8525
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Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
Because there cannot be relations without terms, in a meta-physic that makes first-order tropes the terms of all relations, relational tropes must belong to a second, derivative order.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §8)
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A reaction:
The admission that there could be a 'derivative order' may lead to trouble for trope theory. Ostrich Nominalists could say that properties themselves are derivative second-order abstractions from indivisible particulars. Russell makes them first-order.
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16051
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Life has a new supervenient relation, which alters its underlying physical events [Morgan,L]
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Full Idea:
When some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue of its presence.
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From:
Lloyd Morgan (Emergent Evolution [1923], pp.15-16), quoted by Terence Horgan - From Supervenience to Superdupervenience 1
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A reaction:
This is a clear assertion of 'downward causation' at the first introduction of 'supervenience', supporting 'emergentism' about life and mind. That is, the newly-emerged feature has new causal powers that affect the physical system from outside. Wrong!
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8513
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Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
If we have two cloths of the very same shade of redness, we can show there are two cloths by burning one and leaving the other unaffected; we show there are two cases of redness in the same way: dye one blue, leaving the other unaffected.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §1)
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A reaction:
This has to be one of the basic facts of the problem accepted by everyone. If you dye half of one of the pieces, was the original red therefore one instance or two? Has it become two? How many red tropes are there in a red cloth?
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8524
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Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
The metaphysics of abstract particulars gives a central place to space, or space-time, as the frame of the world. ...Tropes are, of their essence, regional, which carries with it the essential presence of shape and size in any trope occurrence.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §7)
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A reaction:
Trope theory has a problem with Aristotle's example (Idea 557) of what happens when white is mixed with white. Do two tropes become one trope if you paint on a second coat of white? How can particulars merge? How can abstractions merge?
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8519
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Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
Each individual is distinct from each other individual, so the bundle account of objects requires each bundle to be different from every other bundle. So the Identity of Indiscernibles must be a necessary truth, which, unfortunately, it is not.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §5)
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A reaction:
Clearly the Identity of Indiscernibles is not a necessary truth (consider just two identical spheres). Location and time must enter into it. Could we not add a further individuation requirement to the necessary existence of a bundle? (Quinton)
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20653
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Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
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Full Idea:
There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
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From:
report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
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A reaction:
I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
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8512
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Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
An item is abstract if it is got before the mind by an act of abstraction, that is, by concentrating attention on some, but not all, of what is presented.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §1)
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A reaction:
I think this point is incredibly important. Pure Fregean semantics tries to leave out the psychological component, and yet all the problems in semantics concern various sorts of abstraction. Imagination is the focus of the whole operation.
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8516
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Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
Not all singular causal statements are of Davidson's event-event type. Many involve conditions, so there are condition-event (weakness/collapse), event-condition (explosion/movement), and condition-condition (hot/warming) causal connections.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §3)
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A reaction:
Fans of Davidson need to reduce conditions to events. The problem of individuation keeps raising its head. Davidson makes it depend on description. Kim looks good, because events, and presumably conditions, reduce to something small and precise.
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