Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Lloyd Morgan and Paul Bernays

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5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10304 Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
     Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934])
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10303 Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
     Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261)
     A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
10306 Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
     Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268)
     A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16051 Life has a new supervenient relation, which alters its underlying physical events [Morgan,L]
     Full Idea: When some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue of its presence.
     From: Lloyd Morgan (Emergent Evolution [1923], pp.15-16), quoted by Terence Horgan - From Supervenience to Superdupervenience 1
     A reaction: This is a clear assertion of 'downward causation' at the first introduction of 'supervenience', supporting 'emergentism' about life and mind. That is, the newly-emerged feature has new causal powers that affect the physical system from outside. Wrong!
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?