderfully heroic, and accurate, opposition to the prevailing accounts of science when they wrote. The laws, processes and equations of science and just part of a description of the natures and basic powers of what exists. |
| 15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The task of natural science is to investigate the nature of a thing or substance, and to test hypotheses as to the constitution of that thing or substance. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.IV) | |
| A reaction: This seems to suggest that science is only concerned with the very small, but it would include facts such as the dramatic change of a lump of uranium when it grows bigger. |
| 15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: There are competitive models of the nature of things and materials, and that one is chosen which is successful in explaining the most powers and capacities of particulars and in leading to the discovery of hitherto unsuspected powers and capacities. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.III) | |
| A reaction: If the powers and capacities are what get explained, what exactly does the explaining? If you says 'essences', you then have to characterise essences in some other way. I vote for basic powers as primitive. - but Idea 15302. |
| 15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: 'Going together' is irrelevant as an explanation, and that is precisely why it is useless as a reason for having confidence in inductive inferences. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.I) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that the deep underlying question is whether the actual world has modal features - that is, are dispositions, rather than mere categorical properties, a feature of the actual. Is this room full of possibilities? Yes, say I. |
| 15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The atomicity of Humean events ensures the sequential independence of properties, ...and this in turn leads to the Humean problem of induction. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as pretty good analysis of what has gone wrong with the Humean account. As far as I can see, the 'problem' of induction just doesn't occur in scientific essentialism. |
| 15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The question about Hempel's Paradox is whether contraposition is not only equivalent in truth, but equivalent tout court. It forcibly inserts new predicates into a context of properties known to be connected by nature. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.I) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This seems to capture quite nicely the intuition most people have (which makes it a 'paradox') that the equivalent predicate is irrelevant to the immediate enquiry. The paradox is good because it forces the present explanation. |
| 15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: If empirical predicates are linked in clusters, contraposition of (black, raven) would carry one via such pairs as (shoe, white) into a different empirical cluster, or no cluster at all. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.I) | |
| A reaction: This is, of course, addressed to Hempel's Raven Paradox. Those paradoxes now strike me as relics of a time when Humean empiricism and logic were thought to be the best approaches to scientific theory. Harré and Madden pioneered a better view. |
| 15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The generating mechanism that produces black raven-like beings is assumed in the according of potential law status to the statement that all ravens are black. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.III) | |
| A reaction: This is a very nice succinct statement of what I take to be the scientific essentialist view of induction. It isn't about building up Humean habits of regularity, but of gradually inferring explanatory mechanisms, which might even give necessities. |
| 15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Only changes require explanation. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.I) | |
| A reaction: This points to powers as the fundamentals of all explanations, whereas if stasis also has to be explained then structures and matter have to be explained. Why is there something rather than nothing? No explanations allowed! |
| 15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Natural necessity involves causal directionality as an essential element, while entailment as a purely logical relation does not. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.V) | |
| A reaction: If there is a naturally necessary relation between an eclipse and its cause, the directionality of that doesn't seem to arise from the mutual relation between the two. You have to add time's arrow, or causation's arrow. |
| 15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The concept of power can be used to explain the temporal directionality of the concept of causality, and, at the same time, makes that causality a genuine case of natural necessity. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.V) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure that powers actually 'explain' causal direction. It seems more like transferring the directionality from the process to its source. You are still left with brute directionality. |
| 15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: If we see that certain powers and capacities are explained by the nature of certain particulars and are necessarily attendant upon them, then we have an explanation of why certain things must go together and happen as they do. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.I) | |
| A reaction: They are offering this as an account of induction, as well as of explanation, and it is a nice summary of the account which I take to be correct. |
| 15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Usually in science the powers/natures formula does lead to the imagining of hypothetical mechanisms which might be discovered to be real. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III) | |
| A reaction: The underlying mechanism is what I take Aristotle to have proposed, and it is the instinctive explanation by children (charted by Susan Gelman). |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
| From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
| A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
| 15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Solidity is the effect of a power of repulsion between whole things, and shape is the effect of a power of attraction between parts of whole things. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.II.B) | |
