75 ideas
21405 | Cicero sees wisdom in terms of knowledge, but earlier Stoics saw it as moral [Cicero, by Long] |
Full Idea: Cicero (drawing on Panaetius) treats wisdom as if its province were primarily a disinterested pursuit of knowledge. But earlier Stoics gave purely moral definitions of wisdom. | |
From: report of M. Tullius Cicero (On Duties ('De Officiis') [c.44 BCE], 1.11-20) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 5 | |
A reaction: I would have thought that after long discussion most ancient (and even modern) philosophers would conclude that it is both. The 'intellectualism' of Socrates hovers in the background, implying that healthy knowledge produces virtue. |
20871 | Unfortunately we choose a way of life before we are old enough to think clearly [Cicero] |
Full Idea: At the beginning of adolescence when our deliberative capacities are weak we decide on the way of life that we find attractive. So one gets entangled in a definite manner and pattern of life before one is able to judge which one is best. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Duties ('De Officiis') [c.44 BCE], 1.117) | |
A reaction: Hence it is important to have lots of means for bailing out of education courses, jobs, and even marriage. At least university postpones the key life choices till the early twenties. |
5893 | A wise man has integrity, firmness of will, nobility, consistency, sobriety, patience [Cicero] |
Full Idea: The wise man does nothing of which he can repent, nothing against his will, does everything nobly, consistently, soberly, rightly, not looking forward to anything as bound to come, is not astonished at any novel occurrence, abides by his own decisions. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxviii) | |
A reaction: Notice that the wise man never exhibits weakness of will (an Aristotelian virtue), and is consistent (as Kant proposed), and is patient (as the Stoics proposed). But Cicero doesn't think he should busy himself maximising happiness. |
5891 | Philosophy is the collection of rational arguments [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Philosophy consists in the collection of rational arguments. [Philosophia ex rationum collatione constet] | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], IV.xxxviii.84) | |
A reaction: A nice epigraph for this database. Philosophy is, I trust, a little more than that, because you don't just hide them away in a drawer. But if you arrange them nicely in a museum (a website, for example), not a lot more can be done. |
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
Full Idea: We can have words without a world but no world without words or other symbols. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Goodman seems to have a particularly extreme version of the commitment to philosophy as linguistic. Non-human animals have no world, it seems. |
2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], I.viii.32) |
2653 | If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, the whole universe must also be subject to it [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, then the universe itself must be subject to this law. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.86) |
2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
Full Idea: There cannot be more than one truth. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlviii.147) |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Truth pertains solely to what is said ...For nonverbal versions and even for verbal versions without statements, truth is irrelevant. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Goodman is a philosopher of language (like Dummett), but I am a philosopher of thought (like Evans). The test, for me, is whether truth is applicable to the thought of non-human animals. I take it to be obvious that it is applicable. |
15510 | Classes are a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities [Goodman] |
Full Idea: I will not willingly use apparatus that peoples the world with a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (The Structure of Appearance [1951], II.2), quoted by David Lewis - Parts of Classes 2.1 | |
A reaction: This represents the big gap that opened up with Goodman's former comrade in arms, Quine. Lewis quotes it in order to ask whether he means ethereal or platonic, as they are very different. I sympathise with Goodman. |
9920 | Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Goodman, by Burgess/Rosen] |
Full Idea: Goodman argues that the set or class {{a}},{a,b}} is supposed to be distinct from the set or class {{b},{a,b}}, even though both are ultimately constituted from the same a and b. | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Structure of Appearance [1951]) by JP Burgess / G Rosen - A Subject with No Object I.A.2.a | |
A reaction: I'm with Goodman all the way here, even though it is deeply unfashionable, particularly in the circles I move in. If there are trillion grains of sand on a beach, how many sets are we supposed to be committed to? |
10657 | The counties of Utah, and the state, and its acres, are in no way different [Goodman] |
Full Idea: A class (counties of Utah) is different neither from the individual (state of Utah) that contains its members, nor from any other class (acres of Utah) whose members exhaust the whole. For nominalists, distinction of entity means distinction of content. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (The Structure of Appearance [1951], p.26), quoted by Achille Varzi - Mereology 3.1 | |
A reaction: This is a nice credo for the nominalist version of mereology. You can still have a mereology that commits you to the wholes as well as the parts. Cf. Lewis in Idea 10660. |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
Full Idea: A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], p.64) | |
