76 ideas
5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The concept of truth was originated by the senses. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.479) | |
A reaction: This is a refreshing challenge to the modern view of truth, which seems entirely entangled with language. Truth seems a useful concept when discussing the workings of an animal mind. As you get closer to an object, you see it more 'truly'. |
15945 | Second-order set theory just adds a version of Replacement that quantifies over functions [Lavine] |
Full Idea: Second-order set theory is just like first-order set-theory, except that we use the version of Replacement with a universal second-order quantifier over functions from set to sets. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], VII.4) |
15914 | An 'upper bound' is the greatest member of a subset; there may be several of these, so there is a 'least' one [Lavine] |
Full Idea: A member m of M is an 'upper bound' of a subset N of M if m is not less than any member of N. A member m of M is a 'least upper bound' of N if m is an upper bound of N such that if l is any other upper bound of N, then m is less than l. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], III.4) | |
A reaction: [if you don't follow that, you'll have to keep rereading it till you do] |
15921 | Collections of things can't be too big, but collections by a rule seem unlimited in size [Lavine] |
Full Idea: Since combinatorial collections are enumerated, some multiplicities may be too large to be gathered into combinatorial collections. But the size of a multiplicity seems quite irrelevant to whether it forms a logical connection. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], IV.2) |
15937 | Those who reject infinite collections also want to reject the Axiom of Choice [Lavine] |
Full Idea: Many of those who are skeptical about the existence of infinite combinatorial collections would want to doubt or deny the Axiom of Choice. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], VI.2) |
15936 | The Power Set is just the collection of functions from one collection to another [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The Power Set is just he codification of the fact that the collection of functions from a mathematical collection to a mathematical collection is itself a mathematical collection that can serve as a domain of mathematical study. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], VI.1) |
15899 | Replacement was immediately accepted, despite having very few implications [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Replacement (of Skolem and Fraenkel) was remarkable for its universal acceptance, though it seemed to have no consequences except for the properties of the higher reaches of the Cantorian infinite. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], I) |
15930 | Foundation says descending chains are of finite length, blocking circularity, or ungrounded sets [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Foundation (Zermelo 1930) says 'Every (descending) chain in which each element is a member of the previous one is of finite length'. ..This forbids circles of membership, or ungrounded sets. ..The iterative conception gives this centre stage. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], V.4) |
15898 | The controversy was not about the Axiom of Choice, but about functions as arbitrary, or given by rules [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The controversy was not about Choice per se, but about the correct notion of function - between advocates of taking mathematics to be about arbitrary functions and advocates of taking it to be about functions given by rules. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], I) |
15920 | Pure collections of things obey Choice, but collections defined by a rule may not [Lavine] |
Full Idea: Combinatorial collections (defined just by the members) obviously obey the Axiom of Choice, while it is at best dubious whether logical connections (defined by a rule) do. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], IV.2) |
15919 | The 'logical' notion of class has some kind of definition or rule to characterise the class [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The Peano-Russell notion of class is the 'logical' notion, where each collection is associated with some kind of definition or rule that characterises the members of the collection. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], IV.1) |
15900 | The iterative conception of set wasn't suggested until 1947 [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The iterative conception of set was not so much as suggested, let alone advocated by anyone, until 1947. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], I) |
15931 | The iterative conception needs the Axiom of Infinity, to show how far we can iterate [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The iterative conception of sets does not tell us how far to iterate, and so we must start with an Axiom of Infinity. It also presupposes the notion of 'transfinite iteration'. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], V.5) |
15932 | The iterative conception doesn't unify the axioms, and has had little impact on mathematical proofs [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The iterative conception does not provide a conception that unifies the axioms of set theory, ...and it has had very little impact on what theorems can be proved. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], V.5) | |
A reaction: He says he would like to reject the iterative conception, but it may turn out that Foundation enables new proofs in mathematics (though it hasn't so far). |