| A reaction: This sounds a bit too neat in its division, but it shows nicely how a metaphysics with powers can deal with categorical properties. The question, remains, though of what is doing the repelling and attracting. Fields, they say. |
| 15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Capacities just as much as powers, what particulars and substances are liable to undergo as well as what they are able to do, are explained by reference to what the thing is in itself. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.C) | |
| A reaction: This is an important warning against trying to give the whole account in terms of powers - unless the capacities and structures and categorical properties can also be explained in terms of the basic powers. |
| 19736 | Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Early neural nets were really good at recognising general categories, such as a car or a chair. Those networks are good at extracting the 'chair-ness' or the 'car-ness' of the object. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.12.12) | |
| A reaction: [Interview with Yann LeCun, Facebook AI director] Fregean philosophers such as Geach think that extracting features is a ridiculous idea, but if even a machine can do it then I suspect that human beings can (and do) manage it too. |
| 15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The concepts of power, capacity and the nature of a particular involve generalisations and hence already presuppose that there are grounds for extrapolation. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.V) | |
| A reaction: I take sortal essentialism to be a serious misundertanding, but the mistake needs to be explained, and this idea is helpful towards that. I think the problem resides in the nature of the language we need to describe particulars. |
| 16419 | No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The financial sector has been clamouring for a rationality test for years. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) | |
| A reaction: Many aspects of intelligence tests do actually pick out what I would call rationality (which includes 'rational intuition', a new favourite of mine). But they are mixed in with rather mechanical geeky sort of tests. |
| 16417 | About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Possibly a third of the variation in our intelligence is down to the environment in which we grew up - nutrition and education, for example. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) | |
| A reaction: This presumably leaves the other two-thirds to derive from genetics. I am a big believer in environment. Swapping babies between extremes of cultural environment would hugely affect intelligence, say I. |
| 16418 | People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: You really can be highly intelligent, and at the same time very stupid. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) | |
| A reaction: This is closely related to my observation (from a lifetime of study) that a talent for philosophy has a very limited correlation with standard notions of high intelligence. What matters is how conscious reasoning and intuition relate. Greek 'phronesis'. |
| 19484 | Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Psychologists have long thought that measuring on a scale of just five personality dimensions - agreeableness, extroversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness and openness to new experiences - can capture all human variations in behaviour and attitude. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.06.13) | |
| A reaction: Researchers are considering a sixth - called 'honesty-humility' - which is roughly how devious people are. The five mentioned here seem to be a well entrenched orthodoxy among professional psychologists. Is personality more superficial than character? |
| 15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: A statement which asserts that a substance or thing must manifest certain properties in order to be identified as a thing or substance of that sort can be laid down a priori. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.IV) | |
| A reaction: This observation is encountered in Sidelle, but this is earlier, and seems to be the key to the Twin Earth thing. It is just convention whether we call XYZ water, or whether there are two sorts of jade or one. Science has prestige. |
| 15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: To attribute necessity to a condition, an outcome or effect, the truth of a statement, or a conclusion, is to indicate within the relevant context that no alternative is possible. In each context there are appropriate grounds for such judgements. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V) | |
| A reaction: This anticipipates Kit Fine's account of necessity by 25 years, and seems to be the right way to understand it. In ordinary usage, 'there is no alternative' is obvious a quite different claim in very different contexts. |
| 15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Natural necessity involves the concept of generative mechanisms and powerful particulars, and these in turn can be the basis of a useful notion of a natural kind. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.V) | |
| A reaction: Not sure about that. Say gold and silver are two kinds that lead to two outcomes. Each is a natural necessity. How do you distinguish them? Only by one being the gold-necessity and the other the silver-necessity. Circular? |
| 15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: We know from biology that naturally occurring species do not exhibit the constancy required by the concept of natural kind. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.IV) | |
| A reaction: This view has been challenged recently. How much constancy does a natural kind need? Even protons decay eventually, it seems. I think a natural kind just needs a fair degree of stability over a reasonable time-period. Tigers qualify. |
| 15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The concept of cause may come to include the concepts of its usual effects. Concepts of this character are used in science, and in common language, to ascribe powers. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
| A reaction: See Theme 8|c|3 in Theme/Structure for more ideas about powers. It's hard to see how you could specify a cause at all if you weren't allowed to say what it does. I love powers, and want to make them the key idea in all of metaphysics. |