A reaction: This is clearly in tune with Quine's assertion that logic is potentially revisable, and the idea is pragmatist in spirit. It is hard to deny that intuitions about what makes a good argument control our logic. I say the world controls our intuitions. |
21677 | How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: How can something that is not true not be false, or how can something that is not false not be true? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 16.38) | |
A reaction: We must at least distinguish between whether the contrary thing is not actually true, or whether we are prepared to assert that it is not true. The disjunction may seem to be a false dichotomy. 'He isn't good' may not entail 'he is evil'. |
2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
Full Idea: It is a fundamental principle of dialectic that every statement is either true or false. So is this a true proposition or a false one: "If you say that you are lying and say it truly, you lie"? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xxix.95) |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Nothing is primitive or derivationally prior to anything apart from a constructional system. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4c) | |
A reaction: Something may be primitive not just because we can't be bothered to analyse it any further, but because even God couldn't analyse it. Maybe. |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Recognising patterns is very much a matter of inventing or imposing them. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.7) | |
A reaction: I take this to be false. |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Reality in a world, like realism in a picture, is largely a matter of habit. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.6) | |
A reaction: I'm a robust realist, me, but I sort of see what he means. We become steeped in unspoken conventions about how we take our world to be, and filter out anything that conflicts with it. |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
Full Idea: We dismiss as illusory or negligible what cannot be fitted into the architecture of the world we are building. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4d) | |
A reaction: I'm trying to think of an example of this, but can't. Maybe poor people are invisible to the rich? |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
Full Idea: A world may be unmanageably heterogeneous or unbearably monotonous according to how events are sorted into kinds. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4a) | |
A reaction: We might expect this from the man who invented 'grue', which allows you to classify things that change colour with things that don't. Could you describe a bird as 'might have been a fish', and classify it with fish? ('Projectible'?) |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Dispositions of a thing are as important to us as overt behaviour, but they strike us by comparison as rather ethereal. So we are moved to enquire whether we can bring them down to earth, and explain disposition terms without reference to occult powers. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], II.3) | |
A reaction: Mumford quotes this at the start of his book on dispositions, as his agenda. I suspect that the 'occult' aspect crept in because dispositions were based on powers, and the dominant view was that these were the immediate work of God. |
7956 | If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: According to Goodman's 'companionship difficulty', resemblance nominalism has a problem if, say, all and only the red things were the round things, because we cannot distinguish the two different respects in which the things resemble one another. | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Structure of Appearance [1951]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Goodman opts for extreme linguististic nominalism in response to this (Idea 7952), whereas Russell opts for a sort of Platonism (4441). The current idea gives Russell a further problem, of needing a universal of the respect of the resemblance. |
7957 | Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Goodman's 'imperfect community' problem for Resemblance Nominalism says that without mention of respects in which things resemble, we end up with a heterogeneous collection with nothing wholly in common (blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock). | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Structure of Appearance [1951]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.6 | |
A reaction: This suggests Wittgenstein's 'family' resemblance as a way out (Idea 4141), but a blue book and a red clock seem totally unrelated. Nice objection! At this point we start to think that the tropes resemble, rather than the objects. |
7952 | If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Goodman, by Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Predicate nominalism is the view that what all things to which the same word applies have in common is simply our willingness to apply the same word to them. | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Structure of Appearance [1951], Ch.6) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things | |
A reaction: This is Goodman's 'extreme nominalist' position. This seems also to be an anti-realist position, as it denies any 'joints' to nature (Idea 7953). It strikes me as daft. WHY are we willing to apply words in certain ways? |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Identification rests upon organization into entities and kinds. The response to the question 'Same or not the same?' must always be 'Same what?'. ...Identity or constancy in a world is identity with respect to what is within that world as organised. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4a) | |
