15 ideas
| 1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
| Full Idea: A rational donkey faced with two totally identical piles of hay would be unable to decide which one to eat first, and would therefore starve to death | |
| From: report of Jean Buridan (talk [1338]) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: also De Caelo 295b32 (Idea 19740). |
| 472 | No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: No existing things would be clear to anyone, either in themselves or in their relationship to one another, unless there existed Number and its essence. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.03.8 |
| 16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: If magnitude were removed from matter by divine power, it would still have parts distinct from one another, but they would not be positioned either outside one another or inside one another, because position would be removed. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.8 f. 11va), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4 | |
| A reaction: This shows why Quantity is such an important category for scholastic philosopher. |
| 16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: Less properly, one thing is said to be numerically the same as another according to the continuity of distinct parts, one in succession after another. In this way the Seine is said to be the same river after a thousand years. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.10, f. 13vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.3 | |
| A reaction: This is a rather good solution to the difficulty of the looser non-transitive notion of a thing being 'the same'. The Ship of Theseus endures (in the simple case) as long as you remember to replace each departing plank. Must some parts be originals? |
| 16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: The entire difficulty in this question is why through a knowledge of the primary tangible qualities we cannot come to a knowledge of flavors or odors, since these are their causes, since we often go from knowledge of causes to knowing their effects. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics [1344], I.28c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.2 | |
| A reaction: He is commenting on Idea 16725. Still a nice puzzle in the philosophy of mind. Will neuroscientists ever be able to infer to actual character of some quale, just from the structures of the neurons? |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: Inductions are not demonstrations, because they do not conclude on account of their form, since it is not possible to make an induction from all cases. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3 | |
| A reaction: Thus showing that demonstration really is meant to be as conclusive as a mathematical proof, and that Aristotle seems to think such a thing is possible in physical science. |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: Induction should be regarded as a principle of natural science. For otherwise you could not prove that every fire is hot, that all rhubarb is purgative of bile, that every magnet attracts iron. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3 | |
| A reaction: He is basing this on Aristotle, and refers to 'Physics' 190a33-b11. |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
| From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
| A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
| 22511 | Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: Some reasonings are stronger than we are. | |
| From: Philolaus (fragments/reports [c.425 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - Eudemian Ethics 1225a33 | |
| A reaction: This endorses the Aristotle view of akrasia (as opposed to the Socratic view). This isolated remark seems to imply that we are more clearly embodiments of will than of reason. |
| 473 | There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: The nature of number and harmony admits of no falsehood; for this is unrelated to them. Falsehood and envy belong to the nature of the Unlimited and the Unintelligent and the Irrational. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 1518 | Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: Everything which is known has number, because otherwise it is impossible for anything to be the object of thought or knowledge. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B04), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7b |
| 1519 | Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: It would have been impossible for the dissimilar and incompatible sources to have been made into an orderly universe unless harmony had been present in some form or other. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B06), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7d |
| 469 | Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: Since it is plain that existing things are neither wholly from the Limiting, nor wholly from the Unlimited, clearly the cosmos and its contents were fitted together from both the Limiting and the Unlimited. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B02), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7a |
| 476 | Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: Number is the ruling and self-created bond which maintains the everlasting stability of the contents of the universe. | |
| From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B23), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 1787 | Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Philolaus was the first person to affirm that the earth moves in a circle. | |
| From: report of Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 08.Ph.3 |