| 15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The Humean effort to ground the intuition of causal directionality on temporal priority of cause alone fails, because in fact some causes and effects are simultaneous. The moving of the knife and separation of the orange occur together. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: Since I take causation to be largely concerned with movements of 'energy', this idea that cause and effect might be simultaneous sounds more like a matter of pragmatics and convention. Moving the knife and moving the orange are different. |
| 15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The exercise of causal power is not a force or power that has some existence of its own but refers to forceful objects at work. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a behaviourist account of causation, which should make us a bit suspicious. Powers differ from one another. Does all causation have something universally in common? 'Energy' is a stab at the missing ingredient. |
| 15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Causation always involves a material particular which produces or generates something. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A) | |
| A reaction: I agree with this. My bete noire is the idea that causation somehow results from laws or general truths. That gets the whole thing the wrong way round. This idea is based on the notion of 'powers'. |
| 15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Efficient causes comprise both the presence of stimuli which activate a quiescent individual, and the absence or removal of constraints upon an individual already in a state of activity. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.B) | |
| A reaction: This is part of an account of causation in term of 'powers', with which I agree. Before you object, there is always going to be something about causation which is mind boggling weird, and probably leaves even God bewildered. |
| 15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: We can unambiguously differentiate the cause from the effect in that whatever stimulates or releases the action of the powerful particular involved in the causal production is the cause or part of the cause of that effect. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: I have doubts about distinguishing stimulus from release, and they sensibly don't say they have a test for 'the' cause, but I roughly agree with this idea. I take 'the' cause to also be tied in with explanation. |
| 15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The original Humean suggestion was that lawlike statements must contain only purely qualitative predicates - that is, predicates which do not require in a statement of their meaning a reference to any particular object or spatio-temporal location. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II) | |
| A reaction: Harré and Madden are keen to promote particulars (with powers) as the foundation of scientific theory, and I agree with them. It strikes me as quite elementary that generalisations arise from particulars, so can't fundamentally explain them. |
| 15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The whole idea of a formal analysis of the concept of lawlikeness has come to seem hopeless; every syntactical criterion proposed has a counter-example. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II) | |
| A reaction: They seem unaware of Lewis's work in this area, which may be the most sophisticated attempt at a (Humean) attempt at formal analysis. Personally I see nothing in Lewis that would make them change their minds. |
| 15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Given some general theory specifying the fundamental causal powers and thereby laying down the general lineaments of a world, the necessity of certain effects can be inferred. They will be 'hypothetically necessary' (given those powers). | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.III.B) | |
| A reaction: This is a pretty good statement of the core idea of necessity at the heart of scientific essentialism. Are we to call this 'natural' necessity or 'metaphysical' necessity? Presumably it is 'relative' necessity. Big implications for induction! |
| 15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Humeans say there can be no element of necessity in the causal relation because the conjunction of a description of a cause with the negation of a description of its usual effect is never self-contradictory. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.I) | |
| A reaction: We might say there actually is a contradiction, because you assert the existence of something, and then deny that existence by denying that the effect could occur. If the object is inert this is wrong, but if it is defined by its powers it is right. |
| 15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The only sure way of distinguishing lawful and accidental universal statements is to point out that in the former cases we see why the regularity must hold, while in the latter case we do not. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II) | |
| A reaction: I agree with this, and also take it to be the solution to the problem of induction. That smoking causes cancer will be a true generalisation but not a law, until we see clearly why it happens. |
| 15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: There is a case for calling a generalisation a law when its only confirmation is the multiplication of instances, if they don't conflict with other criteria. In fact any supported generalisation could count as a law if there is no counter-evidence. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II) | |
| A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern doubts about laws of nature, fully articulated in Mumford 2004. It seems to me inescapable that laws drop out if our ontology is based on powerful particulars. They are just patterns of outcome. |
| 15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: A moving thing is perceptually distinct from a motionless thing, but takes on no new quality. The perception of its motion is a genuine perception. Its motion is not inferred from observation of its successive occupations of different relative positions. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a response to Russell's reductive 'at-at' account of motion, which always struck me as wrong. It doesn't prove Russell wrong, of course, and they are trying to demonstrate that we perceive causation directly. |