15933 | Limitation of Size: if it's the same size as a set, it's a set; it uses Replacement [Lavine] |
Full Idea: Limitation of Size has it that if a collection is the same size as a set, then it is a set. The Axiom of Replacement is characteristic of limitation of size. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], V.5) |
15913 | A collection is 'well-ordered' if there is a least element, and all of its successors can be identified [Lavine] |
Full Idea: A collection M is 'well-ordered' by a relation < if < linearly orders M with a least element, and every subset of M that has an upper bound not in it has an immediate successor. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], III.4) |
15926 | Second-order logic presupposes a set of relations already fixed by the first-order domain [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The distinctive feature of second-order logic is that it presupposes that, given a domain, there is a fact of the matter about what the relations on it are, so that the range of the second-order quantifiers is fixed as soon as the domain is fixed. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], V.3) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a rather large assumption, which is open to challenge. I am not sure whether it was the basis of Quine's challenge to second-order logic. He seems to have disliked its vagueness, because it didn't stick with 'objects'. |
15934 | Mathematical proof by contradiction needs the law of excluded middle [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The Law of Excluded Middle is (part of) the foundation of the mathematical practice of employing proofs by contradiction. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], VI.1) | |
A reaction: This applies in a lot of logic, as well as in mathematics. Come to think of it, it applies in Sudoku. |
15907 | Mathematics is nowadays (thanks to set theory) regarded as the study of structure, not of quantity [Lavine] |
Full Idea: Mathematics is today thought of as the study of abstract structure, not the study of quantity. That point of view arose directly out of the development of the set-theoretic notion of abstract structure. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], III.2) | |
A reaction: It sounds as if Structuralism, which is a controversial view in philosophy, is a fait accompli among mathematicians. |
15942 | Every rational number, unlike every natural number, is divisible by some other number [Lavine] |
Full Idea: One reason to introduce the rational numbers is that it simplifes the theory of division, since every rational number is divisible by every nonzero rational number, while the analogous statement is false for the natural numbers. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], VI.3) | |
A reaction: That is, with rations every division operation has an answer. |
15922 | For the real numbers to form a set, we need the Continuum Hypothesis to be true [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The chief importance of the Continuum Hypothesis for Cantor (I believe) was that it would show that the real numbers form a set, and hence that they were encompassed by his theory. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], IV.2) |
18250 | Cauchy gave a necessary condition for the convergence of a sequence [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The Cauchy convergence criterion for a sequence: the sequence S0,S1,... has a limit if |S(n+r) - S(n)| is less than any given quantity for every value of r and sufficiently large values of n. He proved this necessary, but not sufficient. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], 2.5) |
15904 | The two sides of the Cut are, roughly, the bounding commensurable ratios [Lavine] |
Full Idea: Roughly speaking, the upper and lower parts of the Dedekind cut correspond to the commensurable ratios greater than and less than a given incommensurable ratio. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], II.6) | |
A reaction: Thus there is the problem of whether the contents of the gap are one unique thing, or many. |
15912 | Counting results in well-ordering, and well-ordering makes counting possible [Lavine] |
Full Idea: Counting a set produces a well-ordering of it. Conversely, if one has a well-ordering of a set, one can count it by following the well-ordering. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], III.4) | |
A reaction: Cantor didn't mean that you could literally count the set, only in principle. |
15947 | The infinite is extrapolation from the experience of indefinitely large size [Lavine] |
Full Idea: My proposal is that the concept of the infinite began with an extrapolation from the experience of indefinitely large size. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], VIII.2) | |
A reaction: I think it might be better to talk of an 'abstraction' than an 'extrapolition', since the latter is just more of the same, which doesn't get you to concept. Lavine spends 100 pages working out his proposal. |
15949 | The theory of infinity must rest on our inability to distinguish between very large sizes [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The indiscernibility of indefinitely large sizes will be a critical part of the theory of indefinitely large sizes. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], VIII.2) |
15940 | The intuitionist endorses only the potential infinite [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The intuitionist endorse the actual finite, but only the potential infinite. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], VI.2) |
