Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Mikhail Bakunin and J.H. Fetzer

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6 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer]
     Full Idea: I propose a dispositional ontology for the physical world, according to which a) every structural property is a dispositional one, b) a physical object is an ordered set of dispositions, and c) every event manifests a dispositional property of the world.
     From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], Intro)
     A reaction: Mumford says this is consistent with ontology as a way of describing the world, rather than being facts about the world. I like Fetzer's sketch, which sounds to have a lot in common with 'process philosophy'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer]
     Full Idea: Every atomic event in the world's history is a manifestation of some dispositional property of the world and every physical object is an instantiation of some set of dispositions; hence, every structural property is dispositional in kind.
     From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 5)
     A reaction: I quite like this drastic view, but there remains the intuition that there must always be something which has the disposition. That may be because I have not yet digested the lessons of modern physics.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Liberty without socialism is injustice; socialism without liberty is brutality [Bakunin]
     Full Idea: Liberty without socialism is injustice; socialism without liberty is slavery and brutality.
     From: Mikhail Bakunin (works [1867], 3), quoted by Adam Gopnik - A Thousand Small Sanities 3
     A reaction: [1867, but no reference] Bakunin was an anarchistic socialist. This must be the best one-line defence of socialism ever written. Gopnik quotes it as part of the anarchist critique of liberalism. So are liberty and socialism long-term compatible?
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer]
     Full Idea: Kinds of things are specific arrangements of dispositions.
     From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 2)
     A reaction: A 'disposition' doesn't seem quite the right word for what is basic to the physical world, though Harré and Madden make a good case for the 'fields' of physic being understood in that way. I prefer 'power', though that doesn't solve anything.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer]
     Full Idea: Lawlike sentences are conceived as logically general dispositional statements attributing permanent dispositional properties to every member of a reference class. ...Their basic form is that of subjunctive generalizations.
     From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 3)
     A reaction: I much prefer talk of 'lawlike sentences' to talk of 'laws'. At least they imply that the true generalisations about nature are fairly fine-grained. Why not talk of 'generalisations' instead of 'laws'? Fetzer wants dispositions to explain everything.