| 21167 | Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Gravity is an odd sort of force, not least because it only ever works one way. Electromagnetism attracts and repels, but with gravity there are only positive masses always attract. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05) | |
| A reaction: This leads to speculation about anti-gravity, but there is no current evidence for it. |
| 15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: In the case of electron/positron/gamma ray annihilation scientists maintain the paradigm of rational explanation by inventing a quasi-substance as the bearer of continuity, and all three are seen in terms of 'energy'. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.III) | |
| A reaction: What a relief to see energy described as a 'quasi-substance'. I spent all of my physics studies bewildered by the nature of energy (especially when described as 'pure energy'). What does e=mc^2 mean if e is a quasi-substance? |
| 15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The 'store' of kinetic energy is used as a latency concept to explain the power of bringing about changes which is manifested by the moving thing when its motion is arrested. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: These ideas have been most illuminating in connecting for me the general idea of a 'power' to the rather dubious concept of 'energy' in physics. |
| 19950 | Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: All our physical laws are time-symmetric, ...so things can run forwards or backwards. But entropy is an exception, saying that disorder increases over time. Many physicists therefore suspect that the flow of time is linked to entropy. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) |
| 21176 | In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: At the origin of the universe gravity becomes so powerful that general relativity breaks down, giving infinity for every answer. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) |
| 21147 | Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The theory of electromagnetism that incorporates both special relativity and quantum mechanics is quantum electrodynamics (QED). It was developed by Dirac and others, and perfected in the 1940s. The field is a collection of quanta. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
| A reaction: This builds on Maxwell's earlier classical theory. QED is said to be the best theory in all of physics. |
| 21155 | Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Photons, the field quanta of the electromagnetic force, have zero rest mass, so virtual photons can exist indefinitely and travel any distance, meaning the electromagnetic force has an infinite range. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
| 19478 | Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: A light ray always moves at one unit of space per unit of time - a constant diagonal on the graph. ...But the direction that light rays travel in is neither space nor time, and is called 'null'. It is on the edge between space and time. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
| A reaction: Don't understand this, but it sounds fun. |
| 21161 | In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The standard model says that the fields of all fundamental forces should merge at extremely high energies, meaning there is also a unified, high-energy field out there. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 03) | |
| A reaction: Not quite sure what 'out there' means. This idea is linked to the quest for dark energy. Is this unified phenomenon only found near the Big Bang? |
| 21146 | Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Electrons in atoms move at high speeds, so they are subject to the special theory of relativity. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this implies a frame of reference, and defining velocities relative to other electrons. Plus time-dilation? |
| 19474 | Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: When we measure the evolution of a quantum state, it is to the beat of an external timepiece of unknown provenance. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
| A reaction: It is best not to leap to philosophical conclusions when studying modern physics. Evidently time has a very different status in quantum mechanics and in relativity theory. |
| 19473 | The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: A quantum object's state is described by a wave function living in Hilbert space, encompassing all of its possible states. We see how the wave function evolves in time, moving from one state to another, using the Schrödinger equation. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
| A reaction: [These idea are basic explanations for non-scientific philosophers - please forgive anything that makes you wince] |
| 21148 | The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Experiments show that the nuclear binding force does not follow the inverse square law, but is repulsive at the shortest distances, then attractive, then fades away rapidly as distance increases further. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
| A reaction: So how does it know when to be strong? Magnetism doesn't vary according to distance, and light obeys the inverse square law, because everything is decided at the output. - See 21151 for an explanation. It interacts after departure. |
| 21151 | Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: In QCD the particles that carry the strong force are called gluons. ...Gluons carry their own colour charges, so they can interact with each other (unlike photons) via the strong nuclear force (which limits the range of the force). | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
| A reaction: So the force varies in strength with distance because the degree of separation among the spreading gluons varies? The force has one range, which is squashed when close, effective at medium, and loses touch with distance? |
| 21152 | The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The strong force holds quarks together within protons and neutrons, and residual effects of the strong force bind protons (whch repel one another) and neutrons together in nuclei. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
| A reaction: So the force is much stronger between quarks (which can't escape), and only 'residual' in the nucleus, which must be why smashing nuclei open is fairly easy, but smashin protons open needs higher energies. |