A reaction: And the gist of his book is that 'organised' is done by us, not by the world. He seems to be committed to the full Geachean relative identity, rather than the mere Wigginsian relative individuation. An unfashionable view! |
12191 | Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge] |
Full Idea: Goodman's central idea was: 'If that match had been scratched, it would have lighted' is true if there are suitable truths from which, with the antecedent, the consequent can be inferred by means of a logical, or more typically natural, law. | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals [1947]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §4 | |
A reaction: Goodman then discusses the problem of identifying the natural laws, and identifying the suitable truths. I'm inclined to think counterfactuals are vaguer than that; they are plausible if coherent reasons can be offered for the inference. |
2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If human nature were interrogated by some god as to whether it was content with its own senses in a sound and undamaged state or demanded something better, I cannot see what more it could ask for. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.19) |
2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: How can there possibly be a memory of what is false? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.22) |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Discovery often amounts, as when I place a piece in a jigsaw puzzle, not to arrival at a proposition for declaration or defense, but to finding a fit. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.7) | |
A reaction: I find Goodman's views here pretty alien, but I like this bit. Coherence really rocks. |
20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
Full Idea: [The sceptical Academics say] what is false cannot be perceived, but every true presentation is such that there can be a false presentation of the same quality. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.40) | |
A reaction: It was the stoics who focused the discussion on 'presentations'. This claim is purely theoretical; no one has ever experienced a false presentation of talking to a family member that was as vivid as the real thing. |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
Full Idea: To use a digital thermometer with readings in tenths of a degree is to recognise no temperature as lying between 90 and 90.1 degrees. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4d) | |
A reaction: This appears to be nonsense, treating users of digital thermometers as if they were stupid. No one thinks temperatures go up and down in quantum leaps. We all know there is a gap between instrument and world. (Very American, I'm thinking!) |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
Full Idea: We have no neat frames of reference, no ready rules for transforming physics, biology and psychology into one another. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.2) |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
Full Idea: Goodman constructed arguments that purported to show that a satisfactory syntactic analysis of the confirmation relation can never be found. In response, philosophers of science tried to model it in probabilistic terms. | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954]) by Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R - Mathematical Methods in Philosophy 4 | |
A reaction: I take this idea to say that Bayesianism was developed in response to the grue problem. This is an interesting light on 'grue', which never bothered me much. The point is it scuppered formal attempts to model induction. |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Goodman has shown that no purely formal criterion can distinguish arguments that are intuitively sound inductive arguments for unsound ones: for every sound one there is an unsound one of the same form. The predicates in the argument make the difference. | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954]) by Hilary Putnam - Why there isn't a ready-made world 'Causation' | |
A reaction: This is to swallow grue whole. I think a bit more chewing is called for. By this date Putnam strikes me as a crazy relativist who has lost his grip on the world. Note the word 'formal' - but Putnam seems to think the argument is important. |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Grue cannot be a relevant kind for induction in the same world as green, for that would preclude some of the decisions, right or wrong, that constitute inductive inference. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4b) | |
A reaction: This may make 'grue' less mad than I thought it was. I always assume we are slicing the world as 'green, blue and grue'. I still say 'green' is a basic predicate of experience, but 'grue' is amenable to analysis. |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
5879 | The soul is the heart, or blood in the heart, or part of the brain, of something living in heart or brain, or breath [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Some think the soul is the heart; Empedocles holds that the soul is blood in the heart; others said one part of the brain claimed the primacy of soul; others say the heart or brain are habitations of the soul; while others identify soul and breath. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.ix.17-19) | |
A reaction: A nice survey of views. Note that many of them identify the psuché/anima with physical parts of the body; only the fourth option seems to be dualist. This is despite the contemptuous response to Democritus' atomist theory of soul. |
