Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Michael Martin and J.H. Fetzer

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason

6855	Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
	Full Idea: Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments.
	From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134)
	A reaction: I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world.

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument

6856	Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
	Full Idea: Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
	From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
	A reaction: Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential

15797	All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer]
	Full Idea: I propose a dispositional ontology for the physical world, according to which a) every structural property is a dispositional one, b) a physical object is an ordered set of dispositions, and c) every event manifests a dispositional property of the world.
	From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], Intro)
	A reaction: Mumford says this is consistent with ontology as a way of describing the world, rather than being facts about the world. I like Fetzer's sketch, which sounds to have a lot in common with 'process philosophy'.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object

15800	All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer]
	Full Idea: Every atomic event in the world's history is a manifestation of some dispositional property of the world and every physical object is an instantiation of some set of dispositions; hence, every structural property is dispositional in kind.
	From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 5)
	A reaction: I quite like this drastic view, but there remains the intuition that there must always be something which has the disposition. That may be because I have not yet digested the lessons of modern physics.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception

6857	An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M]
	Full Idea: You can end up with an error theory of perception, which says our experience is not as it seems to be, as bizarre as that might be.
	From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.140)
	A reaction: This is because of the clash between subjective and objective aspects of perception. It is an enticing proposal, just the sort of thing I pay philosophers to come up with. Given oddities like blindsight, I think it should be taken seriously.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

20653	Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
	Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
	From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
	A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds

15798	Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer]
	Full Idea: Kinds of things are specific arrangements of dispositions.
	From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 2)
	A reaction: A 'disposition' doesn't seem quite the right word for what is basic to the physical world, though Harré and Madden make a good case for the 'fields' of physic being understood in that way. I prefer 'power', though that doesn't solve anything.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities

15799	Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer]
	Full Idea: Lawlike sentences are conceived as logically general dispositional statements attributing permanent dispositional properties to every member of a reference class. ...Their basic form is that of subjunctive generalizations.
	From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 3)
	A reaction: I much prefer talk of 'lawlike sentences' to talk of 'laws'. At least they imply that the true generalisations about nature are fairly fine-grained. Why not talk of 'generalisations' instead of 'laws'? Fetzer wants dispositions to explain everything.