15909 | 'Aleph-0' is cardinality of the naturals, 'aleph-1' the next cardinal, 'aleph-ω' the ω-th cardinal [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The symbol 'aleph-nought' denotes the cardinal number of the set of natural numbers. The symbol 'aleph-one' denotes the next larger cardinal number. 'Aleph-omega' denotes the omega-th cardinal number. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], III.3) |
15915 | Ordinals are basic to Cantor's transfinite, to count the sets [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The ordinals are basic because the transfinite sets are those that can be counted, or (equivalently for Cantor), those that can be numbered by an ordinal or are well-ordered. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], III.4) | |
A reaction: Lavine observes (p.55) that for Cantor 'countable' meant 'countable by God'! |
15917 | Paradox: the class of all ordinals is well-ordered, so must have an ordinal as type - giving a bigger ordinal [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The paradox of the largest ordinal (the 'Burali-Forti') is that the class of all ordinal numbers is apparently well-ordered, and so it has an ordinal number as order type, which must be the largest ordinal - but all ordinals can be increased by one. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], III.5) |
15918 | Paradox: there is no largest cardinal, but the class of everything seems to be the largest [Lavine] |
Full Idea: The paradox of the largest cardinal ('Cantor's Paradox') says the diagonal argument shows there is no largest cardinal, but the class of all individuals (including the classes) must be the largest cardinal number. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], III.5) |
15929 | Set theory will found all of mathematics - except for the notion of proof [Lavine] |
Full Idea: Every theorem of mathematics has a counterpart with set theory - ...but that theory cannot serve as a basis for the notion of proof. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], V.3) |
15935 | Modern mathematics works up to isomorphism, and doesn't care what things 'really are' [Lavine] |
Full Idea: In modern mathematics virtually all work is only up to isomorphism and no one cares what the numbers or points and lines 'really are'. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], VI.1) | |
A reaction: At least that leaves the field open for philosophers, because we do care what things really are. So should everybody else, but there is no persuading some people. |
15928 | Intuitionism rejects set-theory to found mathematics [Lavine] |
Full Idea: Intuitionism in philosophy of mathematics rejects set-theoretic foundations. | |
From: Shaughan Lavine (Understanding the Infinite [1994], V.3 n33) |
5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: What can be a surer guide to the distinction of true from false than our own senses? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.700) | |
A reaction: This doesn't say they are the only guide, which leaves room for guides such as what is consistent or self-evident or inferred. There is enough here, though, to show that the Epicureans were empiricists in a fairly modern way. |
5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The structure of your reasoning must be rickety and defective, if the senses on which it rests are themselves deceptive. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.518) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as one of the most basic tenets of empiricism. It denies the existence of 'pure' reason, and instead asserts that it is built out of complex and abstracted sense experience, which makes it ultimately a second-class citizen. |
5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If a belief resting directly on the foundation of the senses is not valid, there will be no standard to which we can refer any doubt on obscure questions for rational confirmation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.422) | |
A reaction: A classic statement of empiricist foundationalism. The Epicureans don't appear to have any time for a priori truths at all. I wonder if they settled mathematical disputes by counting objects and drawing diagrams? |
5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Paradoxical experiences (such a dreams and illusions) cannot shake our faith in the senses. Most of the illusion is due to the mental assumptions we ourselves superimpose, so that things not perceived by the senses pass for perceptions. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.462) | |
A reaction: Some misinterpretations of the senses, such as thinking a square tower round, are the result of foolish lack of judgement, but actual delusions within the senses, such as a ringing in the ears, or a pain in a amputated leg, seem like real sense failures. |
5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: No fact is so simple that it is not harder to believe than to doubt at the first presentation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1022) | |
A reaction: Hence induction is just 'drumming it in' until you come to believe it. There are good evolutionary reasons why we should be like this, because we would otherwise believe all sorts of silly half-perceptions in the gloaming. |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The guiding principle of the whole body is the mind or intellect, which is firmly lodged in the mid-region of the breast. Here is felt fear and alarm, and the caressing pulse of joy. Here, then is the seat of the intellect and mind. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.140) | |
A reaction: Even by this date thinking people were not clear that the mind is in the brain. They paid insufficient attention to head injuries. The emotions are felt to have a location, but intellect and principles are not. |