5884 | How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Why is it that, using the same mind, we have perception of things so utterly unlike as colour, taste, heat, smell and sound? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xx.47) | |
A reaction: This leaves us with the 'binding problem', of how the dissimilar sensations are pulled together into one field of experience. It is a nice simple objection, though, to anyone who simplistically claims that the mind is self-evidently unified. |
5887 | The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish [Cicero] |
Full Idea: In souls there is no mingling of ingredients, nothing of two-fold nature, so it is impossible for the soul to be divided; impossible, therefore, for it to perish either; for perishing is like the separation of parts which were maintained in union. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxix.71) | |
A reaction: Cicero knows he is pushing his luck in asserting that perishing is a sort of division. Why can't something be there one moment and gone the next? He appears to be in close agreement with Descartes about being a 'thinking thing'. |
5886 | Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things [Cicero] |
Full Idea: The soul has not the power of itself to see itself, but, like the eye, the soul, though it does not see itself, yet discerns other things. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxvii) | |
A reaction: The soul is a complex item which contributes many layers of interpretation to what it sees, so there is scope for parts of the soul seeing other parts. Somewhere in the middle Cicero seems to be right - there is an elusive something we can't get at. |
6029 | Whoever knows future causes knows everything that will be [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Whoever grasps the causes of future things must necessarily grasp all that will be. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Divination ('De divinatione') [c.46 BCE], 1.127) | |
A reaction: Laplace stated this idea in terms of Newtonian physics (Idea 3441), but the key idea is stated more simply and clearly here. God can know the future in this way, without actually seeing it happen now. I can't think why it should not be true. |
2628 | Why would mind mix with matter if it didn't need it? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If the gods have no need of the sensible world, why mix up mind with water and water with mind, if mind can exist by itself without any need of matter? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.24) | |
A reaction: This question migrates into our puzzles about why a separate mental substance would be produced by evolution. If it is device physical systems use to promote themselves, mental substance is reduced to an inferior and dependent role. |
5885 | Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero] |
Full Idea: No beginnings of souls can be found on earth; there is no combination in souls that could be born from earth, nothing that partakes of moist or airy or fiery; for in those elements there is nothing to possess the power of memory, thought, or reflection. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxvi.66) | |
A reaction: Interesting, but I think magnetism is an instructive analogy, which has weird properties which we never perceive in elements (though it is there, buried deep - suggesting panpsychism). Cicero would be disconcerted to find that fire isn't an element. |
21667 | Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it [Cicero] |
Full Idea: There is a close alliance between the orator and the philosophical system of which I am a follower, since the orator borrows subtlely from the Academy, and repays the loan by giving to it a copious and flowing style and rhetorical ornament. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 02.03) | |
A reaction: It is a misundertanding to think that rhetoric and philosophy are seen as in necessary opposition. Philosophers just seemed to think that oratory works a lot better if it is truthful. |
20814 | Eloquence educates, exhorts, comforts, distracts and unites us, and raises us from savagery [Cicero] |
Full Idea: How wonderful is the power of eloquence! It enables us to learn and to teach. We use it to exhort and persuade, to comfort the unfortunate, to distract the timid and calm the passionate. It unites us in law and society, and raises us from savagery. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], 2.147) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Cicero would have been well aware of the doubts about rhetoric felt by Socrates (and possibly Plato). Cicero was probably the greatest Roman orator. |
20440 | Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms [Goodman] |
Full Idea: No definition of art is possible (since it is a referential activity), …but the symptoms of art are syntactic density, semantic density, syntactic repleteness, exemplificationality, and multiple and complex reference. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.22-255), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 4 | |
A reaction: I wish these labels were more self-explanatory. Goodman seems to want to assimilate art to his earlier interests in linguistic anti-realism and mereology. I wouldn't have thought he now had many followers. |
20439 | Artistic symbols are judged by the fruitfulness of their classifications [Goodman, by Giovannelli] |
Full Idea: Artistic symbols are to be judged for the classifications they bring about, for how novel and insightful those classifications are, for how they change our world perceptions and relations. | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968]) by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 4 | |
A reaction: This seems to be an awfully long way from our normal experience of art. I understand 'symbols' in early Flemish art, but not in Mondriaan, or even Rembrandt. |
