Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Nuel D. Belnap and Jack Joslin

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4 ideas

14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox

19000	Read 'all ravens are black' as about ravens, not as about an implication [Belnap]
	Full Idea: 'All ravens are black' might profitably be read as saying not that being a raven 'implies' being black, but rather something more like 'Consider the ravens: each one is black'.
	From: Nuel D. Belnap (Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification [1970], p.7), quoted by Stephen Yablo - Aboutness 04.5
	A reaction: Belnap is more interested in the logic than in the paradox of confirmation, since he evidently thinks that universal generalisations should not be read as implications. I like Belnap's suggestion.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation

17897	Analytic explanation is wholes in terms of parts; synthetic is parts in terms of wholes or contexts [Belnap]
	Full Idea: Throughout the whole texture of philosophy we distinguish two modes of explanation: the analytic mode, which tends to explain wholes in terms of parts, and the synthetic mode, which explains parts in terms of the wholes or contexts in which they occur.
	From: Nuel D. Belnap (Tonk, Plonk and Plink [1962], p.132)
	A reaction: The analytic would be bottom-up, and the synthetic would be top-down. I'm inclined to combine them, and say explanation begins with a model, which can then be sliced in either direction, though the bottom looks more interesting.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

20653	Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
	Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
	From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
	A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique

7417	God can't have silly perfections, but how do we decide which ones are 'silly'? [Joslin]
	Full Idea: It is clear that God cannot have all conceivable perfections, because otherwise he would have absurd perfections (like being the perfect prawn sandwich), so a line must be drawn, and how are we to decide which perfections are appropriate and essential?
	From: Jack Joslin (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: This is an excellent question for curbing the absurdities of those who want to load God with every good thing that can possibly be conceived. Is the God who is also a perfect prawn sandwich more perfect than the one who isn't?