27 ideas
19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
Full Idea: Idealists do not believe that there is an ontological distinction between beliefs and what makes beliefs true. From their perspective, reality is something like a collection of beliefs. | |
From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §2.1) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem to me to wholly reject truthmakers, since beliefs can still be truthmakers for one another. This is something like Davidson's view, that only beliefs can justify other beliefs. |
19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
Full Idea: Coherence theories of truth differ on their accounts of the coherence relation, and on their accounts of the set (or sets) of propositions with which true propositions occur (the 'specified set'). | |
From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1) | |
A reaction: Coherence is clearly more than consistency or mutual entailment, and I like to invoke explanation. The set has to be large, or the theory is absurd (as two absurdities can 'cohere'). So very large, or very very large, or maximally large? |
19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
Full Idea: It is unsatisfactory for the coherence relation to be consistency, because two propositions could be consistent with a 'specified set', and yet be inconsistent with each other. That would imply they are both true, which is impossible. | |
From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced by this. You first accept P because it is consistent with the set; then Q turns up, which is consistent with everything in the set except P. So you have to choose between them, and might eject P. Your set was too small. |
19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
Full Idea: One extreme for the specified set is the largest consistent set of propositions currently believed by actual people. A moderate position makes it the limit of people's enquiries. The other extreme is what would be believed by an omniscient being. | |
From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1) | |
A reaction: One not considered is the set of propositions believed by each individual person. Thoroughgoing relativists might well embrace that one. Peirce and Putnam liked the moderate one. I'm taken with the last one, since truth is an ideal, not a phenomenon. |
19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
Full Idea: It must be remembered that coherentists do not believe that the truth of a proposition consists in coherence with an arbitrarily chosen set of propositions; the coherence is with a set of beliefs, or a set of propositions held to be true. | |
From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §3.1) | |
A reaction: This is a very good response to critics who cite bizarre sets of beliefs which happen to have internal coherence. You have to ask why they are not actually believed, and the answer must be that the coherence is not extensive enough. |
19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
Full Idea: The two main objections to the coherence theory of truth are that there is no way to identify the 'specified set' of propositions without contradiction, ...and that some propositions are true which cohere with no set of beliefs. | |
From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §3.1/2) | |
A reaction: The point of the first is that you need a prior knowledge of truth to say which of two sets is the better one. The second one is thinking of long-lost tiny details from the past, which seem to be true without evidence. A huge set might beat the first one. |
19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
Full Idea: Unlike deflationary theories, the coherence and correspondence theories both hold that truth is a property of propositions that can be analyzed in terms of the sorts of truth-conditions propositions have, and the relation propositions stand in to them. | |
From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is presumably because deflationary theories reject the external relations of a proposition as a feature of its truth. This evidently leaves them in need of a theory of meaning, which may be fairly minimal. Horwich would be an example. |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
4020 | The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The modern notion of the self is defined by disengaged reason (with its associated freedom and dignity), by self-exploration, and by personal commitment. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
A reaction: Taylor makes a good case that this broader view of how the self is seen is as important as narrow debates about personal identity. |
4002 | My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: My entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between the sense of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], Pref) | |
A reaction: An interesting project. Modern brain research supports the idea that emotions and values are tightly integrated into al thought. |
4006 | I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: As a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §2.3) | |
A reaction: An important insight. My immediate sense of self makes my personal history central, not an extra. But a history must be a history OF something. |
19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
Full Idea: For the coherence theory of truth, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are ... objective features of the world. | |
From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro) | |
A reaction: It is obviously rather important for your truth-conditions theory of meaning that you are clear about your theory of truth. A correspondence theory is evidently taken for granted, even in possible worlds versions. |
19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
Full Idea: Coherence theorists can argue that the truth conditions of a proposition are those under which speakers tend to assert it, ...and that speakers can only make a practice of asserting a proposition under conditions they can recognise as justifying it. | |
From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §2.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This sounds rather verificationist, and hence wrong, since if you then asserted anything for which you didn't know the justification, that would remove its truth, and thus make it meaningless. |
4003 | Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
A reaction: This seems an inevitable convergence of three centuries of thought about personal identity and morality. |
4021 | Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
A reaction: Which is why war is required. The growth of civil society meant the inevitable rise of other virtues. |
4005 | To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: If you want to discriminate more finely what makes humans worthy of respect, you must call to mind the claim of human suffering, or what is repugnant about justice, or the awe you feel about human life. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
A reaction: A persuasive part of the claim that such feelings are inseparable from thinking about people in any way at all. |
4004 | Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The issue of consistency presupposes intrinsic description. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
A reaction: This may be the key criticism of Kant. The so-called 'maxim' of an action can be almost infinitely re-expressed to suit the agent. |
4010 | In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: In mature utilitarianism , the stress on modern freedom emerges in the rejection of paternalism. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
A reaction: This seems good; it is the beginnings of a rejection of paternalism. What is better, happiness or freedom? What is the value of freedom? |
22809 | The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The social contract theory …has a vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of ends which are primarily individual. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.29) | |
A reaction: It seems to be initiated by individuals who are only motivated by what is in it for them. This presumes self-sufficient adults, rather than children, or parents with children, or dependent people. The epitome of liberalism, perhaps. |
22811 | Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: It would be incomprehensible and incoherent to ascribe rights to human beings in respect of the specifically human capacities (such as the right to beliefs or life-style) while at the same time denying that those capacities ought to be developed. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |
A reaction: Developed by whom? The agent, their family, or the state? At what point has someone got a capacity, with no further requirement to develop it? Taylor pulls rather large rabbits out of small hats. |
22815 | If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: If realising our freedom partly depends on the society and culture in which we live, then we exercise a fuller freedom if we can help determine the shape of this society and culture. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.47) | |
A reaction: This is clearly in response to the critics of communitarianism who say that it is too conservative, because your values are created for you, by your community. |
22814 | Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: We must all be nurtures by others as children, and we only flourish as adults in relationship with friends, mates, children and so on. But this has nothing to do with any obligation to belong to political society. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.42) | |
A reaction: He is defending community, but not at that minimal human level. Political obligations follows from our need for a wider society, to achieve justice, education, travel, health etc. There are no rights without a society |
22810 | A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Asserting a right is more than issuing an injunction. It has an essential conceptual background, in some notion of the moral worth of certain properties or capacities, without which it would not make. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |
A reaction: A simple right may arise from a contract, which could be quite trivial, and of no moral importance. The winner of the egg and spoon race has a right to the prize, which is an ice cream. I think he means legal rights in a state. |
22812 | For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Most of those who want to affirm the primacy of rights are more interested in asserting the right of freedom, and in a sense which can only be attributed to humans. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.40) | |
A reaction: This is probably more pronounced in North America than in Europe. It may be that without freedom a lot of the other rights are impossible. |
22813 | Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: It is standardly said that we need the right to property as an essential underpinning of life, but this is patently not true. …In reality it is actually seen as an essential part of a life of independence. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.41) | |
A reaction: Hence it has a high value for liberals, for whom an independent life is the prime social aspiration. The law of trespass will define the degree of independence provided by property. |
23417 | If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Charles Taylor says the neutral [liberal] state undermines the sense of community which is required for citizens to accept the sacrifices demanded by the welfare state. | |
From: report of Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979]) by Will Kymlicka - Community 'legitimacy' | |
A reaction: As someone who believes in the welfare state, I think this is correct. Extreme individualistic liberalism is incompatible with a welfare state. A liberal society needs institutions which draw free individuals into the community. |
4009 | Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
A reaction: Part of their attack on Platonism. But what made them place such a high value on the sovereignty of God? |