Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Henri Bergson and William K. Clifford

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy

8226	A well-posed problem is a problem solved [Bergson, by Deleuze/Guattari]
	Full Idea: Bergson said that a well-posed problem was a problem solved
	From: report of Henri Bergson (works [1910]) by G Deleuze / F Guattari - What is Philosophy? 1.3
	A reaction: This is fairly well in tune with the logical positivist style of philosophising, which tends to ask "what exactly is the question?" rather more than it asks "what is the answer?". I thoroughly approve of both of them (e.g. on free will).

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming

21846	Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze]
	Full Idea: Bergson was a rallying point for all the opposition, …not so much because of the theme of duration, as of the theory and practice of becoming of all kinds, of coexistent multiplicities.
	From: report of Henri Bergson (Matter and Memory [1896]) by Gilles Deleuze - A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? I
	A reaction: The three heroes of Deleuze are Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson. All philosophers are either of Being, or of Becoming, I suggest.

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory

21854	Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze]
	Full Idea: Bergson has shown that memory is not an actual image which forms after the object has been perceived, but a virtual image coexisting with the actual perception of the object.
	From: report of Henri Bergson (Matter and Memory [1896]) by Gilles Deleuze - The Actual and the Virtual p.114
	A reaction: It strikes me as plausible to say that all conscious life is memory. Perceiving the present instant is only possible because it endures for a tiny moment.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism

6587	It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford]
	Full Idea: It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
	From: William K. Clifford (works [1870]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4
	A reaction: This is a famous remark, but is in danger of being tautological unless one gives some account of what 'insufficient' means. If Clifford means the evidence must be conclusive, this is nonsense. 'Never believe if there is no evidence' is better.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

20653	Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
	Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
	From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
	A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument

22100	Experienced time means no two mental moments are ever alike [Bergson]
	Full Idea: If duration [experienced time] is what we say, deep-seated psychic states are radically heterogeneous to each other, and it is impossible that any two of them should be quite alike, since they are two different moments in a life-story.
	From: Henri Bergson (Time and Free Will [1889], p.220), quoted by Pete A.Y. Gunter - Bergson p.174
	A reaction: This implies that we are intrinsically unpredictable, and there certainly can't be a regularity account of mental causation. The sense of time is said to make the self radically different from the rest of reality. Bergson later rejected dualism.