12 ideas
16065 | Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman] |
Full Idea: Some insist that constitution is identity, on the grounds that distinct material objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Others argue that constitution is not identity, since the statue and its material differ in important respects. | |
From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: The 'important respects' seem to concern possibilities rather than actualities, which is suspicious. It is misleading to think we are dealing with two things and their relation here. Objects must have constitutions; constitutions make objects. |
16067 | Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman] |
Full Idea: For those for whom 'constitution is not identity' (the 'constitution view'), constitution is said to be an asymmetric relation, and also a dependence relation (unlike identity). | |
From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: It seems obvious that constitution is not identity, because there is more to a thing's identity than its mere constitution. But this idea makes it sound as if constitution has nothing to do with identity (chalk and cheese), and that can't be right. |
16069 | There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman] |
Full Idea: The three most common objections to the constitution view are the Impenetrability Objection (two things in one place?), the Extensionality Objection (mereology says wholes are just their parts), and the Grounding Objection (their ground is the same). | |
From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: [summary] He adds a fourth, that if two things can be in one place, why stop at two? [Among defenders of the Constitution View he lists Baker, Fine, Forbes, Koslicki, Kripke, Lowe, Oderberg, N.Salmon, Shoemaker, Simons and Yablo.] |
16068 | The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman] |
Full Idea: We do not calculate the weight of something by summing the weights of all its parts - weigh bricks and the molecules of a wall and you will get the wrong result, since you have weighed some parts more than once. | |
From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: In fact the complete inventory of the parts of a thing is irrelevant to almost anything we would like to know about the thing. The parts must be counted at some 'level' of division into parts. An element can belong to many different sets. |
16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |
Full Idea: If the relative identity theorist denies transitivity (to deal with the Ship of Theseus, for example), this would make us suspect that relativised identity relations are not identity relations, since transitivity seems central to identity. | |
From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 6) | |
A reaction: The problem here, I think, focuses on the meaning of the word 'same'. One change of plank leaves you with the same ship, but that is not transitive. If 'identical' is too pure to give the meaning of 'the same' it's not much use in discussing the world. |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
20877 | Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: I might make parallel 'mistakes' in ethical deliberation. For instance I might 1) use inconsistent ethical principles, 2) have inappropriate moral standards, and 3) apply moral standards inappropriately. | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.005) | |
A reaction: I would want to get the word 'values' in there somewhere. Dogmatic application of moral rules might indicate a failure of values. |
20878 | We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: In discussing a movie you can challenge my criteria, the weight I give to those criteria, or my application of the criteria (the claim that the movie satisfies the criteria). | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.008) | |
A reaction: I can't think of anything missing here, so it is a helpful start. |
20881 | The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: Consequentialists, unlike deontologists, are unlikely to think that the act/omission distinction is fundamentally important. | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.021) | |
A reaction: Not sure where virtue theory fits in here. Virtues tend to be applied more locally, where duty tends to be global. All moral theories must acknowledge that failure to act may be either a good or a bad thing, depending on circumstances |
20886 | Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: A fundamental question in morality is whether we are obligated to help only those we specifically agreed to help, or are we obligated to help others in need, because they are vulnerable? | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.061) | |
A reaction: [He is considering J.J. Thomson's defence of abortion] The first option sounds extraordinary. If I don't make any agreements at all, then I cease to be a moral being? Not help strangers when they fall over? |
20879 | Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: Having options is not an unadulterated good. Options may make us vulnerable to unwanted pressure from others. For example, having the option to work for less than the minimum wage increases the chances of employers offering less. | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.019) | |
A reaction: [J.D. Velleman is cited for this] A nice point, beginning to articulate my growing feeling that although freedom is generally a virtue, it is the most overrated virtue. |
20880 | Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: Should we give people choices they might not want to have? | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.020) | |
A reaction: In personal life we encounter people who force us to make an unwanted choice (choose the wine, when you know nothing about wine). Politically, there is the sneaky move of giving unwanted choices, to disguise absence of desired choices. |