| 21142 | Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Classifying hadrons according to charge, strangeness and spin revealed patterns of eight and ten particles (SU(3) symmetery). The mathematics then showed that these are built from a basic group of only three members. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) |
| 21143 | Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ˝ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ˝ (proton, duu; neutron, ddu; lambda, dus), or with spin 3/2 (omega-minus, sss). | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) |
| 21150 | Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Just as mixing three colours of light gives white, so the three colour charges of quarks can add up to give no colour. This is what happens in the proton, which always contains one blue-charge quark, one red and one green. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
| 21145 | The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: There are four fundamental forces: gravity, electromagnetism, and the weak and strong nuclear forces. Particle physics has so far failed to encompass the force of gravity. The forces that shape our world are themselves the effect of particles. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
| A reaction: Philosophers must take note of the fact that forces are the effects of particles. Common sense pictures forces imposed on particles, like throwing a tennis ball, but the particles are actually the sources of force. The gravitino is speculative. |
| 21153 | The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The beta decay of the neutron (into a proton, an electron and an antineutrino) can be described in terms of the weak force, which is 10,000 times weaker than the strong force. It allows the quarks and leptons to change from one type to another. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
| A reaction: This seems to make it the key source of radioactivity. Perhaps it should be called the Force of Change? |
| 21154 | Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The quantum field theory of the weak force needs three carrier particles. The W+ and W- are electrically charged, and enable the weak force to change the charge of a particle. The Z° is uncharged, and mediates weak interactions with no charge change. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
| 21156 | The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The W and Z particles are heavy, and so cannot travel far from their parents. The weak force therefore has a very short range. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
| 21164 | Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Why do the proton and electron charges mirror each other so perfectly when they are such different particles? | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04) | |
| A reaction: We seem to have reached a common stage in science, where we have a wonderful descriptive model (the Standard Model), but we cannot explain why what is modelled is the way it is. |
| 21170 | The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The standard model cannot explain dark matter, or dark energy (which is causing expansion to accelerate). It cannot explain how matter survived annihilation with anti-matter in the Big Bang, or explain gravity. The strength of each force is unexplained. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 06) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] P.141 adds that the model has to be manipulated to keep the Higgs mass low enough. |
| 21140 | Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
| A reaction: As an outsider all I can do is collect descriptions of such properties from the experts. The experts appear to be happy with the numbers inserted in the equations. |
| 21149 | Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Quarks have a property akin to electric charge, called their colour charge. It comes in three varieties, red, green and blue. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
| 21158 | Fermions, with spin ˝, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Particles with half-integer spin, such as electrons, protons or quarks (all spin ˝) have an asymmetry in their wavefunction that makes them antisocial. These particles (Fermions) cannot share a quantum state. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
| A reaction: This is said to explain the complexity of matter, with carbon an especially good example. |
| 21165 | Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Spin is a quantum-mechanical property of a particle akin to rotation about its own axis. Particles of different spins respond to magnetic fields in different ways, so it is a relatively easy thing to measure. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04) | |
| A reaction: I wish I knew what 'akin to' meant. Maybe particles are not rigid bodies, so they cannot spin in the way a top can? It must be an electro-magnetic property. Idea 21166 says spin has two possible directions. |
| 21157 | Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Particles obeying the laws of quantum mechanics have wave-like properties - moving as a quantum wave-function, spread out in space, with wavelengths that get shorter as their energy increases. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
| A reaction: Thus X-rays are dangerous, but long wave radio is not. De Broglie's equation. |
| 21163 | The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Most of a proton's or neutrino's mass is contained in the interaction energies of a 'sea' of quarks, antiquarks and gluons that bind them. ...You might feel solid, but in fact you're 99 per cent binding energy. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04) | |
| A reaction: This is because energy is equivalent to mass (although gluons are said to have energy but no mass - puzzled by that). This is a fact which needs a bit of time to digest. Once you've grasped we are full of space, you still have understood it. |
| 21168 | Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: There are two types of mass: gravitational mass quantifies how strongly an object feels gravity, while inertial mass quantifies an object's resistance to acceleration. There proven equality is at the heart of General Relativity. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05) | |
| A reaction: It had never occurred to me that these two values might come apart. Doesn't their identical values demonstrate that they are in fact the same thing? Sounds like Hesperus/Phosphorus to me. The book calls it 'mysterious'. |