5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: First, I maintain that the mind, which we often call the intellect, the seat of guidance and control of life, is part of a man, no less than hand or foot or eyes are parts of a whole living creature. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.95) | |
A reaction: Presumably Lucretius asserts this because some people were denying it. Sounds like common sense to me. The only reason I can see for anyone denying what he says is if they are desperate to survive death. |
21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: No single element [of the soul] can be separated, nor can their capacities be divided spatially; they are like the multiple powers of a single body | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.262), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 2.7 | |
A reaction: It is interesting that this comes from someone with a strongly physicalist view of the mind (though not, if I recall, focusing on the brain). He is still totally impressed by the unified phenomenology of mental experience. He is an empiricist. |
5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The fact that the mind itself has no internal necessity to determine its every act and compel it to suffer in helpless passivity - this is due to the slight swerve of the atoms at no determinate time or place. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.294) | |
A reaction: No one likes this proposal much, but it is very intriguing. The Epicureans had seen a problem, one which doesn't bother me much. If, nowadays, you are a reductive physicalist who believes in free will, you have a philosophical nightmare ahead of you. |
5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing can touch or be touched except body. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.303) | |
A reaction: This is the key objection to interactionism, and the main reason why the atomists have a thoroughly material view of the mind. It is an induction from a very large number of instances, but the argument is not, of course, conclusive. |
5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The earth is and always has been an insentient being. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.658) | |
A reaction: The fact that Epicurus needs to deny this shows that some idea close to panpsychism must still have been around in his time. He is discussing gods at the time, so maybe pantheism was the view being attacked, but that is a subset of panpsychism. |
5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: There is the possibility that particles have senses like those of an animate being as a whole, …but from the fact that we perceive eggs turning into live fledglings, we may infer that sense can be generated from the insentient. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.914) | |
A reaction: He gives other arguments for his view. The egg example is not a strong argument, but is precisely our puzzle of how consciousness can emerge from the process of evolution, and natural selection makes dualism look unlikely. |
5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Mind and spirit are both composed of matter, as we see them propelling limbs, rousing the body from sleep, changing the expression of the face, and guiding the whole man - activities which clearly involves touch, which involves matter. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.164) | |
A reaction: This is the inverse of Descartes' interaction problem, and strikes me as a straightforward common sense truth. However, if you believe in spiritual gods, this gives you a model for the interaction (however mysterious) of matter and spirit. |
5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Why are lions ferocious, foxes crafty, and deer timid? It can only be because the mind always shares in the specific growth of the body according to its seed and breed. If it were immortal and reincarnated, living things would have jumbled characters. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.743) | |
A reaction: A nice argument which I have not encountered in modern times. Of course, even Descartes admits that the mind is intermingled with the body, but it seems that the essential character of a mind is dictated by the body. |
5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: One can laugh without being composed of laughing particles, ..so why cannot the things that we see gifted with sensation be compounded of seeds that are wholly senseless? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.988) | |
A reaction: Lovely argument! You might feel driven to panpsychism in your desperation to explain the 'weirdness' of consciousness, but it would be mad to attribute laughter to basic matter, so comedy has to 'emerge' at some point. |
6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: What is food to one may be literally poison to others. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.638) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the origin of the well-known saying. This is not relativism of perception, but a relativism of how individuals actually respond to the world. It sums up the position with, say, the operas of Wagner. |
5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing in our bodies was born in order that we might be able to use it, but the thing born creates the use. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.834) | |
A reaction: This remark (strongly opposed to Aristotle's view of human function and nature) raises the obvious question of why the body is so very useful for staying alive. Most of its uses are not random. Lucretius would abandon this view if he read Darwin. |
