Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Joseph Levine and William Shakespeare

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
For there was never yet philosopher/ That could endure the toothache patiently [Shakespeare]
     Full Idea: For there was never yet philosopher/ That could endure the toothache patiently.
     From: William Shakespeare (Much Ado About Nothing [1600], V.i)
     A reaction: You can't argue with that. I do think that people who have studied philosophy at length are more likely to be 'philosophical' when faced with human misery, but only up to a point.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Good reasons must give way to better [Shakespeare]
     Full Idea: Good reasons must of force give way to better.
     From: William Shakespeare (Julius Caesar [1599], 4.3.205)
     A reaction: [Brutus to Cassius] This remark is an axiom of rationality. But, of course, reasons can come in groups, and three modest reasons may compete with one very good reason.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Materialists identify pain with the firing of nociceptive-specific neurons in the parietal cortex. Even so, Levine argues, we will still lack any explanation of why nociceptive-specific neurons yield pain.
     From: report of Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1
     A reaction: [Proposed by Levine in 1983] I don't think we need to instantly go dualist when faced with this, but we may all eventually have to concede a bit of mysterianism. The explanation may be holistic (and hence hopelessly complex).
Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Levine says the explanatory gap is peculiar to phenomenal states. Once water has been identified with H2O, or temperature with mean kinetic energy, we do not continue to ask why H2O yields water, or why mean kinetic energy yields temperature.
     From: report of Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1
     A reaction: Everything is mysterious if you think about if for long enough. What about a representational gap? Why do those neurons represent that tree (if the neurons aren't tree-shaped)? To understand qualia, we must understand the whole brain, I suspect.
Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine]
     Full Idea: We cannot give materialist explanations of why brain yields phenomenal properties because phenomenal concepts are not associated with descriptions of causal roles in the same way as pre-theoretical terms in other areas of science.
     From: comment on Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1
     A reaction: I think Papineau has part of the answer, and I certainly like his notion of Conceptual Dualism, but if qualia are physical, there must be a physical account of how they acquire their properties. I think the whole brain needs to be understood first.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
The cause of my action is in my will [Shakespeare]
     Full Idea: The cause is in my will. I will not come./That is enough to satisfy the senate./But for your private satisfaction,/Because I love you, I will let you know.
     From: William Shakespeare (Julius Caesar [1599], II.ii)
     A reaction: This asserts the purest form of volitionism, but then qualifies it, because Caesar's will has been influenced by his wife's dreams.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
Our obedience to the king erases any crimes we commit for him [Shakespeare]
     Full Idea: We know enough if we know we are the king's men. Our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us.
     From: William Shakespeare (Henry V [1599]), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 03
     A reaction: He is referring to the slaughter of the French servants behind the lines at Agincourt. A classic expression of 'I was just obeying orders', which was rejected at Nurnberg in 1946. Depends on the seriousness of the crime.