| 21138 | Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The proton (938.3 MeV) is lighter than the neutron (939.6 MeV) and does not decay, but the heavier neutron can change into a proton by emitting an electron. (If you gather a bucketful of neutrons, after ten minutes only half of them would be left). | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
| A reaction: Protons are more or less eternal, but some theories have them decaying after billions of years. Smashing protons together is a popular pastime for physicists. |
| 21144 | Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Quarks can change from one variety to another, and the top, bottom, charm and strange quarks all rapidly decay to the up and down quarks of everyday life. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
| A reaction: Hence the universe is largely composed of up and down quarks and electrons. The other quarks seem to be more important in the early universe. |
| 21141 | Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: When a neutron decays into a proton and an electron (one example of beta decay), the energy of the two particles adds up to less than the starting energy of the neutron. Pauli and Fermi concluded that a neutrino (an electron antineutrino) is emitted. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
| A reaction: I'm wondering how much they could infer about the nature of the new particle (which was only confirmed 26 years later). |
| 21169 | Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Neutrinos are the only particles that seem just to spin anticlockwise. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 06) | |
| A reaction: See 21166. Anti-neutrino spin is the opposite way. Which way up do you hold the neutrino when pronouncing that it is 'anticlockwise? |
| 21166 | Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: In the conventional standard model neutrinos have antiparticles - which spin in the opposite direction, and have the opposite lepton number. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05) |
| 21171 | The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: In the very early hot universe the electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces were one. The early emergence of the Higgs field led to electroweak symmetry breaking. The W and Z bosons grew fat, and the photon raced away mass-free. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 07) |
| 19954 | It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: String theory has more than 10-to-the-500th solutions, each describing a different sort of universe, so it is nigh-on impossible to find the one solution that corresponds to our geometrically flat, expanding space-time full of particles. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) |
| 21178 | String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: String theory has now been incorporated into Ed Witten's M-Theory, which is a mathematical framework that lives in 11-dimensional space-time, involving higher-dimensional objects called p-branes, of which strings are a special case. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) |
| 19476 | String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions to be mathematically consistent. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
| A reaction: Apparently because of 'Ads/CFT', it may be possible to swap this situation for a more tractable 4-dimensional version. |
| 19953 | In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: String theory suggests that space-time has a grainy substructure - you can't keep chopping it indefinitely into smaller and smaller pieces. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the proposal is that strings are the true 'atoms'. |
| 21179 | Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: String theory, together with its supersymmetric particles, has recently been rewritten in the space-time described by loop quantum gravity (which says that space-time ust be made from finite chunks). | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) |
| 21175 | String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: A future accelerator might create 'stringballs', when two strings slam into one another and, rather than combining to form a stretched string, make a tangled ball. Finding them would prove string theory. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08) | |
| A reaction: This is the only possible test for string theory which I have seen suggested. How do you 'slam strings together'? |
| 21177 | String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: String theory works as a quantum theory of gravity because string vibrations can describe gravitons, the hypothetical carriers of the gravitational force. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the main aim of a quantum theory of gravity is to include gravitons within particle theory. This idea has to be a main attraction of string theory. Compare Idea 21166. |
| 21162 | Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Peter Higgs says he is a fan of supersymmetry, largely because it seems to be the only route by which gravity can be brought into the scheme. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 03) | |
| A reaction: Peter Higgs proposed the Higgs boson (now discovered). This seems a very good reason to favour supersymmetry. A grand unified theory that left out gravity doesn't seem to be unified quite grandly enough. |
| 21159 | Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Supersymmetry posits heavy boson partners for all fermions, and heavy fermions for all bosons. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
| A reaction: The main Fermions are electron, proton and quark. Do extra bosons imply extra forces? Peter Higgs favours supersymmetry. |
| 21173 | Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The key to supersymmetry is that in the high-energy soup of the early universe, particles and their superpartners were indistinguishable. Each pair existed as single massless entities. With expansion and cooling this supersymmetry broke down. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08) |
| 21172 | The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The old front-runner theory, supersymmetry, has fallen from grace as the Large Hadron Collider keeps failing to find it. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 07) |
| 19947 | Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The elements of the abstract mathematical entity called Hilbert Space represent all the possible states of a quantum system | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 1017.02.04) |