8113 | Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner] |
Full Idea: In Goodman's account, knowing what a painting represents is logically like understanding a sentence in a natural language. It requires a grasp of the 'symbol system' to which the painting belongs. | |
From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Languages of Art [1976]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 2.3.2 | |
A reaction: This may fit some pictures well (e.g. early Flemish painting, with its complex iconography), but others hardly at all. You can enjoy a first experience of (say) ballet long before you get the hang of the 'symbol system' involved. |
20438 | A performance is only an instance of a work if there is not a single error [Goodman] |
Full Idea: The most miserable performance without actual mistakes does count as an instance of a work, …but the most brilliant performance with a single wrong note does not. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.186), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) | |
A reaction: Mereological essentialism applied to art! You need to be a highly theoretical and technical philosopher (which Goodman was) to maintain such a weird and contrary-usage proposal. |
20437 | A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Paintings and sculptures do not work within a notation; hence, there is no copying of an original that would preserve its originality. A copy of a painting is a copy, not an instance of the original. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.212), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 2 | |
A reaction: Sounds conclusive, but isn't. Is a poetry manuscript a 'notation' or an original? Why is an etching plate a notation, but painting on canvas is an original? Can I create a painting specifically so that it can be copied (by my students)? Intention matters. |
21678 | If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If the cause of desire is not situated within us, even desire itself is also not in our power. ...It follows that neither assent nor action is in our power. Hence there is no justice in either praise or blame, either honours or punishments. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 17.40) | |
A reaction: This is the view of 'old philosophers', but I'm unsure which ones. Cicero spurns this view. It is obvious that the causes of our desires are largely out of our control. Responsibility seems to concern what we do about our desires. |
2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |
Full Idea: None of the virtues can exist unless they are disinterested, for virtue driven to duty by pleasure as a sort of pay is not virtue at all but a deceptive sham and pretence of virtue. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlvi.140) |
5890 | We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it [Cicero] |
Full Idea: We ought not to share distresses ourselves for the sake of others, but we ought to relieve others of their distress if we can. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], IV.xxvi.56) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a sensible and balanced attitude. Some people, particularly in a Christian culture, urge that feeling strong and painful compassion for others is an intrinsic good, but the commonsense view is that that just increases human suffering. |
5894 | All men except philosophers fear poverty [Cicero] |
Full Idea: All men are afraid of poverty, but not a single philosopher is so. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxxi.88) | |
A reaction: Not a thought which is encountered very often in modern philosophy journals. If a person is to be 'philosophical' in the way they live, calm endurance of the vicissitudes and hardships of life has to be a key prerequisite. |
6031 | The essence of propriety is consistency [Cicero] |
Full Idea: The whole essence of propriety is quite certainly consistency. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Duties ('De Officiis') [c.44 BCE], 1.110) | |
A reaction: This seems to me the key intuition on which Kant built his deontological ethical theory. However, opponents say the consistency requires principles, and these are the enemies of truly good human behaviour, which involves Aristotle's 'particulars'. |
5895 | If one despises illiterate mechanics individually, they are not worth more collectively [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Can anything be more foolish than to suppose that those, whom individually one despises as illiterate mechanics, are worth anything collectively? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxxvi.104) | |
A reaction: Aristotle disagrees (Idea 2823). In 1906 a huge number of people guessed the weight of a cow at a fair, and the average was within one pound of the truth. In our world the healthy workings of the group are warped by the mass media. |
2640 | We have the death penalty, but still have thousands of robbers [Cicero] |
Full Idea: We have robbers by the thousand, although they have the penalty of death before their eyes. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.86) |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
Full Idea: If there is but one world, it embraces a multiplicity of contrasting aspects; if there are many worlds, the collection of them all is one. One world may be taken as many, or many worlds taken as one; whether one or many depends on the way of taking. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.2) | |
A reaction: He cites 'The Pluralistic Universe' by William James for this idea. The idea is that the distinction 'evaporates under analysis'. Parmenides seems to have thought that no features could be distinguished in the true One. |