5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: One who no longer is cannot suffer, or differ in any way from one who has never been born. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.867) | |
A reaction: There is a special kind of pain in being poor if you were once rich, which is not suffered by those who experience only poverty. Lucretius is right, but we are concerned with how we feel now, not with how we won't feel once dead. |
5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nature only clamours for two things, a body free from pain, a mind released from worry and fear for the enjoyment of pleasurable sensation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.21) | |
A reaction: I can't help agreeing with those (like Aristotle) who consider this a very demeaning view of human life. See Idea 99. Bentham agrees with Lucretius (Idea 3777). I think they are largely right, but not entirely. Other motives are possible than sensations. |
5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nature is free and uncontrolled by proud masters and runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1094) | |
A reaction: A nice remark. This apparent personification of nature implies the application of laws to an essentially passive reality. See Idea 5442 and Nature|Laws of Nature|Essentialism for a different view. |
5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: There can be no centre in infinity. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.1069) | |
A reaction: This is highly significant, because if we can establish that the universe is infinite (as Epicurus believes), it follows that the human race cannot be at the centre of it, as the Ptolemaic/medieval view proposed. |
5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The universe is not bounded in any direction. If it were, it would necessarily have a limit somewhere, but a thing cannot have a limit unless there is something outside to limit it. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.959) | |
A reaction: This is a subtler argument than the mere enquiry about why you would have to stop at the end of the universe. It still seems a nice argument, though Einstein's curvature of space seems to have thwarted it. |
5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The ultimate realities of heaven and the gods are the atoms, from which nature creates all things and increases and feeds them, and into which, when they perish, nature again resolves them. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.46) | |
A reaction: Sounds right to me. Nothing in modern particle theory and string theory has refuted this claim. But what makes the atoms move, and what makes them combine in an orderly way? Is the orderliness of atoms made of atoms? Essences? |
5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If there are no atoms, the smallest bodies will have infinite parts, since they can be endlessly halved. ..But then there will be no difference between the smallest thing and the whole universe, as they will equally have infinite parts. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.620) | |
A reaction: Another argument which remains effective even now. There must surely (intuitively) be more divisions possible in a large object than in a small one? Unless of course there were many different sizes of infinity…. See Cantor. |
5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: When atoms are travelling straight down through empty space by their own weight, at quite indeterminate times and places they swerve ever so little from their course. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.217) | |
A reaction: Never a popular theory because it seems to breach the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Ideas 306 + 3646). This seems to be the beginning of a strong need for the concept of free will, and an underlying explanation. Most thinkers put mind outside nature. |
17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing has power to break the binding laws of eternity. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], 5.56) | |
A reaction: This seems to be virtually the only remark from the ancient world suggesting that there are 'laws' of nature, so I'm guessing it is a transient metaphor, not a theory about nature. 'Even the gods must bow to necessity'. |
5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Atoms move themselves. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.133) | |
A reaction: Something has to move itself, I suppose, but then that could be psuché, giving us free will (see Idea 1424). Why does Epicurus need the 'swerve' if atoms are self-movers? See Idea 5708. |
5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: We see movement everywhere, but if there were no empty space, things would be denied the power of movement - or rather, they could not possibly have come into existence, embedded as they would have been in motionless matter. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.342) | |
A reaction: This still seems a good argument, if reality is made of particles. People can move in a crowd until it becomes too dense. |
5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Anything can be more speedily disintegrated than put together again. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.558) | |
A reaction: Clearly the concept of entropy was around long before anyone tried to give a systematic or mathematical account of it. |
5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It must not be claimed that anyone can sense time by itself apart from the movement of things or their restful immobility. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.465) | |