| 15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Space lacks a place, and does not qualify as an individual, since the ordinary notion of individuals relates to place not space. ...But we can think of space as present in every place through the necessary connection between space and all places. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure I understand it being present in every place, given that it is every place. |
| 21160 | The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: The point about the Higgs field is that even the lowest-energy state of space is not empty. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
| A reaction: So where is the Higgs field located? Even if there is no utterly empty space, the concept of location implies a concept of space more basic than the fields (about 16, I gather) which occupy it. You can't describe movement without a concept of location. |
| 19948 | Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Our hunt for the most basic ingredients of reality has left us muddled about the status of time. One culprit for this was Einstein, whose theory of general relativity merged time with space. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) |
| 19955 | Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: A promising theory (based on the 'Maldacena duality' - that string equations for gravity are the same as quantum equations for surface area) is that space-time is really just geometrical manifestations of quantum entanglement. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) | |
| A reaction: This is a speculation which might unite the incompatible quantum and general relativity theories. |
| 19475 | Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Relativity says space and time are on the same footing - together they are the fabric of reality. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, treats time and space differently, with time occasionally seeming more fundamental. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. When talking about time, people glibly cite relativistic space-time to tell you that time is just another dimension. Now I can reply 'Aaah, but what about time in quantum mechanics? Eh? Eh?'. Excellent. |
| 19949 | Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: After general relativity, quantum mechanics reinstated our familiar notion of time. The buzzing of the quantum world plays out according to the authoritative tick of a clock outside the described system, ...but where is this clock doing its ticking? | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) |
| 19951 | Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Smolin observes that if entropy increases, the early universe must have been highly ordered, which we cannot explain. Maybe we need to build time directionality into the laws, instead of making time depend on entropy. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] |
| 19477 | General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Black holes are predicted by general relativity, and are thought to exist where massive stars once lived, as well as at the heart of every galaxy. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
| A reaction: Since black holes now seem to be a certainty, that is one hell of an impressive prediction. |
| 19952 | Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Black holes have a temperature, and hence entropy. ...But if a black hole are just an extreme scrunching of smooth space-time, it should have no substructure, and thus no entropy. This is probably the most obvious incompleteness of general relativity. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) |
| 16420 | 84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Dark matter makes up 84.5 percent of the universe's matter. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) |
| 21174 | Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Whatever dark matter is made of, it must have mass to feel and generate gravity; but no electric charge, so it does not interact with light. The leading candidate has been the weakly interacting massive particle (WIMP), much heavier than a proton. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08) | |
| A reaction: Note that it must 'generate' gravity. The idea of a law of gravity which is externally imposed on matter is long dead. Heavy WIMPs have not yet been detected. |
| 17604 | We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Ei-ichi Negishi (Nobel chemist of 2010) says 'the ultimate goal is to be able to synthesise any molecule we want. We are probably about halfway there'. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2010.10.16) |
| 15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Modern chemistry is not, as chemistry, purely structural. ...Thus CO2 is a different substance from SO2. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.II) | |
| A reaction: I don't think I ever thought the chemistry was purely structural, but if you go in for the idea that reality is essentially geometrical (inspired by physics, presumably, like Ladyman) then you might make this mistake. |
| 15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The same electronic constitution confers two distinct powers upon chemical atoms: the power of entering only into certain chemical combinations and the power to radiate a particular spectrum. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 5.VI) | |
| A reaction: Presumably radioactive elements emit other radiation. Do atoms have passive powers as well as active ones? |
| 17603 | Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.] |
| Full Idea: Ei-ichi Negishi (Nobel chemist of 2010) says 'I work with the periodic table in front of me at all times, and approach all challenges in terms of three particles, positively charged protons, negatively charged electrons, and neutral neutrinos'. | |
| From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2010.10.16) |
| 15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Theism is supposedly a positive view that renders the world more intelligible than its alternatives, and this professed programme requires the production of results. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.VI) | |
| A reaction: A nice articulation of a view of theism which will make believers wince, because Harré and Madden see it as a scientific theory, intended to explain the world. I'm with them. I see Plato's theory of Forms as a scientific theory. |