Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Jan-Erik Jones and Peter John Olivi

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6 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
16030 'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence [Jones,J-E]
     Full Idea: In the Aristotelian tradition, a 'nominal' definition is a pseudo-definition that identifies the members of the species or genus, but fails to capture the essence, e.g. 'man is the featherless biped'.
     From: Jan-Erik Jones (Real Essence [2012], §2)
     A reaction: You can 'individuate' an object as 'the only object in that drawer', while revealing nothing about it. So what must a definition do, in addition to picking something out uniquely?
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
16659 Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world [Olivi]
     Full Idea: It does not seem that a relation adds anything real to that on which it is founded, but only makes for another real aspect belonging to the same thing. It is real since an aspect exists in re, not solely in the intellect, but it is not another thing.
     From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II.54), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.4
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16672 Quantity is the quantified parts of a thing, plus location and coordination [Olivi]
     Full Idea: Quantity refers to nothing other than the parts of the thing quantified, together with their location or position, being extrinsically coordinated with each other.
     From: Peter John Olivi (Treatise on Quantity [1286], f. 49vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.1
     A reaction: I'm not sure I understand 'extrinsically'. Is there some external stretching force? God spends his time spreading out his stuff? It is nice that being spread out isn't taken for granted. We take much more for granted than they did. Motion, for example.
16673 Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts [Olivi]
     Full Idea: Quantity or extension adds absolutely nothing really distinct to the quantified matter or to the extended and quantified form, except perhaps the union and location and position of those parts.
     From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II:58,II:440), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.1
     A reaction: Other views seem to say that the Quantity provides the extension, but he seems to take that as given.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
16663 Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being [Olivi]
     Full Idea: A subject is limited by its species to certain modes of being.
     From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], I:586-7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2
     A reaction: I think this is so very the wrong way round. Species characteristics are generalisations about similar individual creatures. The 'species' doesn't do anything at all. It is a classification. See ring species, for example.