A reaction: This seems a remarkably Einsteinian remark, though he is only talking of the epistemology of the matter, not the ontology. We are not far from the concept of space-time here. |
5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It is in the highest degree unlikely that this earth and sky is the only one to have been created. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1057) | |
A reaction: I can only admire the science fiction imagination of this, which roughly agrees with the assessment of modern cosmologists. We think imagination was cramped in the ancient world, and now wanders free - but that is not so. |
5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: In studying the workings of nature, our starting-point will be this principle: nothing can ever be created by divine power out of nothing. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.152) | |
A reaction: This claim seems to cry out for a bit of empiricist caution. What observation has convinced Lucretius that creation out of nothing is impossible? The early Christians switched to the view that divine creation is 'ex nihilo' - out of nothing. |
5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If the matter in things had not been everlasting, everything by now would have gone back to nothing, and the things we see would be the product of rebirth out of nothing. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.544) | |
A reaction: See Idea 1431, which is Aquinas's Third Way of proving God. Aquinas thinks there must be a necessary being outside of the system, but Lucretius thinks there must be some necessary existence within the system (as Hume had suggested). |
5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The universe was certainly not created for us by divine power: it is so full of imperfections. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.180) | |
A reaction: This is certainly a problem if God is 'supremely perfect', as Descartes proposed, because then the universe would also have to be supremely perfect. See Idea 2114 for a possible answer from Leibniz. Hume agrees with Epicurus about design. |
5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The nature of deity is to enjoy immortal existence in utter tranquillity, aloof and detached from our affairs. It is free from all pain and peril, strong in its own resources, exempt from any need of us, indifferent to our merits and immune from anger. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.652) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the seed of late seventeenth century deism - the idea of a Creator who is now absent, and ignores our prayers. At that time 'Epicurean' became a synonym for atheist, but Epicureans never quite reached that point. |
5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Why does Jupiter never hurl his thunderbolt upon the earth and let loose his thunder out of a sky that is wholly blue? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], VI.400) | |
A reaction: Nice question! It really doesn't take very much to see through superstition, and the fact that most people believed such things shows how staggeringly uncritical they were in their thinking, until philosophers appeared and taught them how to reason. |
5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Spirit is mortal. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.542) | |
A reaction: This is asserted at an historical moment when immortality is beginning to grip everyone's imagination. |
5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If spirit is immortal and can remain sentient when divorced from our body, we must credit it with possession of five senses; but eyes or nostrils or hand or tongue or ears cannot be attached to a disembodied spirit. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.624) | |
A reaction: This is a powerful argument against immortality. If you are going to see, you must interact with photons; to hear you must respond to compression waves; to smell you must react to certain molecules. Immortality without those would be a bit dull. |
5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It is crazy to couple a mortal object with an eternal and suppose that they can work in harmony and mutually interact. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.799) | |
A reaction: An interesting thought, though not a terrible persuasive argument. A god would indeed be a bit restless if it were chained to a human being, but it would presumably knuckle down to the task if firmly instructed to do it by Zeus. |
5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Since the substance of the mind is extraordinarily mobile, it must consist of particles exceptionally small and smooth and round, ..so that, when the spirit has escaped from the body, the outside of the limbs appears intact and there is no loss of weight. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.201) | |
A reaction: Lucretius is wonderfully attentive to interesting evidence. He goes on to compare it to the evaporation of perfume. The fine-grained connections of the brain are not far off what he is proposing. |
5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If the spirit is by nature immortal and is slipped into the body at birth, why do we retain no memory of an earlier existence, no impress of antecedent events? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.670) | |
A reaction: Plato took the view that we do recall previous existence, as seen in our innate ideas. This problem forced the Christian church into the uncomfortable claim that God creates the soul at conception, but that it then goes on to immortality. |