2652 | Some regard nature simply as an irrational force that imparts movement [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Some regard nature as an irrational force which merely imparts a mechanical motion to material bodies. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.81) |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Rather than a sentence being used for prediction because it is a law, it is called a law because it is used for prediction. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], p.21), quoted by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §5.4 | |
A reaction: This smacks of dodgy pragmatism, and sounds deeply wrong. The perception of a law has to be prior to making the prediction. Why do we make the prediction, if we haven't spotted a law. Goodman is mesmerised by language instead of reality. |
2645 | Why shouldn't the gods fear their own destruction? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Why should the gods not be apprehensive of their own possible dissolution? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.114) |
2627 | I wonder whether loss of reverence for the gods would mean the end of all virtue [Cicero] |
Full Idea: I do not know whether, if our reverence for the gods were lost, we should not also see the end of good faith, of human brotherhood, and even of justice itself, which is the keystone of all the virtues. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.3) |
2651 | God doesn't obey the laws of nature; they are subject to the law of God [Cicero] |
Full Idea: God is not subject to obey the laws of nature. It is nature that is subject to the laws of God. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.77) |
2634 | It seems clear to me that we have an innate idea of the divine [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Let us take it as agreed that we have a preconception or "an innate idea" (as I have called it) or a prior knowledge of the divine. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.44) |
2636 | Many primitive people know nothing of the gods [Cicero] |
Full Idea: There must be many wild and primitive peoples who have no idea of the gods at all. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.62) |
2647 | It is obvious from order that someone is in charge, as when we visit a gymnasium [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If one comes into a gymnasium and sees everything properly arranged and carried on in order, one does not imagine these arrangements to be accidental, but infers that there is someone in command whose orders are obeyed. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.15) |
2650 | If a person cannot feel the power of God when looking at the stars, they are probably incapable of feeling [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If any man cannot feel the power of God when he looks upon the stars, then I doubt whether he is capable of any feeling at all. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.55) |
2655 | If the barbarians of Britain saw a complex machine, they would be baffled, but would know it was designed [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If someone were to take the celestial globe of Posidonius and show it to the people of Britain, would a single one of those barbarians fail to see that it was the product of a conscious intelligence? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.88) |
2656 | Chance is no more likely to create the world than spilling lots of letters is likely to create a famous poem [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If someone thinks chance made the world, he should also think that if an infinite number of the letters of the alphabet were shaken together and poured out on the ground it would be possible for them to spell out the whole 'Annals' of Ennius. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.93) |
2657 | If everything with regular movement and order is divine, then recurrent illnesses must be divine [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Are we to find a divinity in every regular movement and in everything which happens in a constant order? If so, we shall have to say that tertian and quartan agues are divine because their course and recurrence is absolutely uniform. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.24) |
2638 | Either the gods are identical, or one is more beautiful than another [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Are the gods all exactly the same? If not, then one must be more beautiful than another. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.80) |
2635 | The gods are happy, so virtuous, so rational, so must have human shape [Cicero] |
Full Idea: We agree the gods are happy, and no happiness is possible without virtue: there is no virtue without reason: and reason is associated only with the human form: then it must follow that the gods themselves have human shape. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.48) |
2641 | Why believe in gods if you have never seen them? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Did you ever actually see a god? Then why do you believe that gods exist? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.88) |
2659 | The lists of good men who have suffered and bad men who have prospered are endless [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Time would fail me if I tried to list all the good men for whom things have turned out badly. So it would if I tried to mention all the wicked who have prospered. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.80) |
2658 | The gods blame men for having vices, but they could have given us enough reason to avoid them [Cicero] |
Full Idea: You gods say that the fault lies in the vices of mankind. But you could have endowed men with reason in a form which would exclude all vice and crime. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.76) |